Variable Pay Component of Compensation: A Study of Its Impact on Performance by Chopra, Sangeeta
VARIABLE PAY COMPONENT OF COMPENSATION: 
A STUDY OF ITS IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE 
ABSTRACT 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
^I)*5i* (pusiintsisi liiminisitratton) 
BY 
MS. SANGEETA CHOPRA 
Under the Supervision of 
DR. BILAL MUSTAFA KHAN 
Sr. Lecturer 
Department of Business Administration 
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India 
(Internal Advisor) 
DR. BHUPENDRA K. SRIVASTAVA 
Professor 
International Management Institute (IMI) 
B-10, Qutab Institutional Area, New Delhi 
(External Advisor) 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
FACULTY OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES AND RESEARCH 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
AUGARH-202002 (INDIA) 
2010 
ABSTRACT 
Overview -
The overview of the thesis essentially provides a rundown of the entire research effort. 
This study probes the subject of variable pay compensation, and particularly focuses on 
the short term variable pay plans. This study tries to understand the impact of variable 
remuneration plans on performance of middle managers, and ultimately its impact on 
performance of organization. Conceptualisation of variable remuneration is laced with the 
• * ' T 
theoretical construct of'New Pay-systems, which represents the philosophy of aligning 
• • • • . * 
, • . . • • • • , • ' • • - ^ 
pay systems with business requirements. "' ' " *" ' 
The variable pay system, with its distinctive features of 'alignment with business 
strategy', 'its(newfound) focus on teams', and its 'basis of payout in organization-
affordability', has its genesis in the New pay conceptualization. Apart from gaining 
understanding about its impact on performance, considerable emphasis is laid on 
accurately understanding its conceptualization. This study has investigated the impact of 
short term variable pay plans, in the 'software consulting and supply' sector of the Indian 
software Industry. The Expectancy theory and the Reinforcement theory framework, have 
been used to understand its motivational impact on managers. The Goal setting theory too 
holds relevance for understanding how to make variable pay plans effective. The sample 
organizations spanned the length and breadth of the country, and its vast geographical 
spread provided a platform to assess if major differences existed in perception, across 
regions. 
Various hypotheses have been tested and the study concluded that 'involvement" of 
managers in the pay plan process (specifically the design and implementation phases) has 
a positive impact on their understanding about its purpose and also their understanding 
about its working details. The study suggests a model that offers managers wide choice in 
selecting that specific variable pay compensation mix, to closely matches one's 
preferences. The next step in the process is to communicate the computational details -
of conversion of their performance score into actual payout amount. The study found that 
much needs to be done to enhance the effectiveness of variable pay systems, in order that 
the claimed objective of supporting business objectives can be achieved. 
Introduction -
Variable remuneration has become entrenched in the remuneration practices of top-
performing companies. Variable pay is the key strategy adopted by 'New Pay' systems, 
that are aimed at achieving business outcomes by ensuring reward strategies remain 
continually aligned with business strategy and also with the other systems of an 
organization. It is the centerpiece of 'New Pay' philosophy, that propagates instituting a 
pay-design process that starts with business strategy. Apart from causing shift in bases of 
pay - fi'om that of job, position, title and seniority to performance, crucially, it catapulted 
pay systems' communication ability to the centrestage. For purpose of this study, 
variability of payout is considered using measures of individual performance, group 
performance or organization performance or any combination of these primary variables. 
The practice of variable remuneration percolated to levels below the executive level in 
1980s. Disillusionment with merit pay systems fuelled the growth of variable pay 
systems, since these hold the promise of pay differentiation on basis of performance 
results. Its rapidity was also caused by sluggish movement in base pay increases. Two 
distinct patterns emerge, that represent a shift in use of variable pay plans; and these 
changes occurred in the following directions. 
Problem Statement 
There are discernible trends to show that these systems are not producing clear-cut 
results. There is a prevailing reluctance in the industry to assess the effectiveness of 
variable pay programs. Equally disturbing is the lack of realization among organisations 
that they are missing out on its critical evaluation. Without a clear knowledge of the 
impact of these pay systems, organizations are continuing with their use, and in most 
cases, intensifying as well as broadening the use of variable pay plans. 
These have been widely used and extensively experimented in organizations bred in 
American culture. Another area needing attention is that of lack of sensitivity towards the 
impon;ance of employee line-of-sight with business goals. Apparently the Human 
Resources personnel are not sufficiently sensitized to the need for instituting line-of-sight, 
and also to the issue of why this mechanism (that of LOS) is, at all critical for optimally 
utilizing variable pay plans. 
When the researcher had embarked upon this subject as the choice of her research work, 
the topmost concern was its relative lack of clarity and an absence of clearcut knowledge 
about its effectiveness. During the preliminary study, while holding interaction with 
middle managers, it became evident that managers' group was, without-an-iota-of-doubt, 
indifferent to its use. More to the point, they exhibited emotions of dejection or even 
bitterness, while talking about this subject. Other aspects supporting the relative-lack-of-
clarity reasoning include a) Lack of a universally accepted theory on variable 
remuneration methodology b) proliferation of variety of terms used to refer to these 
systems. 
Studies have shown that middle managers are being drawn closer to strategic roles. Their 
practical experience coupled with the new people-centered approaches confer upon them 
the special ability to deliver substantial improvements to the bottom line. Pay factor is 
important for middle managers, who collectively comprise 30% of corporate profiles. 
There are indications of a definite trend of steady rise in the proportion of variable pay for 
middle managers segment. This underlines the relevance of finding, understanding and 
studying the impact of variable pay system on middle managers. 
Study of variable pay systems in context of Indian Software and services sector of 
Indian Economy 
Software industry is one of the oldest users of these systems. In an increasingly 
knowledge and service based, skill and talent-short economy, it is even more critical that 
reward arrangements support the business strategy. A report on general Industry trends 
found that 42% respondents reported difficulties in attracting or retaining key talent. 
Reports are even more emphatic about presence of this problem in references made to the 
Indian Software Industry. As already discussed, variable remuneration system should be 
designed and implemented in a manner that it is aligned with the needs of business. This 
implies an active use of reward systems focused on achieving business outcomes. The 
manner in which the two critical phases of STVPP are designed and executed, may either 
provide impetus to performance, or it may fail to exert the desired (or intended) impact on 
performance results. Processes or phenomena of employee involvement, employee 
communication, employee understanding (the latter two are interlinked) are some of the 
constructs that define a new pay plan. 
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The demand for software personnel especially at the middle management level, has 
grown rapidly over the past few years due to expansion of software development activity 
in India. The software industry is under tremendous pressure especially with the 
downturn in the US and European economies and consequently the dwindling order 
flows. Amidst pressures for survival, companies are seeking to reduce their operational 
costs through various measures. One of the key components of reducing costs for the IT 
companies will be compensation, as this account for nearly 40% of their operating costs. 
Variable pay as a tool to increase productivity and curb costs is widely used in the 
software industry. The study proposes to understand the impact of short term variable pay 
plans on performance of middle manager personnel, in context of Indian Software & 
Services sector. The ultimate impact of these pay systems on organization performance 
too has been studied. 
Aims and objectives of the study 
This study is based on the premise that design and implementation systems of a variable 
pay plan are crucial constructs for understanding its impact on performance results. The 
impact of variable remuneration is sought to be understood, as it relates to employee 
performance, and with regard to its relation to the organization performance. The term 
'employee', for the purpose of this study refers to middle managers of the Indian 
Software Industry. It is critical that employees develop an understanding about the pay 
plan's purpose and its working or operational details, as it is hypothesized that such 
understanding about the plan, positively impacts performance results. With these issues in 
mind, this study is designed, and it has the following as its key objectives. 
1 To study the design and implementation systems of short term variable pay plans. 
2 To study the impact of short term variable pay plans on employees' performance. 
3 To study the perceived impact of short term variable pay plans on organisations' 
performance. 
4 To assess employee understanding about the purpose, and about the working-
details of short term variable pay plan. 
5 To assess employee satisfaction with short term variable pay plans. 
The subject of short term variable pay is of relevance for middle managers, since they 
prefer this form of compensation over long term variable payout plans or stock-based 
plans that they consider to be the deferred options. In particular, this study is designed to 
understand the structure and deployment of these plans, extent of managers' involvement 
in the development of pay plan & also in its implementation, their understanding about 
these plans, and nature and extent of performance impact of these plans. 
Conceptual Framework - Variable pay component of compensation 
Literature suggests that compensation objectives should complement overall human 
resources objectives, so that it helps organizations to achieve its overall strategic 
objectives. This idea is presented in the 'New pay' philosophy, that was founded by 
Edward E. Lawler III in year 1990. The main objective of a variable pay system is to 
support achievement of business results. Variable pay refers to that part of pay which 
varies with some measure of individual, divisional or organizational performance. It is not 
a gift that keeps on giving after results are achieved; it requires re-earning and attention to 
goals for the next performance cycle. The payout amount is not consolidated into base pay, 
and thus employees are rewarded each year, on the basis of their assessed contribution to 
business results. 
Literature on the subject clearly brings out two objectives of variable pay system. These 
are - a) To achieve business objectives, andb) To restrict compensation expense. Its other 
important objectives include c) Performance-based pay differentiation and d) inculcation 
of'psychology of ownership' feelings in employees. Significant importance is attached 
to employee involvement in literature on variable pay systems. Most experts agree that 
employees will help the organization make a new pay program work when they have had 
a role in its development, even though it may be a less effective plan from a technical 
standpoint than could have been developed without their involvement. Communication 
system is intricately linked to the success of involvement mechanism. Proper 
communication has been shown to increase employee satisfaction and also their 
appreciation about the pay plan's benefits. 
Variable remuneration motivational impact on performance can be appropriately 
explained through the 'Expectancy theory' and the 'Reinforcement theory" frameworks of 
motivational theory. Variable remuneration is designed and implemented in a project 
management structure referred to as the variable remuneration life cycle. The life cycle is 
a logical process to implement variable remuneration during which it evolves from 
business need to the business outcome. The phases are: 
the business need as presented by the business; 
analysis of the need within the context in which the variable remuneration 
solution will be implemented; 
design of the variable remuneration solution; 
implementation of the variable remuneration solution; 
leveraging of the variable remuneration scheme; 
variable remuneration scheme value-add; and 
feedback on the scheme performance. 
Primarily, variable pay plans are of two types: Profit sharing and Performance-based 
sharing. While profit sharing ensures that payout is based on 'ability to pay', 
performance-based plans maximize participants" 'line of sight' so necessary for 
participants to influence results. To achieve both objectives, many formulae can be 
conceived that lie at different points along the continuum of formula types. Based on the 
business objectives, organisations customize the basic formulae to evolve suitable 
approaches. Inadvertently, the practice of customization has led to some degree of 
confusion in the plan types. 
Review of related literature 
The scope of research studies about variable remuneration has largely focused on the 
CEO segment. In particular, research on variable remuneration for employees below 
executive level is sparse, inconsistent, and has suffered neglect of the academic 
community. Kim(2006) reviewed literature on strategic compensation studies and found 
that compensation research had not adequately addressed the question of how 
compensation strategy is designed, structured, established, and configured. Thorpe & 
Bowey(1998) found in a study of compensation programmes that the differentiating 
factor was the specific manner in which variable pay plans were designed and 
implemented. 
Economic and organizational psychology studies suggest that financial measures such as 
profits and costs provide weak direction to workers and make it difficult to communicate 
how an employee' s actions affect performance goals (Wruck and Jensen, 1994). In a 
large scale study, McAdams & Hawk (1992) found that operational plans reported greater 
improvement in business performance and helped produce greater satisfaction with plan 
results, compared to plans using only "bottom line" financial measures. It is possible that 
the underlying reason for the same lies in employees having the benefit of clearer line-of-
sight with operational measures. Existing literature suggests that group-based 
performance measures make a greater contribution to a firm's performance, as processes 
of group-member-collaboration are improved and also achievement of group objectives is 
likely to be shared (Montemayor,2002). Burke and Hsieh (2005) through results of their 
experimental investigation, found that employees were not as willing to accept variable 
pay plans when implemented at group level compared to its use at individual level. 
Initiatives that confer on employees the feeling of controllability are required when 
group-level aggregation is used. 
Renowned authors in the field have clearly brought out in their researches that while 
historically, decisions concerning pay systems have been made in a top-down manner, 
streaks of change are surfacing(prominent ones include Lawler, Ledford, Mohrman, 
1989; 0'Dell,1987). Brown and Perkins (2007) raised the issue of importance of 
implementation and workability, and Case (2001) observed the need for intensifying the 
pay communication programmes. Studies have found that communication of pay had little 
impact on pay-related satisfaction. This may explain organisation's reluctance to 
seriously expend effort in pay-related communication. It may be reasoned that 
involvement mechanisms, which essentially have an element of communication inherent 
in them, may be a possible vehicle for effecting satisfaction levels. 
Empirical research into evaluating the productivity effects of variable pay practices has 
found that these schemes work better if there is employee participation, and if the variable 
component represents a sizeable share of an employee's compensation (Weitzman and 
Kruse, 1990; Collins, 1998). Using longitudinal models of productivity, researchers found 
that productivity increases were more a function of increases in participation than a result 
of financial bonuses. 
Similar results v/ere found by McAdams & Hawk (1992), who found that plans reported 
better results when employees were involved in the design and implementation phases of 
plan development. Other researches too (ex: Bae and Lawler, 2000) have supported the 
paradigm of high-involvement HR strategy, for leveraging pay plans' positive impact on 
firm performance. In general, there is support for the hypothesis that El facilitates 
positive impact on firm performance. This is further testified, as Lawler perceived 
employee involvement to be a distinct characteristic/ advantage of gainsharing plans, that 
are widely hailed as being successfiji. 
Different perspectives are available in literature about what impacts employee 
satisfaction. Previous literature consistently found that attitudes and behaviors of 
members were significantly affected by their perception of justice, that they derive from 
how reward is determined and distributed across an organization. This brings out the role 
of communication, as a potential predictor of justice perceptions. In a large scale study of 
over 16000 managers in 250 organisations, it was found that use of variable payment 
improved a firm's financial performance (Abowd,1990; Petty, Singleton, & Connell, 
1992), and further a comparative analysis among 3 divisions (that covered 3977 
employees) found that divisions having organization-level variable pay plans reported 
better operational performance with the pay plan than without the pay plan. A variable 
pay plan achieves many important objectives apart from impact on bottomline and 
operational measures. Huff (2006) found in a case study analysis, that other reported 
benefits are - increase in participants' interest level in business, enhancement of employee 
line of sight (between their role and business goals), and increase in pay levels for more 
than 50% of employees (due to self-funding nature of plan). The case clearly brings out 
the role of neat performance measurement system in assessing and reporting 
improvements. 
Brown and Perkins (2007), in an extensive research on state of strategic pay among UK 
owned multinationals, found that organisations are experiencing major problems in 
delivering their reward-policy intentions. Amidst varying types of reports, companies 
have shown faith in potential of variable pay systems at leveraging performance. Number 
of studies using private sector examples (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Heywood et al., 1997; 
Metcalf, 1995) have pointed out the presence of significant positive association between 
PRP and workplace productivity or the financial performance outcomes. Jensen (2003) 
has argued that while less productive workers will opt for the fixed-salary (FS hereafter) 
scheme. In the same way, highly risk-averse employees are less responsive to 
performance-based financial incentives, and may even suffer decline in productivity 
under PFP. According to Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1989), such employees were more 
likely to contemplate leaving their jobs. This suggests that such employees require some 
form of redressai to compensate them of the negativity they perceive in PFP programmes. 
Recent years have seen an increase in tiie debate on the role of payment systems and 
participation in performance improvement. Earlier research (Lupton, 1963; Mayo, 1949; 
Roy,1952) has provided considerable insight into some of the behaviour patterns which 
explain the failure of an incentive payment scheme to motivate higher performance. 
Majority of research available in this field relates to incentives, which offers only broad 
guidance for research work in field of variable pay systems, which is not close enough to 
obviate the need for replication of similar research using variable pay construct platform. 
There is a strong need for such research to address the question of how variable pay 
systems can better affect performance of managers. In the case of researches on variable 
pay, maximum information is available from U.S.-based journals and survey reports. 
Review of literature suggests that research efforts in this field have unraveled the 
compensation field sufficiently, to arrive at the following conclusions - a) Variable pay as 
a component of compensation is desirable b) Philosophy of variable pay motivates 
compensation designers in favour of group-based pay systems, however there are mixed 
reports about impact of different kinds of variable pay structures. Perhaps, the answer to 
the dilemma lies in appreciating the need for effective performance measurement 
systems, and also transparent communication systems. 
Methodology -
Quantitative research approach is used, in view of need for empirical study of key 
variables that influence the plan outcomes. This research regards 'design and 
implementation systems of variable remuneration plan' as its independent variables, and 
considers the 'outcome of variable remunerafion plan' as its dependent variable. The two 
intervening variables are - Employee Involvement in the variable pay process, and their 
level of understanding about its purpose and working aspects. It's a descriptive type of 
study and it uses the strategy of survey method The formal research study has been 
preceded by a preliminary study, which has shaped the course of the study. The following 
listed null hypotheses have been tested in the study. 
List of Null hypotheses 
Hon 
Hon 
Hoi3 
H021 
H022 
H023 
Ho31 
Ho32 
Ho33 
Ho41 
Ho42 
Ho43 
... 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' performance, as 
perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' performance, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' performance, as 
managers themselves perceive it. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisations' performance, as 
perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisations' performance, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisations' performance, as 
perceived by managers. 
Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Human resources 
personnel. 
Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as managers themselves perceive it. 
Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Human resources 
personnel. 
Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as managers themselves perceive it. 
Hosi 
Ho52 
Ho53 
H06I 
Ho62 
Ho63 
Ho7 
H08 
Ho91 
Ho92 
Ho93 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human resources 
personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' satisfaction, as managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay plan has 
no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human resources 
personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay plan has 
no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay plan has 
no impact on managers' satisfaction, as managers themselves perceive it. 
There is no significant difference among the perception of managers, Human 
resources personnel, and the Finance personnel as regards the impact of 
STVPP on managers' performance. 
There is no significant difference among the perception of managers, Human 
resources personnel, and Finance personnel concerning impact of STVPP on 
organizations 'performance. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP, as 
perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP, as 
Hoioi 
Hoi 02 
Ho 103 
Hoiii 
Hoi 12 
Hoil3 
H0121 
H0122 
H012J 
managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of 
STVPP, as perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of 
STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of 
STVPP, as managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of STVPP, as 
perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of STVPP, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of STVPP, as 
managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as managers themselves perceive it. 
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H, 013 Managers' perception about STVPP 's impact on their performance has no 
correlation with their perception of level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
H, 014 Managers' perception about STVPP's impact on their performance has no 
correlation with the extent of control they perceive over performance 
parameters of their variable pay. 
H 015 Managers' perception about their extent of control over performance 
parameters of their variable pay, has no correlation with their level of 
satisfaction with STVPP. 
Semistructured questionnaires are designed, and one to one interviews have been carried 
out on its basis. Three separate questionnaires are prepared, one each for the three groups 
of respondents. Preliminary criteria for variable pay plans have been explicitly specified. 
These are - a) the variable pay plan should have been in use for the middle managers, b) 
variable pay plan duration should be for an year or less, and c) the variable pay proportion 
of CTC (on account of short term variable payout) should be in the range of 15% to 25%, 
and d) that the main purpose of STVPP should be to achieve business objectives. 
The study uses perceptual data and financial data to know the perceived impact of STVPP 
on performance results. At a macro level, the Indian IT industry was considered 
appropriate for studying variable pay plans. It was established that due to the requirement 
for maturity of processes, and due to need for a well-designed performance measurement 
system, the software industry was considered as a suitable ground for conducting this 
research study. Based on considerations discussed with authors of the subject, it was 
decided to use financial performance criteria for screening organizations from the 
population. A list of organizations in the Indian Software Industry was sourced from the 
PROWESS database. Screening was carried out on basis of revenue and profit 
performance. After applying the abovementioned criteria on the Industry masterlist, 122 
organisations qualified, out of the initial base of 382 companies. The average revenue of 
these organizations was computed (at 445 cr) and it was decided to select 15 
organisations around the point of average revenue. The variable pay plans selected in this 
study fulfill these listed criteria. Primary objective of the pay plan should be to achieve 
business objectives, the pay plan should have been used for middle managers for 
minimum 3 year period, and desirably the performance measurement system considers 
13 
individual performance as a factor in determining the payout amount. Considerations used 
in selecting the sample of managers include the following - To be eligible, managers 
should have been employed for minimum 2 years in their current organization. As 
discussed above, three kinds of groups of respondents have been considered, within 
sample organizations. Also, sample organizations across various regions have been 
selected, viz: West, North and South of India. 
Stratified type sampling has been used for selection of middle managers. Sample 
elements are proportionately drawn from the various strata viz. the hierarchical levels of 
middle management. The reliability with which the data is collected depends on four 
aspects: the subject to be studied, the respondents and the context of observations, the 
researcher and the measurement instrument (Mouton & Marais, 1996). Potential risks, 
limited to these identified area, were identified and steps were taken to mitigate these. 
Descriptive statistics, and combination of statistical techniques have been used for data 
analysis. Techniques of anlaysis include One-sample t test, ANOVA (analysis of 
variance), Karl Pearson's coefficient of correlation, and one sample t test. 
The research effort is evaluated for its strengths and shortcomings. Documentary analysis 
could not be performed since secondary documents were not provided in the first place. 
Possibility of attributing financial performance outcomes to variable pay plans, could not 
be explored due to lack of availability of relevant data at the sample organizations. One of 
the lacuna of data is its strong susceptibility to self-report bias. 
Results of the study are useful, since the design and implementation systems of pay plans 
have been comprehensively studied. Wide perspective is used in studying the identified 
objectives of the study. The study provides promising results, as in addition to financial 
criteria of selection, care has been taken to deliberately cover those organizations that 
represent adequate geographical spread. Cities like Pune, Mumbai, Bangalore, and 
Hyderabad have been covered, in addition to the NCR. It added to the cost of research, 
but proved remarkably beneficial for enhancing reliability and representativeness of 
results. 
Findings -
Design and Implementation Systems of Short Term Variable Pay Plans 
The understanding about purpose of a variable pay plan varies across the three 
respondent groups. Large percentage of human resource personnel (two third) consider 
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linking pay with performance as the most important objective of variable compensation 
plan. Considerable number of finance' respondents (one-third) regard risk mitigation as 
the key objective. Majority of middle managers (more than half) believe its key purpose 
is to drive employeep erformance. It is desirable to achieve common understanding 
among the respondent groups, regarding its key purpose. There is no recall for the higher 
order objectives viz: inculcating ownership feelings or achieving alignment (between the 
business goals and employee objectives). 
Human resource personnel at ail organizations (100% of these) have high degree of 
involvement in design of the pay plan'. Sizeable number of organizations (one third) 
involve their finance personnel to a large extent or even completely. Infact they have 
sharp insight into the system's functioning. Most organizations involve their Top 
management, in an important way, in the design phase. Middle managers are minimally 
involved in designing the plan, that too in just a handful of organizations (20%). 
Moreover, their involvement is limited to decisions about their performance parameters 
and about their performance target. It deserves mention that these decisions are merely 
peripheral to the core pay plan process. 
Just a few organizafions (13%) involve their finance in the design process, while more 
than half the organizations involve them all through the pay plan process. Apparently, 
finance may not be involved in formalizing the intricacies, but it oversees the entire 
process on a much broader plane. 
The design and implementation aspects of variable remuneration plans represent a key 
variable of the study. The schematics of the pay plan vary wildly across organizations. 
These aspects are - Structural elements of pay plan (ex: the variable pay proportion of 
salary, level(s) of aggregation included in variable pay structure, frequency and form of 
payout), managers' line of sight with business goals, managers' control over performance 
parameters, aspects about threshold level goal, pay plan funding, related communication, 
its management/administration, plan-related review and motivation through the pay plan. 
These aspects represent static figures - a written-down-form of policy decisions. It is 
improbable that a linkage can be drawn between what is the nature of these aspects and 
what is the consequent impact on performance. However, knowing the structural 
' At all instances, ttrm pay plan may be considered synonymous with STVPP (short term variable pay plan) 
or the variable remuneration plan. 
15 
elements becomes meaningful, when it is padded with meaningful substantiation 
explaining the what and why of a particular aspect. In isolation, plan details may not add 
much value, while when read in the background of a narrative, it becomes enormously 
insightful. Detailed account of all the pay plans is provided in the annexures section, so 
that compensation planners and the interested readers can derive insight out of it. For this 
reason, the summarized findings about pay plan aspects per se are not detailed here, as it 
would look like isolated facts and figures, and may even appear inconsequential. Crucial 
findings about the pay plan process that can be presented meaningfully as standalone 
facts, have been presented in this section. 
Majority of organizations structure variable pay as a particular percentage of employees' 
CTC. On an average, organizations allocate 19.4% of CTC as the variable component, for 
middle managers. 73% organizations do not intend to further enhance proportion of 
variable pay in managers' salary. 80% of organizations include the individual 
performance factor in the va riable pay structure and half the organizations tie their 
variable pay with the organization results too. Organizations that set individual level 
threshold, by and large use subjective criteria for performance assessment. Infact the 
entire sample using individual level threshold deploys only rating based criteria or even 
broader (read more subjective) criteria. Reason could be the wide nature of 
responsibilities at middle level that includes supervisory duties in addition to their 
number-driven role. Organizations uses a sort of personalized form of payout schedule; 
some have tied rating scales to lumpsum amount, some have used only broad 
milestones (like having a pay schedule having 3 milestones) and in between payout is 
defined as proportionate. 
The overall average threshold at organization level is 78%, considering a three year 
period, between 2004 and 2007. The payout schedule at organization level, is broadly 
defined, with fewer slabs, having wider berths, all of which makes it easier to administer 
the payout calculation, but does not offer substantial incentive, in terms of sharper or 
vivid intervals. Largely, organizations follow the practice of using annual frequency of 
variable payout. The often cited argument against ability to shift to a shorter-interval 
payout system, is the issue of difficulty in administering the process. Going by 
reinforcement theory tenets motivation would be higher if payout closely followed 
identified events or behaviours. However, under the predominance of rating system, it is 
difficult to tag the payout amount to a specific event; only a recognition scheme can 
provide desired tiiat kind of directness and immediacy, to follow a specific 
event/behaviour. All organizations make their variable payout in cash form. This is a 
consistent finding, since variable pay is more or less treated as a part of salary and for this 
reason, its payout is in cash form. 
Virtually all organizations (more than 90%) do not use explicit processes to establish/formulate 
employee line-of-sight with business goals. Mere 7% who use explicit processes to establish 
managers' line of sight with business goals, use the goal setting process as the medium to do 
so. Just 2% managers believe they have complete control over their performance parameters, 
and 25% believe they have control of it, 'to a large extent'. All managers correctly understand 
threshold goal as the 'minimum performance level required to activate the commencement of 
variable payout amount'. 
Largely (80% do so), organisations source their payout from salary budget. Another 
13.4% use this method in combination with Project-based benefits, or gains attributable to 
STVPP-use. Thus, the total number of users of the salary-budget method is upward of 
90%. This shows that the conventional method of using salary budget to disburse variable 
payout remains dominant. 60% organizations either do not vary managers' payout in 
response to variability in business earnings, or they do so less than proportionately. Thus, 
they do not justly pass the benefits of higher business gains to managers. 
STVPP details are communicated through multiple channels. Majority uses the intranet 
method, and a meager 13.3% uses discussion method for such communication. There was 
no access to the actual secondary data in form of communication material dispatched to 
employees. Most organizations communicate the plan-related objectives, its working 
details, and also the general business information. In context of this finding, it may be 
added all respondents regarded such communication as highly unimportant, really a non-
issue. If the method of personal discussions were used, it would help in achieving 
objectives of'ownership feelings' and 'alignment'. 2/3rd organisations do not churn out 
'gap analysis' reports, and the remaining 1/3'^ '' use only informal means for conveying 
gap information. Wherever the focus on goal achievement is to be sharpened, frequency 
of reporting should be charged with more agility, and reporting should be intense enough 
to get noticed. The human resources has overall ownership of the plan in 100% 
organizations. It also has administration responsibility in 100% organizations. Top 
management is mainly involved in plan approval. Most organisations review their 
variable pay plans annually, and others do so bi-annually or on a need-basis. 
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More than half the organizations use the incentive lever of STVPP to motivate middle 
managers. A minority (13%) motivates them by instilling feelings of accountability and 
responsibility. One third organizations emphasize employees' LOS for causing 
motivation. 27% compensation personnel perceive that the most important improvement 
to STVPP could be made in the area of communication, and an equal number (ie 27%) 
perceive the need for improvement in goal setting and performance measurement 
processes. Overall, more than 50% suggestions are concerned with improving related 
processes concerning STVPP like communication programme, establishment of line-of-
sight and performance measurement. 73%) managers have expressed the need for making 
STVPP more meaningful and relevant, through its customization to roles (6.7%), 
increased transparency (31.3%), use of encouragement (18%)), increasing their 
participation (3.2%), and by rendering higher objectivity to performance measurements 
(22.7%). 
Impact of STVPP on managers' performance -
The three types of groups 'the middle managers', 'the human resources personnel' and 
'the Finance personnel' have similar perception regarding what is the impact of STVPP 
on performance of middle managers. They all perceive such impact to be only marginal. 
Statistically, not much support exists to indicate if there are worthwhile differences 
among their respective perception. 
The average performance achievement of middle managers of the Indian Software 
Industry, for the year 2005-06 stands at 89.8%) of target. The average threshold level for 
the manager group is determined at 69%), for the particular year. There is a clear case of 
overachievement of performance to the extent of 20.8% of target goal. Similarly their 
average performance for the year 2006-07 is at 923% of target, and likewise the 
overachievement is to the extent of 23.3%) of target. 
Analysis using Pearson's correlation coefficient indicates a statistically insignificant 
relationship between 'perceived impact of STVPP on managers' performance' and 'extent 
of control managers have over the performance parameters of their variable pay". This is 
a case of negative correlation indicating that high scores on 'managers' degree of control 
over performance parameters of their variable pay' are associated with low scores on 'the 
perceived impact of STVPP on their performance'. 
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Perceived impact of STVPP on organization performance 
Statistically significant results are found, to support the finding that STVPP exerts a 
positive impact on organisations' performance, in view of the HR personnel and the 
Finance personnel respectively. According to managers, on an average, there is just little 
agreement about the view that STVPP has a positive impact on organization performance. 
These results have been found to be statistically significant. 
There are statistically significant differences among the perception held by managers, the 
Human Resource personnel and the Finance personnel regarding the perceived impact of 
STVPP on organisations' performance. The 'managers' agree to a very small extent that 
STVPP has a positive impact on organisations' performance, while the 'Human 
Resources personnel' and the 'Finance personnel' (quite) strongly agree about this 
particular aspect. The Newman-Keuls test confirms this impression statistically -
managers are less positive about performance impact of STVPP compared to the 
perception held by 'human resource personnel' and the 'finance personnel' respectively. 
The average organization performance for the three year period is 93% of the average 
target goal. When compared against the average threshold of 78%, the overall average-
overachievement stands at 15% of the target performance goal. 
Managers' understanding about the purpose and working of short term variable 
pay plan. 
The major finding is that more than half the managers perceive the key purpose of 
variable remuneration plan as - "motive to drive employee performance". 89% managers 
perceive line-of-sight linkage with business goals. Within this segment of 89%, 93% of 
them expressed that implicit methods were used to achieve such linkage. 
There are statistically significant results to show that in view of HR personnel, 
understanding about purpose of STVPP does have a positive impact on managers' 
performance. The mean value of 3.6 shows that the level of agreement on this score is not 
very strong - it is moderate. Finance personnel believe that managers would show 
positive impact on their performance results if they clearly understood the purpose of 
STVPP. This has statistically strong backing and therefore is a worthwhile result. In the 
same manner, strong support is found for the hypothesis that (according to managers) 
clear understanding about the purpose of pay plan would positively impact managers' 
performance. 
Statistically significant results are found out, that in the perception of HR personnel, if 
managers are involved in the design process, then it would help them gain a better 
understanding about the purpose of STVPP. Similarly, statistically significant results are 
found to show that, in view of finance personnel, if managers are involved in the design 
process of STVPP, then it would bear positive impact on their understanding about its 
purpose. Managers, more-than agree on the view that if they are involved in the design 
process then it would positively impact their understanding about the purpose of STVPP. 
There is statistically strong support in its favour. 
The group comprising senior finance personnel, has shown high level of agreement to 
support the hypothesis, that managers' involvement in the implementation stage 
contributes to enhancing managers' understanding about the purpose of variable 
remuneration plan. These results are found to be statistically significant. 
The average understanding of middle managers about the structure of variable pay is 
higher than 'to a large extent'. The same is not true for their understanding about its 
working details, which is just little higher than 'partial' level of understanding. Reasons 
for the same are that 'working details' are much broader in scope than just the structure 
of variable pay. There is considerable divergence among the understanding levels of 
managers. The divergence in their level of understanding may be due to discretionary 
practices adopted by some line managers or it could be due to managers' own 
extraordinary interest in the subject that may have enhanced their understanding about 
the operation of the pay plan. Managers' understanding about the purpose of threshold 
level goal averages at 'near complete'. There is little variance among managers' views 
in this regard. 
Test results have significantly shown that, HR personnel believe that if managers 
understand the working details about STVPP, then it would have a positive impact on 
their performance results. Similar results are found, with respect to the views, of the 
Finance personnel too. In the same vein, managers too clearly agree that given a clear 
understanding about the working details of STVPP, its resultant impact on their 
performance would be positive. These results are significant, and the average spread from 
the average view is rather limited. 
HR personnel have shown high degree of confidence in ability of managers' 
'involvement-in-design' as a means for enhancing their understanding about its working 
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details. These results are statistically significant. Similarly tests results are significant to 
support finance' position too that involving managers in the design phase would lead 
them to attain sound understanding about the working details of STVPP. The finance 
personnel have shown clear agreement about this proposition. Similarly, managers too 
support the above hypothesis, and these results too are statistically significant. 
HR personnel have displayed considerably high level of agreement, over the view that 
managers' involvement in implementation of STVPP would enable them a better 
understanding about the working details of STVPP. The results are statistically 
significant. Financial personnel have shown considerably strong support favouring the 
proposition that managers' involvement in implementation of STVPP would increase 
managers' understanding about its working details. Statistically significant results are 
found to support it. On similar lines, managers too agree with the abovestated point of 
view ie they support this hypothesis. Statistically significant results are found to 
support it. 
Managers' satisfaction with short term variable pay plan. 
On an average, managers have little less than partial degree of control over their 
performance parameters. There is considerable spread or variance among managers' 
views, indicating that there is a worthy difference among managers with regard to the 
level of control they have exert over their respective performance parameters. Some of 
them perceive degree of control 'to a small extent' while there are some who perceive the 
level of control, to be considerable (Table 5.101). 
It is found that there is a statistically significant correlation between 'managers' level of 
satisfaction with STVPP' and 'the extent of control they have over the performance 
parameters of their variable pay'. This is a case of positive correlation indicating that high 
scores on 'managers' degree of control over performance parameters of their variable 
pay' are associated with high scores of 'level of managers' satisfaction with STVPP'. 
These test results are found to be significant. 
The average perception of managers, regarding achievability of threshold level goal, is 
little higher than partial level. It is found that there is considerable variance among 
managers' views. 
There is a statistically insignificant relationship, found between 'level of managers' 
satisfaction with STVPP' and the 'perceived impact of STVPP on their performance'. 
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The two variables are unrelated. This is a case of positive correlation and the strength of 
association between these two variables is very weak. The perceived impact of STVPP on 
managers' performance is not accompanied by a similar upward movement of 'managers' 
level of satisfaction with STVPP'. 
The average view among the HR personnel is that of considerably high agreement that 
managers' involvement in design would contribute to higher levels of satisfaction with 
STVPP. They have offered significant support to the view, and the results are statistically 
significant. Similarly, significant results are found about Finance' perception concerning 
impact of managers' involvement in design on their satisfaction with STVPP. Similarly 
significant results are found to support managers' perception too about the raised 
hypothesis. The extent of variance within the sample group is limited. 
HR personnel have expressed clear agreement favouring the view that managers' 
involvement in the implementation stage of STVPP, would help them with higher levels 
of satisfaction with STVPP. It is indicated that there is considerable dispersion among the 
views of HR personnel. The finance personnel too have offered agreement to the 
supposed reladonship between the two variables. Results show healthy agreement among 
finance personnel about positive impact of managers' involvement in implementation 
phase on their (managers') level of satisfaction with STVPP. These results are statistically 
significant. Managers too have offered support to the raised hypothesis. Statistically 
significant results have been found to prove managers' viewpoint. 
Review of Hypotheses 
Results of all the hypotheses raised in the study have been briefly stated in this section. 
The final outcome of the hypotheses is reproduced below. 
S.No. 
Hon 
H012 
H013 
Hypotheses 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' 
performance, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' 
performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' 
performance, as they themselves perceive it. 
Result 
Rejected 
Failed to reject 
Rejected 
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S.No. Hypotheses Result 
H 021 Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisation's 
performance, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Rejected 
H022 Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisation's 
performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Rejected 
H023 Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisation's 
performance, as perceived by managers. 
Rejected 
H, 031 Clear understanding of purpose of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as perceived by 
Human Resource personnel. 
Rejected 
H 032 Clear understanding of purpose of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as perceived by 
Finance personnel. 
Rejected 
H033 Clear understanding of purpose of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as they themselves 
perceive it. 
Rejected 
Ho41 Clear understanding of working of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as perceived by 
Human Resource personnel. 
Rejected 
H 042 Clear understanding of working of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as perceived by 
Finance personnel. 
Rejected 
Ho43 Clear understanding of working of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as they themselves 
perceive it.. 
Rejected 
H 051 Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by 
Human Resource personnel. 
Rejected 
H, 052 Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay Rejected 
23 
S.No. 
Ho53 
H06I 
Ho62 
Ho63 
Ho7 
H08 
Hoioi 
Ho 102 
Hypotheses 
plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by 
Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as they 
themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as 
perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as 
they themselves perceive it. 
There is no significant difference among the perception of 
managers, Human Resources function, and that of Finance 
function, about impact of STVPP on managers' performance. 
There is no significant difference among the perception of 
managers. Human Resources function, and that of Finance 
function, about impact of STVPP on organization 
performance. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding of the purpose 
of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding of the purpose 
of STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Result 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Failed to reject 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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S.No. 
Ho 103 
Hoi 11 
Hoi 12 
Hoil3 
H0121 
H0122 
Ho 123 
Hoi31 
Hypotheses 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding of the purpose 
of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding of 
the purpose of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding of 
the purpose of STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
M^anagers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding of 
the purpose of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the 
working of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the 
working of STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the 
working of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding 
about the working of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
Result 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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S.No. Hypotheses Result 
H, 0132 Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding 
about the working of STVPP, as perceived by Finance 
personnel. 
Rejected 
H, 0133 Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding 
about the working of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Rejected 
H, 014 Managers' perceived impact of STVPP on their performance 
has no correlation with their (managers') level of satisfaction 
with STVPP. 
Rejected 
Hoi5 Managers' perceived impact of STVPP on their performance 
has no correlation with the extent of their (managers') control 
over the performance parameters of their variable pay. 
Failed to reject 
Hoi6 Extent of managers' control over performance parameters of 
their variable pay has no correlation with their (managers') 
level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
Failed to reject 
Conclusions drawn from the study 
Primarily this enquiry has been about variable remuneration's impact on managers' 
performance and on the organisations' results. The figure below encapsulates how 
philosophy of STVPP is transmitted to employees by way of its functioning. 
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Achieving partnership feelings through payout mechanism 
The act 0/'employees 
receiving av/ards' 
'Measurable financial gain' 
to organization. 
The above two, occur at the same 
Payouts are given, only when 
an organization benefits on 
account of its bottomline. 
It becomes clear to all, that 
variable pay plan is adding 
value. 
Strong support to variable 
pay system, especially 
among employees who 
participate in these. 
Feeling of partnership builds 
- since employee payout and 
organizations' gain, are 
shown as occurring together. 
This figure depicts the philosophy on which a variable pay plan is built. The study found 
that very few (7%) organizations project their STVPPs with the objective of 'alignment 
between employees' goals and organisations' goals'. None of the organizations have 
reported the objective of 'psychology of ownership feelings'. Some of the researches 
carried out in the past have put only light emphasis on the need for better empowering 
employees by deepening their line of sight with business goals (For instance 
Filipczak,1996). Due to the lacuna highlighted above, this system is equated to incentives 
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by most employees. This explains the relatively low level of motivation, that managers 
derive from these systems. 
There is a distinct need for increasing transparency of information systems and 
communication programmes associated with STVPP design and implementation. Patterns 
of involvement would need to be intensified if the pay plan is to be projected as a 
strategic initiative. Results of this study are in line with suggestions made by some of the 
empirical studies -Jenkins & Lawler, 1981; Lawler, 1981; Bullock, 1983; Gabris & 
Mitchell, 1988; Gabris, Mitchell, & McLemore, 1985. Organisations would welcome 
such measure, since both HR group and managers' groups have shown overwhelming 
support in favour of proposed involvement of managers in the STVPP process. 
To tighten linkages at various levels of aggregation, many issues are involved - that of 
increasing line-of-sight, that of increasing involvement, more transparency in 
communication systems, education about STVPPs, clear conceptualization and 
communication of the policy purpose, objective performance measurement systems etc. 
Past researches too have emphasized similar measures (Ex: Armstrong and 
Stephens(2005) brought out the need for effective PMS). 
Objective measures of performance are needed for establishing employee trust in the 
system. Goal setting theory's principles of using challenging and clear goals, can be 
gainfully used, by offering upside potential opportunity, against goals that are both -
challenging and specific. Taking it a step further, as per expectancy theory, if the level of 
goal is shown as attainable (from effort to performance), and if clearly communicated 
(instrumentality will be higher), and also if sufficient pay differentiation is performed 
(valence will be higher), then overall expectancy will be higher. Also, as per Skinner's 
reinforcement theory, in addition to the above desirables, contingency must be 
maintained, rather, it should be actively forged between performance and payout, and also 
the frequency of payout should increase. 
It is a process' weakness that most organizations convey line-of-sight implicitly, and 
there is lack of any formal system, towards this end. While managers very well perceive 
that they are connected to business goals, the impression can be made far clearer with 
introduction of formal systems and processes. Also, most managers have only partial 
control over their performance parameters. This is likely to lead to feelings of a blurred 
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line-of-sight with business goals. Need for appropriate variable remuneration design has 
been brought out amply by researchers Hill (1993) and Hudson & Hudson(2005). 
Usually organizations communicate information about payout amount through a letter or 
a pay-slip. By and large, explanatory information that reasons out how the payout amount 
is calculated, is not offered to employees. There is a need to focus on information-
sharing, including business, financial, competitive - performance and planning 
information. Lawler (1972 & 1981) clearly indicated that empirical studies indeed 
supported that employee satisfaction with pay plans was higher when transparency was 
better. Effective communication plan needs to be designed (Britton, 1997) as it links the 
critical business success factors with employees' payout amount (Anfuso, 1995) in the 
minds of employees. 
Considering managers' overachievement of 22%, it is concluded that STVPP's minimum 
expectation has been far exceeded. An element of stretch could be gainfully included in 
the threshold level, as it would be helpful to the organization and it also would be a 
challenge for the high performers (Locke's goal-setting theory provides a useful reference 
point). In line with this initiative, it would be wise to spread out the payout schedule in 
thinner slices of varying performance levels and correspondingly varying levels of 
payout. Such difference has trophy value too, in addition to its obvious economic value. 
Negative correlation is found between managers' control over performance parameters 
and perceived impact of STVPP on their performance. However, the results are 
statistically insignificant, thus no concrete direction is available from this result. 
Organisations have consistently overachieved the threshold target, on an average by 15%, 
across the period covered in the study. It is clear that organizations can accommodate 
ample stretch element in their threshold level, and they can also use the opportunity to 
build such a payout schedule that offers lucrative compensation at above-target levels of 
performance. 
Organizations would be well advised to train and educate managers about the purpose as 
well as the working details of STVPP. 
Another aspect, worthy of consideration, is that of managers' understanding about the 
purpose of threshold goal, for which, all managers have shown complete recall. This 
makes it clear, that if an aspect is communicated through discussions, then, understanding 
about it, is built at a very high level. 
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In many cases, it came across, that the typical role boundaries were - that HR took care of 
the policy, and at the time of payout, finance was involved in disbursement of payout. 
Additionally, another area of finance' participation is, that of providing data about 
expenses-till-date or other information to enable user departments in their planning 
exercise. The top management can assert the need for increased involvement of other 
functions too, since it has the approving authority over STVPP in a considerable number 
(60%) of organizations. 
// is concluded that positive correlation exists between how much control managers 
exercise control over their performance parameters and their level of satisfaction with 
STVBPP. The clear inference is that by increasing degree of control, satisfaction can be 
affected. 
// is concluded that there is insignificant correlation found between managers' 
satisfaction with STVPP and the STVPPs' impact on their performance results. It is 
emphasized that while relationship is found to be positive, the results are non-significant. 
This shows that the results can't be relied upon. 
The first mammoth task, that the organisations face is to change managers' perception 
about this component. It is ludicrous that while STVPP is used for performance purposes, 
neither the HR, nor the managers perceive it as a serious performance-driven initiative. 
Change initiative concerning STVPP needs to begin from the top level itself As of now, 
external consultants' role is not prevalent and is not practised for instituting STVPPs. 
However, if the system is to be turned around with the zeal that often accompanies OD 
initiatives, then one positive step would be to hire external consultants' services, who are 
always brimming with ideas, that require outlet for operationalisation. 
Theoretical contribution of the study -
A short tenTi variable pay plan can become an integral component of business strategy if 
it is continuously supported. Considerations for such a step include - Management 
involvement and support, Employee involvement in plan introduction, communication of 
performance, w.r.t. the plan measures. Top Management support can significantly 
contribute to the successflil implementation of a pay plan. 
The following model of managers' involvement is suggested, that organisations can 
employ in their organisations. Three of its key features are - a) Basket of short term 
variable pay plans, that offer them choice of various programmmes b) Freedom to choose 
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the suitable variable pay program, and c) Open communication about the pay plans and 
the ensuing calculation processes. The model, called the variable pay plan choice-
model, is presented below: 
The variable pay plan choice-model 
Increasing levels of 
Transparency 
Awareness and access - At this level, information about various short term various pay 
plans is detailed and it is freely available. Details about the plans are offered, that give 
managers the freedom to choose the type of pay plan, they desire. The specific 'variable 
pay-to-fixed pay' proportion may be predetermined, so as to avoid any conflict of interest 
between employees and management. 
Points and Status - At this level, it would be explained, how points would be calculated 
for varying levels of performance. At all times, a certain indicator or a metric (something 
like sensex reflecting the health of a company), would be readily calculable. 
Payout mechanism - At this level, it would be shown how points can be converted into 
rewards. 
Conceivably, an even higher level of choice would be the option to choose the kind of 
salary mix, an employee would want for himself/herself This means - the freedom to 
determine the respective proportions of fixed and variable components. 
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The broader issue is, that organisatons' systems in entirety, need to practise initiatives, to 
motivate employees to deliver a little extra, which may be referred as untapped potential 
or discretionary element or their commitment. One such initiative would be to enhance 
managers' line-of-sight by undertaking relevant initiatives, in this direction. Such an 
endeavour is summarized in figure below. Successful Variable pay plans (or VPPs) create 
a link between company objectives and individual's daily actions. This is 
diagrammatically shown below, as to how the same can be achieved. 
Variable pay system linkages that 
enhance employee line-of-sight 
Variable Payout 
Structure 
It has to be shown how targets 
fit into organisation's 
performance framework. 
Line of Sight 
Possible through -
•Employee Involvement 
•Intensive communication 
Employee education 
Such line-of-sight is known to impact employee buy-in in favour of the system, that atleast 
would make employees conducive to working under the system. In a nut shell, the 
following results have been found for the study, that have been proven through the 
hypothesis laid out for the study. 
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Model for enhancing managers' performance through use of STVPP 
Involvement of managers in 
implementation process of 
STVPP 
111 'A "> 
Managers' 
influencability over 
performance 
parameters 
Managers' satisfaction 
with STVPP 
Positive Correlation 
Involvement of managers in 
design process of STVPP 
^ -Q 
'A <* 
1 _ -a 3 in 
Managers' Understanding 
about working details, and 
about purpose of STVPP 
1 
_ T3 
Managers' performance 
^ 
3 In 
r 
Organisation perfomiance 
The study concludes with the results that there is lot of value in organisation's efforts to 
put mechanisms for involving managers deeper into the process of short term variable pay 
plans. This positively impacts their understanding about the STVPP, which in turn 
positively affects their performance results. For practical guidelines and development 
purposes, this study suggests that the top management must help to create an 
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environment in whicii the managers can be both emotionally involved (ie form strong ties 
to work, supervisors and organization) and cognitively involved (ie express feelings of 
STVPP philosophy, and are provided with information and feedback). 
Further, the study ends on the note that it would be a worthwhile effort to calculate the 
ROI of instituting involvement mechanism. Nevertheless, it is apparent that such 
initiative would result in better employee acceptance of the system. Researcher would 
like to conclude that the distinct advantage of traveling across the country and meeting 
different kinds of managers was that it offered the benefit of sharp insight into managers' 
views. At present, as these systems are implemented, managers are bitterly averse to the 
use and sustenance of short term variable pay plans. This counts more than performance 
results, since attitudes directly impact the culture of place they inhabit. In the least, it may 
be certainly said that managers' increased involvement in the process of STVPP, would 
work like magic in displacing their negative feelings with a feelings of receptivity and 
positive disposition. However, future research would do well to test the impact of 
involvement mechanisms on employee attitudes towards STVPP, since its positive impact 
on performance results is already proven in this study. 
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Preface 
Variable pay system has come to be regarded as a strategic device tiiat helps 
organizations to achieve business goals through employee contribution. This view 
about variable pay system came into existence due to wide prevalence and upsurge in 
adoption of New-pay-inspired pay systems. Its emphasis on need for alignment 
between reward strategy and business strategy is fairly similar in tenor to the earlier 
wave of exhortations that favoured alignment between Human resource strategy and 
business strategy. There are fundamental changes occurring in nature of work, that have 
led to growth in experimentation of'New pay' systems (Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 
1998). The variable pay system, with its distinctive features of 'alignment with business 
strategy', 'the (newfound) focus on teams', and its 'basis of payout in organization-
affordability', has its genesis in the New pay conceptualization. Broadly speaking, the 
traditional variable pay system may be understood as something like incentives, while 
the New variable pay, which is its new avatar and a more business-oriented version of 
it, may be perceived as a direct fallout or the incarnation of New pay philosophy. This 
study is grounded in the investigation of the New variable pay systems. 
India's economy is enjoying remarkable growth and is experiencing a demographically 
driven youth movement, a fast growing consumer middle class and an increasing pool 
of educated workers. This is in contrast to US's focus towards an older population of 
aging baby boomers. Back home, businesses are feeling the brunt of insufficient 
investment in higher education as the annual supply of qualified graduates fell far 
below the demand levels (Xin, G. and Sankar, R. 2007). The classic demand supply 
gap, that poses difficulty in finding talent and containing labour costs, is typical of the 
Indian software industry, and is therefore a known problem with the middle managerial 
belt too. This research is about knowing the impact of short term variable pay plans on 
performance of middle managers, and about understanding its cumulative impact on 
organization performance. Apart from gaining understanding about its impact on 
performance, considerable emphasis is laid on accurately understanding its 
conceptualization. More specifically, the subject is referred as 'New variable pay' by 
Schuster and Zingheim', and it may be added that rightfully the credit for originating 
the concept goes to Edward E. Lawler III^ . The construct emphasizes 'involvement' of 
employees, in addition to institution of contingency between performance and payout. 
The emphasis is on employee-related practices, since its philosophy is to share the risks 
and returns of running an organisation, with the employees. 
This makes it important on part of organizations to forge partnership-feelings with 
employees, so as to build feelings of acceptability among them. This study has 
investigated the impact of short term variable pay plans, in the 'software consulting and 
supply'^  sector of the Indian software Industry. The Expectancy theory and the 
Reinforcement theory framework, have been used to understand its motivational impact 
on managers. The Goal setting theory too holds considerable relevance for 
understanding how to make variable pay plans effective. The study has expended 
considerable effort in understanding the conceptualization of variable pay systems, and 
in determination of suitable criteria for selection of sample organisations. One of the 
reasons for this long-drawn process is the lack of clarity, that the subject is afflicted 
with, especially when seen in context of Indian Industry. Iterative processes of 
interaction and exploration with subject authors, industry compensation personnel, 
industry finance personnel and handful of middle managers, had been carried out, for 
clearly understanding how these systems are operationalized in actual use. The research 
data has been primarily gathered from three perspectives, that of the Head of 
Compensation & Benefits, that of the Chief financial officer, and that of middle 
managers. The sample organizations spanned the length and breadth of the country, and 
its vast geographical spread offered a chance to discern, though cursorily, if any major 
(but may be latent) differences of perception existed across regions. The researcher 
observed that no such divide based on geographical spread, was apparent. Various 
' Schuster and Zingheim in their work The New Pay (1992) characterized New Variable pay as the 
component of pay that depends on ability to pay and is strictly based on measures of performance. The 
authors' key contribution lies in rendering dimensions of economic sensitivity and business directedness 
to traditional variable pay systems. 
Eidward E. Lawler in his book Strategic Pay (1990) emphatically brought out and expressed strong 
sentiments favouring 'New Pay' conceptualization. However, the publication held no direct references to 
Lawler being its founder. The researcher confirmed this aspect, in her communication with Jay R. 
Schuster, who is also a strong proponent of New pay and also New variable pay. This is relevant since 
new variable pay has its genesis in the new pay conceptualization. 
•* The industry classification is according to the National Industrial Classification given by Department 
of Industry. For details, see Annexure 4.7. 
hypotheses have been tested and the study concluded that involvement' of managers in 
the pay plan process (specifically the design and implementation phases) has a positive 
impact on their understanding about its purpose and their understanding about its 
working details. Each of these outcomes inturn bears out further positive impact on 
managers' performance results. 
The study suggests a model that offers managers wider choice for selecting the specific 
variable pay compensation mix, that closely matches one's preferences. Under the aegis 
of the suggested model, employees have unrestricted access to information about 
various variable pay opportunities offered by an organization. The system observes 
total transparency and also, it openly communicates to employees their performance 
status. The next step in the process is to communicate the computational details - of 
conversion of their performance score into actual payout amount. 
In a nut shell, the study found that much needs to be done to enhance the effectiveness 
of variable pay systems, so that the claimed objective of supporting business objectives 
can be achieved. With pursuance of this objective, the 'New Pay' philosophy of Lawler 
can rightfully culminate in accruing positive results to organizations. A useful way of 
perceiving variable remuneration plans is to liken these to the 'hygiene factors' or the 
'dissatisflers' of Herzberg's two factor theory"*. It was observed that the payout amount 
often did not offer satisfaction, though its absence (ie cases of no payout or lower than 
expected payout) caused employees palpable dissatisfaction. Also, the researcher 
sensed considerable bitterness among managers directed towards the pay system, that 
made them further tenacious in their intent to achieve the target goal and earn the whole 
of or the maximum possible payout amount. Paradoxically, contemplation of 
withdrawal of variable pay system, too, was not welcomed by managers, and it later 
emerged in discussion with the HR group, that such proposition would likely trigger 
feelings of deprivation or that of having foregone a possible prize amount^. The author 
found not a single instance, ie not a single sample respondent, who displayed complete 
satisfaction with the VPP. This is worthy of consideration since on an average the 
" The theory was developed by Frederick Herzberg, a psychologist, who theorized that job satisfaction 
and job dissatisfaction act independently of each other. Details are avai labie in Herzberg et.al (1959). 
^ The assumption was checked with the human resource personnel and the managers. Both groups felt 
that its withdrawal would serve little purpose, as it would reduce the pull factor necessary for meeting 
annual goals. Regardless of the payout potential, they were reluctant to proposals suggesting its 
withdrawal. 
payout amount is as high as ranging between 90% to 100% of target payout, despite 
which there was no sign of satisfaction among managers. It is fairly prominent (and 
also common), not unlike an epidemic, that managers do not consider these systems as 
a source of satisfaction, in other words its presence does not cause them satisfaction, 
but it plays a useful part in persistently driving them towards the target goal. It would 
be appropriate to regard its presence as a nagging element,that is undesirable, but 
nevertheless is correctly aimed. In other words, meeting the annual goal is a necessity 
(like a hygiene factor) that is fulfilled with the use of variable compensation systems . 
Apparently, with the richness of employee involvement initiatives, STVPPs could be 
cast in the image of'satisfiers', which would be a giant leap from its current image of a 
'hygiene factor'. On the part of organisations, process maturity is required for 
maintaining appropriate database and also for maintaining transparency in processes. 
These suggestions can go a long way in increasing managers' acceptability of the 
variable pay system. 
Conducting this research proved to be a very arduous process, primarily due to poor 
cooperation given by industry. The researcher had expected help from NASSCOM in 
lending support, however, it too turned a cold shoulder and shoved off the project like 
some dirty, unworthy proposition. Per se, the research results have been meaningful, 
and shall be helpful for industry personnel and academicians for fulfilling objectives of 
variable pay systems. The bigger contribution of the study has been in the area of 
shedding light on the conceptualization of variable pay systems, and in understanding 
how this particular construct has drifted away from its rudimentary form i.e. of 
'incentives' and navigated on to its more integrated and business-friendly form, that of 
the framework of 'New variable pay' systems. 
Managers unabashedly vouched the directness of this link. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the topic of the research study - the Variable pay component of 
compensation: A study of its impact on performance. It provides an overview of its 
growing use, its role in business organization, its fitment in total remuneration, and 
traces the pattern of its growing use over a wider employee population. These 
developments are discussed in the backdrop of'New Pay' philosophy of reward systems, 
that emphasize alignment between pay system design and business' strategic 
requirements. The trend of its growing use is discussed which also gives opportunity to 
bring out the transition from incentives to variable pay-based structures. An important 
issue, that of lack of clarity about the impact of variable pay systems, has been brought 
out. Need for the study is discussed which provides a broad framework to the study. 
Objectives of the study are stated towards the end of the chapter. Subsequently, the 
chapterisation of thesis is laid out, which gives an overview of the report. 
1.1 Introduction 
Variable remuneration has become entrenched in the remuneration practices of top-
performing companies. In a wide ranging survey, credited as the most comprehensive 
salary study in Asia Pacific region^ Hewitt reported that 91.8% of its users considered 
variable pay an important means of attracting and retaining talent ("Hewitt study", 
2008). These systems were experimented in the 1980s and were widely implemented in 
the 1990s. Reports have shown a trend of rising importance of variable pay in the total 
compensation package ("Compensation & benefits", 2006; Fraza, 2002). Surveys have 
perpetually indicated that variable remuneration is widely used across levels, across 
functions (eg: Wilson Group, 2007) and also across sectors, as per Hewitt India Annual 
salary increase survey 2005-2006 (Singh, 2006). It is increasingly adopted either because 
companies believe variable pay promotes performance or because they wish to signal 
their conformity to the best practice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker 1977). 
^ In the Asia Pacific Survey, Hewitt associates covered more than 1800 foreign, locally-owned, and joint-
venture companies, covering 14 markets (or countries). 
Variable pay is the key strategy adopted by 'New Pay' systems, that are aimed at 
achieving business outcomes by ensuring reward strategies remain continually aligned 
with business strategy and also to the other systems of an organization. In this equation, 
pay systems are used as a medium to convey business requirements to other constituent 
systems of organization. These systems are closely related to employers' ability to pay, 
and therefore allow the paybill to adjust more quickly (and more realistically) to 
changing economic circumstances. Rightly, Abosch (1998, p. 15) brought forth this idea 
in the following brief he gave. 
Variable pay allows the organization to shift increased compensation 
from the fixed-cost to the variable-cost category, paying out only when 
the money is there to allow a payout. 
Literally, the term 'variable pay' refers to that component of pay which varies based on 
whatever criteria the organization chooses (Worldatwork, 2003b). For purpose of this 
study, variability of payout is considered using the basis of - measure of individual 
performance, group performance or organization performance (or a combination 
thereof). The key aspect is the payout variability with firm's ability to pay, which implies 
transfer of risk to participants. The risk taking capacity of employees, essentially 
depends on their level of earnings. While use of variable pay for senior executives is an 
old phenomenon, its use for employees lower in the hierarchy, represents a relatively 
new and an untested phenomenon. 
1.2 Etackground 
Compensation systems significantly influence the attitudes and behaviors of individuals. 
It has been a major mechanism for influencing actions of the workforce, as this helps 
companies in executing their strategies (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 2000; 
Montemayor, 1996). Compensation studies have suggested that compensation strategy 
strongly affects shaping of human capital composition, motivates instrumentality 
perceptions, and articulates major values, assumptions, and principles of a firm (Kim, 
2006). Recently, compensation scholars and practitioners have made efforts to initiate, 
change, and develop compensation practices in order to stimulate workers to adapt to a 
fluctuating business environment. It Is widely believed that due to economic uncertainty, 
most companies in India have been selective in planning their compensation packages in 
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the year 2009. In particular, thrust is on adopting a performance-based reward strategy 
that entails increased use of innovative methods for enhancing employee productivity 
(Ramnani, 2009). As financial concerns become increasingly important for companies, 
consumers, and governments, managing employee performance has become more 
important than ever (Arco, 1993). Even for an organization, its success or failure 
depends upon the performance results it produces, and the ability to maintain 
improvements in performance (Smoot & Duncan, 1997). 
1.2.1 Role of variable remuneration in tlie business framework 
Variable remuneration is an integral part of the management model and is positioned 
within the wider context of business model. It influences business and is inturn influenced 
by business, as can be seen from the model shown in figure 1.1. In terms of this model, 
business process consists of a number of models, i.e. strategic identity/positioning, design 
and governance, business/financial, resourcing/ staffing and performance models. 
Financial/ 
Business Model 
How do we set up 
our business? 
Design & Governance 
IVIodel 
What logic do we need to 
define, deliver and satisfy 
client needs? 
^ Strateafc Identitv / gi  I i y / 
Positioning IModel 
What is the identity and 
positioning of our 
business? 
Resourcing / 
Staffing iVIodei 
What type of resources 
should we target, that can 
enable us to deliver? 
\ t / 
Performance IVIodei 
What are the critical perfomiance 
indices for our business and what 
are our goals regarding these? 
Figure 1.1: Interconnectivity among various models within business framework 
Source: adapted from De Swardt (2008, p.6) 
The strategic identity model provides the purpose and direction of business, the design 
and governance model provides the infrastructure that enables strategy thereby providing 
sufficient capability to execute business intent, the business/financial model refers to the 
funding process that enables business to function, and the resourcing/staffing model 
refers to the elements of production used to create infrastructure. The performance model 
refers to the activities performed in the business, which ensure that the resourcing model 
delivers the results required by the financial model on a sustainable basis. Overall, the 
model displays components that interact with each other and their environment, within 
defined parameters. 
Variable remuneration is part of the performance model of the business model. Its role is 
to translate strategy into concrete, observable behaviours and to reward behaviour 
patterns that support its intent. The design and governance, business/financial and 
resourcing/staffing models, influence variable remuneration schemes as they determine 
the participation in and the design of the schemes. In this regard, variable remuneration 
is linked to the business model, and also it relies on the infrastructure provided by the 
business model. 
1.2.2 Role of variable remuneration in the total remuneration process 
Total remuneration consists of intangible and tangible remuneration, which together 
comprise the fixed and variable components of pay. Intangible remuneration refers to the 
climate in the organisation (created by culture and leadership), learning and development 
opportunities, social status, self-actualisation (in work life) and the nature of work 
environment. Fixed remuneration includes the methods followed by business to provide 
permanent remuneration to employees. Variable remuneration refers to short-term and 
long-term remuneration that is tied to business outcomes, and in case of which, payout is 
based on a predetermined measure of group or organisational performance (Belcher, 
1996). 
The philosophy of total remuneration drives the remuneration strategy. It consists of a 
purpose, which communicates the commitment and expectations, facilitates total 
remuneration plan design, serves as a reference point to measure success of total rewards, 
and reinforces company culture and values. Variable remuneration is part of the 
remuneration strategy and should be communicated as a philosophy by which employees 
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will benefit through higher compensation, which is made contingent on their displaying 
the required behaviour (Wilson & Altmansberger, 2003). As part of the total 
remuneration process, variable remuneration provides a competitive remuneration offer 
that is flexible, as it provides additional funding during periods when business can afford 
so, and likewise compresses funding pool in lean business times when state of 
affordability is poor. 
1.3 Use of variable pay system 
Variable pay has a long history of use with sales personnel, executives and piece-rate 
workers of the manufacturing-industry era. Its use for other employees (employees who 
normally did not participate in such programs) has its roots in the early nontraditional 
pay systems that were practiced in the 1970s (Schuster, 1971). The practice of variable 
remuneration percolated to levels below the executive level in 1980s, amidst conditions 
of intensifying competition that fuelled need for higher productivity and also the need for 
generating higher profits. The stress of competitive pressures resulted in the insight, and 
consequently the realization, that employees were not to be considered as mere 
disempowered production assets, but they deserved to be treated as individuals, on whom 
the company could depend (Lussier & Achua, 2001). Flannery, Hofrichter, Flatten^ 
(1996, p.105) traced this development and its consequent impact on employees, in these 
following words. 
By moving incentive programs beyond the executive suites and sales 
departments, organisations found they could begin turning their entitled 
cogs into empowered people who had a stake in the company. By 
allowing them to share in the organisation's risks and rewards, these 
new employees not only improved their performance, but took on more 
responsibility for it. 
Belcher (1996) singled out t\\Q process of empowerment as the factor that brought about 
performance improvements. Further, he underscored the need for employee involvement 
as an essential requirement, due to its positive influence on systems and processes. He 
expressed be lief that (ibid, p.ll) "Lacking involvement, employees will have little 
They are compensation professionals representing 'The Hay Group', a renowned consultancy firm 
dealing in compensation. 
influence on work processes, and the variable pay system is, thus, not likely to achieve 
its full potential." Infact, there has been a significant increase in number of organizations 
using variable pay plans at levels lower than the executive level. One of the reports 
("Companies revise", 2005) found that 83% organizations used variable pay programmes 
for employees lower than executive level. While such use has witnessed rapidity, the 
community of academicians and researchers have yet to pick up pace and catch with its 
practice in terms of putting it in a straight jacket theoretical framework. 
1.3.1 Transition to New pay systems 
Variable pay system is the centerpiece of 'New Pay' philosophy, that propagates 
institution o f "pay-design process that starts with business strategy" (Lawler, 1995, 
p. 14). This conceptualization is logical as systems exist to contribute to the organization, 
rather than for picking up a life of their own. Some organisations' discovery of the 
potential impact of pay systems on organizations' performance, is at the heart of 'New 
Pay' sj/stems. These were initiated in the 1980s (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992) and their 
use in high performing companies (Schuster, 1984 & 1985) gave impetus to its adoption 
by others. Schuster & Zingheim (1992) rightly labeled such a shift of thought (the move 
to 'New pay') to be revolutionary. 
The New pay philosophy represents the ideal of 'Reward system-Business strategy' 
alignment. It represents the genre of business need-driven pay systems, that stand for 
total flexibility, which starkly contrasts the earlier known dogmatic nature of traditional 
pay systems. Apart from causing shift in bases of pay - from that of job, position, title 
and seniority to performance, crucially, it catapulted pay systems' communication ability 
to the centrestage. Such communication is about "what the company wants to accomplish 
and the kind of performance level it requires, in order to be 
effective"(Lawler,1995,p.l4). This suggests that the newly acquired role of pay systems 
is to communicate to employees what an organization requires in order to succeed. 
Variable pay systems communicate organisations' strategies and direction 
(Nalbantian,1987) and have inbuilt flexibility (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992), that is 
required for alignment with business needs. In a nut shell, the New pay system aligns 
organizations' systems, and aspects of reward systems, in order to produce behaviours to 
support business strategy. 
It is strongly believed that if pay system is to function as a tool of strategy, it must be 
variable . Armstrong (1993), based on his analyses of contributions made by experts & 
practitioners, concluded that greater attention will be given to achievement of success-
oriented individual bonuses rather than permanent increases to base pay. Similar kind of 
preference favouring result-based pay system is echoed by Murlis (1991). These are 
powerful indicators of growth of variable pay system - a development that has caused 
many organizations to join the bandwagon, and in the process, most of them either 
overlooked or did not pay adequate attention to its development aspects and also that of 
its and implementation (related) issues. 
It is perhaps the nature of variable pay plans to evolve, to strive for the right 
compensation solution that it is able to match business strategy and also the company's 
direction. This may be the reason that studies have reported plan-revision being a 
common practice among its users. In some cases these plans were revised even when its 
performance was rated more than acceptable ("Compensation & Benefits", 2006). Infact 
such practice of revision is more common in low-performing firms (a Watson Wyatt 
survey finding) that reflects organisations' faith in these systems as a means of 
performance improvement (PR Newswire, 2004). 
1.3.2 Growth of variable pay systems 
It is reported that the use of variable pay systems grew since early 1990s, with 78% of 
responding companies offering atleast one type of broad-based variable pay plan, 
compared to 51% of its users in 1991 (Wan, 2008). Even the old economy companies 
have begun to use variable pay, according to Business today-Omam consultants' 
quarterly survey of over 102 companies across 14 industries, in India (Malik, 2007). In 
terms of the share of remuneration bill, variable pay grew from 7.8% in 1998 (Abosch, 
1998) to 10.2% in 2002 (Van Neck & Smilko, 2002). In terms of percentage of 
companies that use these systems, number of its users stood at 66%) in 2001 (as per 
WorldatWork 2003-2004 salary budget survey) and the figure climbed to 75% in 2003 
(Wilson & Altmansberger, 2003). According to a WorldatWork Survey, this figure rose 
to 76% in 2005, based on responses gathered from 2483 respondents (WorldatWork, 
2005). A reflection of its astronomical growth is seen in the now-abundant availability of 
software packages designed for efficiently managing variable pay systems. 
Disillusionment with merit pay systems has given reason for growth of variable pay 
systems (Armstrong & Brown, 2005; Teel, 1986) since these hold the promise of pay 
differentiation on the basis of performance results. Financial slowdown of 2009 has also 
caused companies to increasingly base employees' pay on their productivity (Ramnani, 
2009). Studies have shown that in general, base pay increases have remained stable 
(Hansen,2006a; Hansen,2006b). Higher portions of pay, routed through the medium of 
variable pay, began to be used in order to compensate for sluggish movement in base pay 
increases. A distinct attraction of these systems is that these are forms of contingent 
remuneration - which means less compensation is to be paid when performance falls 
short of target, and likewise more must be paid (it becomes obligator}' for the employer) 
when performance results meet target goal or exceed reasonable performance 
expectations. For this reason, Kom/ Ferry International (India) had predicted that "2009 
would continue to see overall payouts linked largely to corporate performance, as well as 
a reduction in cash bonuses across all employee groups"(Ramnani, 2009, p.2). It is 
reiterated for clarity, that the sharing arrangement suggested is like the proverbial sinking 
and swimming with the ship. An added reason for its upsurge is the need to compensate 
high performers who have reached the top of their salary scales and can't be promoted to 
higher organization levels or higher salary-slabs. It is just that the use of flatter structures 
has restricted and in some cases diminished the opportunities available for upward 
vertical movement (Murlis,199I). Two distinct patterns emerge, that represent a shift in 
use of variable pay plans, these changes occurred in the following directions. 
a) Preference for measurement based on the collective performance results over use of 
individual performance results as its basis (Heneman, Ledford & Gresham, 2000). There 
are benefits in using a group-based pay system as it stimulates workers to share and 
exchange knowledge and information, that is specific and is valuable to the group's 
performance. Also, it motivates group members to collaborate with coworkers, to 
integrate information and knowledge that other members possess, and to translate it into 
group outcome. 
b) The criteria of payout has come to represent more of what an employee contributes, 
than what an employee produces. The subtle yet perceptible difference is, that 
increasingly the payout is based on a) organization-wide results, and b) extent to which 
an employee contributes in producing these. This suggests that at first the organization 
level results are considered, and thereafter that much slice of the pie is distributed to 
employees, which correctly represents their respective contribution. This also makes it 
clear, why there is such an urgent need for drawing line of sight between individual roles 
and overall performance framework. 
1.4 Relative lack of clarity about impact of variable pay system 
Amidst reports of growing use of variable pay plans and that of its increasing importance 
among organizations, there are discernible trends to show that these systems are not 
producing clear-cut results. Substantial investment is made in pay programs due to their 
perceived impact on organizational effectiveness (Scott, McMullen, and Sperling, 2006). 
An implication of its growing importance is that a larger proportion of compensation 
budget is now devoted to it. For instance it increased from 9.5% to 11.4%, as per 
Hewit1:'s survey of 1056 large organizations ("Compensation & Benefits", 2006). 
Therefore, the impact of pay programs should be known. When the management desires 
to know why pay program did not meet expectations, compensation professionals can 
provide suggestions about needed improvements to pay programs. 
There is a prevailing reluctance in the industry to assess the effectiveness of variable pay 
programs. Equally disturbing is the lack of realization among organisations that they are 
missing out on its critical evaluation. That sense of void or of something undone or 
being unattended, is not even remotely traceable am ong industry's human resource 
personnel''. It is more like a dormant issue, a silent problem, that is yet to erupt, and one, 
that has not been seriously noticed. Without a clear knowledge of the impact of these pay 
systems, organizations are continuing with their use, and in most cases, intensifying as 
well as broadening the use of variable pay plans. According to Gyanendra Singh (Royal 
Bank of Scotland, IDC^), "Companies do not evaluate the impact of variable pay 
systems, since they do not perceive themselves (ie the companies) as budget-
constrained." It is rather surprising that in a commercially agile and alert business world, 
organizations are able to turn a blind eye to serious evaluation of variable pay programs. 
'* During personal interviews with the HR personnel, it became evident that they adopted casual approach 
to evaluation of variable pay plans. 
* Royal Bank of Scotland is one of the world's largest financial institutions, and currently, has had a 
presence in India since 2003. 
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As if unconsciously expecting similar nonchalance from researciiers, many respondents 
were rather surprised at researcher's choice of this subject. Most of them responded to 
the queries posed to them, as if they were merely expected to parrot out programmatic 
details of a policy; the strategic significance of variable pay systems was lost on them. 
Certain factors that have contributed to its misplaced understanding are discussed. 
Literature on variable pay systems is predominantly based on experience of American 
organizations (IIMA,2008).These have been widely used and extensively experimented 
in organizations bred in American culture (Macalister, 1994). Perhaps, a contributory 
reason is that Americans place particularly high value on tolerance for uncertainty, which 
is well borne out by cross cultural investigations. Cross cultural comparisons carried out 
in the 1970s and 1980s indicated that variable pay was more common in the United 
States than in Europe or the far East (Bass & Burger, 1979; Pennings,1993). This is one 
of the reasons for the apparent disconnect between its prescriptive literature and its 
practice, as observed in the context of Indian Software industry (which pioneered use of 
variable pay systems in Indian Industry). Seemingly, this discord between documented 
literature and the practical side of it, is partly the reason for varied perceptions about its 
objective. There is lack of consensus about what is the real objective of variable pay 
systems (Abosch, 1998). Literature on variable pay system (Belcher, 1996; Lawler, 1990; 
Schuster & Zingheim, 1992; Zingheim & Schuster, 2000) has emphasized its use for 
achieving business objectives, while in the real industry-practice, it has received 
considerably less attention. According to Abosch(1998), variable pay is used more for its 
cost-control ability, and less for purpose of leveraging performance by forging alignment 
between employee behaviour and business requirements. This is cause of concern since 
'New pay' philosophy, t hat advocates alignment as a route to success, has chosen 
variable pay system for implementing its philosophy. If variable pay system is used in 
passive manner, then its performance impact would be far less than optimal. McAdams 
& Hav/k (1992) in their survey of 432 variable pay plans carried out in North America, 
strongly urged that these plans be viewed by their organizations as business strategies. It 
is likely, that if variable pay system's use is motivated predominantly by cost-control 
considerations, it may seriously hamper its potential for achieving business outcomes. 
While doing a preliminary study of the subject, the author found that the depth of 
'disconnect' between what is talked about it and how these systems are actually used, is 
II 
much deeper than what first appeared to be the case. For instance, the Head of 
compensation & benefits of a Pune based software firm, when asked about whether 
'achieving business objectives' was an aim of variable pay systems, visibly smirked and 
commented "that's like a motherhood statement". Such a crass statement about the 
system's noblest objective, is a sorry equivalent of relegating to trash the ideology of its 
progenitor (that of Edward.E.Lawler III). If the objective of 'business strateg}> alignment 
with reward systems' has acquired the looks of rhetoric, then the clear implication is that 
this objective is no longer considered relevant and therefore it remains in the realm of 
idealism. It is analogous to the condition of human muscles that atrophy out of disuse; 
the same is the case with VPP's objective of alignment that is pushed to oblivion due to 
disuse. The author also found that many of its aspects that are advocated in literature, are 
not being put into practice. Some such practices^ are - preferred use of design teams, an 
elaborate process for selecting the basic formula framework, selection of performance 
measures of the variable pay formula, stress on communication of background or 
explanatory information, emphasis on employee involvement, determining the basic 
formula framework, assigning monetary value to goals achieved or the gains accrued, 
establishing sharing ratio and other similar initiatives that are of a progressive nature. 
Another not-much-significant yet evident and noticeable deviation lies in the kind of 
terminology used to refer to these systems. Commonly, industry refers these systems as 
'policy', while its literature is replete with references to it as 'plan' or 'scheme'. One of 
the senior compensation personnel, Vijay Baijal, Vice President - Human Resources, 
NIIT Technologies Ltd., when asked about reasons for such discrepancy in terminology, 
candidly expressed that "in practice, the variable pay systems are not as fluid or dynamic 
as the term plan or scheme denotes. Hence, the use of a rather commonplace term - that 
of a policy. 
Another area needing attention is that of lack of sensitivity towards the importance of 
employee line-of-sight with business goals. In this regard, Ms. Pragya Gupta, a senior 
team member of Human Resources team at Techspan India Ltd. (now called Headstrong) 
affirmed that "there is an obvious relationship between employee contribution and 
organii^ ation goals, but this relationship is not cut-to-cut." Apparently the Human 
Resources personnel are not sufficiently sensitized to the need for instituting line-of-
^ These aspects are detailed in Belcher (1996). 
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sight, and also to the issue of why this mechanism (that of LOS) is, at all critical for 
optimally utilizing variable pay plans. 
When the researcher had embarked upon this subject as the choice of her research work, 
the topmost concern was its relative lack of clarity and an absence of clearcut knowledge 
about its effectiveness. During the preliminary study, while holding interaction with 
middle managers, it became evident that managers' group was, without-an-iota-of-
doubt, indifferent to its use. More to the point, they exhibited emotions of dejection or 
even bitterness, while talking about this subject. It seemed they had been thrown into this 
merciless pit called variable pay, and they didn't know how to struggle their way out of 
it. Such negative vibes, as they were emanating during first conversation, were a telltale 
sign of their (managers') negative feelings towards variable remuneration system. It 
appeared as if they were shut in a dungeon, that offered them little ray of hope. Such 
were their feelings of indifference and apathy, that it reflected their deeply-held negative 
attitude towards it. One of the managers sarcastically pointed out that variable pay was 
jocularly referred as 'virtual pay' due to its uncertain nature. According to them it 
seemed to them like a mirage - that was just a distant possibility - one that rarely 
materialised. While the researcher does not regard such a loose remark as a serious 
observation, yet it is possible that it carries a germ of truth, needing consideration and 
further probe. On observing such sentiments from managers, a separate question was 
added to the questionnaire, to the effect - "How middle managers can be more concerned 
about the variable pay system?" Also, the indifferent attitude of middle managers further 
built the impetus (as it strengthened the need) for researching the impact of variable 
compensation on managers' performance. 
Other aspects supporting the relative-lack-of-clarity reasoning include a) Lack of a 
universally accepted theory on variable remuneration methodology (De Swardt, 2008) 
and b) proliferation of variety of terms used to refer to these systems (McAdams & 
Hawk, 1994). Some of the terms commonly used synonymously with variable 
remuneration include: Performance related pay. Performance pay. Performance linked 
pay, Performance related incentive, Performance bonus. Performance-linked incentive 
(IIMA, 2008) and result-based pay systems. Also, a wide range of classification has 
cropped up for organizing different kinds of pay plans in a formal typology. For instance 
WorldatWork National survey of compensation plans classified variable pay plans as -
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Hiring bonus plans, Spot Bonus awards, Retention bonuses, Project/ Milestone plans and 
Group Bonus Plans. Each plan-type has an indisputably distinct objective, but, 
apparently there isn't a common theme that holds together the classification or this 
particular typology. While each type serves its individual objective (for instance 
retention bonus accures when talent is successfully retained for a minimum predefined 
period, similarly hiring bonus accrues when a recruit commits to the offer of 
employment etc.), all these together, seemingly do not coalesce into a single unit of 
analysis. Quite likely, this particular classification may have been suitable for the needs 
of particular survey carried out by Worldatwork. The purpose of highlighting this case is 
to demonstrate that in a similar manner, various kinds of variable pay classifications 
have been put into circulation, culminating in an unwieldy structure of pay-plan types. 
1.5 Relevance of studying variable pay system w.r.t. its use for middle 
managers 
Motivating middle managers is important as they are the ones who actually implement 
strategies developed at higher management levels (Farkas & Wetlaufer, 1996). Studies 
have shown that middle managers are being drawn closer to strategic roles. Their 
practical experience coupled with the new people-centered approaches confer upon them 
the special ability to deliver substantial improvements to the bottom line (Amble, 
2007). Herzig and Jimmison(2006) highlight that middle managers provide positive input 
to affect organizational change processes. It is argued that middle management 
considerably influences the extent to which organisations are successful in affecting a 
chosen strategic direction. For instance Olian and Rynes (1991) have noted the need for 
commitment on part of middle managers, particularly to the quality initiatives that are 
launched, a finding that is well documented. Smith (1990) stressed, through his study of 
a Californian bank, that middle managers play an important role in achieving certain 
corporate goals. The need for studying middle manager performance is further 
accentuated by research findings that managers' potential is either untapped or that it is 
not fully utilized (Dixon, 1995); the results are based on research carried out in 46 
private companies, and it further adds that managers' energy could be gainfully utilized 
as a positive lever of change. 
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Pay factor is important for middle managers, wlio collectively comprise 30% of 
corporate profiles. A recent compensation report of Watson Wyatt (2007) found that 
58% of managers changed their jobs, primarily due to pay-related considerations. It 
follows from above that variable pay component is a legitimate concern of middle 
managers, since it spans a worthwhile proportion of their salary, and also since its 
proportion is poised for a gradual rise, as is evident from recent compensation survey 
reports. A Philadelphia based Hay group report, based on its survey of 50 major 
chemical companies, found that 6% of middle managers' salary was variable in 1990 
(which is rather a paltry number) and this miniscule number almost doubled touching 
11% in year 1994 (cited in PLISHNER et al., 1995, p.24). This is indicative of a definite 
trend of steady rise in the proportion of variable pay for middle managers segment. This 
underlines the relevance of finding, understanding and studying the impact of variable 
pay system on middle managers. 
A variable pay plan that has its basis in performance results, essentially has an element 
of risk to it. Studies on individual attitudes towards financial risk have consistently found 
that most people are risk-averse (e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002). Pertinently, Caroli and 
Garcia-Penalosa(2002) outlined a model to show that workers became less risk-averse as 
their income levels grew. This argument brings out the relevance of studying middle 
manager group, since it neither belongs to the low income bracket, nor to the high 
income bracket. The reasoning presented above is buttressed by incidence of growing 
reports that hefty salaries are doled out to them, thus enhancing their economic ability 
and consequently their receptivity to the variable pay component. Variable pay 
component, which essentially transfers or shifts some of the risk element to employees, 
needs attention if its motivational value is to be enhanced. It follows from this, that 
organizations need to be proactive in using ways and means for developing managers' 
acceptance towards the variable pay system. Unless managers' risk aversion is 
effectively countered, variable pay system would merely reinforce the relative 
attractiveness of fixed salary schemes. Also, risk-aversion is likely to be more prevalent 
among middle manager group compared to senior manager group, due to differences in 
their respective risk-bearing capacity. 
Variable pay as a component of salary is widely prevalent for employees below the 
executive level. Hewitt Associates found that 67% of companies offered variable 
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remuneration to employees below executive level (Keegan, 2002). A recent survey 
(Wilson, 2007) covering 30 companies across industries reported that 91% respondents 
used variable pay plans for middle level employees. In view of increasingly lucrative pay 
packages offered by the Indian software and services sector, it is reasonable to expect 
that middle managers are likely to have developed considerable receptivity to the 
variable pay component of pay. This, however, remains a conjecture, requiring a careful 
study to be able to arrive at conclusive results. 
Also, there are pressures on middle level managers to show performance results, in wake 
of a closer scrutiny of middle management roles (Dhall & Nair, 2008). This follows the 
flab-cutting exercise at lower management levels. According to Sampath Shetty, Vice 
President and Business Head, Permanent Staffing Solutions, Team Lease Service "it is 
logical that once you trim the lower end, you also scrutinize the middle management 
roles". He adds that the scrutiny would be sharper "since an organisation does not need 
so many managers to manage a reduced workforce." Added reason is the "overlapping 
roles at middle management level, (which have now) become redundant", according to 
Udit Mittal, MD, Unison International Consulting India, a Human Resource consulting 
firm. The prediction contained in the above argument is relevant since variable pay 
system is quite often used as a lenient and softer alternative to employee lay-offs. In a 
way it is positioned quite like an alibi of the retrenchment-move. Apparently, middle 
managers may have escaped the saw of layoffs for now, however, their activities would 
be closely monitored through mechanisms like variable pay system, so as to ensure they 
are repaying more than their worth to organizations. The researcher, in communication 
with Tom Wilson', found support for need to study variable remuneration's impact on 
middle managers, as according to Wilson, it involves "personnel beyond the usual 
audience of top executives and sales functions" (Wilson 2007, pers. comm. 19 Oct.). 
1.6 Research on use of variable pay systems 
Relative to its importance to a firm's success, scholars and even practitioners have 
highlighted that advancement in compensation research has been stagnant and 
underrepresented (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 2000). In comparison to research on 
pay structure and levels, the compensation literature has tended to overlook the strategic 
' Renowned author and researcher in the field of compensation practice 
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impact of compensation system on organizational performance. Researchers still face 
challenges to understand how compensation systems contribute to a company's 
performance, and what contextual factors may augment or constrain the impact of a 
compensation system (ibid). Beer & Katz(2003) noted that the increasing use of variable 
pay raises several questions that are insufficiently answered by both practitioners and 
academicians. While the remark is made in reference to senior executives, it is relevant 
for other sections of employees too who participate in these plans. Further, they lamented 
the neglect of researchers to tackle the question of how variable pay influences 
performance. The field of compensation is filled with assertions that have not been 
proven empirically (ibid.). The subject is regularly and rather rigorously visited by 
compensation consultants, which helps to explain the relative inexactness of assertions 
(since a researcher is better equipped on account of his concern for accuracy of results). 
Somewhat similar is the experience with variable pay system, in favour of which while 
reports have made positive claims about its efficacy, few have pinpointed the nature of 
its performance impact. 
Research efforts in the field of variable compensation have focused mainly on top 
executive segment, and little attention has been paid to its use for middle level managers. 
Some noteworthy researches that are useful but not immediately relevant to the problem 
at hand, include: Research on proportion of long-term incentive pay in executive and 
managerial payment (Abowd, 1990; Leonard, 1990; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), 
Research on use of Employee stock ownership (ESOP) for members below senior-level 
management (Klein, 1987; Klein & Hall, 1988), Research on finding the optimal 
compensation mix that would maximize a firm's value (Burke & Hsieh, 2006) and 
research on laying down a methodology for variable remuneration (De Swardt, 2008), 
are few of the examples of range of aspects traversed in researching variable 
remuneration. 
The current state of research has provided little direction for understanding a) the short 
term variable pay plans per se and b) also, the type (or nature) of its impact on 
performance of employees, other than top executives. Brown & Perkins (2007) based on 
their analysis of the strategic reward strategies, and their finding that these are not 
working, concluded that {ibid., p. 83) "reward strategies are not being abandoned; their 
potential value and impact in a human capital driven economy are far too great for that." 
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Research into the effectiveness of variable remuneration practices indicates that if 
leveraged well, these systems can purposively enhance business performance (Keegan, 
2002). Consequently, it is in order to analyse how short term variable remuneration plans 
are being deployed and to know about the common pitfalls, committed by its 
practitioners. 
1.7 The relevance of studying variable pay systems in context of 
Indian Software and services sector of Indian Economy 
The Information Technology industry earns its revenue from software, hardware, 
peripherals, training, maintenance and network. The revenues are earned either in the 
domestic market or in the export market. The IT industry revenues during the period 
1994-95 to 1999-2000 grew at an annual average rate of 42.3%.The share of its various 
components had undergone a serious shift during this period. The share of software in 
total revenues increased from 41% in 1994-95 to about 66% in 1999-2000, and parallely 
the share of its other components (viz: Hardware, Peripherals, training, maintenance, 
networking etc.) declined from about 60% to 35%. T his marked the emergence of 
soft^ vare sector as the fastest growing sector of the Indian IT industry. India, due to its 
earlier pre-British connection, has a huge stock of English-knowing population, which 
facilitated adoption of software that is mainly developed in English Language. In the 
initial years, Indian software was not recognized in the global market and its turnover 
was insignificant. Reputation in providing reliable and quality services defacto 
determined the business outcome in software sector (Banerjee & Duflo, 2003). Firms in 
this sector could slowly build up that reputation and could thus partially offset a market 
determined otherwise by arms length contracting. Indian software firms have established 
themselves as major foreign exchange earners. Much of this has been due to rising 
exports, mostly to the U.S. 
India as a competitive exporter of software services has attracted worldwide interest. 
India leads the developing countries in this activity that is as highly knowledge intensive 
as any R & D activity. The companies from across the world rushed to India to set up 
software development centres to take advantage of the pool of talent available and to 
recruit the experienced software personnel. Around 55% of the world's computer science 
graduates come from India and China (Mishra & Ganguli, 2009). The rise of the IT 
18 
Software and Services Industry (henceforth software industry) over the 1990s represents 
one of the most spectacular achievements for the Indian Economy. The growth rate of 
the Indian Software Industry has been substantially higher than that of the global 
software industry. Apparently, India is the only country in the world to register a growth 
rate of around 50% in the software industry. The software industry still accounts for a 
rather marginal share of India's GNP but it has been rising fast. 
Manpower is not as valuable a resource to a traditional manufacturing firm as it is to a 
software firm, which owns little of any other resources. A typical software firm spends 
most on its human resources. More than getting business, the challenge of this industry 
lies in "attracting and retaining talent" according to T.V. Mohandas Pal, Director and 
Head (HR), Infosys Technologies Ltd. The demand for software personnel especially at 
the middle management level, has grown rapidly over the past few years due to 
expansion of software development activity in India and also because of continued 
streaming out or the brain drain. In a recent survey, 57% of the firms that were 
interviewed, indicated manpower and skill shortage as the major problem (Arora et al. 
2000). The problem will become steeper with a predicted shortfall of 5,00,000 
knowledge workers, that is likely to occur by 2010, according to a Nasscom-Mckinsey 
study (Babu, V., 2007). 
An important issue concerning the technological upgradation, international 
competitiveness and the ability to move up the value chain of Indian Software 
Enterprises is whether they are able to constantly improve their productivity, improve 
their efficiency in use of other inputs and hence reduce the unit cost of production and 
thus improve the profit margins. Productivity performance in the software industry has to 
be judged with respect to the key resource in the industry ie its human resources. Kumar 
(2001) noted that over the years 1997 to 2000, the Indian software industry has made an 
effort to improve the efficiency in the use of its key resource which is its manpower. This 
effort might have been prompted by the rising costs and the growing scarcity of trained 
manpower. Due to tight labour market during the period 1995-2000, occurring in wake 
of increasing competition for knowledge workers, there has been a converging trend in 
productivity levels of larger and smaller firms. NASSCOM (the Indian IT industry 
lobby) provided estimates that the Indian IT Industry is expected to rake in an impressive 
$60 billion (Rs.2,70,000 crore) by 2010 - a number considered very ambitious when a 
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Nasscom-Mckinsey report first talked about it in 2005. The industry's compounded 
annual growth) rate for tiie years 2002-2007 works out to be 26%. However, worryingly, 
productivity when measured in terms of revenue and net profit per employee, has been 
declining over the 5 year period (2002 - 2007) for Tier-] companies like TCS, Wipro 
Infotech, Infosys technologies, Satyam, Patni Computer Systems, and HCL Technologies 
(Babu v., 2007). Detailed graphs are given below (Figure 1.2) that amplify this message. 
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Fig 1.2: Productivity performance of Tier 1 software companies, during period 2001- 2006 
Source : Babu, V.(2007, p.75) 
The exact reasons for the aboveshown trend are difficult to pinpoint, however some 
useful observations can be brought to light, to make sense of this paradoxical situation. A 
mismatch between demand and supply of skilled manpower has led to growing shortages 
of experienced IT manpower side by side with growing educated unemployment. The 
quality of higher education system in engineering and technology also seems to have 
suffered over the years as is evident from the declining number of engineering doctorates 
awarded by Indian Universities and other institutions, falling from 511 in 1982 and 629 
in 1990 to 298 in 1996/7. Compared to this, the strength of Indian nationals obtaining 
doctorates in science and engineering has grown from 371 in 1980 to 1276 in 1990 
(Kumar and Agarwal, 2000). This trend may be indicative of falling standards of 
excellence of research in Indian Institutions of higher learning in technical disciplines. 
To some extent the declining standards may be related to the declining levels of funding 
provided to the educational system by the government. 
The software industry is under tremendous pressure especially with the downturn in the 
US and European economies and consequently the dwindling order flows. The downturn 
has affected the demand for IT services. Wage hikes in the year 2006 and 2007 were in 
double-digit percentages, due to higher demand for skilled IT professionals, and many 
companies including foreign IT firms went after the same pool of potential workers. 
However, with demand for IT services slowing down, things have changed dramatically. 
According to S. Gopalakrishnan, CEO Infosys technologies "The global meltdown is 
posing several challenges for IT services companies. Apart from worrying about the wild 
currency fluctuations, IT players have to cope with uncertainties in new contracts, 
customers cutting back IT investments and an overall sluggish market scenario"(Monga 
& Singh, 2008). Last few quarters ie mid 2008 onwards, have been tough because of the 
global slowdown. The $60 billion Indian IT services sector has to brace up for tougher 
times. The sector is expected to see ftirther growth slowdown - to 16% or 18%. The 
industry situation is deteriorating. In April 2008, Nasscom had pegged its growth rate 
down to 21% - 24% from over 30%). Reasons for the slowdown are mainly to do with the 
slowing demand for services, currency fluctuations and newer destinations ramping up. 
Amidst pressures for survival, companies are seeking to reduce their operational costs 
through various measures. According to Vati Consulting's (a HT consulting firm) 
Amitabh Das, the average hike for the IT industry in the calendar year 2008 has been in 
the range of 8% - 10%, down from the previous year's level of 15% - 18%, in 2007. 
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One of the key components of reducing costs for the IT companies will be compensation, 
as this account for nearly 40% of their operating costs. 
In conditions of high demand and low supply, it becomes relevant to use significant 
salary increases and bonuses (Abosch, 1998). Linking objectives to performance 
continues to be popular in the technology sector. Ratio between variable pay and fixed 
pay v/ill likely continue to increase (NASSCOM^ 2005). According to the Nasscom 
survey, 81% of participating organizations confirmed use of short term incentives in the 
form of cash based variable pay plans. Variable pay as a tool to increase productivity and 
curb costs is widely used in the software industry (Rastogi, 1994)^ . In a survey carried 
out in 2001 - 2003, it was found that the practice of variable pay was more prevalent in 
the software sector compared to its use in the general industry (ibid). Where the firm is 
flexible, 1 evel of technology is high and large proportion of people are knowledge 
workers, then in such circumstances, employees' pay should be tied to individual worth 
rather than tying it to specific position in the job hierarchy (Armstrong, 1996). Another 
advantage of using variable remuneration is that it is often seen as a preferable 
alternative to employee layoffs. Belcher (1996, p.8) adds that "...variable pay delivers a 
subtle benefit for the organisations' employees: It improves employment security". This 
should be a major reprieve for employees, given the crass manner in which 
reorganization/retrenchment/downsizing etc. drives are carried out by organisations. 
According to Kajari Mukherjee, Faculty - Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta 
(IIMC), "Salary-cuts are an absolute turn-off for employees" (Sonalee, 2008). In such a 
case, when neither salary cut nor a layoff-decision are acceptable to employees, using 
variable pay seems to be a viable option, since it has in its very constitution, the element 
of contingent compensation. 
1.8 Study framework in context of Indian Software and services 
sector 
The study proposes to understand the impact of short term variable pay plans on 
performance of middle manager personnel, in context of Indian Software & Services 
o 
NASSCOM (National Association of software and service companies) is the apex body as well as 
Chamber of Commerce of IT industry in India. 
' This source contains detailed results of a 2O0 
pay system practise, over a sample of 16 IT and ITES organizations across India. 
0 3 study carried out by Hewitt associates about the variable 
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sector. The ultimate impact of these pay systems on organization performance too has 
been studied. 
Software industry is one of the oldest users of these systems. In an increasingly 
knowledge and service based, skill and talent-short economy, it is even more critical that 
reward arrangements support the business strategy (Brown & Perkins, 2007). Firms in 
industries whose fundamental driver is creation of value from science and technology, 
face enormous challenges in an environment marked by unrelenting technical change and 
global competition (Boutellier, Gassmann and von Zedtwitz, 2000). A report on genera! 
Industry trends (Business Wire, 2005) found that 42% respondents reported difficulties 
in attracting or retaining key talent. Reports are even more emphatic about presence of 
this problem in references made to the Indian Software Industry. Considering the 
enormity of the problem, it is pertinent to note that manpower cost forms a sizeable 
portion of costs in running a software organization, a fact that magnifies the proportion 
of the problem. This is due to the early start multinational firms made in the software 
sector of India. 
As discussed, variable remuneration system should be designed and implemented in a 
manner that it is aligned with the needs of business. This implies an active use of reward 
systems focused on achieving business outcomes. New Pay systems have also 
emphasized role of employee contribution in achieving desired business outcomes. It 
brings forth employee understanding and employee involvement as key variables that 
moderate the impact of variable pay plan on performance results. Employee Involvement 
enables higher understanding among employees, which is crucial for employee 
acceptance of the plan and is also important for enhancing its motivational impact. In 
particular, this study is built around the hypothesis that a variable pay plan has the ability 
to impact performance results through its design and implementation systems. The 
manner in which the two critical phases of STVPP are designed and executed, may either 
provide impetus to performance, or it may fail to exert the desired (or intended) impact 
on performance results. Processes or phenomena of employee involvement, employee 
communication, employee understanding (the latter two are interlinked) are some of the 
constructs that define a new pay plan. The systems and factors involved in developing 
and implementing a variable pay system, that are important for understanding the pay 
plan's impact on performance results, are presented below in the form of study 
framework. The figure below (fig. 1.3) summarises the processes of STVPP, beginning 
its inception stage - on to the final stages of outcomes. 
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1.9 Aims and objectives of the study 
This study is based on the premise that design and implementation systems of a 
variable pay plan are crucial constructs for understanding its impact on performance 
results. The impact of variable remuneration is sought to be understood, as it relates to 
employee performance, and with regard to its relation to the organization performance. 
The tenn 'employee', for the purpose of this study refers to middle managers of the 
Indian Software Industry. It is critical that employees develop an understanding about 
the pay plan's purpose and its working or operational details, as it is hypothesized that 
such understanding about the plan, positively impacts performance results. This 
relationship can be easily understood along the framework of Expectancy theory of 
motivation. 
Other concerns addressed through this study are - level of employee satisfaction with 
STVPP and also the degree of (perceived) control over performance parameters of 
variable pay. While assessment of kind of involvement in design or in the 
implementation phase i s not a delineated objective of the study, it constitutes an 
important theme, and has thus been comprehensively examined. With these issues in 
mind, this study is designed, and it has the following as its key objectives. 
1 To study the design and implementation systems of short term variable pay 
plans. 
2 To study the impact of short term variable pay plans on employees' 
performance. 
3 To study the perceived impact of short term variable pay plans on organisations' 
performance. 
4 To assess employee understanding about the purpose, and about the working-
details of short term variable pay plan. 
5 To assess employee satisfaction with short term variable pay plans. 
The methodology used to study each of these objectives is detailed in Chapter 4. It 
provides an accurate picture of how each of the objectives have been Investigated and 
also brings out the context within which the study findings need to be understood. 
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1.10 Thesis Plan 
The thesis is organized into the following chapters, each having a distinct focus and 
purpose. The writing style used in the thesis is open and expressive, so as to enable 
highest level of assimilation by readers, and at the same time care is taken not to cause 
redundancy among the content of various chapters. The text matter is frequently padded 
with elaborate explanations, so as to make lucid the intended message. The detailed 
chapter plan is specified below. 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The current chapter introduces the subject of the study, brings out the reasons that 
underlie the need for the study and discusses the relevance of studying the middle 
manager belt for knowing the impact of variable pay plan on employee performance. It 
also limits the scope of the study to design and implementation systems of short term 
variable pay plans, on the basis of which research objectives are outlined. This chapter 
discusses the background of Indian software and services sector, and how subject 
compensation i n general and that of variable pay systems in particular, con stitute 
relevant themes, to be studied within the framework of this sector of the industry. 
Chapter 2 - Conceptual Framework - Variable pay component of compensation 
This chapter concentrates on defining clearly the concept of variable pay, as described 
under the framework of A^evv Pay philosophy. It dwells on the various definitions used 
for describing variable pay concept, and works out a synthesis definition based on the 
definitive themes that emerge from its various definitions. Further, the chapter details 
the importance of involvement and communication mechanisms per se, the importance 
of employee satisfaction with pay plan, the key objectives of variable remuneration 
system, the phases of variable remuneration life cycle, the key constructs that influence 
use of variable remuneration (for instance - business considerations, business 
environment), motivational framework for understanding impact of variable 
remuneration on performance, and finally it provides a comprehensive classification of 
short term variable remuneration plans, using various bases. The chapter also details 
how the choice of a suitable variable pay plan depends on the nature of the particular 
objective that is determined for the variable remuneration plan. 
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Chapter 3 - A review of related literature - In general, compensation researches have 
been surveyed and in particular, those studies relevant for knowing performance impact 
of variable remuneration, have been critically analysed. This chapter is organized into 
sub-themes like understanding about design and implementation systems, impact on 
employee performance, impact on organization performance, extent of understanding 
about pay system, level of satisfaction with the pay system, rapidity of its growth, and 
the status of research efforts with regard to the identified objectives of the study. The 
research studies considered in this chapter are systematically organized in distinct 
themes, and relevant arguments are offered to elaborate upon the findings of these 
research studies. The chapter concludes with a narrowing down of research issues, 
specifically those that have been inadequately handled and are in need of focused 
research attention. 
Chapter 4 Methodology - This study has been conducted scientifically, which is 
underpinned by a step-by-step, carefully thought-out methodology. Right from the 
stage of preliminary study to that of research evaluation, all intermediate stages are 
covered in this chapter. The criteria of sample selection has been firmed up through 
numerous steps, which makes it a particularly long-winding process, and the same has 
been duly reported in sufficient detail. It includes details about how each of the 
research objectives are studied, operating under the constraint of what information is 
feasible to gather. Methods of data collection, methods used for ensuring data 
reliability, and techniques used for data analysis are discussed in detail. A candid 
account of research evaluation is provided that truthfully appraises the research project. 
Chapter 5 - Analysis and Interpretation - Primarily, T test and ANOVA tests have 
been used to test the various hypotheses formulated as part of the study. Along with 
likert-type statements, descriptive questions too have been included, in order to have a 
complete account of respondents' views. Both, the objective views and the descriptive 
views are analysed. Additionally, detailed profiles of all pay plans are scripted, and are 
separately provided in the annexures section. Towards the end of the chapter, all 
hypotheses are reviewed to have the results available at a glance. 
Chapter 6- Findings and Discussion - This chapter forms the backbone of the entire 
study. It crunches up the results of the study in terms of what the study has found out. 
While the analysis chapter spends effort in giving justification for results, and 
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conveying the results in a conversational manner, this chapter has used a clipped tone 
to focus solely on the results obtained from this study. Crucially, at this stage, attempt 
is made to integrate the current study's results into the framework of available 
knowledge and research results that are known and are sourced from creditable sources. 
Chapter 7 - Summary & Conclusions - It summarizes the content of the report, the 
gist of what has been found out and ultimately its implications. This chapter essentially 
ties up all the perspectives adopted for carrying out the research and converges these in 
the form of essence of the research study. The study makes theoretical contribution 
proposing using involvement mechanism, in order to enhance employee performance 
by way of strengthening employee understanding about the plan. Also, it proposes a 
model that advocates free access to information about variable pay plan possibilities, 
information on to-date performance, in terms of performance points, and the 
methodology of converting points into payout amount. The chapter concludes with 
suggestions for future research that can be gainfully utilized for enhancing 
effectiveness of STVPPs. 
1.11 Chapter summary and conclusions 
Variable pay systems are cast in Lawler's New pay philosophy, which fervently 
advocates alignment between business strategy and compensation system, and further 
advocates synchronization with the internal systems of organization. Variable pay 
systems are seen as an important lever of business strategy, that bring employees to the 
centrestage, through their involvement in pay plan development and execution. Within 
this broad framework this study is built. 
Variable pay systems are a growing concern for software professionals. There is 
relative lack of clarity about use of variable pay systems. Its use is increasing (in terms 
of number of participants and also in terms of share of salary it uses) while little effort 
is expended in understanding their impact. Reasons for the same include - its 
predominant use in American setting, reluctance among organizations to assess its 
impact, relative confusion about its key objective, middle managers' indifference 
towards this policy, lack of clearcut methodology of variable remuneration and 
proliferation of allied terms used indiscriminately to refer to these systems. Some of 
these aspects became apparent to the author while conducting the preliminary study and 
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others surfaced during course of interaction witli some of its authors. A second concern 
is the inabihty to accurately discern its impact on performance results. It is surprising 
that there is a wide upsurge in use of these systems, despite not fully knowing their 
performance impact. Another important issue the study addresses is of looking into 
impact of these systems among the middle manager audience, instead of remaining 
riveted to the top management layer. Middle managers have risen in strategic 
importance, occupy critical positions - that are of considerable responsibility and of 
significance to the industry; hence it makes sense to understand the efficacy of variable 
compensation system - specifically, its impact on performance results. 
Additionally, there have been concerns about falling productivity levels of manpower 
in the top tier companies of Indian software industry. In this context too, variable pay 
systems find relevance, since these systems help to explain the motivation level of 
employees. Thus, there are conflicting pressures operating on the software sector, that 
require urgent attention. These are a) falling productivity levels of manpower b) 
Constant pressures for stretching upward the compensation budget c) continued 
struggle to attract and retain quality manpower. Amidst maze of pressures facing this 
industry, one of the vital and potent solutions is appropriately leveraging the 
compensation system. The subject of short term variable pay is of relevance for middle 
managers, since they prefer this form of compensation over long term variable payout 
plans or stock-based plans, that they consider to be the deferred options. Variable 
payout, that is directly tied to performance results, and that is not cemented as an added 
layer of salary, keeps employees on their toes, and puts them under pressure to 
demonstrate performance results. In particular, this study is designed to understand the 
structure and deployment of these plans, extent of managers' involvement in the 
development of pay plan & also in its implementation, their understanding about these 
plans, and nature and extent of performance impact of these plans. This framework is 
graphically depicted through an elaborate diagram, shown in the chapter. 
There lies a huge gulf between variable remuneration's theory and its practice. 
Conceptually, these are advanced and are supposed to be supporting business strategy, 
however in its current use, it remains trapped in the practice of incentives. It remains to 
be seen how New pay philosophy can pull its practice closer to the ideals propagated in 
its favour, in its theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual Framework -
Variable pay component of compensation 
From the inception of organizational science, pay has been considered an important 
reward to motivate the behaviour of employees (Taylor and Vest, 1992). Literature 
suggests that compensation objectives should complement overall human resources 
objectives, so that it helps organizations to achieve its overall strategic objectives. Rapid 
changes in business environment lay demands on organisations to respond with speed 
and agility. The ability of an organization to adapt to such changes depends on how 
flexible its systems are. Systems that are aligned with organisation strategy are inherently 
responsive to the ongoing developments taking place in business environment. This idea 
is presented in the 'New pay' philosophy, that was founded by Edward E. Lawler III in 
year 1990. The philosophy represents the view that reward systems should be aligned 
with the important changes occurring in organizations (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992). 
While ail systems directly or indirectly effect employee behaviour, compensation 
systems in particular, can be gainfully leveraged to steer employee behaviour in the 
desired direction. According to Lawler (1995), among the four elements of total pay viz: 
Base pay, Variable pay, Benefits and Recognition & Celebration, the 'variable pay" 
component is the most flexible and is therefore best able to respond to changes of 
strategy. For this reason, Lawler (1995) referred to this component of pay as the 
centerpiece of New Pay. It wouldn't be off the mark to view 'Variable pay' as a key tool 
in the armoury of New pay systems, as it holds the promise of precipitating this 
philosophy, deep into employees' psyche. It does so by achieving alignment between 
employees' roles and oragnisation's strategy-level requirements. 
2.1 Introduction 
The main objective of a variable pay system is to support achievement of business results. A 
variable pay plan communicates to the participants what the organization wants them to 
focus on (Szypko, 1999). It drives a sense of performance orientation among employees 
through means of well-designed variable pay plans. Business targets are linked to degrees of 
variable payout possibilities, as the exact equation depends on level of target achieved. A 
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threshold target is defined, and this is that minimum level of performance that must be 
achieved for variable payout stream to get actuated. Since threshold level is the critical 
performance mark, its achievement is the minimum condition that needs to be satisfied for 
variable payout to happen. Upward of the threshold level performance, increasing amount of 
variable payout is offered for higher levels of performance. Clearly, variable pay is a 
function of two factors a) Extent to which target is achieved, and b) ability of organisation to 
pay. Thus, variable pay refers to that part of pay which varies with some measure of 
individual, divisional or organizational performance. It is not a gift that keeps on giving after 
results are achieved; it requires re-earning and attention to goals for the next performance 
cycle (Zingheim & Schuster, 2000). Variable remuneration refers to short-term and long-
term remuneration that is not contracted as part of the fixed remuneration package. It pays 
for performance of collectivities rather than focusing on individuals, since a group as a 
workunit, is a strong driver of business results, and its contribution is relatively easy to 
recognize and measure. A clear cut benefit is that it does not create annuity unlike merit-
based remuneration plans, and to that extent, it helps to curtail or to keep in check, an 
organisation's long-term obligations. 
2.2 Historical use of variable pay system 
Variable Pay is not a new concept. In the first century B.C, Julius Caesar awarded 
supplementary bonuses to his soldiers, based on rank, after each successful campaign. 
Presumably, this strengthened morale and made distribution of booty more orderly and 
equitable. In the 19* century, textile mills on both sides of the Atlantic used piecework 
incentives. And in the Heyday of New England whaling, the common sailor's entire pay 
was computed according to an elaborate share system tied to the expedition's profit - the 
ultimate in pay-at-risk plans. This protected the owner's profits but did little to motivate 
the typical sailor, who had no influence on the captain's handling of the venture 
(Abosch, 1998). This clearly establishes the need for employee-influencability over their 
performance parameters, provided the desired outcome is to motivate through the pay 
mechanism. 
Historically, the most typical form of variable pay was the piece-rate system, that was 
more prevalent during the early part of 20th centurj' than at the beginning of the 21" 
centuiy. Variable pay shares a long history of use with sales personnel and executives at 
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top management ranks. Employees at lower levels were left out due to the popular 
perception that they were mere "cogs in the larger organisation machine" (Flannery, 
Hofrichter, Flatten, 1996, pi05). Subsequently, the decade of 1980s witnessed steep 
competition, forcing organizations to meet the challenge head-on. In the same period, 
which were the high-inflation years of 1980s, merit increases climbed to a double-digit 
range and then fell back to earth in the slow-growth, post recession economy of the 
1990s. Average base pay raises dipped and as many economists noted, base pay 
increases actually lagged the modest upward nudges in the consumer Price Index during 
most of these years. 1990s was also the decade during which reengineering and flat 
structures were widely preached as the gospel of good business. Along with flattening of 
base pay increases, increasingly more and more companies began to expand and broaden 
use of incentive awards, including year-end bonuses, profit sharing, and stock options. 
The spate of these events and the rapidity with which these occurred, challenged 
organisations' capabilities - that led them to bring forward their 'employees' to the 
centrestage. Employees, until then, were considered not able to influence the business 
outcomes. During the period 1980s and 1990s, organizations realized that its 'other 
employees' too could potentially contribute to the ideal of organization performance. 
Variable pay component, was thus extended to employees below executive level. As a 
result of this move "organisations found they could begin turning their entitled cogs into 
empowered people who had a stake in the company. By allowing them to share in the 
organisation's risks and rewards, these new employees not only improved their 
performance, but took on more responsibility for it." (Flannery, Hofrichter, Flatten, 
1996, pi 05). Such type of shift in variable pay system's coverage, marked the beginning 
of the growing practice of extending it to wider sections of employee population. This 
trend v/as typical of business organizations having profit as their primary motive. 
Variable pay system has its roots in the early nontraditional pay systems of 1970s 
(Schuster, 1971). Covey (1998, p.5) strongly favoured its use for 'wider em ployee 
population', as is evident in his following expression. 
" Once they (employees) understand the economic reality - that 
their organization won't survive unless they meet the demands of the 
marketplace they begin to see the greater wisdom of variable pay." 
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The above statement clearly brings out the business orientation that is embedded in 
variable pay systems and also supports its key proposition of being 'the centerpiece 
of new pay systems'. 
2.3 'Variable pay' defined 
Different authors have focused on different aspects of variable remuneration; a review of 
these definitions will help the reader to construct a whole picture out of these. These are 
presented below and are useful to understand the essence of these systems. Such 
elaboration is helpful in bringing to fore those specific aspects likely to cause confusion 
or blur the intended meaning. Covey (1998, p.5) emphasised the philosophy of variable 
pay systems, as is evident in the following words. 
The work of the people is tied to the realities of the marketplace. In a sense, 
the marketplace is always based on variable pay, since a company only does 
as well as its customers and clients determine". He further adds "if 
employees are involved they see the wisdom of it and (businesses) can 
open the windows ... inviting the economic realities to waft through. 
According to Covey, variable pay system ensure that people are rewarded based on their 
value-added contribution. It ensures that people in power do not overreward themselves 
or reward themselves in a manner disproportionate to their rightful value-added 
contribution. As per him, the aspect of employee involvement serves to make them 
understand the rationale of payout distribution. John Case, drawing on the similar theme 
of ever}' employee being in a real marketplace, very pertinently mentioned in his book 
Open-Book Management (1995,p. xvii), "Since the economic future of every... 
individual depends on whether the company succeeds in the marketplace, everyone 
who works there is 'in business'..., whether they know it or not." Quite similar is the 
observation of O'Regan, N. and Ghobadian, A.(2004) who noted that literature clearly 
suggested that environmental context be considered in order to understand the firm 
performance. 
Schuster & Zingheim (1992, p. 154) highlighted its 'non-consolidation' aspect through 
their oft-quoted phrase - "it's not a gift that keeps on giving". This particular aspect 
distinguishes variable pay systems from other performance related pay plans (Hay 
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consultants, 1998). Schuster & Zingheim (1992), authors o f The New Pay' emphasized 
the following aspects of variable pay system: 
• Non-consolidation into base pay. 
• 'Participative management' and 'performance measurement' in groups. 
• Sharing of financial success between employees and organisation. 
According to Zingheim and Schuster (2000), traditional variable pay practice focused on 
individual employees, and under the system 'base pay' formed a major part of cash 
compensation. Successive performance increments were merged into base pay. Such 
manner of its use or practice was not designed to reflect variability of performance 
results. For this reason, it fostered an 'entitlement mentality'. In contrast, variable pay in 
its current form, wherein it projects the New pay philosophy, a) focuses on team results 
and b) deploys 'variable pay' component instead of 'base pay' component for reflecting 
differences of contribution. Kovac (2005) brought out the contingency aspect of payout, 
in the following definition - "the company needs to hit certain objectives for employees 
to receive the variable payout". Belcher (1996) emphasized the aspect of 'participative 
management' and felt that it was the 'very act of empowering employees' which enabled 
them to bring about performance improvements. Wilson (1995, p.53) defined the subject 
comprehensively in the following words: 
This is compensation received in addition to base pay, and it varies 
depending on the performance of the individual, team, company, etc. By 
its very nature, it is not guaranteed, although many organizations have 
allowed such programs to become entitlements, like base pay (has always 
been). Variable pay is usually received in a lump-sum check, and does not 
become part of the base pay element. Variable pay can also take the form 
of cash payments or equity related investments. 
Worldatwork (2003b), a premier organisation in the field of compensation, benefits and 
total rewards, defines variable pay as - Compensation that is discretionary or contingent 
on performance or results achieved, and can be designed for any individual or 
combination of individuals (e.g., an entire organisation, business unit, division, 
department, location (site), workgroup or special team). It is termed variable because the 
amount actually paid will vary based on whatever criteria the organisafion chooses. The 
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definition is broad enough to include discretionary-basis payouts too, which is really 
beyond the scope of the usual rule-driven variable remuneration plans. It is surprising 
that 'discretionary payout' is considered a valid base for payout when increasingly, the 
caveat is to "replace discretionary pay-for-performance plans with rule-driven plans." 
(Daniels A, Daniels J, Abernathy, 2006). 
On the basis of above definitions, a composite definition of variable pay systems is culled. 
Its central aim is to achieve organisation's objectives, payout is contingent on results-
achieved and the financial ability of organisation, payout is not consolidated into base pay, 
and employees are rewarded for their contribution to business results, with the endeavour 
of infusing psychology of ownership in employees. 
2.4 Variable Pay and Incentives 
The issue of differentiation between variable pay and incentives is a tricky business, 
about which clear demarcation is not available in literature, a fact that causes authors to 
interchangeably use both te rms, unmindful of confusion it causes, even among the 
perspicacious ones. This sub-section elaborates these two concepts based on available 
literature. 
Traditional Variable pay and New variable pay 
Section 2.2 above emphasized VPP's selective use for executives and sales personnel, 
mainly due to their 'ability to influence performance results' and also, because of their 
abilit)/ to perceive line of sight with business goals. Nevertheless, majority of their total 
compensation was scripted as base pay, and that did not vary substantially with changes 
to performance results or with variations of organisations' ability to pay. This was how 
traditional form of variable pay was practiced. Crucial elements that were excluded from 
its practice include - a) it was not strategically driven, and b) it did not create teamwork 
(instead, it created groups of haves and have-nots). The new form of variable pay, 
referred to as the 'new variable pay', is described by Schuster & Zingheim (1992) as an 
offshoot of '«ew/)flr);' philosophy, which is heavily influenced by Edward E. Lawler's III 
construct 'line-of-sight'. Its key characteristics include a link between payout and 
organisation's results and its inbuilt flexibility to be able to vary its design, 
implementation or payout distribution mechanisms. Additionally, there are aspects of 
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new variable pay, that have not been highlighted or have not even been brought out in its 
traditional form. These aspects are mentioned below and are elaborated. 
a) Employee-organisation partnership - Variable pay plans are so constructed that when 
organisations earn measurable financial gains, these are shared with the employees ie 
when an organization does well, variable pay awards are higher and when it does not 
fare well, the payout awards are small or non-existent (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992). 
b) Employee Involvement - Issue of employee involvement in developing and 
implementing compensation programs, is clearly a new pay tactic (Schuster & 
Zingheim, 1992). The three thrust area of New pay are - a)including employees who 
usually did not participate in variable pay programmes, b)measuring performance in 
groups of employees, and c)basing payout on organisations' 'ability to pay' (Schuster 
& Zingheim, 1992). Since new variable pay is a thrust area of New pay, it too 
espouses these three elements. The emphasis laid on employee involvement appears 
logical and in some ways it could be critical as well, especially since employees are 
expected to acquiesce to its contentious issues like - linking payout to 'group 
performance', and tying payout to 'affordabiltiy'. Supposedly, this is the reason that 
the involvement initiative is seen as integral to variable pay system's functioning. 
Belcher (1996) believes it is essential since it helps to achieve work-related 
improvements. He expresses that if the initiative of employee involvement is not 
practised, the resultant work-improvements would be lesser and as a result, the 
system's potential would not be fully utilised. EI is also useful since it helps 
employees to understand how they 'influence' performance results. This can be 
perceived as one of the natural routes for building employee line of sight between 
one's roles and business goals. 
c) Measures of performance should be relevant and simple: Relevance, at an 
organisation level means that measures should be such that these relate to the 
bottomline measures, and relevance at employee level means that the measures 
should be within influencability of employees. Also, an effective balance is desired 
among the measures chosen, so as to ensure adequate balance between degree of line-
of-sight and ability to impact the bottom-line. Requirement of simplicity suggests the 
plan should be easy to understand so that employees can comprehend whether they 
achieved or they missed their goals, and by how much. 
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d) Reiterative nature of communication about the pay plan and about the performance 
progress. 
e) Incremental change of total cash compensation mix - from a purely fixed-pay type 
structure to a composite one having components of both the fixed and the variable 
components. 
Belcher (1996,p.ll) clarified in no uncertain terms that "While variable pay 
unquestionably has some incentive aspects, it is dangerous to view this system as nothing 
more than an incentive program". He adds that the difference between the two lies in 
using employee participation process in case of variable pay, which according to him, 
causes work improvements. He summed up the difference between these two cryptically, 
in these words (ibid.) "Working faster is not the issue (which is the case with incentives); 
working smarter is (which is expected of variable pay system)". Evidently, the new 
variable pay includes intangible elements of employee participation, that supposedly 
result in work improvements. This was missing from incentives, since they banked only 
on making clear the link between performance and pay, for causing motivation. If 
incentives and new variable pay are seen as the two ends of a spectrum, then concept of 
traditional variable pay would lean towards the incentives' end of the scale. 
Despairingly a clear difference between new variable pay and traditional variable pay is 
not readily available on a thoroughly researched platter, within the scope of related 
literature. In one of their works, Schuster and Zingheim (1992) clarified that under 
special circumstances, individual variable pay plans could be considered a part of new 
pay. At first it causes surprise, since apparently A'evv pay measures performance of group 
as a unit, or more to the point, that is its thrust area. The authors add (p. 169) that "....to 
the extent that they involve employees, who would not traditionally participate in 
variable pay plans and that they do not inhibit the teamwork required in an employee-
organisation partnership", such plans would come under the purview of new pay 
systems. It can be reasonably established, that the new variable pay system represents a 
phenomenon or a drive, that focuses on the following two aspects - a) to include those 
who have been typically excluded, and thus foster teamwork, b) greater employee 
involvement, and c) measuring performance in collective forms like groups. A quick 
analysis of these three aspects reveals that these have the effect of putting employees in 
closer contact with the broad picture of business goals. These initiatives work to 
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establish or strengthen employees' line of sight with business goals. When this is 
achieved through a pay system, perhaps this would be the result of pursuing alignment 
between business strategy and reward systems. 
Incentives 
In economics and sociology, an incentive is any factor (financial or non-financial) that 
enables or motivates a particular course of action, or counts as a reason for preferring one 
choice to the alternatives. It is an expectation that encourages people to behave in a 
certain way (Sullivan & Shefffrin, 2003). Since human beings are purposeful creatures, 
study of incentive structures is central to the study of all economic activity. Lawler 
(1990, p.57) offered the following definition of incentives, which is specific to its use in 
industry. According to him. 
Incentive pay calls for paying individuals predetermined amounts of money 
for each unit produced. More than any other pay-for-performance system, 
incentive pay has the potential to create a clear line of sight between an 
individual's pay and performance. 
There is a clearcut relation between the level to which an employee performs and his 
payout amount, that encourages high levels of performance. Similar kind of clarity is not 
present in case of variable pay plans, since the determining factor is the organization 
performance and ability to pay. National Productivity Council (1969) has given a 
perspective that incentives are aimed at improving efficiency levels, on the assumption 
that individuals possess latent abilities, in far greater abundance than they normally 
utilize. Key literature on variable pay (Lawler, 1990; Schuster & Zingheim,1992; 
Brown,2001; Armstrong, 1993; Belcher,1996) was analysed to establish those specific 
aspects, around which these two terms differ. Such points of divergence include the 
follov/ing: 
a) Incentives are more oriented to the level of output achieved at an individual/group 
level, and there is no consideration of 'organisation results' or 'ability to pay' as a 
factor of payout amount. Implication is that uncertainty of organisation results does 
not factor in calculating incentive payout amount. This casts 'incentives' as a near-
certain proposition, and the only factor of uncertainty being the level of output 
produced. 
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b) It follows from above that, strategic orientation is not shown as an element of 
incentives. This suggests incentives' focus is limited to individual / group, and not 
necessarily directed at achieving business objectives. This is the likely reason that 
crucial intangibles like 'inculcating ownership-feelings' are not specified, resulting in 
nondescript existence of employee communication, level of understanding, and level 
of involvement (w.r.t employees) in incentives' literature. Beer and Katz's (2003) 
argument buttresses the assertion made above, as according to them, labor market 
theories offer a better explanation for why incentive schemes are adopted than 
theories of motivation. They added that its careful design (that of incentives) was not 
important enough, and design efforts may at best lag rather than lead efforts to 
improve performance of a firm. 
c) There is a suggestion in variable pay literature that the proportion of variable pay 
should be gradually increased. No such suggestion is made concerning incentives 
since it is purely seen as a monetary exchange with no regard for or cognizance of 
intangible aspects like 'achieving alignment between goals' or 'inculcating 
ownership feelings.' 
The abovelisted observations are based on what has been emphasized in the available 
literature. Comparative picture between the two is put together based on what was found 
amiss in the respective literature on variable pay and incentives. Demarcation between 
the two is not absolute or anything certain like a carving is stone, due to lack of explicit 
literature showing gap between these two constructs. These are analysed threadbare and 
the aspects of differentiation that surfaced have been discussed above. 
2.5 Oibjectives of Variable Pay System 
Literature on the subject clearly brings out two objectives of variable pay system. These 
are - a) To achieve business objectives, and b) To restrict compensation expense. Its 
other important objectives include c) Performance-based pay differentiation and 
d) inculcating 'psychology of ownership' feelings in employees. 
41 
2.5.1 To achieve business objectives 
Variable pay transports employees closer to strategy by working towards execution of its 
goals (HR Focus, 2000). One of the roles of variable pay is to communicate the link 
between individual performance and organisation performance (Beatty, 1994). Successful 
variable pay plans do so by creating an explicit link between company objectives and daily 
actions or activities of employees. They put employees in the driving seat through 
initiatives like employee involvement, employee communication and extensive education 
on variable pay-related issues. It thus fosters 'partnership feelings' in them and extends 
their line-of-sight with business objectives. These systems can therefore motivate 
employees both intrinsically and extrinsically; by means of'empowerment' and through its 
'incentive character', which is more like a legacy of its mother construct, the incentives. 
Studies have reported predominant use of incentive aspect than empowerment in order to 
cause motivation (Ducharme & Podolsky, 2006). Ideals like infusing 'Psychology of 
ownership' have remained more in the ideological domain than a practice popularly used. 
A plausible explanation is that it is a challenging task for management to communicate 
firm-v/ide objectives and motivate employees to achieve these (Prasad and Steffes, 2002). 
There is wideranging support to endorse 'variable pay-strategy' linkage. A recent report 
quoted a leading management consultant (Ernst & Young India) asserting that 
"Organisation's strategic intent" should drive the choice of variable pay model (Indian 
Management Report, 2006). Infact variable pay is more about sending messages than it is 
about delivering pay (Flannery, Hofrichter, Platten, 1996) - and these messages are 
obviously strategic. 
2.5.2 To restrict compensation expense 
Variable pay is not a recurring cost, it prevents escalation of base pay and consequently 
controls part of benefits costs also. The payout is based on a firm's ability to pay, and 
therefore has an economic justification. Covey (1998, p.5) emphasizing its contingency 
aspect, dramatically remarked "When the company encounters bad times, everyone is 
hurt". According to Belcher (1996) contingent compensation is the second driving force 
for adoption of variable pay in American industry. The same trend is picking up in 
Indian Industry too as companies use it "to have increased variability (in compensation) 
which can increase in times of plenty and shrink if the going is tough"(Indian 
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Management Report, 2006, p.30). Increasing the ratio of variable remuneration to fixed 
remuneration adds flexibility to a business and for this reason it is extensively used in 
companies' growth phase (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1985). When business performs 
well, it is in a better position to pay higher remuneration, and vice versa (Wilson & 
Altmansberger, 2003). A substantial portion of remuneration bill needs to become 
variable to provide employers with the flexibility they require. Lawler (1990) strongly 
advocated pay costs adjustment with organizational performance results, through the 
medium of variable pay system. Kanter(1989) reasoned that while fixed pay should 
reflect level, position or job title (factors that have been generically seen as vital), a 
larger portion of cash should be variable that depends on a company's earnings. 
However, when this objective becomes the primary driving force, such plans frequently 
fail in the long run (Flannery, Hofrichter, Flatten, 1996) and according to Hewitt 
Associates (Abosch,1998) it fosters a culture of entiflement. 
Diversity among its key Objectives 
In a survey of 200 mid-to-large sized organisations who contributed to Hewitt Associates* 
VCM database, it was found that "there existed confusion about the objective of using 
variable pay. Some looked at it strategically.... (while) others looked at it as a tool for 
reducing fixed costs" (Abosch,1998, ). This was a cause of concern as there was no 
concrete evidence about variable pay's contribution to organisation performance (Abosch, 
1998). Q'uestioning its very existence, Cox(2000, p.5) remarked "...Neither is the question 
of why, if at all, variable pay should be a component, satisfactorily explained on a 
theoretical level". Its a universal truth that philosophy needs to precede strategy and 
implementation (Murlis,1991). In the case of variable pay system, just the reverse 
happened as many organisations simply rushed to implement these plans, during 1980s and 
1990s, sidetracking its design aspects. Abosch(]998, p.l5 ) described this phenomenon as 
"action that preceded careful planning". This explains, why employees, under most plans, 
failed to see the link between variable pay plans and strategic objectives. This lack of 
linkage, as perceived by employees, led to failure of such plans (Zingheim & Schuster, 
2000). A recent study found that the perfomiance gains attributed to variable pay plans 
were more because of an altered financial arrangement that due to the inherently 
motivational attributes of variable compensation system (Ducharme & Podolsky, 2006). 
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This points to the lesser utihzed potential of VPPs for motivating employees through 
strategic linkage. 
2.5.3 Performance-based pay differentiation 
It is suggested that variable compensation should provide big rewards for outstanding 
performance and meaningful penalties for poor performance (Jenson & Murphy, 1990). 
Pay-differentiation based on performance represents a shift in focus from job-based pay 
systems to person-based pay systems. Its need is well supported by Lawler (Armstrong, 
1999) and research on pay concurs that pay-programs that differentiate pay on basis of 
performance, accomplish several organizational imperatives (Porter & Lawler, 1968). 
According to Mercer Consulting (India)'s country leader Padma Ravichandar, "(there is 
a need to) plug gaps like rewarding mediocre performance with high pay. Companies 
need to adopt a performance-based reward strategy (and) employees should now 
focus on developing an entrepreneurial mindset". Lawler has supported this need being 
present in employees (Armstrong, 1999). This need is expected to precipitate with the 
entry of younger employees in the workforce, who are ambitious, hardworking, and 
demand fair pay for their contribution. Considerable research on pay suggests that pay 
programs that differentiate pay based on performance, accomplish several organizational 
imperatives (Porter & Lawler, 1968). In a large measure, pay differentiation among 
employees is determined by the robustness and sharpness of performance measurement 
systems, and based on the contribution of processes or subsystems supporting the PMS. 
2.5.4 To inclulcate psychology of ownership 
Variable remuneration has the pull of an incentive and since it is the central element of 
the nev/-pay philosophy, it additionally motivates through ownership-feelings. One of 
the most effective ways an organization can pursue its strategic objectives is to develop a 
spirit that everyone has a stake in the organisation's success. The same can be achieved 
by building a sense of responsibility, accountability, and ownership-financially, 
emotionally, or both (McAdams, 1996). 
Ownership on an emotional level is considered an important aspect of variable pay 
system as it influences employee commitment to business. Though the concept of LOS is 
less talked about in literature, the same can be achieved by drawing role-related linkages 
between day-to-day activities of participants and business goals. This creates 
44 
'psychology of ownership' in employees. The middle managers interviewed during the 
study confirmed that explicit line-of-sight with business goals would be helpful to instill 
ownership feelings in them. The point was specifically raised with them because the idea 
of 'ownership-feelings' by means of variable pay appeared so disjointed to them, that 
they found such discussion inconsistent. It is required that for making the process 
effective, performance measures should be related to the line-of-sight accountabilities ie 
the factors which employees are responsible for and can control. A background task for 
compensation designers is to ensure that there exists a link between the LOS 
accountabilities and the bottomline measures or measures that determine variable payout 
amount (similar to depiction in fig 2.1). Lawler (1990, p.14) defined line of sight (or line 
of influence) as "the influenceability of a measure." 
Presence of 
LOS 
Employees' 
role 
Employee 
performance 
measures 
Link between employees' effort 
and performance results -
Figure 2.1: Employee line-of-sight 
Source: de Swardt (2008) 
Absence of 
LOS 
Employees do 
not perceive 
the link 
Bottom-line 
measures 
B 
• Employees fail to perceive link 
between A and B. 
• According to employees, there is 
a void, as there isn't a link 
between performance and reward. 
• Instrumentality link Is missing, 
while expectancy perception is 
there. 
"1 
Establishing LOS is based on the belief that variable pay systems align employees' 
interests with that of the organisations and help foster a feeling of mutuality between 
employees and employers. This is close to the ideal of inculcating 'ownership feelings' 
in employees. 
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2.6 Importance of Communication and Involvement Meclianisms 
Significant importance is attached to employee involvement in literature on variable pay 
systems. According to Schuster and Zingheim (1992, p.306) "Employee involvement is a 
more comfortable partner with new pay because new pay is based on involvement, 
partnerships, teamwork, and collaboration". Involvement enables voicing of opinions -
leading to perceptions of procedural justice, which positively affects acceptance and 
commitment (Ladd and Marshall, 2004). In words of Steudel and Desruelle (1992) 
" Only by drawing on the combined brainpower of all employees can a firm face up to 
the turbulence and constraint of today's business environment". When employees are 
involved they take more responsibility, get enthusiastic, take more initiative, better 
understand a strategy and also the acceptance is better (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992). 
When employees have some means to continually increase their involvement in the 
organization, they help the organization to succeed (Schuster and Zingheim, 1996). Most 
experts agree that employees will help the organization make a new pay program work 
when they have had a role in its development, even though it may be a less effective plan 
from a technical standpoint than could have been developed without their involvement 
(Lawler, 1986). When employees are involved, they become owner of both its process 
and the results. Organisations are finding considerable value in encouraging employees 
to participate (get involved) in the evaluation, design, implementation and administration 
of pay programs (Schuster and Zingheim, 1992). This means there should be a culture of 
employee involvement and toleration for close evaluation and scrutiny, on part of 
organizations. Thorpe and Bowey(1983) found in their study of various types of variable 
pay plans, that the degree of involvement and communication during the process of 
design and operation was far more important than the type of plan. Importance of EI in 
organization-wide improvement process for achieving strategic objectives is widely 
supported (For instance Crosby, 1979; Ishikawa, 1985 etc.). A case in point is a highly 
successful VPP at Eli Lilly's Basingstoke Plant, that attributed its success to heavy 
emphasis on communications and involvement. Figure 2.2, shown below, brings out the 
benefits of using involvement and communication mechanisms in developing a variable 
pay plan. 
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Figure 2.2: Importance of Involvement and Employee Communication 
Source: adapted from Brown (2001, p. 186) 
Involvement results in Hawthorne-type effect, which signifies that the performance results 
are attributed to people responding to sense of being involved and attended to. Further, it 
enables better understanding about VPP purpose, its working and also helps build trust. 
The driving force behind employee involvement is that of purposeful communication 
systems. 
Communication system is intricately linked to the success of involvement mechanism. 
Clear communication of the objective of a variable pay plan, is a requirement of a 
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successful pay plan (Abosch, 1998). Effective 'top-down' communication means that 
people understand the focus of the reward strategy , its rationale, what the pay plan 
intends to accomplish, how it operates and which are the actions, behaviours and results 
that the system rewards. Then, in a 'bottom up' sense it can be effective, only if, people 
are motivated by the variable reward on offer, and if they really get involved and 
committed to the purpose of VPP. Building communication and EI structure involves 
three important steps, namely: 
a) Defining responsibilities at various levels of EI structure. 
b) Planning and Implementing EI Teams. 
c) Implementing EI pilot teams. 
This requires setting up a steering committee at the company's top management level. 
The steering committee's role is to support, facilitate and monitor action, necessary for 
implementing the EI program. Denton (1999, p. 111), in context of his study of highly 
successful EI initiative at Dow Chemical, established that it is management's job to 
encourage employees to continually find ways to improve operations but, unfortunately, 
many EI initiatives are often, disjointed. Concluding about how to make EI work, he 
remarked (ibid) "there are no gimmicks, just a focus on good communication Create 
logical, well focused employee involvement efforts and everything else will take care of 
itself. " Based on wide industry experience, Brown (2001, p. 187) established that "the 
realisation of reward strategy can become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, if you 
openly involve staff in its development, operation and evolution". Brown(2001), 
consistently found in his case studies (documented in his work Reward Strategies : From 
Intent to Impact) evidence to support the importance of 'communication' in reward 
strategy, regardless of the organisation size, age, sector or type of reward issue. SYPKO 
(1999) emphasized that the performance expectations from the employees should be 
made clear. The misunderstandings and conflicts can be reduced by giving clear 
messages to employees about organizational priorities (Wilson, 2001). Clarity about 
goals and expectations from the program, is a near-necessity for enlisting employee 
involvement. Proper communication has been shown to increase employee satisfaction 
and appreciation of incentive compensation benefits (Rabin, 1995). Case (2001) noted 
that knowing the how (working) and the why (purpose) of pay systems enhances 
employee understanding of the business, which furthers the 'psychology of ownership' 
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objective of variable remuneration. Despite the importance given to need for 
communication, many employees do not understand how what they are doing effects 
strategic performance, and they therefore show low levels of commitment to these goals, 
as they perceive themselves unable to influence the performance measures used in 
reward schemes, which lowers their motivation level. This lack of understanding can be 
addressed through meaningful communication, which tells each individual how their job 
contributes to company objectives, as that will help to increase their level of 
commitment. 
2.7 Importance of Employee Satisfaction 
Employee satisfaction with the scheme outcomes is affected by various factors, that are 
described below. 
• Participants' awareness of external and internal variable remuneration practices 
influences the level of satisfaction they will derive from the outcomes of scheme. 
• Where targets are too high, participants will give up before the scheme is even 
implemented. A high and unacceptable level of stretch will be daunting and it is 
likely that it will stifle their motivation. When the targets are acceptable but 
challenging, employees will expect larger payouts compared to situations where 
difficulty level is lower. A ground rule is that acceptance from employees can be 
built when goals are negotiated through involvement (goal setting theory). This will 
further the satisfaction level of the participants. 
• The historical payouts also create an expected benchmark. Research also indicates 
that there is a significant gap between what participants want to be paid for their 
performance and what they receive (Lawler, 1990). These expectations must be 
moderated with the business's 'ability to pay.' It is expected that the variation in 
business will cause (sometimes) unexpected ups and downs in payouts. This 
volatility may affect satisfaction and therefore the entire process of VPP needs to be 
padded with high levels of communication to give participants the feeling of 
experiencing business dynamics that lead to unforeseen changes in payout amount. 
Also, if volatility of payout is borne out by the trend of payouts in the past, then it is 
all the more important to make the past payout history known to the participants. It is 
emphasized that the best antidote to root out suspicions of it being a management 
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gimmick is by way of extensive involvement and related communication - that shall 
result in acceptance. 
• Awards should be meaningful (Wilson, 1999) in order to be motivational. This 
corresponds with the 'valence' factor of motivation (expectancy theory). 
• Whether individuals are satisfied with other aspects of their employment, (reward 
management handout) 
• Lawler (2000) identifies the following factors that contribute positively to the 
perception of fair distribution which in turn impact participant satisfaction: 
• Openness about the decision process 
• Having the "right" individuals involved in the distribution process 
• Clearly stated criteria for distribution exist prior to the distribution 
• Involvement of participants in the distribution process 
• The existence of an appeal process. 
2.8 Role of motivational theory in variable remuneration 
Understanding the fundamental motivation principles would assist the variable 
remuneration designer to understand and predict behavioural outcomes. Variable pay 
awards combine extrinsic rewards (incentive opportunity) and intrinsic rewards 
(ownership feelings, feelings of responsibility, accountability) and such strategies (that 
use this combination) are known to result in the highest degree of institutionalization 
(Goodman, 1982). It is possible that the value attached to variable remuneration payout 
has more symbolic meaning to participants than the quantum paid (Tropman, 2001). The 
award of a payout may mean a certificate of achievement to employees. Thus, spending 
of incentive/bonus budget on visible tokens that demonstrate competence, appreciation 
or success in one's work is a symbolic satisfier of higher-level needs. The versatility of 
variable remuneration as a satisfier of human needs and motivation therefore cannot be 
limited to extrinsic motivation only. It is the most tacit way a business can demonstrate 
appreciation. This places variable remuneration in a different category than just a 
satisfier of basic needs. The symbolic meaning of variable remuneration is supported by 
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the following motivational theories': Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, the ERG theory; 
Herzberg's Two-factor theory, McClelland's Acquired Needs theory, and the Equity 
theory. 
The objective of motivational theories is to explain the behaviour of participants in 
variable remuneration schemes. Variable pay plans rely on the motivational impact on 
employees to achieve business results. Variable pay system supports the achievement of 
the desired business outcomes by enforcing the intended behaviour. Also, the amount of 
variable payout eamable by an employee is 'clearly made contingent on results 
achieved'. It may be inferred that variable remuneration motivational impact on 
performance can be appropriately explained by the 'Expectancy theory' and the 
'Reinforcement theory' of motivation. 
2.8.1 Expectancy theory 
Expectancy theory explains behaviour in variable remuneration schemes and explains 
rational and predictable external motivation. It is therefore an important component of 
the theoretical basis of the variable remuneration model. Expectancy theory is based on 
the premise that motivation is behaviour specific and that it can be calculated (Zillmann, 
2000). The formula to explain motivational force is given below (Scholl, 2002): 
Motivational Force = Expectancy (E) x Instrumentality (I) x Valence (V) 
Motivational Force : Force that directs specific behavioural alternatives 
Expectancy (E) : Perceived probability that effort will lead to good performance. 
Instrumentality (I) : Perceived probability that good performance will lead to 
desired outcomes (incentive) 
Valence (V) : Valueofexpectedoutcomes to the individual 
Each variable in the above formula is explained more fully below. 
Expectancy, the belief/perception that one's effort will result in the attainment of the 
desired goals, is based on the following variables: Self-efficacy. Efficacy is the person's 
belief about his or her ability to perform. E.g. does the person believe that s/he has the 
' Detailed description of these motivational theories is beyond the immediate scope of the current study. 
Hence it is not provided. 
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skills and competencies to perform well? That is why some organizations offer 
performance coaching to employees specifically to build their capacity to achieve 
threshold goals. 
Goal difficulty: If goals are too difficult to achieve, expectations will be low and 
motivation to achieve the goal will be low. This explains why the goals set under 
variable pay should not have excessive stretch. 
Perceived control over performance. If individuals believe that they will be able to 
control/ influence the situation, they will increase their effort to influence it. This 
explains why it is advocated that employees should have close line of sight in order to 
feel motivated. 
Instrumentality is the belief that if a person meets the performance expectations, s/he 
will receive a (greater) reward. This belief can be strengthened by showing employees a 
clear performance-payout schedule, preferably at the outset of the performance period. It 
also happens that if all levels of performance lead to the same rewards, the 
instrumentality is low (e.g. all performance levels leading to same payout amount). If 
employees are to have faith in the workability of the system, different levels of 
performance should deserve rewards that differ justifiably. If this does not happen, then 
variable pay would not be able to cause pay differentiation among varying types of 
performers. The following variables affect the perception of instrumentality: 
Trust: When individuals trust their leaders, they are more likely to believe their 
promises that good performance will be rewarded. 
Understanding: When the employees believe they understand how, why and when 
rewards are distributed, instrumentality tends to increase. 
Policies. Where the reward is in writing, almost as a policy, the instrumentality goes up 
and therefore the motivation as well. 
Valence is the value the individual personally places on rewards. This is a function of his 
or her needs, goals, values and sources of motivation. Variables that affect the 
individual's value of the outcome include: 
Values the social rules or norms influencing participant behaviour. 
Needs .• the deficiencies to be ftilfilled. 
Goals : the ideals that the individual strives to achieve. 
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Preferences : the priorities displayed in goal achievement or need elimination. 
Sources of Whether these are internal or external to the individual. 
motivation 
According to Riemer (2000), the Expectancy theory provides for outcomes on two levels. 
IhQ first level of expectation is that if the person puts in effort, an expected performance 
will result. The second level of expectation is that the performance will lead to an 
outcome or reward. Expectancy theory includes the following three linkages: 
Effort-performance linkage. The probability perceived by the individual that exerting a 
given amount of effort would lead to performance (first-level outcome). 
Performance-reward linkage. The degree to which the individual believes that 
performing at a particular level (first-level outcome) will lead to the attainment of a 
desired outcome (second-level outcome). 
Attractiveness of the reward. The importance that the individual places on the potential 
outcome (second-level outcome). 
Understanding the Expectancy, Instrumentality and Valence elements of the Expectancy 
theory explains behaviour and helps the designer of variable remuneration schemes to 
predict the direction of the participant's behaviour. 
2.8.2 Reinforcement theory 
This theory comes in large part from the work on operant conditioning by B.F. Skinner 
(1953). Reinforcement theory has been extended from laboratory settings to the work 
place by a number of authors, including Luthans and Kreitner (1975). This theory 
suggests that any behavior, including performance, is determined by its consequences. 
Unlike expectancy theory where attention is given to both antecedents and to 
consequences of performance, reinforcement theory focuses solely on the consequences 
of performance (Komaki, 1986). Hence, in the language of expectancy theory, 
reinforcement theory provides additional explanation of instrumentality perceptions and 
is silent on expectancy perceptions. The usefulness of reinforcement theory in industrial 
settings has been covered in two major reviews of the research (O'Hara, Johnson, & 
Beer, 1985; Schneier, 1974). The reviews suggest that when the principles of 
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reinforcement theory are followed, performance is indeed increased as predicted from the 
theory. 
According to reinforcement theory, the frequency of a behavior is likely to be increased 
when a valued reward is made contingent upon that behavior. The contingency between 
the behavior and reward is likely to be strengthened the more clearly the behavior is 
defined, the closer in time the reward is to behavior, and the closer in time the magnitude 
of reward is to the behavior. 
The relevant implications of reinforcement theory are:-
Variable pay should motivate increased performance because the monetary consequences 
of good performance are made known to the employee. For variable pay to lead to better 
motivation and performance, performance must be clearly defined, payout must be made 
contingent upon desired performance, variable award should increase in size with 
increases in performance, and pay increase should be granted closer in time to the 
desired performance. (Heneman, 1992) 
2.8.3 Learnings based on motivational theories 
The value of theories in variable remuneration is that they explain behaviour. On the 
basis of motivational theories, the following learnings can be derived. These are relevant 
for design and implementation of variable remuneration plans. 
• Goals that are achievable, arrived at participatively, based on challenging job/role 
design with meaningful feedback on performance against the goals, stimulate 
performance and satisfaction. 
• The participants should believe that the goals are attainable (Expectancy theory, 
Reinforcement approaches and Goal-setting theory). 
• Participants in the variable remuneration scheme must believe that they have control 
over the performance and the outcome of the variable remuneration scheme. If they 
do not, they will not be motivated (Expectancy theory). 
• A trust relationship should exist between management and participants. 
• Written contracts that spell out the rules of schemes and the conditions under which 
the participants will be rewarded will increase motivation (the instrumentality 
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C Ace f-'t-
variable of the Expectancy theory). A clear cut performance pa'yDu't'^ cJRSdule that the 
participants can understand and is openly communicated will help. 
• Motivation increases when the participant is assured of reward and when uncertainty 
about the reward is removed (Expectancy theory). 
• The values, personal goals, needs and preferences of the participants must match the 
rewards of the variable remuneration scheme. Schemes that offer outcomes which are 
not of value to the participants will not motivate them. The designers need to know 
what incentive will be valued, for proper valuing of the scheme rewards and thus 
higher motivation (Expectancy theory). 
2.9 Underlying assumptions and constructs applicable to variable 
remuneration 
Constructs found in the literature about variable remuneration were organized into a 
meaningful framework which shows their influence on variable remuneration (Figure 
2.3). The framework provides for external business environmental factors which 
influence the characteristics of the business and the organisation's remuneration 
strategy. These factors play a role in the success of the variable remuneration plan (via 
the variable remuneration life cycle - see Figure 2.3) and the business outcomes. 
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Figure 2.3: A framework of variable remuneration constructs. 
Source: adapted from Miceli & Heneman (2002) 
The model consists of five areas that influence variable remuneration. The extent to 
which the different areas influence the others ranges from uncontrollable to active 
leveraging. The elements of each area are discussed below. 
2.9.1 'Business Environment' 
A business exists in an environment that is made up of several stakeholders. An 
understanding of the relationship between the stakeholders and variable remuneration is 
important in order to determine the appropriateness of the scheme. Miceli and Heneman 
(2002) describe the competitiveness of the business's trading and employment 
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environment as an uncontrollable influence on variable remuneration. This may facilitate 
a strategy to leverage the variable remuneration by creating a higher ratio of variable 
remuneration to fixed remuneration and thus sharing the risk with the employees. 
During periods of environmental turbulence and uncertainty, sharing the risk with the 
employees leverages variable remuneration. However, during "revolutionary" change 
(especially within the organisation) variable remuneration may not be a recommended 
strategy. 
2.9.2 'Business characteristics' 
An understanding of the business processes allows designers to appreciate the 
complexity involved and to identify leverage points (Orens & Elliott, 2002; Heneman, 
2001; Gross & Nalbantian, 2002). The return on investment is higher if a larger 
performance gap is closed through the Introduction of variable remuneration (Lawler, 
1990). It is necessary to analyse if employees (potential participants) have the power, 
knowledge and information to influence important decisions, and also if they have the 
organisational "right" (Lawler, 2000) to influence the outcomes. Where uncontrollable 
factors affect outcomes, the element of lack of control reduces the motivational level of 
participants (Scholl, 2002). 
The broader elements of a good business strategy, leadership, infrastructure, and 
performance management must exist for variable remuneration to be successful 
(Wilson, 1999). Determining the drivers of performance is one of the important areas that 
should be identified. The model below (Figure 2.4) is adopted from the WorldatWork 
(2003a) description of performance management in a business. 
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Figure 2.4: Relationship between business performance and performance 
management. 
Source: WorldatWork (2003a) 
The model above explains the translation of strategy into performance measures and the 
subsequent use of these measures for perfonnance measurement. The Balanced 
Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1996), Management by Objectives (MBO) and the Key 
Performance Areas (KPAs) methods could also be used to translate business strategy into 
performance management processes. 
2.9.3 Remuneration strategies of business 
An understanding of the organisation's perceived need for variable remuneration may be 
derived from the "pros" and "cons" of the current remuneration strategy. The effect of 
the remuneration strategy on the desired business goals should determine whether 
variable remuneration schemes need a full design upgrade or whether they already 
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suffice. It is possible tliat the organisation's need may not be for variable remuneration 
but for a change in management practices (Orens & Elliott, 2002). 
2.10 Variable remuneration life cycle 
The variable remuneration life cycle refers to the different phases during which variable 
remuneration evolves from business need to the business outcome. The phases are: 
• the business need as presented by the business; 
• analysis of the need within the context in which the variable remuneration 
solution will be implemented; 
• design of the variable remuneration solution; 
• implementation of the variable remuneration solution; 
• leveraging of the variable remuneration scheme; 
• variable remuneration scheme value-add; and 
• feedback on the scheme performance. 
Phase 1: 
2.10.1 Analysis of the remuneration problem 
At this stage the designers can identify with a fair degree of accuracy the most 
appropriate scheme design. The designers must determine to what extent scheme will 
add value to business outcomes and whether risks will be mitigated. It needs to be 
ensured that there is congruency between the business model and the type of variable 
remuneration scheme. It must be checked if variable remuneration scheme has the 
approval from the highest levels in the organization, as it is a good governance practise. 
(King, 2001) 
Phase 2; 
2.10.2 Design of variable remuneration schemes 
The first step in auditing or designing a variable remuneration scheme is to define its 
scope, outcomes and benefits (Hansen, Smith & Hansen, 2002). A distinguishing feature 
of a successful variable remuneration plan is unmistakable clarity about what the plan is 
to accomplish (Abosch, 1998). In terms of the Expectancy theory, a formal "policy" 
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increases motivation as it strengthens the instrumentality or the perceived relation 
between performance and the expected reward (Scholl, 2002). Using a design team has 
its benefits, as it provides a better fit to organisation need, employee buy-in is higher and 
it is likely that a creative solution will evolve. 
Plan purpose - The purpose statement often makes a distinction between financial 
(outcome-based or hard) measures and non-financial (operational, process or soft) 
measures (Ittner & Larcker, 2002). Non-financial measures are often leading indicators 
of future financial performance while financial measures are often historical (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996). Combining financial and non-financial measures may shorten the line of 
sight, which in turn improves motivation. Overall business performance improvement 
seems to be better if schemes with a financial purpose are used (Abosch, 1998). Non-
financial measures are better drivers of organisational change. 
Eligibility - Eligible participants need to be aligned with the purpose of variable 
remuneration scheme, as Hewitt Associates found one of the reasons for failure of 
variable remuneration schemes was employees' poor ability to influence result (Abosch, 
1998; WorldatWork, 2003b; Orens & Elliott, 2002). Often companies increase the 
coverage of a variable pay plans, merely because these are forms of contingent 
remuneration. For instance, in a 2001 survey Hewitt Associates found that 54% of the 
employers surveyed had variable remuneration plans which covered 80% to 100% of the 
workforce (Van Neck & Smilko, 2002). Another technique used by companies in 
defining the variable remuneration scheme participants is to identify critical positions: 
those core organisational competencies that drive business success. Performance 
measures - In variable remuneration scheme design, a central debate is always the 
process of target setting. Unless it could be tied to objective processes that are 
defendable and fair to participants, suspicion is often raised about the targets to be 
achieved. In Figure 2.5 the process to define the performance measures is described as a 
process where the critical success targets (CST) are informed by and integrated with the 
organisational strategy (WorldatWork, 2003c). The critical success targets are then 
translated into performance measures. Performance measures could be a single measure 
or a combination of measures and are defined at organisational, business unit, 
departmental, team, and/or individual level. 
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Figure 2.5: Framework to select performance measures 
Performance measures and specifically the hurdles per performance measure should 
ensure that a minimum return be achieved before any incentive is paid (Bannister & 
Gentry, 1999). 
Performance measures are commonly divided into financial and non-financial 
performance measures (Ittner & Larcker, 2002). Hewitt Associates also identify 
quantitative and operational measures (Reynolds, 1998). Financial performance 
measures (net earnings, net income, ROE, EPS, ROA) and quantitative measures (market 
share, unit volume, productivity goals) are more common in higher levels of the 
organisation. 'Hon-financial measures (implementing a new business system, completing 
a new facility) and operational measures (successfully integrating two similar business 
functions, upgrading employee skill levels and producing x units) are used lower in the 
organisation. The operational and non-financial criteria work best for departments or 
individuals. Operational and non-financial criteria are treated as leading indicators of 
ultimate business performance. Hewitt Associates found that 61% of the participants in 
their survey used a combination of financial and operational benchmarks (Reynolds, 
1998). Where performance is measured on more than one level in the organisation, the 
contribution on each level could be weighted to calculate the bonus distribution. The 
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number of performance measures must remains manageable. Between three and five 
measures (WorldatWork, 2003b) have been described as an optimum number of 
measures per scheme. These include a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
measures (Bannister & Gentry, 1999; Moynahan, 1981). In multiple-measure plans, 
different weighting can be given to each measure. The weighting will be determined by 
the purpose of the scheme as it reflects the business strategy. 
Funding - Funding is the method by which money for awards is generated 
(WorldatWork, 2003b). Funding models are described as the methods employed by 
designers to generate the necessary funds to finance the variable remuneration scheme. 
Funding is based on the "line of sight" principle, which means that the behaviour of the 
participants is aligned with the mechanisms that will lead to the achievement and 
exceeding of the performance standards. Funding models represent categories of variable 
remuneration scheme types grouped together on the basis of the way they are funded and 
funds distributed. The categories identified are: equity-based remuneration, self-funded 
incentive and/or bonus schemes, gain-share schemes, budgeted incentive and/or bonus 
schemes, and activity-based incentive schemes. 
Equity-based schemes obtain funding from the equity of the company, often these are 
used for long-term variable remuneration, and such schemes extend beyond periods of 
one year. Self-funded schemes provide an over-profit or over-income or reduced losses 
and are based on the overall financial performance of the business (unit). Self-funded 
schemes normally fund pools of funds, which are then distributed to individuals or to 
teams using individual- or team-based distribution techniques. Gain-share schemes 
typically measure controllable cost or units of output, not profits, in calculating the 
payout. It is therefore possible that gain-share schemes could pay out incentives without 
the business making profit. These are characterized by high level of participant 
involvement. Budgeted incentive^onus schemes refer to funding models where 
provisions are raised against the income statement as there isn't a direct link between 
behaviour of the participants and performance measures that drive the funding of the 
scheme. Under the activity-based schemes, participants are paid a supplement amount on 
their fixed salary per activity performed over a target. The reward normally forms part of 
the product cost and is paid out long before the financial results of the business are 
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known. Typical examples are commission schemes or productivity improvement 
incentive schemes. 
The improvement caused by the introduction of the scheme can be divided into cash 
value and operational measures. Any qualitative gains from the scheme are listed as 
statements of qualitative gains (WorldatWork, 2003b). This is done to supplement the 
quantitative gains in the above calculation. The two sets of information provide the full 
value-add of the scheme. Awards could be financial and/or non-fmancial but should be 
meaningful (Wilson, 1999). If possible, the financial contribution of each measure 
should be calculated according to the contribution it made to the business outcome. 
Distribution of payout - Distribution of payout is based on either behavioural or results 
measures. Behavioural measures are based on how people do things and deal with the 
process side of the business. These measures are within the control of participants, but 
are not directly linked to business outcomes and therefore payments may be made 
without any corresponding business achievement. Cases where management chooses to 
use discretionary distribution criteria, the line of sight is broken and in terms of the 
Expectancy theory, level of motivation is reduced. 
Where individual performance appraisals are used, the work and job design must allow 
for individual appraisal, and the individual (participant in the scheme) must be 
responsible for the whole job and not be dependent on other people for performance. 
Desirably, the scheme participant must get regular feedback, as this would improve the 
outcome of the variable remuneration scheme (Lawler, 1990). In some cases, it may be 
necessan,' to measure and reward group or team performance. Team distribution 
amplifies the message that teamwork and group solutions are important and that those 
teams should take responsibility for managing the process under their control. The move 
towards lateral organisation process structuring, to reduce cost and improve the quality 
and speed of decision-making requires team-based distribution practices (Lawler, 2000). 
Considerations related to payout - The irequency of payout has a direct impact on the 
behaviour it stimulates. If the reward is paid soon after the behaviour is displayed, the 
motivation levels will be higher because of increased awareness and the perceived line of 
sight. However, it puts more pressure on administration and management time. 
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The threshold is the minimum level of performance at which a payout is earned. It is 
determined by the scheme rules and could be on or below the target performance 
baseline. The maximum or the cap is the level of performance at which the payout stops. 
This ensures that the cost of the scheme is controlled and it prevents windfalls. 
Differential rates of payout could be used at different stages of the performance scale. 
Scheme administration - The administrative rules of the plan must as far as possible be 
standardized. Some important considerations that need to be taken into account include 
(Orens & Elliott, 2002; Harris, 2002) - rules related to continuation and termination of 
scheme, movement of staff between departments/divisions, promotion of participants in 
and out of the scheme, tenure of employment of the participants, reporting of payments 
and those that deal with exceptional circumstances. Defining the responsibility for the 
administrative tasks ensures that misunderstanding and failure of delivery remain 
limited. 
Governance - Schemes should therefore provide for proper guidelines on how the 
scheme should be governed. Governance guidelines on the following aspects should be 
specified in the scheme rules: 
• The powers of role players who will approve the scheme. 
• The powers of role players who will approve amendment to the rules or invoke 
escape clauses. 
• The powers of role players responsible for approval of payouts 
• How reports about incentive payments will be structured and reported. 
• Audit of schemes after a prespecified overview period. Audits should provide an 
assessment of the value-add of the scheme and include an assessment of whether the 
scheme has achieved its purpose. 
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Testing the pay plan - The design team will need to test the design with a wider spectrum 
of people or communicate it more widely. It will lead to further adjustments to the 
scheme or it will result in rejection of the proposed scheme. 
Phase 3: 
2.10.3 Impiementation of variable remuneration schemes 
Traditionally, the design of variable remuneration schemes received the most attention. 
There is, however, a growing awareness of the importance of proper scheme 
implementation. This includes planning, communication, training, change management, 
adjustment to business processes and use of information systems to ensure a smooth-
running scheme. During implementation, targets are negotiated and communicated. At 
the end of the implementation process the implementation is evaluated to determine its 
success. As a result of successful implementation, the plan participants should 
understand, accept and internalise the performance measures of the approved scheme. 
Also, they must clearly understand what behaviour they will need to display to achieve 
the performance measures. 
Implementation of variable remuneration schemes can vary from a single memo to 
eligible employees to an extremely complex process involving stakeholder negotiations 
and substantial change management. The change readiness of the business to assimilate 
changes should be analysed. The change assessment factors are chosen from the specific 
environment in which the scheme will be implemented and a determination of the change 
scales is made based on the designers' assessment of the complexity of the change 
risks.Where the change readiness results indicate that complicated change management 
processes need to be followed during the implementation process, more resources will be 
required. 
While a core team is sufficient for low-level change interventions, supplemental cross-
functional representation is required for complex implementations. Burkholder(2002) 
describes the team involvement in the implementation phase, as depicted below in Figure 
2.6. 
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Figure 2.6: Low-level vs. complex implementations 
In the above model the core team is used for all implementations, and the extended teams 
(shaded, additional blocks) are used primarily for complex implementations. The level of 
change involved, determines which role players will be involved (see the list below), and 
also the cost of implementation. 
• The Steering Committee (leadership group), which must always be involved. 
• Representatives from the design team (including line management) form the core 
team. 
• A representative from the Human Resources group, if its representative is not already 
included in the design team. 
• Communication/ change management expert (extended team). 
• Technology representatives (extended team). 
• Measurement and contracting representatives of the participants (extended team). 
This team (either the core or the core team with the extended team) should review the 
implications of the scheme and agree on actions needed for the scheme to be 
implemented successfully. Activities performed by the different role players of 
implementation team are briefed below. 
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Implementation activities - Prior to implementation, the variable remuneration scheme 
needs to be approved by the management team or the person identified as the authorised 
approver. The approval process is best served if designers offer the approvers an analysis 
of the scheme in terms of its positioning in the business, the project cost/budget 
estimates, the scheme design, the administration of the programme, the roles of key 
participants and the risks identified. Plans to mitigate the risks should be submitted so 
that the approvers can make informed decisions (WorldatWork, 2003b). An 
implementation leader is appointed to guide the implementation process. The 
management, and stakeholders who are affected by the changes should be involved in the 
proposed changes to business processes (Kurlander & Barton, 2004). Typically, a 
database with participants' information, and funding & distribution rules is created and is 
linked to the operational systems. A number of enterprise incentive management (EIM) 
systems have been developed recently and it is predicted that this will proliferate over 
the next few years (Mclntyre, 2001; Kurlander & Barton, 2004). y\ system to monitor 
possible payments and a calculator to conceptualise "what if scenarios are valuable 
instruments to calculate the business's obligation, and also to provide such information 
to the participants. 
By this stage of the scheme development, the funding target would have already been 
agreed, for obtaining the scheme design approval. The contracting process with 
individuals must ensure that line of sight is established between behaviour of participants 
and the purpose of variable remuneration scheme. It is important that participants 
develop clarity in respect of what behaviour will be rewarded, &nd how it will be 
measured. Regular review dates to ensure commitment to the targets should be planned 
at this stage. Individual contracts should be developed, signed and stored. 
Communication is the cornerstone of the implementation process. The content of 
communication is planned in detail so that line managers will be able to inform 
participants of when and why the variable remuneration scheme will be implemented ; 
how it will benefit the participants; what behaviour changes are necessary; how the 
scheme differs from previous schemes and how it works (EJurkholder, 2002; 
Worldatwork, 2003b). Some organisations have found that if they communicate the 
scheme poorly, they have to increase the amount of remuneration (Wilson, 1999). in 
studies by Hewitt Associates it was found that among companies who reported 
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significantly less successful variable remuneration schemes, only 27% said that they had 
communication plans, while 70% of the companies who claimed successful variable 
remuneration schemes reported that they had communication plans (Abosch, 1998). 
Hewitt Associates again found the same tendency in 2001 and concluded that 
communication of performance measures has the strongest link to overall variable 
remuneration effectiveness. The HayGroup (2001) emphasises that communication in the 
implementation of variable remuneration should provide for general awareness of the 
scheme, and ensure regular reference to it during performance management discussions. 
In schemes where large populations are eligible for participation, the scheme content is 
best left to trainers to transfer. Ongoing training and follow-up training are required to 
ensure top-of-the-mind awareness. Training/education about the scheme affords line 
managers the opportunity to explain the scheme and motivate participants with regard to 
their role in terms of the business processes and performance drivers (Orens & Elliott, 
2002). 
Executive leadership and support should be building up during the different phases of the 
development of the scheme. Where strong leadership is shown throughout the design and 
implementation process, participants accept that the scheme(s) is not optional but part of 
the business (Burkholder, 2002). Executive support contributes directly to building 
commitment to the organisational goals (Wilson, 1999). 
The remuneration committee relies on the designers to provide them with information 
that will enable them to make decisions about the right remuneration levels, the 
performance targets, and the performance against the targets (Gallo, Hellerman & Jones, 
2003; England & Barrett, 2003). The education of the executive or members of the 
remuneration committee about remuneration terminology, philosophy and history as well 
as new trends and legislative developments is part of the corporate governance plan for 
the business. If the remuneration committee members need a second opinion on 
remuneration matters, they should obtain advice that will enable them to fulfil their 
governance role. 
Implementation plan and timelines - Once a clear picture of the desired changes and the 
need for the changes has been developed and agreed, the format of the implementation 
approach (e.g. "big bang" or incremental roll-out) should be decided upon. While the 
scheme implementation is planned, provision is made for the review of progress against 
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the scheme puqDOse. Implementing the variable remuneration scheme signals the 
commitment of line towards the operational goals and the scheme. If it is done with 
conviction, participants' confidence and commitment towards achieving the purpose of 
the scheme will increase. Implementation of the scheme is done according to the rollout 
plan. Communication to affected employees during implementation ensures support and 
understanding. Everyone needs to know what is happening, why it is happening and 
when (Hansen et a!., 2002). In spite of all the precautions that have been taken, the new 
variable remuneration scheme may not be appreciated. There could be many reasons why 
this happens and to overcome it, a strong belief in and commitment to the new scheme 
will be necessary. Through constant reviewing and improving of the scheme, the 
necessary confidence in the scheme will be created (Wilson, 1999). 
Evaluation - The quality of the implementation is a critical link in the chain of events 
that leads to an operational variable remuneration scheme. While it is possible that a 
good design may lose its impact if it is not well implemented, it is only after 
implementation that the acceptance, understanding and potential value of a scheme could 
be assessed with some degree of certainty. The assessment includes the evaluation of the 
communication, understanding of the scheme purpose and the behaviour necessary to 
enhance performance. Variable remuneration schemes should be audited regularly and 
recalibrated to adjust for changes. Implementation audits should be qualitative to ensure 
that the scheme is implemented according to minimum standards, as well as quantitative 
to determine why it achieved or did not achieve targets. 
Failure to leverage the scheme to achieve its purpose after implementation is a common 
risk in the management of variable remuneration. The tendency to "file away" the 
scheme after implementation is common. Management time, leadership and conflict 
management to constantly remind participants of the targets, their commitment to it and 
their progress against it, are all necessary to make variable remuneration schemes 
successful. The leadership challenge of variable remuneration management is to actively 
seek ways to support participants to achieve and exceed their targets. The process of 
leveraging variable remuneration is discussed in section 2.10.4. 
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Phase 4: 
2.10.4 Leveraging the variable remuneration schemes 
Leveraging the variable remuneration scheme is the process through which the return on 
payment (ROP) is optimised through communicating with the participants and by linlcing 
the variable remuneration scheme to other business processes. In terms of the variable 
remuneration life cycle, leveraging happens once the scheme has been implemented and 
evaluation against performance measures has commenced. 
Feedback to participants and shareholders - For the scheme to be effective, continuous 
feedback needs to be given to the participants on their performance against the 
performance measures both for the funding of the scheme and also for distribution of 
payouts to individual participants (Orens & Elliott, 2002). This is a line management 
function and the success of the scheme depends on the quality with which the feedback 
programme is implemented. The value of reward as a feedback measure is that it goes 
beyond objective feedback and appeals to the emotions and intellect of the participants 
(Wilson, 1999). Design of feedback is part of the scheme design and it should be offered 
systematically. 
According to WorldatWork (2003b), reinforcement of line of sight is essential. The 
scheme must ideally be integrated with the daily work and the performance goals of the 
position/role. Feedback could be accompanied by the distribution of performance 
statements stating how the participants performed against the performance measures and 
what they can do to improve performance. Other specific information such as the current 
year's incentives compared to that of previous year and year-to-date performance will 
provide a better perspective on the performance and encourage higher performance. New 
participants need to be orientated in respect of the scheme purpose and rules to allow for 
ongoing support for the scheme purpose. Scheme rules and objectives are most reliably 
communicated through written communication. Books, brochures, payout letters, 
individual contracts and question-and-answer information sheets are examples of 
communication instruments. Verbal communication could also be used. It is useful 
where the visibility of line management needs to be increased and motivation to perform 
is required/enhanced. Electronic communication offers quick and comprehensive 
feedback, especially if it is derived directly from production or financial systems. 
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Linking variable remuneration with other business processes - Leveraging variable 
remuneration implies that it should be linked to other business processes such as 
performance management, training (Orens & Elliott, 2002), organisational development 
and job design. The benefit of this link is the additional focus of the scheme and the 
enabling that takes place through these business processes. It enables and creates 
consequences for performance. It also integrates all human resource interventions, which 
is necessary for a focused approach to optimising human effort. 
It is emphasized that leveraging of variable remuneration scheme is done through 
feedback and linking of the scheme results with other business processes. The principle 
of feedback is supported by several of the motivational theories. Variable remuneration 
that is linked to other business improvement processes creates more opportunities for 
performance improvement and the achievement of variable remuneration targets. The 
assessment of the scheme is done during implementation and on review after the first 
cycle has been completed. This process is described in section 2.10.5. 
Phase 5 
2.10.5 Evaluating variable remuneration schemes 
Variable remuneration schemes are monitored after implementation to assess whether 
they are achieving their purpose (the desired business targets). The ultimate goal of 
variable remuneration, if the scheme is designed and implemented s>stematically, is to 
pay out substantial remuneration to participants. This requires that significant business 
targets be achieved and that participants be highly motivated. The outcomes of the 
variable remuneration scheme can be categorised into four different scenarios. These are 
detailed in Table 2.1. The four scenarios are: 
• No/little payout to employees and no/little benefit realisation for the business 
• Good payout to employees and no/little benefit realisation for the business 
• No/little payout to employees and good benefit realisation for the business 
• Good payout to employees and good benefit realisation for the business 
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TABLE 2.1 
Scenarios of Possible Outcomes of Variable Remuneration 
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J Distribution of payout (to Participants) ^ 
Less (unfavourable) payout Healthy (favourable)payout 
Lose/lose scenario 
No/little payout to participants 
and no/little benefit realisation to 
the business 
Win/lose scenario 
No/little payout to participants 
and good benefit realisation to the 
business 
Lose/win scenario 
Good payout to participants and 
no/little benefit realisation to the 
business 
Win /win scenario 
Good payout to participants and good 
benefit realisation to the business 
Possible explanations for the different scenarios are given below: 
Lose/lose scenario - In assessing a variable remuneration scheme, other factors that could 
impact performance achievement should also be reviewed. The scheme may be good, but 
these factors may inhibit the achievement of targets. 
• Employees are not competent. 
• Market conditions, that are outside of the control of employees, are unfavourable. 
• Products/services are not competitive. 
• The systems used cannot cope with the workload. 
• Resources are not available to achieve targets. 
• The scheme was not well designed and implemented 
• Management did not leverage the scheme to increase awareness and motivation 
(Barksdale, 1998). 
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Lose/win scenario - Where the scheme is not motivating the achievement of the purpose 
(the business is not gaining), yet staff received payouts, the following may be the 
possible problems: 
• Targets are set too low. Market niche/competitive standards were not considered. 
• There is not a sufficient linic between business performance and the performance 
measures of the variable remuneration scheme, i.e. people are being paid without a 
corresponding benefit to the business. 
• Employees have manipulated the scheme so that quality is lost or targets unfairly 
achieved. 
• The scheme was not tested and administered properly. 
Win/lose scenario -This scenario is an unlikely one, where the business achieves good 
outcomes but no payments are made to the employees. Possible reasons, for this scenario 
could be: 
• External, uncontrollable factors were responsible for the business performance. 
• Errors led to performance measures not registering employee performance. 
• A spike in the performance of the business was not recognised by the performance 
measures identified to drive performance. 
• Poor design, especially performance measures were identified incorrectly. 
Win/win scenario - This scenario is where the payout to the participants is made in terms 
of the scheme rules, while the business exceeds performance expectations. This is the 
desired outcome. However, scheme evaluation should still be done in these 
circumstances, as some of the many elements of the scheme design may become a future 
problem. If nothing else, the scheme will have to be recalibrated for the next financial 
year (Van Neck & Smilko, 2002). Changes to scheme designs could also bring 
excitement if the scheme has been unchanged for a long period. A scheme that remains 
unchanged for too long becomes an entitlement and loses motivational value. 
Auditing of schemes -
Once a scheme has been implemented, it should be audited for its applicability. This 
should happen during the implementation period of the scheme to allow for ongoing 
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modification and improvement. At the end of the implementation period, the scheme 
should be fully reviewed for its contribution to business goals as specified in the purpose 
(Hansen, 2002). Where schemes are not reviewed regularly and recalibrated, their 
effectiveness ratings are lower. In spite of this obvious requirement, Hewitt Associates 
found that nearly half of the companies they surveyed had no formal review process in 
place to assess the effectiveness of their variable remuneration plans; (Van Neck & 
Smilko, 2002). 
Why do businesses not audit their schemes? If a scheme does not add value to the 
business, why continue using it? Hewitt Associates found the following (Abosch, 1998): 
• Variable remuneration schemes are implemented during volatile economic conditions 
to contain the remuneration bill. 
• Most businesses do not realise that schemes are not adding value. 
• Lack of understanding of how to correct the variable remuneration scheme. 
• Competition for talent forces managers to tolerate less than perfect schemes out of 
fear that they may lose skilled employees. 
• Once the scheme has been implemented, it is virtually impossible to remove it 
without causing serious morale problems. 
There are two types of audits. The first is a qualitative audit that should be done during 
the implementation of the scheme to assess whether the scheme has been well enough 
implemented to become effective. The second audit is the audit of the scheme outcome. 
Qualitative audit - The qualitative audit (during the implementation period) consists of a 
range of questions to determine the level of internalisation of the scheme (Barksdale, 
1998). These questions are asked against a barometer of internalisation of the variable 
remuneration scheme, as depicted in Figure 2.7. The progression towards the 
internalisation (right-hand side) indicates more internalisation and successful 
entrenchment. 
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Figure 2.7: A qualitative audit of the implementation of variable remuneration 
Quantitative audit - The quantitative audit should take place once the implications of 
payouts are known, which for self-ftinded bonus schemes is after the audited results in 
the business unit (Barksdale, 1998). The Return on Payment (ROP) calculation indicates 
the non-validated value-add of the scheme. It is, however, important to validate the ROP 
in terms of the impact of the scheme on the outcome. Validation should be done through 
statistical predictions of the contribution of the scheme towards the scheme outcome. 
This aspect of the methodology is currently not available (de swardt, 2008). 
The possible scenarios of quantitative outcomes are explained in Figure 2.8. 
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Lower Higher 
Good (favourable) outcome 
inspite of the scheme 
Overall, the scheme did not add 
value 
Good (favourable) outcome because 
of the scheme 
Outcome may have been poorer, had 
the scheme not been implemented 
Figure 2.8: Possible scenarios of the scheme outcome explained by the 
variable remuneration model 
The second analysis is a qualitative assessment of the Balanced Scorecard perspectives 
on the business outcome. In this instance the designer or line manager is assessing 
subjectively whether the scheme made any contributions to the different Balanced 
Scorecard perspectives. This subjective assessment is then used to decide whether the 
scheme added value to the outcome of the business. This method is, however, unreliable 
because of the subjective nature of the technique. 
Feedback to management -
Feedback on the qualitative implementation of the scheme, specifically if it is done 
immediately after the implementation and during the operation of the scheme, will allow 
management to make adjustments where required. Qualitative feedback includes views 
on the need to make changes to the scheme design. The translation of strategy into 
understandable performance criteria is also a qualitative assessment that needs to be 
made. Feedback of a quantitative nature is only feasible at the end of a cycle. This 
feedback should indicate whether the purpose of the scheme has been achieved. 
Information on governance issues, e.g. adherence to scheme rules, approval of payments, 
distribution of funds and other related practices, should be included in feedback. This 
will ensure stakeholder support for the variable remuneration scheme. 
It may be summarised, that the business and the participants benefit from the scheme 
outcome. This outcome is evaluated qualitatively to determine the quality of the 
implementation and operationalisation of the scheme, and quantitatively to determine the 
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extent to which the purpose has been reah'sed. The final phase in the variable 
remuneration life cycle is the value-add of the scheme. This is described in section 2.10.6 
Phase 6: 
2.10.6 Value-add of variable remuneration schemes 
The outcome of the scheme is the result of the systematic implementation of the variable 
pay plan. It is a defined phase because it defines what constitutes success and therefore 
determines whether the variable remuneration solution has added value. The value-add of 
the scheme is subject to all the transmission loss that takes place between the business-
need for variable remuneration and the delivery of the outcome. Not all variables are 
within the control of the scheme designers, the business or the participants. The outcome 
of the scheme is a combination of objective and subjective criteria. It is described against 
the purpose of the scheme, as viewed by the different stakeholders. An assessment of 
whether the scheme was successful or not is therefore a combination of objective 
calculafions (with transmission loss discounted) and subjective criteria. The outcome 
remains important as continued investment in the variable remuneration scheme depends 
on the outcome. 
Figure 2.9 provides a summary view of overall variable pay remuneration cycle, in terms 
of phases involved, and the activities contained within each such phase. 
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2.11 Classification of variable remuneration plans 
Operationally, variable remuneration is administered through formalising the policy in 
form of variable pay plans. Variable pay plans may span a period of time that is longer 
than a year, or where this period is limited to within a year's duration. The former type 
is implemented through long term variable pay, while the latter is executed through 
designing, what are popularly known as the short term variable pay plans. This research 
is centered around variable pay plans for a shorter duration, ie of a year or less, and 
hence the focus of writing this report is limited to short term variable pay plans due to 
scope limitation and issue of relevance. 
Numerous designs/ types are available to guide designers for choosing the appropriate 
type of variable pay plan. Attempt has been made to classify these using various 
criteria. The short term type of variable pay plans have been detailed since these relate 
to the immediate scope of the study. The classification of the plans, given below in 
Table 2.2, that uses multiple criteria, is useful for making an informed choice about the 
type of plan, that suits an organisation's needs closely. 
Table 2.2 
Classification of variable remuneration plans 
Basis of ciassification 
(l)Structuring of variable pay in 
salary 
(Zingheim & Schuster, 2000) 
(II) Basic types (or forms) 
(Worldatwork ,2003b) 
Variable pay categories 
A Add-on variable pay 
B. At risk pay 
Bl Base pay at risk 
B2 Potential pay at risk 
B3 Less than competitive 
A Incentives 
B Bonus 
C Recognition 
base pay. 
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Basis of classification 
(III) Length of performance period 
(Zingheim & Schuster, 2000) 
(IV) Unit or entity, in which 
performance results are vested OR 
unit of performance measurement, 
for variable pay purposes. 
(V) Type of Performance Measures 
(McAdams and Hawk ,1992) 
(VI) Methodology used for funding 
the plan 
Variable pay categories 
A Short-term variable pay (see design options 
also) 
B Long-term variable pay 
Bl Long term cash variable pay 
B2 Long-term equity variable pay 
A Individual Variable pay. 
B Group Variable pay or Small Group Systems. 
A Financial plans 
B Operational plans 
C Combination plans 
A Self funded schemes 
B Budgeted schemes 
E Combination (of above tv/o ) 
(VII) Number of organization levels 
considered, in framing variable pay 
structure (Belcher, 1996): 
A Multi-tiered plans: 
B Other plans (that use single organizational 
level for performance measurement) 
(VIII) Discretion in determining 
payout amount 
A Discretionary 
B Non-Discretionary 
(IX) Formula used to determine 
reward 
A Cash profit sharing 
B Gainsharing 
C Goalsharing 
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Note: It may be noted that all the types described above have their justification in 
performance improvement as a necessary condition to earn variable pay. Lump-sum 
awards are a type of variable pay award that are not based on performance 
improvement results. 
Each of the abovementioned types of variable pay plans have been elaborated 
below. 
I According to structuring of variable pay in the salary structure: 
Traditionally, salary structures were built around base pay. When variable pay became 
widespread, almost to the tune of being seen as a norm for good pay structures, it 
formally got configured in the salary structure. Variable pay can be included into 
existing salary structure in various ways depending on how existing base pay is 
configured. These approaches are : 
A. Add-on variable pay 
• Offers additional pay - has only upside opportunity. Employees are assured of their 
salary amount. Variable payout is offered as an additional unit, amount of which is 
determined on the basis of performance results. 
• Variable pay is contingent on attaining performance targets. Employees may need to 
fulfill certain performance requirements or they may need to acquire specific skills or 
competencies. 
• A results-rewards relationship needs to be developed. A large-enough award 
opportunity is perceptible and often meaningful to people. 
B. At-Risk Pay 
This is the form of variable pay, wherein people might make less in total cash (w.r.t. 
their salary) if they fail to attain the minimum performance requirement. For 
acceptance and support among employees, it is required that they understand the 
potential gains out of it. The various forms of at-risk pay are described below: 
Bl. Base-pay at risk- Its key characteristics include -
• Base pay reduction funds variable pay opportunity 
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• The 'reduction' in base pay can be earned back upon emplo -^'ees meeting the 
minimum performance requirement. 
• Used when company is facing severe financial constraints. 
• For acceptance, a high-enough upside opportunity should exist, in the eventuality of 
organizations overachieving or surpassing their target. 
B2. Potential pay at risk 
• Part of potential increase, scheduled to be affected to base pay, is transformed into 
variable pay opportunity. This portion of pay is designed to be recoverable, made 
contingent upon meeting specific performance requirement. 
• For generating acceptance towards it, a high enough upside opportunity should be 
put on offer, so as to make the offer look lucrative. 
B3. Less than competitive base pay 
Base pay is positioned at 'moderately competitive' or 'less than competitive' level. In 
exchange, there is an upside opportunity to allow employees to earn higher than the 
competitive level of pay. 
II Basic typology (forms or types) 
Worldatwork (2005) has provided the following basic structure for classifying variable 
pay types. 
A. Incentives 
• The performance criteria and the corresponding reward schedule are determined in 
advance and communicated to participants. 
• Payout amount varies with the level of performance. 
• Rewards may be monetary (cash or equity) or nonmonetary (merchandise, travel 
etc). 
• The plan may be self-funded (generates on its own) or it may be budgeted. Such 
plans are nondiscretionary in nature. 
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B. Bonus 
• Rewards are contingent upon completing a specific task or objective. 
• Amount is determined in advance. 
• Payments are usually in cash; although sometimes equity form is also used. 
• The plan is usually budgeted. 
• Nondiscretionary 
C. Recognition 
• Criteria for recognition (award) are broadly defined (such as above and beyond' 
work or 'exceptional customer service'). 
• Criteria is discretionary and subjective 
• Its award is more spontaneous than incentives or bonuses. 
• Decision about whom to 'recognise' is made after the fact, usually without the 
benchmark of predetermined goals or performance levels ; its criteria is only 
loosely defined. 
• Focus is on recognizing, promoting, and replicating behaviours(versus results) that 
support company objectives. 
• Rewards could be monetary or nonmonetary. 
• Often budgeted at the corporate or business unit level. 
• Discretionary. 
Ill According to duration of performance period, under consideration 
Zingheim & Schuster(2000) classified variable pay plans according to the duration of 
performance period in its (STVPP) radar. They gave the following classification and 
described these as a set of three interrelated tools. These are: 
A. Short-term variable pay 
• Cash that rewards short term business results. 
• Short term means time periods of one year or less. 
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Since the scope of the study is limited to short term variable pay, it is pertinent to 
understand its types. The incentive designs used for short term variable pay are 
Business goal plan (goalsharing), gainsharing plan, team incentive plan, and Individual 
Incentive plan (Zingheim & Schuster, 2005). Other types of short term variable pay are: 
Winsharing, Combination plan and Cash profit sharing. A brief description about 
various types of short term variable pay plans is presented in Table 2.3 below. 
Table 2.3 
Types of Short Term Variable Pay plans 
Plan type Chief characteristics 
Basic design iypes: 
Business goal plan (goalsharing) 
(seeAnnexure2.2) 
• Focuses on one or more business performance 
indicators 
• Value added determines the incentive funding. 
Gainsharing plan 
(see Annexure 2.2) 
• Focuses on cost savings, improvements in 
efficiency or increases in productivity -
basically a form of gain that results from 
improvements affected. 
• Part of savings are shared with employees since 
they contribute to making such improvements 
possible. When no more gains are possible 
beyond what has been achieved, these plans are 
converted into goalsharing plans. 
Team incentive plan • Focus is on small team. 
• Focus is on shared goals 
• If one team member wins, others win too. 
(concept of shared destiny). 
• Research shows that the teams that use such 
method of sharing outperform teams that pay 
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Plsin type 
Individual Incentive plan 
Chief characteristics 
team members based on basis of their individual 
performance. (Mohrman, Cohen, Mohrman Jr., 
1995) 
• Used when individual performance can be 
judged. 
• It is possible that individuals governed by such a 
plan may compete with others, to the detriment 
of the organization. 
Other types:' 
Winsharing 
(see Table B, Annexure 2.2) 
Combination plar 
Cash profit sharing 
Quite like a goalsharing plan; additionally, it 
requires having met the financial outcome 
requirement. 
Uses combination of designs 
Funding is based on financial performance. 
B. Long-term variable pay: Depending on the method of payment chosen for the 
transaction, such plans could be categorized as either cash-based or equity-based pay 
plans. Thus two of its prime types are long term cash variable pay and long term equity 
variable pay. 
Bl. Long-term cash variable pay 
• Payout is in cash. 
• Performance; period ranges between more than one year, stretching upto two or 
more years. 
• Underlying philosophy is to reward business results over a sustained period of time. 
B2. Long-term equity variable pay 
• Payout is in form of stock options or other types of stock solutions. 
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• Value of options and the stock awarded is determined by how the company's 
common stock performs in the equity market. 
Since short-term and long-term variable pay types are interrelated, these need to be 
integrated in the total pay picture. 
IV According to choice of unit or entity, in whicii performance 
results are vested -
Variable pay plans may be designed to measure performance of groups or of 
individuals. 
A. Individual Variable pay 
• Such plans use individual performance results, as its basis for payout. 
• These are used, when work is not highly interrelated or when individual 
contribution can be meaningfully recognized. 
• Such plans may involve larger number of measures than just those relating to 
financial peribrmance. 
• Managers/Supervisors may recommend payout, using basis of individual 
performance objectives or that of performance ratings. 
• It is desirable that such plans link individual goals to team, group, business unit or 
company goals. 
• It is called the senior citizen of variable pay, with its roots in the textile industry of 
the 1800s. Traditionally, variable pay programs have shown highest level of 
concern for individual performance results.. 
Various approaihes to individual variable pay are detailed in Annexure 2.2. Its 
objectives and ksy considerations are detailed m Annexure 2.3. 
B. Group Varijible pay: 
• Such plans reward group performance. These plans operate on the assumption that 
individual performance based systems encourage behaviour that does not support 
partnership. 
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• These plans encourages employees to work collaboratively. Processes of Objective-
setting, performance measurement, and reward calculation are carried out at the 
group level. Individual contribution to group performance may be considered 
secondarily, only if it can be measured credibly. It is a caveat, that the larger the 
group under scope, broader are the organisational goals that are considered. 
• Many organisations include group element in their pay plans, even if these plans are 
originally intended to focus on individual performance results. 
• Members of group may belong to different functions, departments, divisions, or 
business units. 
• Such plans better reflects the chain (and the events) of work flow. 
• Payout may be more frequent than annual and may sometimes extend beyond the 
life of the team. Funding may be based on financial results or using the basis of 
qualitative results. Distribution of award is based on team or individual 
performance. Payout may be uniform for team members. 
• Administratively, these are complicated to handle. Such plans are appropriate for 
relatively large organisations. 
• In such plans, there remains the difficulty of measuring performance of 
administrative and support groups. 
Small group variable pay systems refer to the plans that are designed for groups within 
an organization, but such plans exclude organization-wide plans (Belcher, 1996). These 
are also referred as small-group incentives or team rewards. These are equivalent to 
group variable pay plans except that the definition of group excludes 'whole 
organisation' from its scope. 
V. According to type of Performance Measures 
McAdams and Hawk (1994) classified variable pay plans into three; categories based on 
how performan:e is measured. They used the classification to survey variable pay 
plans(VPPs). Using this typology, they studied 2200 plans. This particular 
classification of variable pay plans is widely practiced in US based organisations. 
These are primarily of three types, that are detailed below. 
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A. Financial Pla as 
• Similar to 'cash profit sharing' plans; also called the great-grandparent of variable 
pay. 
• Payout is based on bottom-line performance that in a way reflects a company's 
'ability to pay'. A 'measure of profit or profitability' is used as the basis for payout. 
A percentage of profits, generally after having achieved a predetermined level of 
profitability (that represents a specified level of return on investment) is made 
available for sharing. 
• Clear performance-reward link exists. 
• Suitable for the contingent compensation objective of variable pay plan. Such plans 
payout currer tly rather than deferring the awards. 
B. Self-funded plans. 
• Generally, all employees get an equal percentage of base pay or an equal rupee 
amount. Individual performance hurdles may be included. 
• Most notable feature is the simplicity of design, of such plans. 
Various approaches to 'profit sharing' plans are detailed in Annexure 2.2. 
Objectives and key considerations are detailed in Annexure 2.3. 
C. Operational Plans: 
• These plans are similar in their basic nature, to the performance-based sharing 
plans. Bottom-line based or financial measures are not used. 
• Performance is defined in terms of selected criteria (e.g. quality, customer 
satisfaction, responsiveness, productivity). Performance standards are established 
and incentiv3 awards are contingent upon meeting these levels. 
• Such plans exist at all organisation levels viz: organisation, business unit or team. 
Performance hi measured against pre-determined objectives. Examples include 
Performance improvement plan, peer comparison, target performance, productivity 
gains. 
• These are defined for a specific period. 
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Such plans siould be reevaluated for effectiveness at the end of each performance 
period. 
Its primary approaches are goalsharing and gainsharing. 
Schuster and Zingheim (1992) described another type (under this categorization) 
called winsharing. 
- Another variation is scheduled payout plans( described in Belcher, 1996). These 
are essentially gain-sharing plans with the gains grouped into steps, with the 
associated payouts defined and communicated in advance. 
Details of various approaches to performance-based sharing plans are provided in 
Annexure 2.2. Objectives and key considerations are detailed in Annexure 2.3. 
D. Combination plans: 
• Such plans represent a mix of the two primary types ie financial plans and 
operational plan types. 
• These plans combine financial and operational measures to determine payouts. 
• These have dual benefits of a) offering participants a short 'line of sight' and b) 
basing payouts on 'ability (of organization) to pay'. 
VI On the basis of method of funding 
Classification of variable pay plans based on method of funding is described in 
considerable detail in section 2.10.2 based on typology offered by WorldatWork 
(2003b). It is described clearly, as a part of design aspects of variable remuneration 
plans. For purposes of relevance, these types are mentioned herein - Self-funded pay 
plans, Gainshan; schemes, Budgeted pay plans. Activity-based variable remuneration 
schemes. 
VII On the basis of number of organization levels, considered for framing 
variable pay structure 
These plans measure performance at multiple levels in order to achieve the objectives 
of contingent compensation and support objectives in nature of organisation change. 
A. Multi-tiered plans 
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• Such plans ase two (or even three) separate formula that together support both of 
the objectives of variable pay. Accordingly, such plans may be two-tiered plans, 
three-tiered plans or spanning an even larger number of organizational levels. 
• Each formula that it used, measures performance at a different organisation level. 
• Employees leceive payout amount on the basis of two or more separate formula. 
Typically, one part (or kind) of payout is based on corporate performance and the 
other, is based on site or operating unit performance. Separate payout amounts are 
funded from performance of different organizational entities. 
B. Plans that measure performance at a single level 
• One single Ibrmula is used since performance is measured at only one single level 
of organisaton. Apparently, such plans are simple to understand and administer. 
• Such plans are designed to achieve only one of the two primary objectives ie. either 
implementing contingent compensation or that of supporting organisation change. 
VIII According to 'use of discretion in determining payout amount' 
A. Discretionaiy: 
Awards that are based on subjective criteria, like using one's judgment for determining 
payout amount, are discretionary-nature plans. Such plans are not driven by need to 
adhere to a pre-;5pecified formula. Examples of such plans include -
Special Recognition Awards: 
• Distributed close to the event in order to recognize performance. 
• It is not formula driven. 
• Usually a budgeted expense. 
• Low cost program having high perceived value. 
• Awards or payout delivery, immediately follows the event. 
• These plans carry a high trophy value. 
• Acknowledge performance that far exceeds expectations. Usually not adequately 
compensated by other rewards. These plans award significant and critical 
breakthroughs, that are likely to have long term impact on organisation. 
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B. Non-discretionary 
Wherever, an upfront performance-reward link is shown, award is governed by 
specified rules and therefore these plans are non-discretionary. For instance, plans of 
incentive nature ar; non-discretionary. 
IX According to formula used to determine reward 
The formula of a variable pay program establishes the type of organizational 
performance imprDvement that will generate a reward. This is the core of the variable 
pay system. Three basic types of formula frameworks are explained below: 
A Cash Prof t Sharing: Similar to financial plans, described in the same section 
above, in point V that explains the plans on the basis of type of performance 
measures. Complete details are available in Annexure 2.2. 
B Gainsharing: Both gainsharing and goalsharing are based on performance, and 
are therefore classified under operational plans or performance-based sharing 
plans. It has been described in point V that explains the plans on the basis of 
type of performance measures. Gainsharing and goalsharing plans are specific 
approaches to operational plans, that are detailed in Annexure 2.2. 
C Goalsharing (also known as Business goal plan). These have been discussed in 
sufficient detail in Annexure 2.2. 
Lump-sum award 
Performance-basis may not be the condition used for earning this type of variable 
payout - this is just a way to restructure base pay to avoid compounding of costs 
associated with base pay. Its use can be associated with individual or group 
performance. The specific variable pay opportunity could be large or small. This 
methodology of siphoning part of base pay through lump-sum award is usually used 
when base pay amount is above the competitive market rate of the job. While 
maintaining the broad ratio of base-pay and lump-sum mix, such award may be 
increasingly offered to the top performers, in order to showcase performance results as 
the desired requirement (for earning this portion of payout). 
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Another variation could be to use potential base pay increase as lump sum award. Tliis 
strategy is suited ivliere organisations are paying below the desired labor market 
position. Such plans are typically funded as a pay expense. Another variation could be 
to base it partly on merit budget and partly on financial performance. At target goal 
level, all variable pay may be awarded, while above target performance may be funded 
by sharing of financial success. 
Conclusion: 
Primarily, variable pay plans are of two types: Profit sharing and Performance-based 
sharing. These type;s inform the basis on which payouts are made to participants. While 
profit sharing ensures that payout is based on 'ability to pay', performance-based plans 
maximize participants' 'line of sight' so necessary for participants to influence results. 
To achieve both objectives, many formulae can be conceived that lie at different points 
along the continujm of formula types. The figure below (fig 2.10) shows various 
formula approaches and their objectives. Apart from the standardized formulae shown 
below, it is clear that many more variations can be formulated. This conceptualization 
is depicted below in Fig 2.10 
Formula Continuum: Types of Variable Pay plan 
Performance-
Measures based 
Financial Measures 
based 
Gain Sharing 
(Family of Measures) Financially Funded Goal Sharing 
Profit Sharing 
Goal Sharing 
< • ^ <• 
Gain Sharing 
(Cost Formula) 
^ 
Profit Sharing 
<r •^ 
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Figure 2.10: Variable Pay Objectives Coatinuum, Source: (Belcher, 1996, p. 89) 
The approaches shown above are explained in Annexure 2.2 & 2.3. Based on the 
business objectives, organisations customize the basic formulae to evolve suitable 
approaches. Inadvertently, the practice of customization has led to some degree of 
confusion in the plan types. Miceli (2002), who described variable pay as a 
combination of gainsharing, profitsharing and team pay, found that "the lines of 
demarcation between these "pure" plans were blurred in both theory (Heneman, 
Ledford & Gresharn, in press) and actual pay practice (McAdams & Hawk, 1994)". As 
mentioned earlier, the author has attempted to elaborate the theoretical constructs, in 
order to clear awa> the ambiguity that surrounds the subject. 
2.12 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
Variable pay systems are an offshoot of the 'New pay' philosophy that has pervaded 
contemporary thought on pay systems. Motivational theories explain the behaviour of 
participants in variable remuneration. Although human behaviour cannot be predicted 
accurately by motivation theory, it explains behaviour and helps to bring out the 
patterns of preference, displayed by individuals. A body of knowledge about variable 
remuneration practices exists but it is not widely known among those who practice it. 
Variable remuneration is designed and implemented in a project management structure 
referred to as the variable remuneration life cycle. The life cycle is a logical process to 
implement variable remuneration. Its summary is provided below, and shall be useful 
for recalling at once the phases that constitute the variable remuneration process. 
Phase 1: Analysi;; - During the analysis phase designers determine the appropriateness 
of variable remuneration as a solution to improve business performance. The outcome 
of the analysis is a business case that either supports or rejects the implementation of 
variable remuneration as a business solution. 
Phase 2: Design - The designing of variable remuneration schemes commences once 
the business case proposal (following the analysis) has been accepted. The design 
process should produce a scheme document that will be used for approval and in 
communication v^ith participants. 
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Phase 3: Implementation - Variable remuneration schemes are implemented if all 
participants understand, accept and have internalised the performance standards. 
Participants mus'. also understand the behaviour that they will have to display to 
achieve the performance measures. Systems must be in place to measure the 
performance and regular feedback against the perfonnance criteria must be given. 
Where targets were achieved, payments are made on the set date. Variable 
remuneration schemes that are implemented well lead to understanding of the business 
and accountability for results is reinforced at all levels of participation. Implementation 
of variable remuneration schemes can vary from a single memo addressed to eligible 
employees to complex processes involving stakeholder negotiations and substantial 
change managen i^ent. 
Phase 4: Levereiging - Leveraging the variable remuneration scheme refers to the 
process by which the return on payment (ROP) is optimised through communication 
with the participants and through the linking of the variable remuneration scheme to 
other business processes. In terms of the variable remuneration methodology, 
leveraging happens once the scheme has been implemented and performance against 
the targets has started. 
Phase 5: Evaluation -Variable remuneration schemes are monitored during and after 
implementation to assess whether they have achieved their purpose (the desired 
business targets). The ultimate goal of variable remuneration, if the scheme is designed 
and implemented systematically, is to pay out substantial remuneration to participants. 
This requires that significant business targets have been achieved and that participants 
are highly moti\'ated. The process of evaluation is a qualitative and quantitative process 
of review to er.sure that the variable remuneration scheme will be the cause of the 
achievement of the business objectives and not uncontrollable variables. 
Phase 6: Value-add - The outcome of the scheme is the result of the systematic 
implementation of the variable remuneration scheme methodology. In terms of the 
methodology, it is a defined phase because it defines what constitutes success and 
therefore determines whether the variable remuneration solution has added value. 
Detailed information is provided that may at once seem broad and general, considering 
the immediate purpose of the study, however, it is important to create understanding on 
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the subject to set the background for a more focused study. Largely, the variable pay 
remuneration life cycle encapsulates the phases of analysis, design, implementation, 
leverage, evaluation and value-add, each of which have been sufficiently elaborated. 
Within each phase, multiple aspects that are crucial for framing a variable pay plan, 
exist, most of which have been considered and elaborated. By and large, the tone used 
in comprehending the multiple aspects contained in each phase, is that of ascertaining 
how employee motivation can be caused, or rather sharpened, so as to increase the 
efficacy of a STVPP. 
Towards the latter iialf of the chapter, variable pay plans have been categorized using 
multiple bases for ;>uch classification. Conceivably, most bases have been covered for 
classifying variable pay plans and elaborating each of their types. It would be more 
appropriate to say that the classification is detailed enough and has been culled out 
from the literature studied during the course of the research process. In writing this 
chapter, focus is not maintained on any one class of employees, since variable 
remuneration has been conceptually elaborated as a construct of compensation systems 
geared to align employees' goals with the business strategic direction. 
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Chapter 3 
A review of related literature 
3.1 Introduction 
Inspite of difficulties inherent in measuring productivity, the quest for linking variable 
pay to performance has been endeavoured by previous researches (Nisar, 2003). A 
survey of pay systems in 480 UK organizations conducted by the CBI and Hay 
Management Consultants in year 1995 found that the most significant factors that were 
driving change in reward management, were the need for strengthening the link between 
pay and business performance, cost control and retention pressures respectively 
(Armstrong, 1996). Compensation subject is truly one of the planks based on which the 
human resources function derives its strategic advantage. Relative to its 
(compensation's) importance to a firm's success, scholars and even practitioners have 
lamented that the advancement in compensation research has been stagnant and 
underrepresented (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 2000). In a review, Heneman. 
Ledford and Gresham (2000) observed that the state of the compensation literature was 
strikingly similar to that of 1960s when Opsahl and Dunnette (1966) called for research 
to catch up with practice. The scope of research studies about variable remuneration has 
largely focused on the CEO segment. In particular, research on variable remuneration for 
employees below executive level is sparse, inconsistent, and has suffered neglect of the 
academic community. 
3.2 Studies related to design aspects of variable pay plan 
Variable pay system represents the spectrum of a relatively new approach to 
compensation, one that requires research, for understanding its effectiveness, with regard 
to its key design variables, which also helps to examine its success and failure. 
Kim(2006) reviewed literature on strategic compensation studies and found that 
compensation research had not adequately addressed the question of how compensation 
strategy is designed, structured, established, and configured. According to Lawler(1990), 
too much attention is focused on reducing pay costs and too little of it is focused on 
increasing benefits of the pay system. He emphasized that {ibid.,^x\) "A well designed 
pay system can be a very important contributor to an organisation's effectiveness." 
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Bringing out the importance of design and implementation of variable pay plans, Thorpe 
& Bowey(I998) found in a study of compensation programmes of 73 listed 
companies,(all of these in Newzealand) that it was difficult to say categorically whether 
as such, the schemes were poor or successfiil, since they found similar types of schemes 
producing good results in some organizations and the same schemes producing poor 
results in others. They confirmed that the differentiating factor was the specific manner 
in which variable pay plans were designed and implemented. 
Employee participation in plan design: Despite exhortations in literature about 
involving employees in designing pay systems, doubts haunt its practitioners as to the 
feasibility of doing so and also about benefits to be accrued from such extensive 
exercise. Lawler and Hackman(1969) did a study with a janitorial crew with the 
objective of reducing their high turnover rate. In his later work (Lawler, 1990), Lawler 
recalls his doubts about using participative system for designing an attendance bonus 
system, and to the same effect, he candidly admitted {ibid., p.224) 
Not exactly the ideal situation for participative pay system design! 
Nevertheless in the spirit of scientific inquiry we proceeded to help several 
janitorial crews design attendance bonus systems. Somewhat to our 
surprise, they designed rather good systems that provided in some cases far 
smaller bonuses than (what) the company was willing to offer. The systems 
reduced absenteeism throughout the company, but the effect was greatest in 
the crews that designed them. 
Studies also show that, typically participative design is slower than top-down design. 
Despite the educational effort needed to groom employees, Lawler (1990) concluded in 
no unclear terms that the traditional method of top-down design may be quick, but that is 
not the fastest way to get a system operating effectively. The crucial difference is that in 
case of a participative design, the program communication, its selling and understanding 
processes are already on a roll even when the design process is barely complete {ibid.). 
Research related to 'link between pay and performance': Peck(1984) in a national 
survey of compensation administrators found that the primary objective of compensation 
systems is to tie pay to performance. Eskew and Heneman (1996) conducted a survey 
among senior compensation professionals from 72 organisations, in order to examine the 
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effectiveness of merit pay in achieving orgnisational objectives. Tiie survey found that 
'clarifying the link between pay and performance was related to improved pay plan 
effectiveness.' It may be added that such need for clarity between pet); and performance 
is stronger in case of short term variable pay plans since one of its objectives is to 
closely differentiate pay based on performance results achieved. 
Research related to alignment behveen performance measurement systems and strategic 
priorities: Armstrong and Brown (2005) cited the case of a manufacturing plant which 
had close alignment between the performance measures and the strategic priorities of 
business. They observed that this alignment was rather easy to achieve on paper, but 
difficult to implement in practice. While such 'close alignment' enthused the board, 
research showed that majority of employees were unable to influence any of the 
measures and hence the subsequent performance and payments were disappointing. It 
may be inferred that employees should be able to influence the measures in order to 
impact performance, and subsequently influence the payout amount. In a closely relevant 
case, change initiatives that originated at the branch level, could not see the light of the 
day, as these were later considered unnecessary by the top management; which leads us 
to establish accurately that top management commitment and a realization at their end 
about necessity of change, is crucial if at all reward system is to support and push in the 
direction of business strategy ("A false start", 1998). Advocates have argued that 
measurement techniques like balanced scorecard process, causal business modeling, and 
economic value measurement help companies to improve alignment between their 
performance measurement systems and their organizational objectives (Gates, 1999; 
Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1996, 2001; Stewart, 1991; Young & O'Byrne, 2001). Despite 
these arguments, the extent to which the firms claiming to use these techniques, actually 
link their performance measures closely to strategic priorities, is unknown. 
Research related to plan funding: Crane and Joyce Pellino(2004) discussed the findings 
of research by Hewitt associates, that found that slow growth companies put fewer 
resources into performance-based pay programs, budgeting 30 percent less per employee 
for variable-pay plans as compared to the investment made by the high-growth 
companies. The reason could very well lie in the self-finding nature of the plan. A senior 
leader of the consultancy opined that high growth companies were more committed to 
variable pay and (for this reason) regarded it as a significant element of total 
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compensation. A unique feature of fast growing companies that was brougi^ it to light was 
that these companies paid higher reward percentages in the form of variable pay, 
especially to those at the lower end of pay scale - so as to encourage them to be more 
engaged and motivate ("The Prosperity Gap",1999). A straightforward implication is, 
that increasing the proportion of variable pay has effects on engagement level of 
employees. This is a creditable finding as the results are based on a wide sample base of 
111 companies, and the criteria of selection entails an average growth rate of 10% for 5 
years - in order to select the high growth companies. 
Research related to type of pay mix (ratio of variable pay to fixed pay elements): Gerhart 
and Milkovich (1990) tested the assumption that not only how much employees are paid 
but also how they are paid influences a firm's performance. They found that the ratio of 
variable-to-base pay was positively related to a firm's financial performance - even if 
industry, job characteristics, and human capital variables were controlled for. A 
compensation survey carried out for the Sales & Marketing professionals found, that 
rapidly, the practice of increasing variable pay proportion of compensation, was catching 
on, in order to proliferate the ideology of paying for performance ("Report on Salary 
Surveys", 2006). A related research carried out by Burke and Hseih (2006) sought to find 
the optimal balance between variable pay and fixed pay costs. They proposed a model to 
determine whether a compensation plan was adding value or not. They argued that 
increasing variable pay beyond a point has potential losses, and therefore it is desirable 
to discontinue its rise and let it stagnate at the optimal point. 
Research related to Performance Measures: Variable remuneration systems aligns the 
preferences of firms with that of employees (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Performance 
measures are a critical component in achieving this linkage. In a survey carried out by 
Watson Wyatt, covering 242 participants ("New Benchmarks", 2004) it was found that 
maximum changes were made to the performance measures, that determined the payout 
amount (68%). The second-highest number of changes were in the direction of -
increasing the threshold level goal (46%). This brings out the pattern of usage of a) 
performance measures, and b) threshold level, that are highly leveraged in a dynamic 
variable pay plan. Both, the economic and organizational psychology studies suggest that 
financial measures such as profits and costs provide weak direction to workers and make 
it difficult to communicate how an employee's actions affect performance goals (Wruck 
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and Jensen, 1994). If such ambiguities persist, employee commitment to performance 
targets may wear off, leading to divergence between desirable and actual status of 
performance achievement (Nisar,2003). Such pay-performance non-linearities, force 
organisations to use subjective means for establishing link between payout and employee 
performance(/i/c/.). While such practices call for rectification in order to restore 
perceptions of fairness, it also brings forth the fact about presence of work pressures, that 
force supervisors to forge a seemingly credible link, even if it is of suspect quality, and 
defies objectivity concerns. 
Research related to pay plan simplicity: A health care company that had 22 performance 
measures in its profit sharing plan was not able to recognize individual contributions and 
therefore no one understood it (Colletti & Fiss, 2005). The plan was later simplified, 
each division was asked to choose customized measures (on the basis of its objectives), 
and a scorecard system was instated to track division's goals and related measurements. 
Three broad goals - that of quality, service and finance, were identified, a segregation 
that enabled demarcation between how each goal contributed to a predefined percentage 
of payout (for instance 'service' counted towards one-third of the payout calculation). 
The authors found that such a plan was easier to explain, track and reward. The 
implication is that a plan that is simple, is amenable to neat measurement. 
In Huffs (2006) case study, the method of payout calculation used, was simple enough, 
as the author could state it in barely two lines. A specialized software was used for 
capturing the data, so much so, that it enabled sound understanding, among the drivers 
(who were the plan participants). Ease of providing regular performance updates, 
increased their interest to know how their performance results measured up against the 
scorecard system. Also, according to the author, the drivers became interested to put in 
extra effort, in order to be eligible for a raise. The reason was that they could clearly see 
how they measured up against the performance measurement system and therefore, they 
wanted to expend higher levels of effort, so as to climb higher on the equation of pay and 
performance. 
Research related to use of group level of aggregation: The existing literature has 
suggested that a group-based pay plan makes a greater contribution to a firm's 
performance, as processes of group-member-collaboration are improved and also since 
the achievement of group objectives is likely to be shared (Montemayor, 2002). On the 
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flip side, both economic and organizational psychology studies suggest that financial 
measures such as profits and costs provide weak direction to workers and make it 
difficult to communicate how an employee' s actions affect performance goals (Wruck 
and Jensen, 1994). Such ambiguities preclude employee commitment to performance 
targets, causing wide divergence between desirable and actual performance achievement 
(Nisar, 2003). Such pay-performance non-linearities are known to cause companies to 
find alternative methods, to be able to tie rewards more closely to performance. Nisar's 
research suggested an alternative mechanism of using subjectivity to fonn appropriate 
linkages between incentives and employee performance. This contrasts the importance 
laid on 'performance measurability', and it may be argued that subjective measures 
could compound measurement concerns that are commonly associated with group based 
pay plans; which may result in erosion of trust levels. 
Benefits associated with use of group-level parameters: Anfuso (1995) reported ease of 
performance-measurement, as a distinct benefit of deploying organization-performance-
measures. It follows that such performance measures considerably ease out the task of 
calculating the overall payout amount. Concerns about non-feasibility of accurately 
measuring individual contribution (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), and that it weakens the 
instrumentality perception, serve to substantiate the choice of organisation-level 
measures. According to Lawler (1988), use of organization level measures caused a loss 
of direct relationship between individual performance and rewards. Holmstrom (1982) 
observed that it led to free-rider effects, wherein while an individual employee may bear 
the entire load of cost of his greater effort, his payoff may be just part of the gain that he 
helped to generate. On the positive side, Anfiiso (1995) found that firm level incentives 
appear to be accompanied by use of advanced human resource management practices, 
that entail development of channels to promote employees' involvement in the company. 
It was cautioned that in order to involve employees, the firm should show commitment to 
maintaining employment relafionship for an extended period, (ibid.) used context of 
'involvement' since it was believed that financial participation (of linking workers' 
compensation to organizational performance) complements actions aimed at promoting 
participation and involvement initiatives. 
Research related to 'ability to influence' performance measures: Burke and Hsieh 
(2005) brought out the results of an experimental investigation that found that employees 
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were not as willing to accept variable pay plans when implemented at the group level 
compared to its use at the individual level. Employees do not mind variable pay 
schemes, if they are ultimately in control. Therefore, group pay plans may produce some 
element of dissatisfaction, which could eventually translate into lower efficiency. This 
suggests, that in order that employees feel satisfied, they should be able to feel 'in 
control'. It follows that employees expect feelings of 'being in control, and apparently 
this effects satisfaction level. Initiatives that give employees feeling of 'being in control' 
are required when group-level aggregation is used. This can also be achieved through 
education about the plan, education about the business, and through involvement of 
employees at various stages of plan development. Meta-analysis studies of behavioral 
responses (to pay) have concluded significant improvement in productivity due to 
individual incentives (Guzzo, Jette, & Katzell, 1985; Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 
1998; Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, & Denny, 1980; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997), 
which further brings out the need for enhancing feelings of 'controllability' among 
employees. 
Research related to relationship between performance and payout: Huff(2006) in a study 
of performance-based pay plan at a truck carrier company, found that an 'all-or-nothing' 
type of program did not motivate employees after they first defaulted, as it made them 
ineligible for any further payout. This particular organization had a six month 
measurement period - which meant that if employees discovered in the very first month 
that they would not get any payout, then this would cause them to reduce their efforts in 
the subsequent period. A related inference is that such a design of 'all-or-nothing' type 
may prove beneficial, only when performance cycles are short enough ie when these 
occur in frequent episodes, so as to afford employees a second chance, after a shorter 
time interval, through the next performance evaluation cycle. A study ("Report on Salary 
Surveys", 2006) found that organizations designed their payout schedule in a manner so 
as to pay significant rewards to the top performers, in contrast to the amount of payout, 
given to average performers. In this case the reported difference was an average of 26%, 
high enough and quite palpable, to enhance instrumentality perceptions of employees. 
Research related to practice of plan revision: A study reported 95% of companies 
expressing their intention to make changes to their VPPs, even though 88% rated its 
effectiveness as 'acceptable' or 'better than acceptable' ("Report: on Salary Surveys", 
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2006). The exact reason is not made explicit in the study findings. 'Plan revision' is a 
common feature, as a Watson Wyatt study found that half the respondents revised their 
plans, of which 27% increased the size of target award. It found that there v^ as proneness 
among the low performing firms to make plan revisions, as 63% had done so in previous 
12 months. In contrast, a considerably lesser number, which is 40% of high performing 
companies, had affected such changes; and the changes were mainly directed at 
increasing the amount of target awards (44%). This may be an important aspect for 
sustaining employees' interest level and for maintaining trust levels in variable pay plans 
("Report on Salary Surveys", 2005). 
Research related to use of variable remuneration in particular organization types: A 
Hewitt study (Crane & Joyce, 2004) surveyed 111 high-growth companies to gauge the 
correlation between revenue growth and variable-pay plans. The study found that 
companies with slower growth rate and integrated cost-saving measures benefitted lesser 
than those with a consistently high growth rate and having no cost-containment 
measures. The report shows that companies that don't tie cost reduction to growth and 
instead measure success against revenue and share price, do far better. It also found that 
slower-growth companies, on the other hand, put fewer resources into performance-
based pay programs, budgeting 30 percent less per employee for the variable-pay plan as 
compared to their high-growth counterparts. According to Paul Shafer, a Hewitt business 
leader, high-growlh companies are more committed to variable pay and view it "as a 
more significant element of total compensation." 
Research about successful variable pay plans (that used holistic measures): Two case 
studies - about Motorola (Coli, 1997) and Trigon (Gross et al., 1997) bring out the aspect 
of their considerable experience with plans designed at group level aggregation, during 
the period 1992 to 1997. Guidelines for successful introduction of variable pay plans 
include - having a clear strategic purpose, regular updates about results and rewards, 
using financial measures and stretch objectives, training in teamwork skills, evaluating 
and reviewing the reward system. The above is a synthesis of major findings based on 
experience of 150 teams (at Motorola) in five sites around the world and Trigon's four 
years' experience with team-based pay. Gross(1985) on the basis of a study by Hay 
consultancy reported that the following aspects were rated approx. 25% higher in 
successful plans than in the case of troubled programs. Thus, these emerge as important 
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considerations in using a variable pay plan. These include emphasis on performance, 
level of trust, encouragement of initiative and performance measurement. 
3.3 Studies related to implementation of variable pay plan 
A study found that variable compensation even if properly designed, could aggravate 
problems like manipulation of performance measures, thus harming the long term 
interests of the firm ("RSS calendar", 2005). Brown and Perkins (2007) based on their 
researches concluded that there is "a new emphasis on implementation and workability" 
(p.83) of variable pay plans. Armstrong and Brown (2005) brought out the changeover in 
UK reward related thought and practice, inspired by the US success stories of reward 
strategy. They claimed it indisputable that strategic reward management is at the centre 
of HR and Business agenda in the UK. Though this is the experience of UK, it can be 
seen as a model for other countries, for evolving a perfect fit between reward's 
perspective and the business perspective. In particular, they noted that the practice of a 
formal reward strategy that took birth from Lawler's seminal work 'Strategic pay', 
gradually acquired the status of a universally accepted practice, though it took longer to 
pick roots in the UK. So strong was the influence of his seminal work, that CIPD survey 
found that half of all employers and more than 70% of larger ones had a stated reward 
strategy aligned with business strategy and human resource strategy. This is a good sign 
as a stated reward strategy is a breeding ground and a facilitator for a formal variable pay 
policy. One of the challenges UK managers face was w.r.t. implementation of such pay 
systems. The author notes the advice of the reward director of a global giants company, 
that sums it up very succinctly "keep designs simple (but simple isn't easy)". 
Renowned authors in the field have clearly brought out in their researches that while 
historically decisions concerning pay systems have been made in a top-down manner, 
streaks of change have begun to appear (prominent ones include Lawler, Ledford, 
Mohrman, 1989; 0'Dell,1987). Emphasising the value of employee involvement, one of 
the respondents' quoted "Value of in-depth employee consultation should not be 
undervalued and time should always be allowed for it". The authors summed up the 
challenges faced during implementation of strategic reward programmes - specifically in 
the context of strategic reward programmes. They noted that the board members who 
were initially enthused by the perfect alignment with the performance measures later 
found that they could not influence the performance measures and also the payments 
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were dismal. The authors have cited results of studies to bring out the relative ease of 
designing pay systems and contrastingly, the concomitant difficulty of translating it into 
practice. 
Research related to use of pay-related communication : Employees have a desire to 
know how their pay level is determined. Knowing how and why pay systems are 
developed, or even what others in the organization are paid, satisfies employees' feeling 
that they have the "right to know" (Eastman, 1988; The ManageMentor, 2003). This 
merely goes to establish a preexisting need among employees for having clear 
understanding about pay. Pay communication is of relevance to the aim of assessing 
employees' understanding about the working of pay plan. In this context. Case (2001) 
noted that knowing the how and the why of pay systems enhances employee 
understanding about the business. This is truer in case of variable pay plans since the 
payout amount is closely linked to business performance. Additionally, proper 
communication has been shown to increase employee satisfaction (Heneman and 
Judge,2000; Cappelli and Sherer,1988) and lead them into "appreciation of incentive 
compensation benefits" (Rabin, 1995, p.7). In particular, Cappelli and Sherer (1988) 
reported a strong positive relationship between the two variables. Day(2007) added that 
it would result in perception of fairness, satisfaction and equity. McAdams & Hawk 
(1992) in their study of 432 performance reward plans carried out in organizations in 
North America, found that when organizations communicate more about the pay plan, in 
those cases, the plans tend to report better results. Respondents in the study (Day,2007) 
showed an obvious interest in receiving this information, since over one-third (37 
percent) reported asking their supervisor to explain the method of determination of pay 
levels. One study found that managers in open conditions, in which nearly all aspects of 
pay except others' pay levels were known, made fewer comparisons with others inside 
the organization than those, who had no pay information (Thompson and Pronsky, 1975). 
This leads to the inference that when employees have knowledge of the pay system, they 
are less distracted to make comparisons, and can therefore spend more time on their 
performance. 
Limited use of pay communication practice Authors have boldly noted that even with the 
proliferation of open management strategies, most organizations do not communicate 
about pay to employees (The Vault, 2001; Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1985). This just 
sketches the dismal state of communication about pay, which it may be argued, is the 
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legacy of old management practice wherein the predominant culture was to keep pay 
policies secretive and under close wraps. Studies indicate that few organizations provide 
pay infonnation, beyond communicating the salary range (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 
1985; Lawler, 2003). Previous researches show (The Vault, 2001; Balkin and Gomez-
Mejia, 1985; Lawler, 2003) that few respondents report that their employers 
communicate about how pay is determined. Infact knowledge about how pay is 
determined, is all the more relevant in case of variable pay, since a) it is formula driven 
and b) it pays varying amounts of payout for varying levels of performance. An internet 
survey of employers found that over one-third employer organizations prohibited talking 
about pay (The Vault, 2001). Prohibition is a serious deterrent and is a far cry from the 
coveted practice of open communication. Open communication is important for two 
reasons - understanding depends on it, and it sets the path for involvement. Lawler 
(2003) studied 149 Fortune 1000 companies, and supported the above results, in that as 
few as 3.5% organizations had open pay information systems, a figure that had risen by 
a minor 0.1%, since year 1993. This shows how poorly communication is regarded as a 
priority. This can be especially disappointing and even damaging for variable pay 
systems, given that these strive to motivate employees in pursuit of business objectives. 
An alternative viewpoint, according to Nancy E. Day's experience as a compensation 
consultant, is that employees are most concerned with their pay levels, rather than other 
issues about pay, and organizations are most likely to present pay information bearing 
this aspect in mind (Day,2007). This may explain why organizations play truant on the 
subject of pay communication, often neglecting communication about lesser-critical and 
lesser-visible aspects of'working details', 'philosophy' or 'objectives'. 
Organizations that were reported to use empowerment strategies tended to communicate 
more about pay (the zero-order correlation was 0.31, significant at the p,0.001 level) 
(ibid). However, those who "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that their organizations were 
"empowered" only reported a pay communication mean of 2.73, below the scale's 
midpoint (3.0). Thus, even organizations that profess to share key business information, 
do not specifically score high on communicating information about pay. The study found 
that communication of pay had little impact on pay-related satisfaction. This may explain 
organisation's reluctance to seriously expend effort in pay-related communication. It 
may be reasoned that involvement mechanisms, which essentially have an element of 
communication inherent in them, may be a possible vehicle for effecting satisfaction 
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levels. The finding noted above relates to traditional pay system, which may have caused 
the authors to overlook the involvement dimension, due to its perceived non-criticality to 
motivation. 
An alternative view is presented by Futrell and Jenkins (1978) who found limited 
evidence to show that lack of information about pay, was related to lowered performance 
motivation and pay satisfaction. The finding is in context of salespeople, who often are 
assured of clearcut compensation plans, have an advantage of clear line-of-sight and also 
have the benefit of a regular stream of easily-accessible performance feedback. This may 
explain the limited impact of toned-down communication, in eroding motivational 
impact or satisfaction levels, w.r.t. this particular case. 
3.4 Studies related to employee involvement 
Empirical research into evaluating the productivity effects of these practices have found 
that these schemes work better if there is employee participation and if the variable 
component represents a sizeable share of an employee' s compensation (Weitzman and 
Kruse, 1990; Collins, 1998). In the backdrop of confusion over what causes work 
improvements in variable pay plans (with specific reference to gainsharing plans) -
whether it is the role of participation & involvement or whether it is the impact of 
financial incentive, Rosenberg and Rosenstein(1980) tested these two explanations 
empirically (Bullock & Lawler, 1984). Using longitudinal models of productivity, they 
found that productivity increases were more a fiinction of increases in participation than 
as a result of financial bonuses. This, however, has been countered by researchers like 
Geare (1976) who perceived that gainsharing-plan-results were primarily due to 
economic motivation, than due to role of participation or self-actualization. The authors 
(Rosenberg and Rosenstein) concluded that involvement was a more significant factor 
than financial rewards in increasing pay plan effectiveness. Similar results were found by 
McAdams & Hawk (1992), who found that plans reported better results when employees 
were involved in the design and implementation phases of plan development. Bae and 
Lawler (2000) supported the hypothesis that high-involvement HR strategy had positive 
impact on firm performance in emerging economies, which inturn supported the 
universality perspective. Huselid (1995) tested the impact of 'high performance work 
practice' on employee productivity (and turnover) and organizational outcomes (ROA, 
Tobin's Q), when used with regard to employee incentive programme. In particular, 
'high-performance work practice' develops employees' skills and knowledge, and allows 
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their involvement in problem-solving and decision-making activities. Key feature of the 
practice is the use of extensive involvement programs. Huselid (1995) found that a 
greater ratio of such high-performance work practice led to higher financial performance 
and employee outcomes. The study has used the human resource tool as a means for 
motivation than relying only on the incentive aspects of the plan. This shows that in 
general, there is support for the hypothesis that EI facilitates positive impact on firm 
performance. Lawler perceived employee involvement as a distinct characteristic/ 
advantage of gainsharing plans. 
Previous research initiatives found that approximately 4 out of 5 organisations did not 
involve employees in design of compensation programs. This is part of the reason that 
compensation professionals report that 'building better line of sight' and 'effective 
program communication' are viewed as two of the top challenges in pay program design 
(Scott, Mcmullen, Wallace 2004). In CIPD's (Central Institute of Personnel and 
Development) Annual reward management survey 2005, similar results were found. It 
was found that in less than half the organizations, the HR personnel consulted line 
managers at the time of developing the reward strategy. Some HR personnel went as far 
as not even sharing the strategy with them, even after the roll-out stage of the plan. The 
survey covered 500 organisations that represented 1.5 million employees (CIPD,2005). 
3.5 Studies related to employee understanding of variable pay system 
Huff (2006) studied the performance pay plan at a 200-truck carrier company, and found 
that when the payout is based on a neat performance measurement system, it positively 
affects understanding and acceptance. In this case, weekly performance reports were 
provided. Drivers' were given reports in terms of'revenue-per-driver' that offered them 
visibility of their contribution to business goals. Its benefits were: a) it kept up the 
momentum to continue making improvements b) it clearly showed how the payout 
varied, based on performance results, thus making the ideal of pay-differentiation very 
perceptible and tangible. The payout schedule was developed around the scorecard 
system, and drivers were evaluated every 6 months, wherein they had a chance to raise or 
lower their pay rate. This also points to the role of frequent performance evaluation, and 
existence of involvement mechanism, which helped understanding and also made 
management proactive. Performance measurement included assessment of performance, 
and ascertaining contribution to the company. This suggests that at some organizations, 
performance measurement may be so designed, so that indirectly it leads to setting up of 
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employee LOS with business results (Huff, 2006). Measurability of performance 
measures and clear definition of payout schedule made the plan simple to understand and 
one of its key benefits were that it attracted strong performers. This meets the critical 
requirement of 'attraction of talent' that constantly gnaws at the Indian Software 
Industry. The suggestion of the statement is that performance measurability and visible 
differentiation in salary or acknowledgement of performance is a potential motivator for 
employees. 
Clear Performance 
Measurement 
System 
Frequent 
performance 
feedback 
Understanding 
and acceptance 
Attraction of talent 
Employee 
Involvement 
Fig. 3.1: Role of communication and involvement, leading up to acceptance 
Huff (2006) reported other plan features that contributed to understanding of the plan. 
These aspects included self-funding nature of plan(savings to performance measures 
added to the payout pool), one-month pilot testing post implementation, and simplicity of 
its design. A direct fallout of better understanding was that the drivers' interest increased 
in business and they began putting in more effort to improve their performance. This also 
goes to establish that when employees' interest in business is enhanced, it is a motivation 
for them to improve performance. 
3.6 Studies related to employee satisfaction 
Different perspectives are available in literature about what impacts employee 
satisfaction. The previous literature consistently found that attitudes and behaviors of 
members were significantly affected by their perceptions of justice, that they derive from 
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how reward is determined and distributed across an organization. This brings out the role 
of communication, as a potential predictor of justice perceptions. Chang and Hahn (2006, 
p.407) found that 'commitment performance appraisal practice' significantly increased 
the perception of distributive justice, which contributed to employee satisfaction. This 
particular approach views a) employees as resources or assets and (this has a semblance 
of treating employees like partners in business.) b) values their voice. In essence this 
approach trusts employees and values employee involvement. It is inferred that when 
employees feel valued and are given a chance to contribute through involvement, the 
positive effects of PFP on employees' attitudes are enhanced. 
McCausland, Pouliakas & Theodossiou (2005) using data from four yearly periods 
(1998-2001) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) found that when pay is 
related to performance, it exerts a positive effect on the mean job satisfaction(JS) of 
(very) high-paid workers. A potential explanation for this pattern could be that for low-
paid employees PRP is perceived to be controlling, whereas high-paid workers derive a 
utility benefit from such pay plans. This partly explains the relative indifference of 
middle managers towards variable pay system. Since every countr}' is characterized by 
distinct labour market contexts, the results can't be generalised. Nevertheless, relevant 
inferences can be drawn and used. The findings suggest that performance pay could 
prove counterproductive for certain low-paid occupations, with reference to employee 
satisfaction level. It may be argued that since middle managers do not belong to low paid 
belt, more so in the IT industry, PRP's negative effects on satisfaction level may not 
similarly apply to the middle managerial level employees. It is reasonable to surmise that 
job satisfaction is likely to have an effect on satisfaction with pay plan too. Useful 
inferences can be drawn w.r.t satisfaction experienced by low paid workers vis-a-vis high 
paid workers. A useful inference for compensation designers is the option of keeping 
varying proportions of salary as variable for employees, depending on their salary 
bracket. 
3.7 Studies related to impact on organization performance 
Research literature on variable pay plans is predominantly available in form of case 
studies. "There is a paucity of studies in which the effects of PP (and other pay systems) 
have been analyzed on a longitudinal basis with adequate experimental and control 
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groups Most evidence is based upon impressions, interviews, and hope" (Thierry, 
2006). Significantly, in a large scale study carried out by McAdams & Hawk (1992), 
they conclusively found that operational plans reported greater improvement in business 
performance and also showed greater satisfaction with plan results than the plans using 
only "bottom line" financial measures. It is possible that the underlying reason for the 
same lies in employees having the benefit of clearer line-of-sight with operational 
measures. In particular, longitudinal studies may be difficult for variable pay plans since 
these are frequently revised, and there isn't an aspect of constancy to these plans. A case 
study of the US postal service is discussed, which discusses the problem that prior to use 
of PFP, its pay levels were above what private sector paid, while its performance was not 
even close to the goals set ("How variable pay", 2002). The postal service used pay-for-
performance system of the EVA type and divided the pay budget into 'pay increase 
budget' and 'lumpsum bonus'. As a result, its productivity increased and the pay bills 
were brought in check. The particular design was that it paid only one third of the payout 
in the same year, and carried forward the rest by adding it to a reserve, In the following 
year, it paid one-third of the account, and thus kept tab on present as well as future 
performance. The impact was observed on the organization's performance - the 
overnight delivery - which they measured as having increased by 8% to 9% mark. This 
figure is not set against any target or a threshold performance. Impact on another 
performance measure is written in qualitative terms, in terms of - 'observed a steady 
decline' - which is not a quantitative measurement, but is written in a positive tone, 
indicating a measure of gain. It is worthy of consideration that one of the program 
objectives of 'creating a stakeholdership feeling' that was mentioned explicitly - is 
neither backed by measures put in place for achieving it (like - communication or 
involvement initiatives) nor are its result mentioned (ibid). Since the main motivation to 
implement the program was to make pay levels more competitive, this objective may 
have been pushed to the background. Also, since this was initiated by an external 
consulting firm, it is likely that the more tangible objectives were tackled first, to the 
neglect of the less noticeable ones like 'imbibing stakeholdership feeling'. Infact, the 
finding offers a mere glimpse of what could be a much wider phenomenon, with other 
users following the same path and espousing similar priorities. Also, productivity is 
discussed at the organization level and intermediate impact on employees is not 
112 
discussed. Also, the author is silent about communication process and involvement 
process w.r.t. employees. 
Several studies have found support for the contingency perspective., which draws on the 
notion that the alignment of compensation system with strategic objectives fetches 
superior returns because the compensation system promotes behaviors needed for 
successful strategy impIementation(Kim, 2006). Due to lack of a standard methodology 
for impact evaluation (de Swardt, 2008), different organizations use different criteria for 
assessing plan success. In Huffs case (2006), the plan was perceived as successful since 
a) it sufficiently differentiated among pay levels, based on performance and b) it was 
self-funding. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of pay plans in terms of productivity results. Lawler 
studied 500 plans and found that only 33 had sufficient detail to enable assessment of 
productivity (Roy and Dugal, 2005). Since the requirements of compensation disclosure 
are not stringent enough, as evidenced through a study of 73 listed companies in 
Newzealand (Thorpe & Bowey, 1998), it becomes difficult to do an adequate analysis of 
the link between incentive compensation and corporate performance. 
Some researchers have expressed doubt about the efficacy of variable pay plans. For 
instance ThieiTy(2006) noted that "in most reseifch (w.r.t. impact on organization 
performance) the causal factors have not been identified; (and) consequently, it is 
possible that better performing companies have subsequently introduced PP (instead of 
the other way round)." Another failing Thierry (2006) noted was that many companies 
did not measure productivity or performance data before and after introduction of a 
performance pay system, neither on individual or group level or on company level 
(ibid). 
Measurability is an important factor in success of these systems. Measurability enables 
the plan users to assess and know about the effectiveness of plans. A case is discussed to 
bring out this point. lOMA's pay for performance report ("How variable pay", 2002) 
discusses the case of US postal services that faced the problems of a) high pay costs -
14% higher than the market pay - that was not related to performance and b) inability to 
achieve the set goals. To overcome these problems, it brought in pay-for-performance 
system using EVA financial performance measure. Instead of giving out annual pay 
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hikes of 5% per year compounded annually, it made 18% reward available, of which 
2.5% was given as pay increase and remaining 15.5% as lumpsum payment. As a result, 
the pay levels (and profits) were brought on a competitive track and the postal service 
achieved its goal of better overnight delivery—which rose from 83% in the early 1990s 
to 93% in the late 1990s. These figures are not set in the background of a threshold 
target. One of the objectives of the programme was 'creating a stakeholdership feeling' -
but its achievement was not reported. It may be inferred that the objectives that are not 
accompanied by clear criteria of evaluation, usually are left non-assessed. 
Research related to favourable impact on organisation performance: Improved 
performance as a result of PFP systems in field settings has led to better overall financial 
performance for organizations over both three and five year periods in some studies (see 
Lyons & Ben-Ora, 2002). In a large scale study of over 16000 managers in 250 
organisations, it was found that use of variable payment improved a firm's financial 
performance (Abowd,1990; Petty, Singleton, & Connell, 1992), and further a 
comparative analysis among 3 divisions (that covered 3977 employees) found that 
divisions having organization-level variable pay plans reported better operational 
performance with the pay plan than without the pay plan. Huff(2006) in his study of a 
truck driver company, evaluated the variable pay program in terms of revenue, level of 
performance (operational) and if employee turnover went belov/ industry average. In 
particular, the focus of a STVPP is distinctly on performance results achieved. The 
author has not given indication about extent of revenue or the degree of employee 
performance factor that was achieved, when seen in contrast to a predefined milestone. 
A true incentive system rewards, on the basis of meeting or exceeding targets. Incentive 
systems have been shown to increase performance in both basic and applied research 
studies when compared to hourly wages e.g., see Abemathy, 1996; Bucklin, McGee & 
Dickinson 2003; Frisch & Dickinson, 1990; George & Hopkins, 1989; Smoot & Duncan, 
1997). Some research has shown as much as 200% to 300%) improvement in 
performance with incentive pay (Frisch & Dickenson, 1990),The study reports an 
impressive performance increase with use of incentives. Incentives have a characteristic 
of clearly bringing out the relation between performance and pay and thus enhancing 
instrumentality and overall motivational force. The same clarity of link between 
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performance and pay if replicated with use of variable pay systems, it can positively 
impact performance results. 
Burke and Terry (2004) demonstrated how variable compensation can lead to reducing 
the operating leverage and the breakeven point, as a result of shifting more costs (ie the 
compensation cost) from fixed to the variable. They based their analysis on manipulation 
of compensation costs rather than analysis of motivational impact on employees" 
performance. They built on the premise that variable compensation grew only when it 
was backed by corresponding revenue growth. 
A variable pay plans achieves many important objectives apart from impact on 
bottomline and operational measures. Huff (2006) found in a case study analysis, that the 
reported benefits include- increase in participant interest level in business, enhancement 
of employee line of sight (between their role and business goals), and an increase in pay 
levels for more than 50% of employees (due to self-funding nature of plan). The case 
clearly brings out the role of neat performance measurement system in assessing and 
reporting improvements. 
Research related to unfavourable impact on organization: Brown and Perkins (2007) 
conducted an extensive research on the state of strategic pay among UK owned 
multinationals. They reviewed and themselves carried out detailed surveys and research 
studies, most notably- The CIPD's Annual Reward Management Survey (C1PD,2006), 
case studies in 20 UK organizations (Armstrong & Brown, 2006) and a survey of 
international reward practices among 63 multinational organizations. According to their 
analysis "it's not working. Organisations are experiencing major problems in delivering 
on their reward-policy intentions". Amidst varying types of reports, companies have 
shown faith in potential of variable pay systems at leveraging performance. The Watson 
Wyatt survey ("New Benchmarks", 2004) found that low-performing firms made 
maximum revisions to their VPPs as 63% had changed their plan in previous 12 months 
compared to a parallel figure of 40% in case of high-performing companies. This 
indicates that low growth firms are hopeful of leveraging their VPPs, in the hope that it 
will be instrumental in solving their business problems. 
Researches showing negative impact of money on work motivation (Eisenberger & 
Cameron, 1996; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003) are not directly relevant for this study purposes. 
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yet these help to once again differentiate between incentives and variable pay, bringing 
forth aspects of 'ownership feelings', 'feeling of accountability', and 'empowerment' 
that must necessarily be inculcated in participants. Another vivid learning is that variable 
pay encompasses involvement and communication mechanisms in addition to monetary 
incentive aspect. 
3.8 Studies related to impact on employee performance 
Arthur (1992,1994) MacDuffie (1995) found that patterns of human resource programs 
and practices (labeled as "commitment strategy/flexibility logic") that considered human 
resources as valuable assets and useful tools for improving firm outcomes, produced 
better performance results than the case where human resource programs are seen as 
mere cost reduction strategies. Therein lies the suggestion favouring application of 
strategies that relate effectively to employees (for instance involvement, communication, 
empowerment). Seen in context of variable remuneration plans, it may be interpreted that 
use of these mechanisms is a worthwhile decision and a well-supported idea, rather than 
choosing to limit its scope to merely its incentive character. This contention suggests 
that firm outcomes are better when employees are treated as valuable assets than when 
they are perceived as- being manipulable, through cost reduction strategies. This very 
closely corresponds with the preferred use of 'strategic alignment' objective of variable 
remuneration. Anfuso (1995) examined organisational variable pay plans to understand 
whether variable pay led to enhancement of performance by way of improvement in 
motivation of employees (Poole and Jenkins, 1990 ; Kaufman, 1992 ; Kruse, 1992,1993 ; 
Jones and Kato, 1993a,b etc ) or through promised amount of variable pay. Vp5 
analysed VPPs from employee perspective to understand whether variable payout led to 
an improvement in job satisfaction or did it merely cause increase in wages. Belfield and 
Marsden (2003) found that the evidence for effectiveness of PRP in improving employee 
performance was less clear-cut with differing studies reaching rival conclusions on the 
matter. Contrarily, a number of studies using private sector examples (Fernie and 
Metcalf, 1995; Heywood et al., 1997; Metcalf, 1995) have pointed out the presence of 
significant positive association between PRP and workplace productivity or financial 
performance outcomes. Some observers, though, are less sanguine. Addison and Belfield 
(2001), for example, found no significant relationship between PRP and productivity 
performance in the private sector, while study on the public sector by Marsden et al. 
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(2001) concludes that, in the long term, PRP may actually have a negative impact on 
organizational performance. In the least, it indicates the role organisation culture plays in 
determining the impact of pay plans. 
Jensen (2003), offering a rich insight into employee peculiarities, observed that the 
shape of a firm's compensation scheme, i.e. whether people are paid a fixed salary or on 
the basis of performance results, leads job applicants to self-select into a preferred 
compensation scheme based on their productivity. In particular, he argues that more 
productive workers will choose the PFP scheme, while less productive workers will opt 
for the fixed-salary (FS hereafter) scheme. This has implications for employee 
preferences for the type of compensation plan they would like to opt for. This would be 
relevant if organizations make it optional for employees to seek or not to seek variable 
pay component as a part of their salary. In the least it points to higher levels of 
satisfaction with VPP among those employees who have high productivity levels. 
Highly risk-averse employees are less responsive to performance-based financial 
incentives, and may even suffer a decline in productivity under PFP. Cadsby, Song, 
Tapon, (2005) demonstrated that the effectiveness of PFP at improving productivity was 
inversely related to individual levels of risk aversion, as for about a quarter of the 
participants, PFP actually lowered productivity. This is exactly opposite to the response 
which is sought to be evoked through use of VPPs. Similar finding was reported by 
Cable and Judge (1994: 341), who reported that "risk-averse individuals placed less 
emphasis on pay level as a criterion in their job pursuit process". This suggests that the 
valence associated with reward may be lower for risk-averse individuals. One might 
expect that the incentive effects of PFP might be less pronounced for more risk-averse 
participants. Holt & Laury (2002) found a significant inverse relationship between 
productivity improvement under PFP and the level of risk aversion, {p =.017). This 
suggests that variable pay plans need to first assess the risk attitudes of individuals 
before applying the plan. This would suggest customizing the plans to the specific risk 
behaviour or risk preferences of an employee. This is important as it impacts 
productivity improvement. It requires research to understand whether such customized 
plans, based on employee risk patterns, would yield desired results or would it 
inadvertently breed perceptions of unfairness and inequity among employees. 
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Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1989) added that risk averse employees were more likely to 
contemplate leaving their jobs. It suggests that such employees require some form of 
redressal to setoff the negativity they perceive in PFP programmes. Useful inititatives to 
build their acceptance level include intensive use of communication and involvement 
mechanisms. A more risk-averse person assigned to a PFP system v/ith its uncertain 
payoffs might well experience considerable discomfort and stress when compared to a 
less risk-averse person. If such stress impedes performance, the hypothesized incentive 
effect of PFP may be weakened, eliminated or even reversed. A considerable literature 
exists concerning the relationship between stress and job performance (see Muse, Harris, 
& Field, 2003, for a critical review of this literature). Most of the empirical literature 
suggests that stress is negatively related to performance (see the references in Muse et al, 
2003).If this is the case, the higher level of stress experienced by a more risk-averse 
participant assigned to the PFP scheme along with the lower level of reward valence 
found by Cable and Judge (1994) might together reduce the strength of the hypothesized 
incentive effect of PFP. 
3.9 Conclusions from the chapter / Need for Research 
Recent years have seen an increase in the debate on the role of payment systems and 
participation in performance improvement. Earlier research (Lupton, 1963; Mayo, 1949; 
Roy, 1952) has provided a great deal of insight into some of the behaviour patterns which 
explain the failure of an incentive payment scheme to motivate higher performance. 
Majority of research available in this field relates to incentives, that only offers broad 
guidance for research work in field of variable pay systems, but not close enough to 
obviate the need for replication of similar research uisng variable pay construct platform. 
It is established that variable pay systems comprise the constructs of contingency as well 
as of participation (as articulated in the New pay philosophy). There have been many 
ways in which organizations have sought to influence the productivity of their employees 
which include wage payment systems, efforts to reduce worker fatigue, improvements in 
human relations, changes in management style, better job design and job enrichment, 
participation and autonomous working groups. In spite of all the new techniques and 
theories, the incentive-based wage payment system continues to be widely used. 
However this is not to downplay the inherent negativity attributed to incentive systems, 
but an occasion to uphold the powerful effect it potentially has on employee behavior. 
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There is a strong need for such research to address the question of how variable pa}' 
systems can better affect performance of managers. Previous research, mainly , rather 
most pertinent one being by Thorpe and Bowey (1988), has found that benefits of higher 
management understanding, and higher understanding and also commitment on part of 
employees, as benefits of consultation. Not many similar researchers have so directly hit 
the subject of involvement, and more so none of the type is available in Indian scenario. 
To add to it, no significant work as such is available to comment upon such pay systems' 
impact on middle managers belt. Thus, a need is felt to rigorously pursue research in this 
direction that so directly deals with issue of performance impact. 
The studies conducted in the area of compensation have largely been in the United states 
understandably because of better research facilities created by its affluence. More 
specifically, in the case of researches on variable Pay, maximum information is available 
from U.S. Journals and survey reports. This may be due to the fact that about 70% of 
U.S. companies use some form of variable pay, according to a survey by Hewitt 
Associates and American compensation Association (Stacy, 2000). The review of 
literature suggests that research efforts in this field have unraveled the compensation 
field sufficiently, to arrive at the following conclusions - a) Variable pay as a component 
of compensation is desirable b)The philosophy of variable pay strongly motivates 
compensation designers in favour of group-based pay systems, however, there are mixed 
results about organizations using different kinds of variable pay structures. The answer 
to the dilemma lies in the effectiveness of performance measurement, and extent of 
transparency of communication systems. Literature also clearly brings out that support 
communication systems in favour of STVPPs are not strong enough. 
Consider the caveat - Variable pay plans signal shifting of risk to the employees, which 
instills feelings of ownership, insecurity, and being on the edge. Involvement of 
employees is very low in design as well as implementation of the plan. Considering this, 
employees shall be able to espouse the scheme willingly and wholeheartedly, only when 
constant support, in form of ongoing communication, is visible to them. These startling 
revelations about rather feeble communication systems for variable pay implementation, 
as well as its sustenance, point to a glaring need for a thorough study to assess the 
magnitude as well as the causes of gaps in communication. 
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Many companies have adopted new pay practices in the past decade to align reward 
systems with the important changes occurring in organizational design and management. 
(Schuster and Zingheim, 1992). However, the issue of variable pay is not getting 
sufficient attention , particularly in the early stages of the pay-design process(Burns, 
Gherson 1996). Though numerous survey results have shown an increased use of 
variable pay, companies tend to devote a very small percentage of their total annual cash 
compensation (typically between 3% and 10%) to variable pay. The reasons for its 
restricted use could be the uncertainty about the effectiveness of variable pay. The 
caution organistions exercise in use of variable pay, may also stem from tentative nature 
of results about effectiveness of VPPs. The reasons for scanty literature on effectiveness 
of variable pay schemes can be summed up in the follov/ing words: 
Assessment of effectiveness must be sensitive to what management is 
trying to achieve. As implied, a pay system may well be informed by a 
range of objectives. Moreover, measuring the impact of pay upon the 
performance of the individual employee or of the organization is an 
extremely difficult process. Given that performance in both senses is 
dependent on such a wide range of variables, the viability of isolating 
the impact of one - a particular payment system - remains highly 
problematic. It may also explain why the choice of any given payment 
system is often viewed as an 'act of faith' by management (Kessler, 
2002, p. 5185). 
A similar evaluation has been provided by E.E. Lawler III (Lawler, 1966), who has 
investigated the "mythology" in current management compensation programmes which 
has prevailed due to the absence of sound psychological research. He observed that "if 
most of the proper conditions do exist for money to be used as a suitable motivator to 
increase productivity, there will be little increase in productivity until the managers see 
that management is actually relating pay to productivity." The statement does attest to 
the need for employees to perceive a strong link between pay and performance. It is 
precisely the validity of the premise, and the immense potential it holds for high impact 
on business performance, that it is thought necessary to conduct a systematic study on 
the impact of variable pay plans. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Various aspects of methodology, that are relevant for purpose of this research, are 
discussed in this chapter. Methodology refers to how research should be conducted, 
while methods concern the tools and techniques that are used to collect data (Saunders et 
al., 2003). Research is defined by Saunders et al.(2003) as "something that people 
undertake in order to find out things in a systematic way, thereby increasing their 
knowledge." 
The chapter dwells on the research approaches available and the one adopted for this 
study, it discusses the research objectives that are outlined for this study, specifies the 
research variables used and draws out the research questions to be dealt with through this 
study. A survey strategy is used and the study's hallmark is that it was preceded by a 
rather intensive preliminary level study. The research hypotheses, development of 
research Instrument, and composition of the respondent groups is discussed. It is 
explained how the criteria for identification of sample is determined. The sampling plan 
is detailed that discusses how organizations in the population were screened, discusses 
the eligibility criteria for sample of middle managers, gives the sample composition, and 
in particular gives a detailed description of the term 'Middle Managers'. Particular 
attention is paid to the criteria used for identification of middle manager levels, and the 
same is discussed. Methods used for data collection are discussed. The method adopted 
for carrying out the study is evaluated under four separate groups, that are : a) The 
subject to be studied, b) The respondents and the context of observations, c)the 
researcher, and d) the research instrument. 
Data analysis techniques are briefly discussed. Towards the end, critical evaluation of the 
overall research effort is conducted. The chapter culminates in a brief summary of the 
research methodology adopted for this study. 
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4.2 Research approach 
Research can be conducted within mainly three paradigms. These are the quantitative, 
qualitative and critical social science paradigms (Neuman, 2000). The first two paradigms 
are the most frequently used approaches in research. The critical social science paradigm is 
rather a philosophy about the purpose of research than a methodology. The philosophy of 
the critical social science paradigm is that any approach (be it qualitative or quantitative) is 
acceptable as long as it contributes to the ideal of improving the quality of society (Neuman, 
2000). 
4.2.1 The qualitative and quantitative research approaches 
Qualitative and quantitative approaches to research are often positioned as two opposing 
approaches. Although there is no rule that only one approach may be used in a research, 
researchers usually embrace only one of the two. Qualitative research is language based 
and conceptualised through observations of social reality. It describes people in their 
natural habitat. Quantitative research refers to frequencies, concepts, variables and 
measurements of people's perceptions and opinions. Qualitative research normally starts 
with an "open" agenda and is led by the evidence to a conclusion. In contrast, 
quantitative research starts from definite hypotheses, postulates or propositions that are 
either supported or not supported by empirical evidence during the research. 
4.2.2 Research approach chosen 
The purpose of this study is to seek clarity about the very expensive business practice of 
variable remuneration. It seeks to understand the impact of variable remuneration on 
performance of middle managers, and also to understand its impact on overall business 
results. Using the perspective of the critical social science paradigm, the choice of a 
quantitative research approach is preferred. The reasons for this choice are the following: 
• There already exists a body of knowledge about variable remuneration, though there 
is ambiguity about the various terminologies used for referring to these systems. In 
particular, the term 'New variable pay' carries the additional meaning that it supports 
business strategy through the route of business-employee alignment and employee 
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involvement. This study shall address concerns about ambiguity that has shadowed 
the conceptualisation of variable pay - this constitutes its secondary focus. 
• Interrelationships between variables need to be studied empirically, in order to 
understand which initiatives are useful and need to be stressed, and also to 
understand which initiatives are not contributing sufficiently, that need to be de-
emphasized. 
• Empirical relationships between variable remuneration system and performance 
outcomes need to be understood, even if variable pay systems can't be credited with 
sole attribution for the outcome. 
• The study needs to be replicated. The choice of middle managers for this particular 
study is motivated by concerns of a) increasing strategic importance of middle 
managers' roles, and b) relative neglect of this belt, from the point of view of 
understanding performance impact of remuneration plans. Such a study needs to be 
replicated for two purposes - a) Iterative process of the study may be used, in order 
to optimise the impact of variable remuneration plans on middle managers' 
performance, and b) Lower levels of management that are covered by variable 
remuneration, may also require a similar study, for understanding the impact of 
variable remuneration on performance results. 
For these reasons, use of a quantitative approach to carrying out this research would be 
most appropriate. The research is conducted within the ideals of a scientific approach. A 
scientific approach can be defined as "...the systematic, controlled, empirical, amoral, 
public, and critical investigation of natural phenomena. It is guided by theory and 
hypotheses about the presumed relations amongst such phenomena" (Kerlinger & Lee, 
2000, p. 14). The basic aim of science is to build theory. Theories are tentative 
explanations for observable phenomena (Mouton & Marais, 1996). These are regarded as 
the working truth until they are reviewed during empirical research. Each theory is 
evaluated empirically to determine how well it predicts new findings. Theories could be 
used to guide the research plan by generating testable hypotheses and conducting their 
empirical testing in the defined framework of the selected population, This study follows 
the ideals of scientific approach and is subject to all the norms followed by the scientific 
community in pursuing a quantitative approach. 
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4.2.3 Research Objectives 
This study is built on tlie hypothesis that the design and implementation systems of a 
short term variable pay plan potentially impact the performance outcomes of an 
organization. Since the study's focus is limited to studying middle managers, its impact 
on their performance results is studied. Its impact is at best indirect since employee 
involvement and employee understanding are the key system variables that moderate the 
impact of the pay plan process. Additionally, an equally important area requiring 
attention Is that of relative 'lack of clarity' about the subject (see section 1.4). It is 
incumbent upon a researcher to delve into potentially critical issues that relate closely to 
the subject of study, and are in need of research attention. Confronted with problems of 
'ambiguity' and 'uncertainty of impact', it is logical to turn to its basics, and examine the 
foundation of these plans. The roots of these systems lie essentially in their design and 
implementation systems. This study pivots around the design and implementation 
systems used for crafting a variable remuneration plan. Particularly, the focus is on 
involvement mechanism and employee-related practices like communication systems, 
type of education/training imparted and whether there are systems to ensure high level of 
employee understanding, with specific reference to operation of variable pay plans. 
Employee satisfaction with these plans is also examined. In investigating these plans, the 
single minded focus has been on identifying ways and means for enhancing their 
performance impact. 
4.2.3.1 Research variables 
Variables could be dependent (presumed effect) or independent (the cause). For example, 
a value can be attached to a construct that relates to the predictability of the influence 
that the construct has on the outcome of variable remuneration. This allows the 
researcher to assign cause (independent variables) and effect (dependent variables) status 
to variables. In the research process the researcher uses the independent variables to 
prove and ultimately predict the relationship with the dependent variables. This research 
regards 'design and implementation systems of a variable remuneration plan' as its 
independent variables, and considers the 'outcome of the variable remuneration plan' as 
its dependent variable. The study holds the belief that the way payment systems are 
designed and implemented, can affect chances of the pay program's success. 
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A third category of variables, moderating variables, has also been investigated, to 
determine the intervening influence they have on the dependent variables. Moderation 
occurs when the relationship between two variables depends on a third variable. Such 
variable affects the direction and/or strength of the relation between dependent and 
independent variables. In this particular research, the two intervening variables are -
Employee Involvement in the variable pay process, and their level of understanding 
about its purpose and working aspects. 
4.2.4 Research Questions 
A good first step is to formulate a research question. A Research Question is a statement 
that identifies the phenomenon to be studied ("The relationship", 2002). It is the question 
which the research sets out to answer. A good research question defines the 
investigation, sets boundaries and provides direction (O'Leary,2004), The research 
question states clearly what the study will investigate or attempt to prove. The research 
question is a logical statement that progresses from what is known or believed to be true 
(as determined by the literature review) to that is unknown and requires validation. 
The researcher arrived at the research questions as a result of engagement with related 
literature, dialogue with some of the renowned authors in the field, and on the basis of 
insight from the preliminary study carried out in interaction with industry'. While the 
related literature (mainly authored by Schuster and Zingheim, Lav/ler, Ledford and 
Covey) emphasized the motivational potential of New variable pay systems, the 
compensation survey reports (from credible consultancies like Hewitt, Towers Perrin etc) 
expressed skepticism about the positivity associated with these systems. The discrepancy 
presented a crack in the door, which was further pursued and taken up vigorously in 
interaction with cross-section of personnel of software industry. The rough attitude of 
employees and the shallow approach of human resources as v/ell as that of finance 
personnel, caused researcher to take notice of the apparent disconnect between theory 
and practice. In a way, such preliminary level study provided sturdy reason to pursue 
research about knowing impact of variable pay systems. 
' The preliminary study was carried out after formalizing the topic of research. Its objective was to learn 
more about the practice of variable pay, mainly because it appeared a little inchoate. 
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Given this background, it was decided to investigate the impact of variable pay 
component of compensation on the performance outcomes. An important ancillary 
objective has been to clarify the conceptualization of 'New variable pay' systems. Infact 
throughout this thesis, great emphasis is laid on clarifying this construct, and wherever 
possible, it has been clearly differentiated from incentives. This should be useful to 
ingrain in the minds of the reader, how new variable pay is different from incentives. It 
may be a little cumbersome for the reader to everytime encounter the term 'New 
variable pay', however this much elaboration is required since the term variable pay is 
synonymous with incentives, and the terms are very well interchangeable. 
The subject has been dealt with in the context of Indian Software Industry since this 
industry was the first one to adopt such kind of remuneration system, that happened as a 
ruboff of its parent companies that were often MNCs. The goal of this research study 
shall be achieved by studying and answering the following questions ? 
1 What are the specific aspects of the design and implementation systems of short 
term variable pay plans, that are used in the Indian Software Industry? 
2 What is the impact of short term variable pay plans on managers' performance? 
3 What is the perceived impact of short term variable pay plans on organizations' 
performance? 
4 What is the level of managers' understanding about the purpose and about the 
working of short term variable pay plans? 
5 What is the level of managers' satisfaction with short term variable pay plans? 
The above research questions are useful, as together, these converge to create 
understanding about how to improve the impact of STVPP on performance outcomes. 
4.2.5 Research Strategy 
The research strategy is a plan of how the researcher will go about to answer the research 
questions (Saunders et al., 2003). A number of research strategies are available for 
conducting social science researches: Experiments, surveys, histories, case studies, and 
the analysis of archival information. As shown in Table 4.1, the researcher can choose a 
suitable research strategy based on three conditions: the type of research question, the 
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extent of control that an investigator has over actual behavioral events, and whether the 
focus is on contemporary or historical events (Yin, 2003). 
Table 4.1: Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
Strategy 
Experiment 
Survey 
Archival 
analysis 
History 
Case Study 
Form of research 
question 
How, Why? 
Who, What, Where, 
How many. How much? 
Who, What, 
Where, How many, How 
much? 
How, Why? 
How, Why? 
Required control 
over behavioral 
events 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Focuses on 
contemporary 
events 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes/No 
No 
Yes 
Source: Yin (2003), p. 5 
The first and the most important condition for differentiating among the various research 
strategies is to identify the type of research questions being asked (Yin, 1989). The 
research questions set the stage for demarcating the scope of the study, and for narrowing 
down the focus to those sample elements that provide the required information, for 
adequately answering the research questions. The research questions set out for this 
study (see sec 4.2.5) are aimed at understanding the design and implementation systems 
of a variable remuneration plan, their impact on performance results, how well 
employees understand these and the extent to which they feel satisfied with their use. 
The study requires information and analysis of the processes the software industry uses 
for developing and implementing variable pay systems, performance output of middle 
128 
managers^ and that of organization under operation of these systems, their level of 
understanding about the pay plan and the extent of satisfaction they perceive w.r.t. their 
experience with functioning of these systems. 
The nature of data required for the study warrants a descriptive nature of study. The 
study uses the strategy of survey method, as its principal form of enquiry. Descriptive 
research (or survey approach) collects data in order to answer questions about the current 
status of the subject or topic of study. It is an orderly, scientific and disciplined process, 
involving selecting an appropriate sample of participants, collecting valid and reliable 
data and reporting conclusions. Survey is a non-experimental, descriptive research 
method, and it is useful when it is intended to collect data on phenomena that cannot be 
directly obsen'ed. Survey methodology is a commonly used means for accessing reliable 
compensation data. For instance CARS^ (Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies), 
a leading compensation research firm worldwide, used survey approach to examine the 
effectiveness of 750 variable pay plans, in its first 3 studies - viz: CARS I (1990-1993), 
CARS II (1993-1995) and CARS III (1995-1996). Survey research does not belong to 
any one field and it can be employed by almost any discipline. It is perhaps a dominant 
form of data collection in social sciences, providing for efficient collection of data over 
broad populations, and is amenable to administration in person, by telephone, and over 
the Internet. Various studies on pay plan effectiveness carried out in the past have used 
this approach (Ex: Cable and Judge, 1994). 'What, Why, How, When & How much 
nature of quesitions have been used to examine the design and implementation systems of 
a variable pay plan. 
The processes involved in formulating variable pay plans are complex and varied, and so 
are the specific features of these plans. Such emergent diversity is partly explained by 
their relative lack of clarity (see section 1.4), and partly by exhortations favouring 
customization of pay plans to specific business needs (Ex: Schuster & Zingheim, 1992; 
Lawler, 1990). This research does not endeavour to control the behavioral events as it is 
" Particularly middle managers are chosen since these have been not covered under variable pay systems, 
not until the 1980s. Thus, it represents a relatively new and an untested phenomenon. This theme is 
elaborated in section 1.5 
^ CARS was formed in 1990 by Jerry McAdams (former rewards practice leader at Watson Wyatt) and 
Elizabeth Hav/k, kicking off more than a decade of extensive research in the field of compensation. 
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neither possible nor feasible to lay out all the influencing factors on a drawing board; 
also it is inconceivable to attempt any type of strict control over its causative factors 
/events. The f^ cus is on understanding the nature of its contemporary practice and with 
this reasoning., the survey approach is apparently the most appropriate research strategy. 
4.2.5.1 The formal research study was preceded by a preliminary study, which turned 
out to be extensive as well as intensive. The preliminary study formed the first pedestal 
from where the researcher could get a glimpse of the real practice of short term variable 
pay plans (section 4.4.2.3).The results of the study provided momentous direction and 
shaped the course of the study. While the detailed results of the preliminary study are 
summarised in Annexure 5.2, some of its results that strongly affect the subsequent 
research process, are discussed here. 
Inability to use before-after design: The software sector has been an old user of variable 
pay systems. Large setups like HCL, Wipro, Satyam, TCS, Infosys have pioneered use 
of STVPPs in this industry. The relatively smaller boutique shops, that have cropped up 
in the past, are nothing but start-ups by ex-industry personnel (Kalyan Singh, VP - HR, 
HCL Comnet). This adequately explains the universal rule that governs this industry -
institution of variable pay systems right from the inception stage of organizations. 
Inability to carry out a longitudinal type of study: Literature survey led to the inference 
that variable pay plans are fi-equently revised. The same was accepted by the industry 
practitioners too. According to them, these plans essentially change every year, while the 
extent of change may be minor or major. Hence due to highly dynamic nature of variable 
pay plans, a longitudinal study would not be valid, since the nature of scheme would be 
different each year. While it was apprehended that high attrition rate of managers would 
be a potential problem in doing a longitudinal study, the study never came to this hurdle 
largely because of instability in the pay plans itself 
4.2.6 Research Hypotheses 
Hypotheses are statements that describe the relationship or difference between two or 
more variables related to the research problem or statement. Hypotheses are normally 
formulated as relationships that need to be tested. A hypothesis can also be described as 
a conjectural statement of the relationship that exists between two or more variables. 
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In quantitative researcii the concept of a null hypothesis refers to relationships where it is 
postulated that no relationship exists between the variables. The objective of the research 
procedure is to disprove the null hypothesis or to prove that the relationship between 
variables is not coincidental. Hypotheses are predictions of some specific event with a 
probability greater than chance. The prediction is based on theory. The hypothesis guides 
the study to prove its correctness. If enough evidence is found that the hypothesis is true, 
the confidence that the theory is good increases (Goodwin, 2000). 
In order to adequately answer the research questions {see section 4.2.5), the following 
null hypotheses have been tested in the study. These are listed below in table 4.2. 
TABLE 4,2 
List of Null hypotheses 
Hon 
Hoi2 
Hoi3 
Ho21 
Ho22 
Ho23 
Ho31 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' performance, as 
perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' performance, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' performance, as 
managers themselves perceive it. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisations' performance, as 
perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisations' performance, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisations' performance, as 
perceived by managers. 
Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Human resources 
personnel. 
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Ho32 
Ho33 
Ho41 
Ho42 
Ho43 
Ho51 
Ho52 
Hos3 
H061 
Ho62 
Ho63 
Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as managers themselves perceive it. 
Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Human resources 
personnel. 
Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has no 
impaict on managers' performance, as managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human resources 
personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' satisfaction, as managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay plan has 
no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human resources 
personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay plan has 
no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay plan has 
no impact on managers' satisfaction, as managers themselves perceive it. 
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H07 
Ho8 
Ho9l 
Ho92 
Ho93 
Hoioi 
H0102 
H0103 
Hoi 11 
There is no significant difference among the perception of managers, Human 
resources personnel, and the Finance personnel as regards the impact of 
STVPP on managers 'performance. 
There is no significant difference among the perception of managers, Human 
resources personnel, and Finance personnel concerning impact of STVPP on 
organizations 'performance. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP, as 
perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP, as 
managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of 
STVPP, as perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of 
STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the purpose of 
STVPP, as managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of STVPP, as 
perceived by Human resources personnel. 
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Hoi 12 
Hoi 13 
H0121 
Hoi 22 
Hoi 23 
Hoi3 
H014 
Hois 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of STVPP, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the design phase of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of STVPP, as 
managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as perceived by Human resources personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay |3lan has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the implementation phase of short term variable 
pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as managers themselves perceive it. 
Managers' perception about STVPP's impact on their performance has no 
correlation with their perception of level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
Managers' perception about STVPP's impact on their performance has no 
corr(;lation with the extent of control they perceive over performance 
parameters of their variable pay. 
Managers' perception about their extent of control over performance 
parameters of their variable pay, has no correlation with their level of 
satisfaction with STVPP. 
4.2.7 Research instrument: 
A descriptive research uses formal instruments to study preferences, attitudes, practices, 
concerns, or interests of a sample. Questionnaire method for data collection is quite 
popular, particularly in case of big enquiries (Kothari, 2004). The sample size of middle 
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managers was fairly large, thus it required a formal plan of investigation. Interviews 
were conducted based on a formal plan in order to reach the highest levels of accuracy 
and validity. The purpose of study was such that it required more indepth information, 
than what could be afforded by a purely structured questionnaire. A semi-structured 
questionnaire provides greater depth than is possible with a totally structured type 
(Westburn Publishers Ltd., 2002). For this reason, the questionnaire was made semi-
structured, which accommodated both open-ended and closed-ended questions 
{Annexure 4.2a,b,c). Use of open-ended questions enhances richness of findings (Scott 
et.al., 2004) and it allows researcher greater control over sample of respondents (Moore, 
1983). For instance - Questions about understanding of 'purpose' and about 
understanding of 'working details' required detailed questioning, which was only 
possible through constant probing permissible only with open-ended type questions. 
The survey instrument was self-developed, so as to adequately cover issues requiring 
examination. Fay & Tare (2007, p.65) perceive that "Although many surveys are 
available, most are general rather than industry-specific". There is wide support in 
compensation research that favours use of self-developed instruments, for meeting 
specific study-based data needs. (Scott et. al.; Chartered institute of Personnel and 
Development, 2006). A useful example is of Ponsford and Carpenter (1978), who 
cautioned others to be careful in using their very own developed instrument, since they 
were doubtful if it would accurately match all contexts. Thus, the instrument is 
developed, specifically for Indian software & services sector, particularly for the middle 
managerial levels. Three separate questionnaires are prepared, one each for each of the 
following groups of respondents. 
Respondent Groups 
The Human Resources' 
Group 
Middle Managers' 
Group 
The Finance group 
Various aspects of design and implementation, issues of involvement in STVPP process, 
extent of understanding about the purpose and about its working aspects, and satisfaction 
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with variable pay plans, have been studied. Broadly, the questionnaires are divided into 
two sections - Section A and Section B. 
Section A contains statements, on the format of a valid 5 point numerical scale (Likert 
scale - ordinal) wherein 1 denotes "strongly disagree", 2 "disagree" , 3 "neither agree 
nor disagree", 4 "agree", and 5 represents the highest degree of agreement "strongly 
agree". Likert-type scale is widely supported and is actively used in compensation 
research community (Beer & Katz,2003). This is due to heavy reliance on attitudes as a 
predictor of actual practice. Scott et.al (2004), too had used Likert scale for their study on 
effectiveness of variable programs. 
There are 66 statements for managers' questionnaire, and 45 each for the human 
resources group and the finance group relevant questionnaires. The following list (in 
table 4.3) gives the variables used in the questionnaires. Each variable code may have 
maximum three variants, wherein one particular variant represents the perception of one 
type of respondent group. Accordingly each variant is suitably prefixed with the 
appropriate letter. For instance - variable DC denotes degree of control over 
performance parameters, and when it is written as MDC, it represents managers' 
perception about the same. Similarly variants are used for the other 2 groups too. 
TABLE 4.3 
List of variables used, and their respective descriptions 
Variable code 
DC' 
(only variant is M DC) 
LS 
(variants include '^1_LS, FLS, and H_FS) 
lEP 
(variants include MJE?, FJEP, and H_IEP) 
lOP 
(variants include MJO?, F_IOP, and HJOP) 
Variable description 
Degree of control over performance 
parameters 
Level of satisfaction with STVPP 
Impact of STVPP on managers' 
performance 
Impact of STVPP on organisations' 
performance 
This variable has been examined only with the managers' audience. 
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Variable code 
UP_EP 
(variants include M UP EP, F UP EP, and 
H_UP_EP) 
UW_EP 
(variants include M UW EP, F UW EP, and 
H_UW_EP) 
InD_ES 
(variants include M InD ES, F InD ES, and 
HJnD_ES) 
Inl_ES 
(variants include M Inl ES, F Inl ES, and 
HJnI_ES) 
InD_UP 
(variants include M InD UP, F InD UP, and 
HJnD_UP). 
InlUP 
(variants includes M Inl UP, F Inl UP, and 
HJnI_UP. 
InDUW 
(variants include M InD UW, F InD UW, and H 
InD_UW). 
InI_UW 
(variants include M Inl UW, F Inl UW, and 
HJnI_UW) 
UP 
(variants includ(^  MUP, F_UP, and HUP) 
UW 
(variants include M_UW, F_UW, and H_UW) 
Variable description 
Understanding about purpose of STVPP 
has a positive impact on managers' 
performance. 
Understanding about worliing of STVPP 
has a positive impact on managers' 
performance. 
Involvement in design of STVPP has a 
positive impact on managers' satisfaction 
with STVPP 
Involvement in implementation of STVPP 
has a positive impact on managers' 
satisfaction with STVPP 
Involvement in design of STVPP has a 
positive impact on managers' 
understanding about purpose of STVPP 
Involvement in implementation of STVPP 
has a positive impact on managers' 
understanding about purpose of STVPP 
Involvement in design of STVPP has a 
positive impact on managers' 
understanding about working of STVPP 
Involvement in implementation of STVPP 
has a positive impact on managers' 
understanding about working of STVPP 
Level of managers' understanding about 
purpose of STVPP. 
Level of managers' understanding about 
working of STVPP. 
Note: Prefix 'M_' represents the perception of managers, prefix 'F_' represents the perception of Finance 
group, and prefix 'H_' represents the perception of Human Resources group. For ex: FUP denotes that 
- In perception of finance personnel, managers 'understanding about the purpose of STVPP has a positive 
impact on their performance. 
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Section B contains open ended questions that are meant for understanding detailed or 
descriptive opinions. Also, it offers opportunity' for clarifying opinion, wherever related 
perceptual views pose situation of conflict or confusion. The specific nature of data 
sourced from the three kinds of respondents, is detailed below. 
Respondent type 1- Head of Compensation and Benefits, representing the human 
resources group at the particular sample organisation 
This particular respondent type constitutes the source of following data needs -
Primary purpose of STVPP, details of variable pay structure, as defined for various 
levels of middle management (with specific reference to year 2006-07), significance of 
threshold level goal. Involvement in plan design, potential benefits associated with 
involvement of managers, plan administration details, plan-related communication 
carried out vv'ith managers, methods of communication used, method for establishing 
managers' LOS with business goals, nature of performance progress reports for tracking 
employee performance and also for tracking organization performance & frequency of 
such reporting, method of communication used for information about payout amount, 
extent of explanatory information offered in support of payout-related information, how 
STVPP endeavours to motivate managers, suggestions for enhancing motivational 
impact on managers, opinion about increasing proportion of variable pay for managers, 
perceived impact of STVPP on managers' performance, perceived impact of STVPP on 
organisation-level STVPP goals, and some general nature information about organization 
structure. The Human resource group was essentially probed about the design aspects, 
the implementation aspects and the perceived impact on performance results. 
Additionally, propositions concerning impact of higher involvement and a clearer 
understanding on performance outcomes and on satisfaction level, were put up for their 
opinion. 
Respondent type 2 : The Chief financial officer, representing the finance group of the 
sample organisation 
The respondent constituted the source of the following identified data needs -
Overview of STVPP process, primary purpose of STVPP, significance of organization 
threshold level goal, whether managers' line-of-sight with business goals is established, 
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involvement of finance in STVPP process (and its extent), source of funds for variable 
payout, whether the pay plan is evaluated to determine its impact on performance, 
methodology used for impact assessment, suggestions for enhancing its motivation 
power and organization performance information (along with threshold level) for three 
year period. Ideally organization performance and payout information was required in 
exact numbers. While pre-testing the quesionnaire it came through that exact 
performance information about Revenue, PAT etc is quite sensitive and would be 
difficult to procure in any IT company (Mr. Jitendra Mahajan, CFO, NUT Ltd.). For this 
reason, the financial information was procured in form of broad class intervals, and was 
sourced directly from the CFO, in order to ensure highest level of accuracy. The Annual 
report could have served as a potential alternative source for required performance 
information, however, it would not have provided details about threshold goal, which is 
the kingpin for assessing performance impact of variable remuneration plans. 
Additionally, there are other bits of financial information that are suitably modified for 
serving specific needs of a variable compensation plan. Such information includes the 
key performance parameters used for evaluation of variable pay plan, and the relative 
weights assigned to these parameters. 
Essentially, the finance personnel were asked to provide a broad overview of the pay 
plan process, the nature and extent of their involvement, and financial information 
needed to know the pay plan's effectiveness. Additionally, propositions concerning 
impact of higher involvement and a clearer understanding on performance outcomes and 
on satisfaction level, were put up for their opinion. 
Respondent type 3: Middle Managers, representing the middle management's.rQup of the 
sample organisation 
The managers' group constituted the source for the specified data needs, that include 
understanding about the structure of variable pay, its perceived objectives, perceived 
understanding about its working, perceived control over performance parameters of 
variable payout, significance of threshold level goal, perception about line-of-sight with 
business goals, desirability of including organization-linked performance parameter, 
nature and extent of managers' involvement in process of STVPP, whether their 
involvement should be increased in STVPP process, which aspect of STVPP they find 
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motivating, suggestions for enliancing its motivational value, how their interest level can 
be heightened in the pay system, their overall satisfaction level with the STVPP process, 
and their performance information about the two year period between 2005-2007 with 
specific reference to the level of threshold goal. Additionally, propositions concerning 
impact of higher involvement and a clearer understanding on performance outcomes and 
on satisfaction level, were put up for their opinion. Also, the propositions were directed 
at finding out what would cause a better understanding about STVPP process among 
managers. 
The research instruments developed for the study have the underpinning of the research 
questions identified in the study. Each research question is scientifically examined and 
analysed to determine the type of questions to be raised. Thus, the perspective the 
researcher adopted in examining each of the research questions, is hereby briefed. 
Study of Design and implementation systems ofSTVPPs - In order to ensure homogenity 
among pay plans included in this study, certain preliminary conditions were specified at 
the pre-interview stage^ and important ones were reiterated for confirmation, at the 
beginning of the interview. These conditions include - a) the variable pay plan should 
have been in use for the middle managers, b) variable pay plan duration should be for an 
year or less, and c) the variable pay proportion of CTC (on account of short term variable 
payout) should be in the range of 15% to 25% d) the main purpose of STVPP should be 
to achieve business objectives. 
Impact of STVPP on managers 'performance 
Difficulties associated with assessing impact of variable pay plan, in terms of 
productivity, are widely reported. Lawler studied 500 plans and found that only 33 had 
sufficient detail to enable assessment of productivity (Roy and Dugal, 2005). Even when 
productivity improvements have been found with rigorous methods, it is difficult to find 
the cause {ibid). Performance can be defined as "the ability of an object to produce 
results in a dimension determined a priori, in relation to a target" (Laitinen, 2002 cited in 
O'Regan and Ghobadian, 2004, p.409). According to Armstrong (1996), one method of 
^ Certain conditions about pertaining to the variable pay plans were checked with the HR representative, at 
the time of seeking appointments. 
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defining its impact is in terms of percentage of target goals achieved, fn this regard, it 
seems appropriate to compare the current period's achievement with a previously set 
benchmaric, which is of strategic significance to the organisation. This study rests on the 
premise that organizations set the threshold goal with a view that this is the minimum 
level of performance that employees must achieve. Similarly a threshold level is 
determined at the level of organization performance too. Once an organization is able to 
achieve its threshold, it signals the organization has acquired the minimum ability, 
required to pay the committed amount of variable pay (ie target variable pay amount). 
Considering lack of consistent findings on impact of pay systems, this method offers a 
reasonably certain platform for assessing performance impact. 
Employee performance data is understood as performance information of employees, in 
the form it is measured by the concerned organization. Most organizations capture 
performance in terms of level of goal achievement or performance rating. Data has been 
gathered about percentage of targets achieved in years 2005-06, 2006-07 Comparison 
was made with threshold level goal and the target level goal. In cases where rating was 
used, same procedure of comparison in reference to threshold and target was used. 
Wherever threshold rating or threshold goals were not specified, industry practice of 
average threshold has been considered. In general, the industry practice about the 
variable pay policy is highly secretive. For the purpose of this study, this norm has been 
calculated on the basis of information gathered from other respondent organizations. 
Cases where individual performance is not an explicit factor of variable payout, it was 
checked if they achieved the benchmark level (or threshold level) of performance. In 
addition to it, perceptual data has been used to assess impact on employee performance. 
Similarly, Eskew and Heneman(1996) in their case study analysis, made use of 
'employee attitudes toward pay' to understand type of its impact. 
Impact of short term variable pay plans on organisation performance The objective of a 
variable remuneration plan should be defined in a manner that makes it possible to assess 
the extent to which it has been achieved (Armstrong, 1993). It is common knowledge 
that there are difficulties in measuring and assessing the economic impact of a pay 
program (Eskew&Heneman,I996). Many companies do a cursory review of variable pay 
plans, while only few conduct a systematic exercise to evaluate the link between the pay 
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plan focus and increased firm value. Applying a systematic approach helps companies to 
make informed decisions about financial focus in the design of pay plan (Marino & Kay, 
2006-07). Often quantifiable performance measures are chosen, since financial measure 
is the ultimate arbiter of organisation performance in a capitalist economy (Belfield and 
Marsden, 2003) Studies on impact of STVPP on organization performance that were 
carried out in the past (Huff, 2006) have looked at indicators like employee turnover (in 
comparison to industry average), revenue, and level of performance. The performance 
measures used, were not explicitly referenced against a milestone (like threshold goal or 
an overall target) for determining if a company has the 'ability to pay' the committed 
payout amount. 
Even when productivity improvements have been found with rigorous methods, it is 
difficult to find the cause (Roy and Duggal, 2005). In view of this they suggested that 
firm performance should include both objective and subjective measures. Luthans and 
Peterson(2002) noted that while predominantly organizations have used financial 
measures, there is a realization that even soft measures are important. Studies that have 
measured plan success, have widely used perceptual data as the basis of evaluation 
("Report on salary", 2006). Likert type scale is popularly used for assessing extent of 
plan success(ibid). This study has used perceptual data and financial data to understand 
the perceived impact of STVPP on organisation performance. This research relies on the 
performance measures that each organization uses in its calculation of variable payout 
amount. These measures (which could be Revenue, PAT or other financial measures) 
have a predefined threshold level, which organizations use as a reference point for 
determining the payout amount to be declared. It was found what percentage of targets 
organisations achieved in the 3 year period, between 2004 to 2007. Data was gathered in 
form of broad class intervals viz: 70% to 85% achievement, 85% to 100%) achievement, 
and 100% to 120% achievement. This data was compared with threshold, and the extent 
of overachievement or underachievement was determined. In those cases where the 
organizations have not specified the threshold level goal, as an alternative the industry 
average (of threshold level) has been used on the assumption of generalizability. Some of 
these organizations reasoned that they did not specify threshold as they were confident of 
surpassing the minimum performance requirement. One of the respondents referred to it 
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as the pull factor, and felt that given the buoyant scenario, this factor need not be 
activated (Sunil Sapre, Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd., Mumbai). 
It was always intended to use the additional methods of impact evaluation, that 
organizations themselves used for impact assessment. In most cases organizations did 
not use any evaluation methodology as such; instead the question was often redirected 
back to the researcher, questioning how such evaluation was possible. According to 
Eskew and Heneman(1996), compensation professionals can potentially assess its impact 
thru employee attitude. It is common among studies to use perceptual data gathered from 
participants to understand the overall impact of pay plan (Ex: "Report on salary", 2006). 
This particular study found results in terms of 'extent to which organizations achieved 
the objectives of STVPPs', using a likert scale. 
Managers' understanding about the purpose and the working details of STVPPs : 
Employee understanding about the purpose of STVPP has been assessed directly and 
indirectly. Managers were questioned about the purpose of STVPP, and their 
understanding of the same was assessed by researcher. An open ended nature response 
was sought, in order to test the depth of their understanding. The intent was to assess 
their knowledge level about it. Their responses were recorded and assessed by the 
researcher. Level of understanding was ascertained on the basis of the following key. 
TABLE 4.4 
Template for interpreting level of understanding about the 'purpose' 
of STVPP 
'Objective' of variable pay plan 
To ensure employees achieve their goals. 
To ensure business achieves its objectives 
Alignment of employee goals with 
organisation's goals 
To connect employees to business in a 
{Indicative) Level of understanding 
To a large extent 
Completely 
Completely 
Completely 
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'Objective' of variable pay plan 
partnership relationship 
Risk mitigation 
To keep portion of employees' salary under 
company's control 
Retention 
To link pay to performance 
To make perfoi-mance quantifiable 
To control compensation cost 
To have a performance culture 
To alert employees 
To create a sense of belonging in employees 
To bring ownership feeling in employees 
To push performance / 
to motivate high performance 
(Indicative) Level of understanding 
Partly 
Partly 
To a small extent 
To a large extent 
To a small extent 
Partly 
To a large extent 
Partly 
Completely 
Completely 
To a large extent 
The above coding is based on researcher's tacit knowledge. For ease of analysis, similar 
nature statements were clubbed together. For instance - 'Risk mitigation' was clubbed with 
'To keep compensation cost at a minimum'. The level of employee understanding has been 
scored in the manner: 5 for 'completely understand, 4 for 'understand to a large extent', 3 for 
'partly understand', 2 for 'understand to a small extent' and 1 for 'understand not at all or no 
understanding'. Based on these scores, descriptive statistics have been calculated for each 
organization. Another method adopted to assess employee understanding of purpose was to 
ascertain theii understanding of the link between their goals and organisation's goals. This 
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constitutes employee line-of-sight with business goals and its understanding significantly 
contributes to understanding of STVPP purpose. 
Employee understanding about working of STVPP was assessed using tliree different 
approaclies. These are discussed in detail. 
Managers were explicitly questioned about the structure of their variable pay. It aimed to 
assess managers' knowledge about variable pay structure. Their responses were assessed 
on a 5 point scale to ascertain the degree of correctness. The assessment was carried out 
by the researcher as she was aware of the salary structure of employees. This information 
constitutes a part of pay plan design, which was gathered during interview with head of 
Compensation and Benefits. This served as a benchmark or the touchstone for assessing 
employees' responses. These responses are numerically scored, and are analysed using 
descriptive statistics. 
A second method was the assessment of managers' perceived understanding about 
working of STVPP. While the earlier question was about their knowledge of structure of 
variable pay, this question adopted a broader scope as it checked employees' perception 
regarding overall understanding of its working details. A third method involved 
assessing, which is a necessity, if one is to understand the v^orking of STVPP. If 
managers are able to grasp that threshold level is the key to actual delivery of payout, 
they would most likely exert greater effort in direction of achieving this milestone. With 
this view, this aspect of their understanding was assessed. 
Employee satisfaction with short term variable pay plan : Satisfaction with a variable 
pay plan can make or break a plan. McAdams and Hawk (1994) in a wide-ranging study 
of 2200 variable pay plans, assessed satisfaction level using a 5 point likert-scale. 
This study assesses employee satisfaction using both direct and indirect approaches. The 
following indicators were used to assess managers' satisfaction with variable 
remuneration plan. 
(A) Achievability of threshold level goal 
(B) Fairness in administration of STVPP 
(C) Preference as to its continuance 
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(D) Measure of overall satisfaction - Direct question was asked in order to gauge 
overall satisfaction with use of STVPP. 
Other indicators of STVPP-related satisfaction include -
(E) Extent of control over performance parameters of payout •• It is to be expected 
that employees would like to exert complete control over parameters that 
determine their payout amount. 
(F) Perceived impact of STVPP on manager performance (V/ith regard to this, a 
triangulated view of the three respondent groups was gathered) 
4.2.7.1 Pilot Test: 
A pilot test involves simulating the actual data collection process on a small scale to get 
feedback on whether or not the instruments are likely to work as expected in a "real 
world" situation. Thus, it provides an opportunity to make revisions to instruments and 
data collection procedures to ensure that appropriate questions are being asked, the right 
data will be collected, and the data collection methods will work ("Planning & 
conducting a pilot test", 2008). The instruments developed for the study were pilot tested 
to ensure the overall structure was not cumbersome and the flow of questions was 
logical. Pilot survey is a replica of the main survey. It brings to light the weaknesses 
found in the questionnaires and any other weaknesses apparent in the survey techniques. 
The questionnaire for middle managers was pilot tested on 15 respondents (10% of 
sample size), and the questionnaires meant for human resources and finance group, were 
pilot tested with 3 professionals in each case. 
A mix of methods that included face-to-face communication, communication through 
email and telephonic conversation, were used to assess general reactions to the 
questionnaires. Suggestions for improvement included simplifying the language of 
questions, restricting the length of questionnaire, and other aspects related to the content 
and also the sequence of questions. Suggestions that were relevant and also feasible, 
were incorporated and consequently the questionnaires were revised. 
Changeover from closed-ended to open-ended: A peculiar problem had occurred in 
relation to the closed-nature questions. It was observed that the respondents spent 
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considerable time in rank ordering the pre-coded categories, that represent various 
responses. The> spent considerable time juggling between the various options and 
getting the rank order correct. It was observed that, very often, in doing so, they often 
failed to express their true opinion, and instead got entangled in the sea of options 
presented to thein. In doing so, the purpose of interview was often lost, since they did not 
come out with their own view and instead focused on the options presented to them. 
Thus, due to the failure to find out reality through closed ended questions, all such 
questions were changed into open-ended form. There were 3 such questions posed to the 
human resources group, 2 such questions were posed to the finance group, and 3 of these 
types were posed to the middle manager group. This slight tweaking in the manner of 
asking questions ensured respondents could freely air their thoughts without being 
shackled by the burden of choosing among the pre-stated options. This change was 
achieved at the cost of higher investment in recording as well as in analyzing the 
responses, but it offered returns of richer and a unique insight into respondents' 
perceptions. To lucidly bring out the strength of this argument, an example is cited. 
When asked about impact of STVPP on performance, most managers merely shrugged 
their shoulders and said that it had no impact on their performance. Precisely these 
particular words could neither be captured through rating scales and nor these could be 
assimilated through the closed type questions. Thus, for crucial questions like these, it 
became critical to change the form of question. Incidentally due to this insight, an 
additional question about how managers could be more concerned with STVPP, was also 
added. 
It is important that the sample be so selected that the data requirement is fruitflilly met, 
research questions appropriately investigated, and valid findings arrived at. Towards this 
end the process of selecting an appropriate criteria of sampling, was taken up. The same 
is detailed in the following sub-secfion (ie section 4.2.8) 
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4.2.8 Process of determining the criteria for identification of sample 
organisations 
At a macro level, the Indian IT industry was considered appropriate for studying variable 
pay plans, since linking objectives to performance outcomes, continues to be popular in 
the technology sector. A 1994 survey, carried out by Sheffield consulting firm found that 
90% of companies in the computing and information systems industry, paid some form 
of variable pay (mainly bonus or a profit share) (Macalister, 1994). Despite the 
preponderance of variable pay systems in the information technology industry, it was not 
clear what basis of selection should be used to further select the actual sample 
organizations. 
It is pertinent to note at this stage that while the chief objective of the research concerns 
the formally identified research objectives, an additional concern gnawing at the 
researcher was a growing feeling of there being an unexplained gap - a void between 
what is advocated about these systems and their practice in context of software industry. 
Though this issue is like an inactive bomb, it would have been unfair to just have swept 
it under the rug, without appropriately solving it. Observing the apparent discrepancy, it 
was thought important to approach knowledgeable personnel in the field. Scott et. 
al.(2004) in their study of annual cash variable pay plans, had similarly used the method 
of informal discussions with academicians and practitioners. 
It is summarized that primarily two reasons constituted the basis for carrying out a 
preliminary study. These are - a) the need to crystallize the criteria that would be used 
for sample selection, b) the need to understand the nature of discrepancies between 
conceptualization and operationalisation of these plans. 
4.2.8.1 Preliminary study 
Truly the preliminary study turned out to be a precursor that prefixed the actual research 
process. Since it dwelt on the fringes of the main process, buffering it rather 
significantly, the researcher chose to refer to it as the 'preliminary study'. However, it 
may as well be termed formally, in keeping with the research parlance, and referred as 
the pilot study. A pilot study is a small scale preliminary study conducted before the 
main research in order to check the feasibility or to improve the design of the research. 
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They are frequently carried out before large-scale quantitative research studies, in an 
attempt to avoid time and money being wasted on an inadequately designed project 
(Wikipedia, 2010). Specific questions were discussed with industry personnel (see 
Annexure 4.1 for questions asked) that helped in clear conceptualization of the subject 
and also helped in clarifying subsequent path of research. Understanding these aspects 
helps in developing an appropriate survey instrument that is realistic in approach and is 
not unnecessaril) theoretical in its outlook. Answers to these questions are helpful in 
choosing a robust criteria of sample selection, which, in a large measure, takes care of 
the issue of feasibility of data collection. For instance - the preliminary study of this 
research led the researcher to believe that it was highly impractical to propose to the HR 
personnel to allow access to complete employee database, for pro-rata basis selection of 
middle managers, across levels and across functions. Such proposal would have truly 
decimated any hopes of getting permission to conduct research in an organization. The 
researcher wishes to highlight here that the course of preliminary study, made it 
abundantly clear without any trace of doubt, that the selection of middle managers would 
have to be carried out by organization itself, wherein the researcher could at best adopt 
an advisory posture. 
Results of the preliminary study: The results of the study, reflect the thought pattern of 
the researcher, as she went about, meandering through various considerations, accepting 
or rejecting perspectives, brought forth by respondents. The broad themes or the issues, 
that were hashed out during this phase are presented below. These can be seen as a series 
of steps, as the researcher kept rolling from one to another, until she reached the desired 
criteria for identification of sample. 
Theme^ I - The researcher began with the default position of endeavoring to study those 
plans that had formal design and implementation processes. This would have ensured 
availability of substantive data about the pay plans. Really, it would have offered enough 
meat to construct a good case out of it. However, a point of divergence was encountered 
in that if the study was restricted to formal pay plans only, then it would limit its 
representativeness. There was no substantive reason for choosing to ignore informal 
plans, leaving them out of the loop of this study, except that these could pose problems 
* The term 'theme' can be understood as a tentative criteria, to be tested for its suitability 
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of gathering data in a structured form. Tiius, criteria of process maturity was favoured as 
an appropriate screening condition. 
Theme 2 - It v/as suggested that within the IT industry, such sector should be chosen, 
where performance measurements are mature (Viveic Punekar, Vice President - Human 
Resources, HCL technologies ltd). This led to the search for a suitable indicator about 
maturity of performance measurement systems. 
Theme 3 - It required examination as to which sector of the industiry would offer promise 
of mature measurements. Towards this end, primarily the software sector and the BPO 
(Business Process outsourcing) sectors were explored. Results of such examination are 
discussed below: 
1 Nature of Performance measurements in the BPO sector 
Feasibility of working in BPO sector was examined on the assumption that it would offer 
benefits of less stringent barriers, that would mean relative ease of gathering data from 
respondents. According to Amit Bajaj, Corbus India Ltd. "while data collection may not 
be so much of a challenge in this sector, a bigger issue is that the measurements are not 
mature in the BPO sector." Reasons for the same include the relative newness of this 
sector, and the factor of immature processes, since it was common to find pressure-
driven scenarios that made even senior level personnel go neck-deep in operational 
matters - leaving them little time for processes-building activities (for instance activities 
like chalking out key result area, designing systems to quantify performance results, 
systematizing training need identification and planning its execution). Also, the fear of 
high employee turnover rates, can easily render such detailed measurement exercise 
futile, that further explains their reluctance in investing serious effort in drafting systems. 
This explains the reasons for relatively immature performance measurement systems in 
the Indian BPO industry. 
2 Performance measurements in the software sector 
In comparison to the BPO sector, measurements are more mature in the software sector 
(Vineet Son], Consultant, Hewitt Associates; Gyanendra Singh, Human Resources 
Manager, RBS). Reason is that this industry has had variable pay ingrained in its 
compensation structure, since its inception in India (Kalyan Singh, HR, HCL Comnet). 
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Additional reasons for maturity of its measurements are that all IT-related jobs are 
outsourced which necessitates measurability, and that this dati is routinely used for 
employees' training need identification (Vineet Soni, Hewitt associates). It is established 
that due to reasons of mature processes and well-designed performance measurement 
systems, the software industry provides a relatively suitable ground for conducting this 
research study. The aspects favouring software industry have been found to be 
nonexistent in respect of the Indian BPO industry. 
Theme 4 - Having decided the sector of IT industry, the question about indicator of 
maturity of performance measurements, remained unanswered. 
• As a first step it was checked if the CMMI certified (a quality standard, popular in 
the software industry and also highly coveted) organisations possessed characteristics 
of process orientation (with specific reference to design and implementation systems 
of compensation programmes). 
• Enquiry was made with the HR personnel of CMMI certified organizations (CMMI 
level 4, CMMI level 5 and PCMM certified companies were approached) on the 
basis of list of member companies procured from NASSCOM {see Annexure 4.3). 
Enquiry was also made with QAI (Quality Assurance of India) and SEI^  (Software 
Engineering Institute) that are highly respected institutions, in the field of quality 
certification. Experts responded to the query, that are briefed in Annexure 4.4. Based 
on responses obtained to these queries, it was found that CMMI standard was 
relevant only for those organizations that are involved in system engineering and 
software engineering. By and large, respondents disagreed that CMMI indicated 
process orientation of organisation. Model PCMM too did not cater to the process 
orientation requirement of compensation plans. It was concluded from views of 
experts that there did not exist any specific quality certification that could offer 
indications about 'process maturity' or 'performance measurability' w.r.t 
compensation systems. 
CMMI: Capability Maturity Model® Integration (CMMI) is a process improvement approach that 
provides organizations with the essential elements of effective processes. 
PCMM • People capability maturity model is a maturity framework that focuses on continuously 
improving the management and development of the human assets of an organization. 
' Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh) developed CMMI model 
(Wikepedia Encyclopaedia). 
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• Having undertaken such detailed enquiry, it seems reasonable to conclude that none 
of the currently available quality-related indicators used in the Indian software 
industry, are suitable for determining process maturity or soundness of performance 
measurement systems in an organization. Herefrom this line of enquiry was therefore 
suspended as it had reached a deadend. The next step constituted contacting 
renowned authors of the subject, for their suggestions about choosing suitable criteria 
for sample selection. 
Theme 5 - Which criteria would be most suitable for selection of variable pay plans? This 
question was pursued with known authors of the subject. 
As a next step, authors of variable remuneration subject were contacted (through email) 
for suggestions about possible criteria for sample selection, so as to be able to tap the 
plans that offer promise of mature measurements. Suggestions included companies 
having similar revenue size, similar business, history of positive revenue and positive 
profit for 3 to 5 years (Jay R. Schuster, Personal communication, 2007), plan age of 
minimum 3 years, that would offer "some historical and enduring elements of the plan" 
(Tom Wilson, Personal communication, 2007). Detailed views of authors concerning 
possibly useful criteria of sample selection, are detailed in Annexure 4.5. On the basis of 
analysis of the views offered by authors and industry practitioners, a set of selection 
criteria, based on financial parameters, was drawn up. 
The preliminary study helped in defining a suitable criteria for identification of sample 
organizations. Financial performance criteria were used to screen the population and 
thereafter, these were short listed for finally selecting the sample. 
4.2.9 Sampling Plan 
According to Webster (1985), to research is to search or investigate exhaustively. 
Sample is a finite part of a statistical population, selected from a larger population for the 
purpose of a survey, whose properties are studied to gain information about the whole 
{ibid.). Sampling is an important aspect of data collection. It is concerned with the 
selection of an unbiased or random subset of individual observations within a population 
of individuals intended to yield some knowledge about the population of concern, 
especially for the purposes of making predictions based on statistical inference 
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(Wikipedia, 2010). In business research, sampling is widely used for gathering 
information about a population (Black, 2004). 
4.2.9.1 Defining the population 
A population can be defined as including all people or items with the characteristic one 
wishes to understand. Due to limitation on resources of time and money, the goal 
becomes to find a representative sample (or subset) of the population. 
A list of organizations in the Indian Software Industry was sourced from the PROWESS 
database of CMIE, as on IV^ Septmber'2007 (See Amexure 4.6). PROWESS database is 
highly credible, in view of the robust methodology it uses and also because of its 
systematic organization of the database (See Annexure 4.7). Organisations listed in the 
PROWESS database are classified under a unique industry group.. The closest matching 
description for Indian software sector is the following category -
Economic Activity - 'Computer and related activities (no. 72)', and further the sub-
activity chosen was 'Software consulting and supply (no. 722).' 
• The list consists of 382 companies. It is important to mention the date (ie 23 '^' 
Sept'07), as by this date, all companies had not posted financial results for the year 
2006 - 07. For this reason, only those companies were considered, that had posted 
complete financial results for the 3 year period ,2003 -2006. 
• Financial results for year 2006-07 could not be considered due to time lag between 
close of the financial year (April) and formal reporting of financial results. For 
instance - Even by September'07 very few companies had reported their 2006 - 07 
results. Infact these 3 years were considered on the suggestion of CMIE research 
team, as they expressed that results for 2006-07 would keep trickling until the very 
end of calendar year. Such a long wait was not feasible, hence 2006-07 results were 
not considered. Also, since the purpose of the study was to know about the trend of 
profitability, the researcher settled for three year period prior to 2006 - 07. 
4.2.9.2 Screening of organizations, from the PROWESS database 
On the basis of views of authors, and results of the pilot study, the following criteria 
were used to identify the sample organizations. 
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I First level screening was carried out on the basis of revenue and profit performance. 
At first it was determined which organizations had complete financial data for the 
years 2003-04, 2004-05, and 2005-06. Since this frame of 3 year period was decided 
to be considered, double check was run on the information 'Year of Incorporation' 
that was required to be either year 2002 or anytime earlier, but no later than this. 
Second level screening cons\%\zdi of determining if the revenue and PAT (profit after 
tax) performance for the identified financial period ie 2003-04, 2004-05, and 2005-06 
was positive. 
2 After applying the abovementioned criteria on the Industry masterlist, 122 
organisations qualified, out of the initial base of 382 companies. The average revenue 
of these organizations was computed, that came out to be 445 cr. Positional average 
was not favoured as majority of organizations have revenues of less than lOOcrores 
(see annexure 4.8). Thus, due to skewed nature of distribution of companies along 
the range of annual turnover, it was decided to not favour use of positional average. 
3 Sample-size determination is an important step in planning a study. In many practical 
situations, the sample size is mostly or entirely based on non-statistical criteria. It is a 
common situation wherein a researcher or a senior colleague may have established 
some convention regarding how much data is "enough." (Lenth, 2001). In his rather 
extensive analysis of problems associated with sample size determination, he 
concluded (p. 10) that "Sample-size problems are context-dependenf and that how 
important it is to increase sample size for reducing uncertainty {ibid.) " depends 
on practical criteria". Moreover, sample size is not always the main issue; it is only 
one aspect of the quality of a study design. 
The above background lays groundwork for answering the dilemma faced in 
determining the sample size for this particular study. The population size being 
finite, the formula for sample size determination requires an estimate of the standard 
deviation of population'" (Kothari, 2004, p. 176). It is suggested that it is (ie S.D.) "to 
be estimated fi-om past experience or on the basis of a trial sample" {ibid.). It is 
reiterated that the core research question about impact on performance, in terms of 
objective data, is assessed by ascertaining if the threshold goals are achieved or not. 
' Sample size (n)=z^xNxcrp/(N-l)e^+zVp 
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Other findings about the same are covered using perceptual basis. This establishes 
that the study in part sought to estabhsh the effectiveness of STVPP by ascertaining 
if threshold goal had been accomplished. This study very well conducted a 
preliminary nature study (sec 4.2.8.1), however sensitive information about 
performance outcomes was not revealed in such informal discussion. Performance 
information about either the managers or that of the organization, were a far cry from 
what organisations were willing to share across the table at such an early stage. 
Therefore, due to nonavailability of performance information at the pilot study stage, 
S.D. w.r.t this dimension could not be calculated. A bigger problem is that due to 
inability to attribute performance outcomes solely to STVPP, the only possible 
quantification was to determine whether threshold target was achieved or not. Since 
the broad result is not in nature of an absolute value, it would be inappropriate to use 
S.D. statistic in this case. 
Earlier in the discussion, cognizance is given to "practical criteria" for determining if 
sample size should be increased in order to reduce uncertainty of findings. This 
aspect is pertinent since due to hostile behavior of prospective sample organizations, 
such leverage could not be taken to enhance certainty of findings. Towards this end, 
the researcher endeavoured to route her request for data collection through 
NASSCOM (the IT industry lobby in India), but it plain refused to offer any such 
help as it was not in their policy to do so. For reasons as cited above, it was discussed 
with authors in the field" about an appropriate sample size, which was also ratified 
with the supervisors assigned to the study. It was decided to carry out the study with 
15 organisations, out of a base of eligible organisations of 122. 
4 The average revenue was determined at 445 cr, and a tentative selection of 8 
companies with revenues above this amount and 8 companies with revenues below 
this figure, was made (Annexure 4.6). This constituted the initial sample of the study. 
However, due to various reasons like ineligibility of organizations, or due to their 
unwillingness to share data, the finally selected sample list turned out to be 
drastically different from the original one. 
" Repeated discussion were held through email with Jay. R Schuster and Tom Wilson, who were kind 
enough to share their experience with the researcher. 
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The operational definition of short term variable pay plans as understood in the study, 
was used to determine eligibility of organizations for participating in the study. These 
criteria are listed below in the subsection below. 
4.2.9.3 Operational definition of short term variable pay plans, as 
defined for study purposes 
It is more appropriate to regard the narrative below as the criteria of eligibility, for the 
purpose of selection of sample organizations. The organizations that were selected, were 
first examined to check the adequacy of the variable pay plans they used. If the 
organizations successfully met the following criteria, then they were finally selected as 
sample for the study. The specific conditions that were used to ascertain the nature of 
pay plans used, are listed below. 
a) The primary objective of variable pay plan should be to achieve business objectives. 
Such plans are known to report better results (McAdams & Hawk, 1992). 
b) Such a plan should have been used for middle managers for a minimum of 3 year 
period. Three years period is kept as the minimum criteria, so that the plans have had 
a chance to reach the stage of maturity through an iterative process of refinements. 
c) It is desirable that individual performance be considered a factor in determining the 
variable payout amount of an employee. 
Other desirable aspects, while not in nature of strict conditions, were also made known to 
the organizations. These include the following. 
d) The pay plan defines a clear performance-payout schedule, preferably at the 
beginning of the performance period. 
e) Performance measures are quantified and middle managers possess the ability to 
influence their achievement. Preferably performance results should be measured in 
terms of 'percentage goal achievement'. However, since legacy of performance 
rating continues almost pervasively, its equivalent would be found out in numerical 
terms, v^herever possible. 
f) Level of threshold and that of target, are defined for middle managerial positions. 
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g) Organisation performance results are measurable in terms of 'percentage of goal 
achieved' (or its equivalent can be found). Usually, such would be the case, since as 
it is organization performance is captured in hardcore numbers in order to determine 
the bottomiine worthwhileness. 
Out of 16 organisations that were initially shortlisted, some companies did not meet the 
eligibility criteria for pay plans and some refused to participate. Progressively, more and 
more organizations were included in the prospective sample list, moving upwards and 
downwards (in equal numbers), from the average point, till 15 companies finally agreed 
to share their views and were also considered eligible. 
The logical next step was to determine the criteria for selection of managers from within 
the organizations. Such criteria and other considerations used in selecting sample of 
managers, are briefed below. 
4.2.9.4 Eligibility criteria for sample of middle managers 
In order to be eligible as sample respondents, managers should have been employed for 
minimum 2 years in their current organization. The time period required for eligibility is 
deliberatively kept conservative, due to known difficulties of data collection, that are 
all the more pronounced in the software sector. 
The abovementioned eligibility criteria for organizations (briefed in 4.2.9.3) and those 
for the middle managers (briefed in 4.2.9.4) were put across to Jay R. Schuster'^  (a key 
proponent of variable pay systems and a noted author of the subject) for his opinion on 
its appropriateness. These criteria, according to him, were suitable considering the 
purpose of the study. 
4.2.9.5 Sample composition 
Three different groups of respondents have been considered, within sample 
organizations. 
These are - The Human Resources group (represented by Head of Compensation & 
Benefits, the Finance group (represented by Chief Financial Officer) and a sample of 
'^  Added reeison was that the author had been taking is advice every now and then, since the beginning of 
the research and he was well aware of the study framework. For this reason, he was approached for advise 
about the choice of eligibility criteria. 
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middle managers (10 nos). In all, there were 12 sample elements respondents in each 
sample organization (10 Middle managers + 1 CFO + 1 Head C & B) 
4.2.9.5.1 Sample of organizations: 
A great deal of formal documentation, communication and follow-up was involved, as 
organizations were approached through cold-calling. The intention was to establish 
credibility of researcher's work as pure academic pursuit for knowledge, and allay any 
suspicions they may have about researches related to compensation. The sample 
composition in terms of their geographic profile is depicted below in Chart 5.1. 
Chart 5.1 
Geographic Distribution of Sample 
Organizations 
Hyderabad 
Bangalore 
27% 
NCR (National 
Capital Region) 
7% 
Mumbai 
26% 
The sample organisations had agreed to share data on the condition of anonymity. For 
this reason, their names have not been disclosed. The organizations' names are instead 
coded as CI, C2, C3, in this manner till C15. 
4.2.9.5.2 Sample of middle managers: 
The eligibility criteria for selection of middle managers is discussed previously in section 
4.2.9.4. A bigger question that required attention was "Which hierarchical levels of an 
organization, constitute the middle management level?" The role and function of middle 
management depends on an organisation's history, culture, ownership, structure, sector 
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and size (Hoiden & Roberts, 2000). Thus, the concept of middle managers is 
organization-specific. Its definition cannot be generalized. The inherent difficulty in 
defining the term 'middle managers' is well established in literature. Part of the difficulty 
is in portraying the role of middle managers. That is why, some researchers have based 
their definition on how sample organizations had described them (for instance 
Hodgkinson,2000). 
Generic description of middle managers 
For purpose of this research study, a literature based description of middle managers' 
roles and their functions, had been prepared for use of sample organizations, in form of a 
guideline. A clear template like this, would have offered a uniform framework, for 
delineating boundaries of the middle manager group. The description is reproduced 
below. 
Middle managers are primarily responsible for implementing plans and policies 
developed by top management and for supervising and coordinating the activities of 
lower level managers (Farkas & Wetlauter, 1996). They interpret senior management's 
vision to employees and play a co-ordinating role but within procedurally-limited 
autonomy (Bach and Della-Rocca, 2000). They are responsible for coaching managers 
within the framework of daily activities, and are also responsible for motivating 
managers. Middle managers have new roles of a teacher, intrapraneur, and that of 
strategic relations manager. These roles were included when middle managers seemingly 
became redundant due to use of computers for information processing. Some of their 
newer roles include the following. 
i. To ensure strategic priorities of organization are carried out 
ii. To act as a change agent 
iii. To facilitate innovation 
iv. To ensure exchange of information across the organization. 
V. To contribute technical skills. 
They mainly require human relation skills, followed by technical skills and to some 
extent the conceptual skills. They spend 36% of their time in leading, 33% in organizing, 
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18% in planning and 13% in controlling. They perform three kinds of work viz: 
Administrative work (routine, visible, identifiable activities such as collection and 
distribution of information), Technical work (related to one's profession) and Managerial 
work (persuading others into a particular opinion or course of action) (Torrington and 
Weightman, 1987). They are above the first-level supervisors and subordinate to 
executives who have company-wide responsibilities (Frohman and Johnson, 1992). 
Role of middle managers in the software industry 
Additionally, an industry perspective of roles of middle managers was prepared, on basis 
of 'Nasscom-Hewitt Total Rewards Study-2005, Benefits Base Report: IT industry'. {See 
annexure 4.9). Analysis of role-based responsibilities of key jobs, helped to select 
organization levels that closely represent middle managerial levels. 
TABLE 4.5 
Roles & responsibilities at middle managerial levels 
Designations (those constituting middle management level) 
Assistant Manager/ Deputy 
Manager 
Operations Manager / 
Manager 
Operations senior Manager 
Supervises a team of 40 to 60. Supervises a team size of 100 
tol50 
Supervises a team of 200 to 
250. 
Responsible for team's 
smooth operation 
Ensures seamless delivery to 
customers 
Ensures seamless delivery to 
customers 
Plans, directs and evaluates 
the work flow 
Strategically facilitates 
process improvements or cost 
reduction initiatives. 
Develops business plan for 
small / medium sized business 
unit including budget 
development. 
Takes care of resource 
utilization. 
Identifies career development 
opportunities for staff 
Infrastructure 
planning. 
capacity 
Selection of middle managers' sample 
Stratified type sampling has been used for selection of middle managers. Sample 
elements are proportionately drawn from various strata viz: the hierarchical levels of 
middle management. This type of sampling improves representativeness of the sample 
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by reducing sampling error. It produces a weighted mean that has less variability than the 
arithmetic mean of a simple random sample of the population. This type of sampling 
necessitates careful planning and presupposes free access to employee database. 
Software organizations in the private sector use a guarded approach and are wary of 
researchers' attempts to garner information. Perhaps, it is the contentious nature of this 
subject that has triggered industry's ire. The spadework that preceded the formal 
research, had made it quite evident early in the discovery that the industry adopted a 
generally hostile approach to researchers' con concerns for appeals for observing 
scientific procedure. Ultimately, the actual selection of middle managers was carried out 
by organizations themselves. It was suggested that preferably those managers be selected 
who have had a chance to experience changes in variable pay plan design. The human 
resource personnel, who administered the data collection exercise, were briefed about the 
methodology for delineating levels of middle management (Table 4.7 and also see 
Annexure 4.9 for details). 
Sample size of managers was deliberately kept conservative, at 10 per organization, in 
light of difficulty of getting permission for interviews. The organizations (its human 
resources personnel in particular) description were not agreeable to sparing even 10 
managers, since time expended on such interviews is supposedly equivalent to loss of 
that many employee manhours. Such considerations prompted the researcher to interview 
some of them telephonically, outside of their working hours, so as not to disturb their 
onsite working hours. 
It was observed that the sample of middle managers that were selected by organizations 
at the behest of researcher, did not exactly match the prescribed template. The 
discrepancy came to light when managers' demographic information was gathered at the 
end of formal interview. Apparently, the requested criteria for sample selection had been 
tampered with to suit the convenience of respective organizations. On being questioned 
about the deviation, most human resources personnel were of the view that those 
managers were selected, who could be conveniently made available and who had 
considerable knowledge about the subject. This itself is a divergence from the prescribed 
method of sample selection, as such criteria are clearly inadmissible. Had the researcher 
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voiced objection to practise of such discrepancy, it may have become difficult to hold on 
to the concerned organizations as a sample elements. 
As pointed out earlier, access to employee database was denied on account of concerns 
of confidentiality and sensitivity of subject. For these reasons, it became difficult to carry 
out a purely scientific selection of sample. It is reiterated that industry regards research 
suspiciously, and the subject 'compensafion' is a very touchy subject for human 
resources personnel, all the more so in the software industry with its incumbent problems 
of employee attraction and retention. The researcher thus, gracefully accepted sample 
elements provided by organisations' HR personnel for the study purpose. Any negative 
effects of sample selection were offset by carrying out intensive examination of the 
selected sample elements. This is pretty evident as each manager who was interviewed 
was investigated about the subject for close to an hour or even more. Such a lengthy 
discussion offered clear insight into managers' motivation level and also their 
satisfaction level with STVPP, something that is not completely evident from mere 
frequency of choices made by respondents. 
Opinion of experts was sought on the adequacy of sample size. According to Tom 
Wilson, who heads Wilson inc. and routinely carries out international level surveys on 
reward programmes, he responded to this query by saying "that's a lot of people." 
(Personal communication, Oct26,2007). 
4.2.9.5.3 Sample of the Human Resources Group 
The initial choice of the respondent from the human resources group, was sought to be 
the Head of HR. However, in view of some of the difficulties faced, it was later decided 
to interview the Head of Compensation and Benefits. The reasons for a shift in choice of 
respondent include: The head of HR was often not well versed with details related to 
design of variable pay policy, the finer details of implementation of the policy were 
better known to C & B personnel, and that the C & B personnel could spend 1 hr or 1 hr 
30 minutes for the whole interview while Head-HR were typically time-constrained or 
usually on travel for recruitment purposes etc. The Head of Compensation and Benefits 
is best aware of the objectives, design, implementation and evaluation aspects of a 
variable pay plan. Compensation managers have substantial knowledge of variable pay 
plans and are accountable for programme administration (Scott et al, 2004). Studies 
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carried out in the past have relied on senior compensation professionals as a primary 
data source (Ex: Eskew and Heneman, 1996). Organisations with more than 100 
employees often have a HR professional to design purposive compensation plans (Dow 
Scott, Tom Wilson; Communication through email, 2007). 
These interviews were designed to include active discussion on the subject in order to 
gather insight about the subject. This was important because variable pay, as a 
compensation practice has yet to prove itself and the nuances of its operation need to be 
understood for understanding the concept in its entirety. 
4.2.9.5.4 Sample from the Finance Group 
In finance department, the respondent was the CFO (Chief Financial Officer). Their 
portfolio allows them a close view of the working of the organization. The CFO of 
organization is intricately involved in the entire process of variable pay plan. Also, they 
were easy to contact and were assisted by personal secretaries who efficiently gave 
appointments without trouble or procrastination. Initially the intention was to meet the 
Head of Finance. However, similar problems of approaching them and getting them to 
give an appointment were experienced. In a few organizations, it was suggested by the 
Finance personnel that such queries are better addressed by the office of CFO. 
Thereafter, the researcher asked for the CFO, when fixing appointments. 
4.2.9.5.5AdditionaI respondents 
In many organizations, HR personnel had a junior associate during the interview and 
similarly in many cases the CFO too had a junior associate for assistance during the 
interview. This offered wider perspective. The additional respondent helped as a filler 
too, as sometimes the chief respondent had to attend to phone calls or other interruptions 
in the office. Since the interview duration often stretched to an hour and a quarter or even 
more, an additional respondent answered the questions whenever the key respondent was 
not present to answer the question or was at a lack of ideas. It also proved useful in 
maintaining interest level in the proceedings. 
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4.2.9.6 Source of data 
Data of a triangulated nature is sourced from three types of respondents so as to 
understand their perspective about the same phenomenon (functioning of short term 
variable pay plan). In addition to primary data, certain secondary nature information was 
required from sample organisations. This included background information about 
organization, number of grades, number of employees (level-wise), compensation 
structure, Annual Report for last 3 yrs (2004 -05, 2005-06, 2006-07) ,Communication 
material prepared on VPP. Sample respondents selected for purpose of data collection, 
were approached to gather the required data, to fulfill the research objectives outlined in 
the study. 
4.2.9.7 Data collection 
One-to-one interviews were conducted with a total of 180 respondents; some were 
telephonic interviews (managers who could not be contacted at the organization site, 
were later contacted through telephone). Qualitative interviews were carried out. Perkins 
(2006) extensively used qualitative interviews in his study of international reward 
practices in 63 multinational organizations across the world. Interviews carried out in 
this manner offer opportunity for frequent probing, discussion, and confirming the 
opinion. As Pennings (1993) notes, the extent to which pay plans are motivating 
depends upon the meaning people attach to these (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977), 
understanding of which requires opportunity for intensive investigation. Additionally, 
interviews are more personal than questionnaires and therefore tend to produce better 
response rates (Moore, 1983). The researcher chose interview method over pure 
questionnaire method in view of the difficulty associated with sourcing data. 
Compensation is a very sensitive issue in any industry and it is difficult to get 
respondents talking about it. The Indian software industry, that is particularly plagued 
with problems of attraction and retention, makes any discussion on compensation 
subject, a taboo in this industry. Moreso, variable pay is a contentious issue due to 
employees' evident dislike towards it, which is well in the awareness of the HR 
personnel. Due to the issues cited above, it had become extremely difficult to convince 
the human resource personnel to give a clear go-ahead for interviewing 10 of its middle 
managers. They agreed to the request only after a thorough scrutiny of the questionnaires 
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and other relevant documents. For this particular reason, direct questions about 
contentious issues like managers' level of acceptance, their perception about its fairness, 
questions concerning the payout amount etc. were ail worded discreetly. 
All interviews were personally administered and were immediately transcribed after the 
close of the interview, in order to avoid losing vital information due to time lapse. Winter 
(1982) emphasizes that the recording of interviews facilitates the comprehension of what 
has been said and discussed. Attempt was made to elaborate their views as it provided 
wealth of information on their perception about STVPP. This refers to opinions, which 
though highly personal and subjective, nevertheless give a streak of one's buried 
feelings. Their revelation was typically their moment of truth that deserved complete 
recording and reporting. This was important as STVPP is proving to be a especially 
elusive area in terms of its impact on employees. 
4.2.10 Method evaluation 
The integrity of the research can be threatened by uncontrollable factors in the research 
design. These risks were identified and specific steps were taken to mitigate them. The 
reliability with which the data is collected depends on four aspects: the subject to be 
studied, the respondents and the context of observations, the researcher and the 
measurement instrument (Mouton & Marais, 1996). 
A: The subject to be studied - Variable remuneration is a subject loaded with 
subjectivity, personal preferences, and conventional wisdom. It is an emotional and a 
high-risk area for objective research. Through carefijl application of research techniques, 
some of the obvious observation errors have been eliminated (e.g. proper sampling, a 
well-designed data-collection instrument, and use of discussion method with 
respondents, so as to cross-check their perceptions) However, there always remains 
doubt as to whether the observations that took place under sufficiently controlled 
circumstances were objective and valid. In order to mitigate these high risks, the 
following steps were taken: 
The statements put in the questionnaire were deduced from systematic study of the 
body of knowledge on variable remuneration. Wherever comparable researches 
existed, the propositions tested in the research were compared to the findings and 
165 
propositions of otiier researchers in the field of variable remuneration. Also, 
practitioners of variable remuneration were asked to assess the items in the 
questionnaire. 
Standardised written instructions were given to all respondents on how to respond to 
the questions asked in the interview. 
All questionnaires were administered in person, despite the fact that it became very 
time consuming. Also, detailed notes were taken, when the responses were 
transcribed. The transcription of interviews was conducted immediately after the 
interview process got over. Taking these precautions ensured that the subject-related 
b'ias was kept to the minimum. 
B: The respondents and context of the observations - Observations about variable 
remuneration constructs could be influenced by many circumstances, ranging from 
subjective interpretations (e.g. to make a point) to environment-specific interpretations 
(influenced by the organisational culture) or pleasing responses relating to universally 
accepted concepts. The researcher cannot deliberately control these interpretations 
without influencing the observations. This proved to be difficult to achieve. The 
following steps were taken to mitigate the risk posed : 
- The operational definition of the concept of short term variable remuneration, was 
informally discussed with respondents at the beginning of the interview. It was 
ensured that respondents understood STVPP's definition, and the specific context, in 
which the study defined and intended to investigate it. Respondents were repeatedly 
urged to consider their responses only within the context of the framework defined in 
the study. It is reiterated at this point, purely for purposes of relevance and emphasis, 
that STVPP as defined in the study, is grounded in New pay philosophy that directs 
pay systems in support of achieving business objectives. 
- The statements contained in the questionnaire were comprehensive and these covered 
all relevant aspects, that are described in the related literature. 
- Independent variables were differentiated from dependent variables. Opinions were 
sought from the three groups on all statements, barring statements related to 'degree 
of control over performance parameters' that were put up exclusively to the 
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managers' group. Later, opinions of the three groups were contrasted to assess points 
of discrepancies. 
C: The researcher - It was quite conceivable that the researcher may have been able to 
influence respondents' assessment of the independent variables. This could be 
accomplished through undue deliberation over select items in the questionnaire and also 
by means of communication that was prejudiced (or selectively disposed towards) certain 
select aspects or facets of STVPP. The risk of losing objectivity was identified in the 
following areas, and was mitigated in ways described below: 
Personal preferences and experiences could have tampered with the importance 
attached to various aspects of variable remuneration. This means that some 
constructs could have been included or excluded, based on personal preferences, 
instead of their relevance or otherwise. 
To mitigate such risk, the themes identified in the literature survey of variable 
remuneration were listed. These themes were then analysed to identify the critical 
aspects of independent variable. The emerging questions were then tested by having 
these independently checked by subject authors and also with the help of industry 
practitioners. This was done to ensure sufficient support for the composition of 
independent variables that drive the outcomes of variable remuneration schemes. 
• The researcher influences the respondents to give certain responses. 
In order to minimise the risk on this account, the respondents were selected randomly, as 
these were drawn out by the human resources team at the sample organisations. 
Researcher took care not to indicate preference or likeability for a particular line of 
thought, while interacting with the respondents, in the process of taking their responses. 
Also, researcher carried out a few trial interviews with peers to ensure that her tone and 
conduct was noncommittal, and was fi-ee of any predispositions. 
• Interpretation of the responses to the questions. This could have led to constructs 
being regarded as valid or invalid based on the subjective view of the researcher. To 
mitigate this risk, the following steps were taken: 
Well-documented statistical techniques were used to analyse the results under the 
supervision of statisticians who have no preconceived concepts about variable 
167 
remuneration. Infact two statistics personnel were independently approaciied to obtain 
their clearance for the methods used. 
D: The research instrument ;_The research instrument used to measure the independent 
variables and also the dependent variables, was designed to ensure objectivity in the 
application of the instrument. 
4.2.10.1 Obtaining data on dependent and independent variables 
Data on the dependent variable and the independent variable was sourced from three 
different groups. The same factors that influence data collection in case of independent 
variables, these also influence the data collection in relation to the dependent variable. 
The steps taken to mitigate these influences include the following: 
A: The subject to be studied : Asking the owners/designers of the variable remuneration 
scheme to assess the outcome of the scheme is very subjective. Respondents could be 
motivated by personal motives that can distort the outcome. To overcome this, the 
respondents were informed about the purpose of the study. Emphasis was placed on 
realistic assessments. Inspite of the controls that were put in place, some respondents had 
a more optimistic outlook than others. To get around this problem, a major component of 
the questionnaire focused on obtaining information about the pay plan threadbare. Facts 
of the pay plan set considerable limitations on the respondent to exercise discretion in 
tendering views. Moreso, the respondent which in this case is the head of compensation 
and benefits, holds a senior position, and has considerable experience in participating in 
open-ended discussions, and thus could be expected to retain his / her objectivity without 
getting swayed by any particular line of thought. The extended discussions that took 
place at the end of interviews, gave researcher a chance to verify whether their opinions 
were factual and valid or were these just unnecessarily prejudicial. 
In all cases respondents were asked to review their answers once they had had the 
opportunity to work through the entire assessment. Keeping the respondents motivated 
was not difficult as they all had a keen interest in the subject. Also, it was ensured that 
they had sufficient time to pore over the subject and organize their thoughts, as the 
interviews were scheduled at their convenience and a copy of the questionnaire was sent 
to them beforehand to brief them on the information requirements. 
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B: The respondents and context of the obsen'ations ; Respondents have personal 
opinions about variable remuneration. It was likely that some respondents would be 
positive about the STVPP outcomes, and some would carry jaundiced views against the 
scheme. Managing such variability in responses was difficult. To take care of this inbuilt 
bias in responses, the researcher deliberately spent some time at the beginning of 
interview, talking informally about respondents' job and life issues in general. A rough 
estimate about respondents' thought pattern could be made, as to whether the respondent 
was a positive person or a negative person, by nature. Knowledge about respondents' 
personality, forewarned the researcher, and she took extra care to verify their views with 
them, and also double checked that these views were backed by facts. 
The assessment of performance outcomes was done using the benchmark of threshold 
level goal that each organization determined as a milestone for determining payout 
amount. Comparison was made with this benchmark to assess degree of 
overachievement or underachievement. Such methodology for assessing impact was 
ratified with subject authors. The industry personnel did not seem to agree with this 
criteria, since they had not found it viable to evaluate the outcome of variable 
remuneration plans. Using threshold-based criteria ensured that a fact-based result was 
found, that had its basis in actual performance results. 
C: The researcher : The biases of the researcher cannot be disregarded. Awareness of 
biases allows the researcher to take deliberate steps to remain objective. Yet, it would be 
impossible to determine the effect of researcher biases on the respondents. For instance -
in this particular case, the researcher candidly admits to holding a somewhat jaundiced 
view, that borders on being caustic and apprehensive. In order to control this weakness 
from affecting the respondents' responses, the researcher let the respondents do most of 
the talking, and deliberately maintained an impartial posture, that showed neither 
inclination nor any distaste for STVPPs. 
D: The research instrument: The purpose of the interviews was two fold - a) to 
understand the design and implementation systems of short term type variable pay plans, 
and b) to understand its performance impact. The research instrument was designed so as 
to gain knowledge about managers' understanding, their involvement, and their 
satisfaction in relation to short term variable pay plan. Additionally, performance 
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outcome was assessed on the basis of actual performance figures. To mitigate risl<s that 
may have tampered the reliability of the results, following steps were taken. 
1) Most variables were measured using perceptual method, and also using the 
objective method. Thus, both direct and indirect methods of examination were 
used. 
2) For most variables, wherever perceptual inputs were gathered, inputs of all three 
groups were gathered, in order to check for any major discrepancies among the 
three groups. If any such contentious grounds were found, justification was 
sought from independent sources who could be trusted for their experience and 
wisdom. 
4.2.11 Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics, and combination of statistical techniques are used to analyse data. 
The methods used include One-sample t test, ANOVA (analysis of variance), Karl 
Pearson's coefficient of correlation, and one sample t test. 
A One-Way Analysis of Variance is a way to test the equality of three or more means at 
one time, by using variances. The null hypothesis is that all population means are equal, 
and the alternative hypothesis is that at least one mean is different. This technique is used 
to assess differences among views of the three respondent groups (represented by the 
human resources group, the finance group and the managers' group). The reason this 
analysis is called ANOVA rather than multi-group means analysis (or something like 
that) is because it compares group means by analyzing comparisons of variance 
estimates. 
One sample t-test is a statistical procedure that is used to know the mean difference 
between the sample and the known value of the population mean. T-test was conducted 
in all instances to compare the calculated mean of a particular variable with the null 
hypotheses, that represented its 'no impact' value. The results obtained indicated the 
degree and the type of impact. 
Pearson's coefficient of correlation was used for assessing relationships between 
variables. The quantity r, called the linear correlation coefficient, measures the strength 
and the direction of a linear relationship between two variables. The coefficient ranges 
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between -1 and +1. Perfect positive correlation (a correlation coefficient of +1) means 
there is parallel movement between the two variables, in the same direction. Perfect 
negative correlation means that when one variable moves in one direction, the other 
variable will move by an equal amount in the opposite direction. If the correlation is 0, 
the movements of the variables have no correlation. 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the main features of a collection of data in 
quantitative terms. Descriptive statistics are distinguished from inferential statistics, in 
that descriptive statistics aim to quantitatively summarize a data set, rather than being 
used to support inferential statements about the population .Descriptive statistics are 
generally presented along with more formal analyses. 
4.2.12 Research Evaluation 
It is only appropriate that the researcher submits a candid account of the limitations as 
well as the strengths of the study. Doing so, sets up a context, within which a reader 
should understand the results, and also it cautions the prospective researcher to take extra 
care or make suitable arrangements, to avoid the stated pitfalls. At the same time, the 
strengths of the study, earn the researcher due credit for his/her efforts. 
4.2.12.1 Limitations related to difficulty of procuring data 
1. The selection of respondents among the middle manager belt could not be performed 
by the researcher herself. Due to concerns of data secrecy, this task was performed 
by the HR team of the sample organizations. While all precautions have been taken 
to ensure that selection is criteria-based, and is scientifically done, yet, the 
researcher can't develop complete faith in ability of organisations' inhouse personnel 
to methodically select the sample. The researcher only has their word for checking 
whether selection is systematically done or not. 
2. Documentary analysis could not be done as secondary documents were made 
available. Many of the secondary data requirements remained unfulfilled due to 
organisations' lack of cooperation and a rather stiff attitude adopted by them. 
Information about detailed performance payout schedule, payout percentages 
declared, communication material about STVPP, were some of the requirements for 
secondary data that could not be fijlfilled. This is certainly a serious limitation, as 
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compromises had to be made, due to lack of such information. The researcher 
considers this a lacuna of the study, and for this very reason, demographic 
information of respondents could not be analysed in the study. 
3. Due to problems associated with meeting respondents, the idea of holding FGDs had 
to be summarily shelved. During the course of preliminary study itself, the researcher 
got a bitter taste of bottlenecks involved in arranging meetings with industry 
personnel. To overcome this weakness, a rather extensive preliminary study had to be 
carried out, as number of individual meetings had to be held instead of holding a few 
group meetings. Thus, precious time was wasted, and also some of the benefits 
arising in a group situation, may have been inaccessible to this study. 
4. Financial performance outcomes, that could be attributed to plan use, could not be 
calculated due to lack of relevant data availability at organizations, (discussed in 
detail, in 'contribution of the study' section) 
4.2.12.2 Data limitations 
1 It is commonly believed that in survey studies, self-report bias may influence the 
results (for ex: Cable and Judge, 1994). Thus, the limitation applies to this study 
too. 
4.2.12.3 Strengths of the study 
1 The design and implementation systems have been comprehensively studied, which 
in itself is commendable considering its wide scope and the added issue of 
complexity of designs in general. 
2 Objectives of the study have been studied through various propositions raised, and 
wide perspective has been taken in examining these. Three groups have been 
covered, and their views have been taken on all propositions covered. This unduely 
expanded the scope of the study, but proved helpful in knowing variations among 
groups. 
3 The line of enquiry selected for the study includes both direct methods and indirect 
methods for assessing responses. For ex: Questions about What is the purpose of a 
STVPP' was asked directly also, and also in an indirect manner. This format of 
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questioning helps to assess degree of accuracy of responses. The same approach is 
used for all variables, wherever indirect approaches too could be feasibly deployed. 
4 The methods of using one-to-one personal interviews with all 180 respondents 
proved especially useful in forming perceptions about respondents' deeply held 
opinions. This offered rich insight, that might have eluded the researcher, had an 
impersonal method of mailing questionnaires been used. For instance - The aspect 
of managers' indifference towards the use of STVPP, would not have been evident, 
had the questionnaires been administered by any other method than in person. In the 
same manner, the shallowness of Human resources' perception about the New pay 
systems and the aspect of keen insight that Finance has about STVPP's use, would 
not have been even remotely apparent, had an impersonal method of questioning 
been used. Thus, a personal method of holding interviews proved especially useful 
in reading the emotions of the respondents. 
5 The study provides promising results, as in addition to financial criteria of selection, 
care has been taken to deliberately cover those organizations, that represent adequate 
geographical spread. Cities like Pune, Mumbai, Bangalore, and Hyderabad were 
covered, in addition to the NCR region. This increased the cost of research, but 
proved beneficial in enhancing reliability and representativeness of results. 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
The research study has adopted a quantitative approach to studying the problem. The 
research questions have been answered by first establishing hypotheses that need to be 
tested. The study has expended considerable effort on carrying out a preliminary study, 
in order to determine the appropriate criteria for sample selection. 
Multi-stage type of sampling procedure has been adopted for selection of sample. These 
stages are: 
a) First level screening - It included two criteria, relating to a)Revenue and Profit 
performance for three year period 2003-04,2004 - 05, and 2005 - 06 and b) Year of 
incorporation of the organisation. 
b) Second level screening: This included multiple criteria -
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1) Minimum duration of use of short term variable pay plan 2) Key objective of using 
STVPP and 3) use of STVPP for middle managers. 
c) A third level screening has been used for selection of sample of middle managers. 
Primary criteria includes minimum 2 years performance period, and additionally 
other considerations for their selection, have been discussed in detail in 'Sample 
composition'. 
The study is being conducted in the IT software and services sector of Indian economy, 
and the specific issue discussed is that of impact of short term variable pay plans on 
performance of middle managers, and that of organizations. Sample organizations are 
selected on the basis of financial criteria. Sample of middle managers was selected 
randomly by the organizations themselves, after they considered the guidelines provided 
by the researcher. Survey methodology is used for collection of data. Three separate 
questionnaires are prepared, one each for the three types of respondent groups - middle 
managers, human resource personnel, and the Finance personnel. Personal interviews 
were conducted with all respondents, and all of these were carried out in form o^ open-
ended discussions rather than a straight-jacket form of structured interviews. 
Data reliability has been ensured by taking extreme care of factors that may have 
prejudiced the data unfairly. Data has been analysed with the help of descriptive statistics 
and one sample t-tests, one way ANOVA and Pearson's correlation coefficient. 
The research has contributed to building of theory, in terms of how a short term variable 
pay plan, by maneuvering its design and implementation aspects, can positively impact 
managers' performance. One of the major limitations of this research has been the 
difficulty encountered in procuring data from respondents. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis and interpretation 
5.0 Introduction 
5.1 Design and Implementation Systems of Siiort Term Variable Pay Plans 
(referred as STVPP) 
5.1.1 Purpose of instituting STVPP 
5.1.2 Involvement in the process of STVPP 
5.1.3 Design and Implementation aspects of STVPP 
5.1.4 Motivation through STVPP 
5.2 Impact of STVPP on managers" performance 
5.2.1 Hypotheses about perceived impact of STVPP on mcinager.s' 
performance. 
5.2.2 Comparison between 'managers' actual performance' and the 
'applicable threshold goal', in reference to their past performance 
5.2.3 Correlation between managers' perceived impact of STVPP on their 
performance and the extent of control managers have over 
performance parameters of their variable pay. 
5.3 Perceived impact of STVPP on organization performance 
5.3.1 Hypotheses about perceived impact of STVPP on organization 
performance. 
5.3.2 Comparison between organization performance result and 
organization-level threshold goal. 
5.4 Managers' understanding about the purpose and working of short term 
variable pay plan.. 
5.4a Managers' understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan. 
5.4a. 1 Managers' knowledge of the purpose of STVPP 
5.4a.2 Managers' understanding about their line-of-sight with business 
goals. 
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5.4a.3 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' understanding 
of purpose ofSTVPP on their performance result. 
5.4a.4 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement in 
design process ofSTVPP on their understanding about its purpose. 
5.4a.5 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement in 
implementation process of STVPP on their understanding about its 
purpose. 
5.4b Managers'understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan. 
5.4b. 1 Managers' understanding about variable pay structure, as a 
component of their salary 
5.4b.2 Managers' perceived understanding about overall working of 
STVPP - A cross company comparison 
5.4b.3 Managers' understanding of the purpose of threshold level. 
5.4b.4 Understanding of working details of STVPP on three planes -
variable pay's structuring into ones's compensation, its overall working 
details and the purpose of threshold goal - A relative view 
5.4b.5 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' 
i/nderstanding of working details ofSTVPP on their performance. 
5.4b.6 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement 
in the design process of STVPP on their understanding about its 
working details. 
5.4b.7 Hypotheses ahovX perceived impact of managers' involvement in 
the implementation process ofSTVPP on their understanding about its 
working details. 
5.5 Managers' satisfaction with short term variable pay plan. 
5.5.1 Managers' extent of control over their performance parameters of their 
variable pay. 
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5.5.1a Correlation between extent of control managers have over performance 
parameters of their variable pay and their level of satisfaction with 
STVPP. 
5.5.2 Managers' perception about the degree of achievability of threshold 
level goal 
5.5.3 Correlation between managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP and 
perceived impact of STVPP on managers' performance. 
5.5.4 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement in design 
process of STVPP on their level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
5.5.5 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement in 
implementation process of STVPP on their level of satisfaction with 
STVPP. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis and Interpretation 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides analysis of study results uncovered during the research process. 
Deliberate effort is made to capture the nuances of research results. This chapter is 
structured around the objectives identified in the study, as it helps to ensure all 
pertinent analytical information is presented in a logical manner. Each of the objectives 
have been analysed, their results interpreted and are presented in form of five major 
subsections. 
In section 1, results about design and implementation systems of short term variable 
pay plans are analyzed, and these are interpreted in the broader framework of aspects or 
facets that are crucial to determine their effectiveness. These facets span a vast stretch 
of processes that sculpt a STVPP and give it its unique / chief character. As far as 
possible, results are quantified and thereafter numerically analyzed. Some of the 
results, that could have lost their full significance if captured in numbers only, have 
been presented separately in an annexure in a descriptive form as well. As far as 
feasible and within bounds of reasonable logic, some descriptive findings too have been 
crunched up and presented in its summarized form in the main text. 
In section 2, results are provided about impact of Short Term Variable Pay plan on 
performance of middle managers. In order to have a broader view of results, both 
perceived-performance impact and performance impact based on objective-data, have 
been analysed. Interpretation has been drawn, that is presented in form of meaningful 
results. 
In section 3, results about impact of STVPP on performance of organization, have been 
analysed. Towards this end, both perceptual and objective data are analysed and 
suitable interpretations are drawn in order to construct a meaningful picture of 
STVPP's impact on organization performance. 
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In section 4, results are presented on managers' understanding about the purpose of 
STVPP, and also their understanding about its working details, which is details of its 
functioning. Dual aspects of STVPP- that of its purpose and about its working details 
are analysed through direct as well as indirect means, which provide for a closer 
examination and also provide a basis for verification of responses. It is also like an 
inbuilt anti-cheat mechanism that provides protection against deliberate falsification of 
information by respondents. 
In section 5, results about managers' satisfaction with STVPP are analysed and 
interpreted. Satisfaction related results are found directly and also indirectly by way of 
examining aspects that bear upon managers' satisfaction with STVPP. The 
methodology of combining self-report data with the relevant indicators, is used as a 
safeguard against respondents' attempts (willingly or unwillingly) to outwit 
researcher's efforts at unraveling the true picture. 
This chapter focuses on analysis and interpretation of study results. Relevant analysis 
that is meaningful and value-adding, is elaborated. In the ensuing chapter, study 
findings and relevant discussion are presented. 
Section 1 
5.1 Design and Implementation Systems of Short Term Variable Pay 
Plans (also referred as STVPPs) 
The design and implementation aspects of STVPPs, examined through a first-hand 
investigation of key entities' involved in its preparation, finalisation & execution, are 
presented. Observations of STVPPs' target audience ie the participants who are covered 
under the plan, have also been included in order to form an unbiased picture about the 
pay plans. In order to assess the degree of commonality or discrepancy among the 
perceptions of different entities, views of each of these are shown in segregated 
manner, and are also presented collectively - for facilitating comprehensive 
assimilation. 
' Usage of the term is generic; its reference could be directed at individuals or alternatively at specific 
departments, that are involved in shaping of STVPP process. 
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The above two processes have been neatly broken down into their smallest units, 
referred as aspects ox features (for instance 'variable pay as a % of CTC is an example 
of one of the aspects of STVPP). Despite efforts to put information in crisp tables to 
maintain brevity and meaningfulness, there are some intangible aspects that defy neat 
quantification, but are nonetheless no less in terms of their importance. These softer 
aspects are compiled along with key plan aspects, in a composite form and such write-
up us \2ihQ\QA plan profiles in this study (Annexure 5.1). 
The plan related aspects are categorized into two phases viz the 'design' phase and the 
'implementation' phase. Relation between these two is similar to the proverbial chicken 
and egg phenomenon - as each one feeds on the other, and is intricately intertwined 
with the other half for its sustenance. What gets implemented, essentially passes the 
design phase, and further the implemented aspects inturn aid the design phase through 
lessons of hindsight. For instance - how would one classify 'STVPP related 
communication', that apparently bears the chief character of an implementation aspect? 
However, it also has the necessary antecedent of a think-through or an idea-generation 
stage. For this reason, the two phases are clubbed together in this study, and no attempt 
is made to break these into disjointed parts. The only attempt to break the process into 
neatly separable and insulated stages has been to break the whole chain of decisions 
into singular steps, for the purpose of identifying with specificity those particular stages 
that entail wider involvement. Such close examination of involvement practice is 
necessary so as to enable designers to assess stages / decisions that are wanting in 
sufficient involvement of others. Such subdivisions of the pay plan process include -
I.Deciding performance parameters, 2.Setting performance targets, 3.Deciding 
threshold level goal, 4.Deciding payout percentage at various performance levels 
S.Calculating payout and 6.Evaluating variable pay plan. Essentially these are the key 
decisions required for a pay plan process. The first four aspects belong to the design 
phase while the latter two belong to the implementation phase. Such simplistic 
subdivision is, in researcher's view, not the best approach to view the integrated aspects 
of the pay plan process. It is cautioned that essentially all these stages carry shades of 
both design and implementation phases, and the particular classification shown above is 
only for the very specific task of delineating who all are involved at which all stages of 
the process. Thus, such subdivision is only for the purpose defined above. 
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The overall STVPP process is analysed based on the following sub-themes, presented 
below. Such grouping is useful as it provides a clear form to its unwieldy spread. Each 
such sub-theme presented below is important for fully traversing the vast stretch of 
STVPP systems. 
5.1.1 Purpose of instituting STVPP 
The choice of the purpose of a STVPP is the central point in understanding the 
development of the whole plan. While the aspect of 'purpose' belongs neither to the 
design nor to the implementation phase, it powerfully shapes the plan as also the 
specific manner of its use. The research did not merely rely on the professed purpose 
but chose to delve deeper into the perceptions of those involved in its design ie those 
who represent its thought (metaphorical) and also those closely affected by its use, ie 
the audience closely impacted by the 'do' or the 'act' part of STVPP. Opinions have 
been compared and contrasted and wherever it seemed logical to deduce, meaningful 
inferences are drawn. Given below are the findings that relate to the practised purpose 
of STVPP. The term 'practise' is highlighted in order to bring out its distinctiveness as 
against its version that is available in the official policy statement. Related results are 
presented below in Table 5.1. 
5,1.1.1 Perception of human resources function 
Roughly, two out of three Human Resource functionaries perceive that the prime 
objective of STVPP is to provide pay with a strong backing of performance linkage. 
This is the idealspeak of any HR professional and the fact that such linkage is most 
coveted by all employees, is in itself a sufficient reason for such high degree of claim 
witnessed in its favour (67% respondents are for this opinion). One in five HR 
respondents attribute its driving force to the need for achieving performance results. On 
the face of it, 'need for rendering justification to employee pay' is not much different 
from 'need for driving performance results.' However, to fully capture the thoughts of 
respondents, it is necessary to appreciate the difference, since to a not-so-astute a 
reader, it may look like a mere spin of words. While the former is bent upon giving 
rightful justification to pay, the latter is more concerned with the need for increasing 
performance level. The difference is more to do with its orientation, than anything to do 
with its endresult. Only 7% consider alignment to be the most important objective, 
which is surprising considering it is the foundation of 'New pay' philosophy. Also, the 
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alignment objective, if pursued vigorously, would require meticulously-designed 
mechanisms of involvement, communication and systems to ensure employees' line-of-
sight. Apparently, designers of the plan do not sufficiently capitalize on the strategic-
leverage route as much as they use the (monetary) incentive route for motivating 
performance. This could be due to insufficient knowledge about 'New pay" philosophy 
or a lack of willingness to traverse the tortuous route, with broad beginnings of 
business direction that ultimately culminate in the labyrinthine operational goals. 
Similar reasoning could be tendered for yet another important objective of 'New Pay'-
that of inculcating team spirit and a feeling of collectiveness. There is feeble support 
for the objective 'promoting team spirit' as only 7% consider it most important. Table 
5.1 below gives a perceptual scenario on understanding of STVPP's purpose among its 
key audience. 
TABLE 5.1 
Purpose of instituting STVPP 
Most important purpose of a 
STVPP 
To link pay with performance^ 
To inculcate spirit of team 
performance. 
To align employees' goals with 
organization goals 
To drive employees towards 
higher levels of performance' 
To ensure performance is 
quantified 
To achieve business objectives 
Risk mitigation'' 
Perception of 
human resources' 
group 
66.7% 
6.7% 
6.7% 
20% 
-
-
-
Perception of 
finance group 
13.3% 
-
-
26.7% 
6.7% 
20% 
33.4% 
Perception of 
middle managers' 
group 
2% 
-
10% 
51.3% 
.7% 
18% 
18.1% 
' Similar objectives include "to reward performance", "Pay differentiation", "Payout should not be 
automatically incremental". 
' Includes objective statements like "making employees accountable", "focusing employees' attention on 
performance" and "to create performance-centric culture". 
" Includes objectives like "Sharing of risks and rewards with employees", "Keeping portion of employees' 
salary under company's control", "employee retention" and "to keep compensation budget variable". 
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Though not mentioned as a primary purpose, 'retention of employees' was mentioned 
as a distinct aim of pursuing STVPP. IVIost respondents were unwilling to officially go 
on record with the claim that 'retention' was one of its main objectives. Such 
affirmation might have put them in a compromising position, professionally, 
considering that 'retention' as an objective of STVPP, is not the top choice of any 
conscientious and righteous compensation professional. It is reiterated that this part of 
conversation was made in strict confidence, so much so that the researcher couldn't 
even make notes of it, in presence of respondents. This aspect usually came up as the 
moment of truth that often occurs at the fagend of interview, when trust and rapport are 
high, and the real intent begins to peek through the cracks, due to respondents" 
wanning up to the occasion. Also, such long-drawn interviews tend to have a sobering 
effect on respondents, wherein their small voice of truth (that resides in all of us) craves 
for an outlet and a listening ear. Hence, the cascade of confession that most respondents 
submit themselves to, in order to come out clean with their instinctive views that are 
often not readily acceptable in real work surroundings. 
5.1.1.2 Perception of finance function 
Only 13% believe that the reason for its use is to provide a performance linkage. Low 
count on this observation could be attributed to the 'function-specific' perspective 
(among respondents) ie views they have formed owing to their particular functional 
specialization. As in this case, the Finance function is primarily responsible for macro-
level business performance, and its concern is not so much with 'what is a good basis 
of pay'. This very well describes the result that a bare 10% finance professionals 
perceive its primary objective as 'providing pay with a performance backing'. 
5.1.1.3 Perception of middle managers 
More than half the middle managers perceive STVPP's most important objective being 
'to drive performance'. Per se there seems to be no objection about its validity, 
however what is bothersome is the narrowness of its scope. While this goal is desirable 
in its own right, it fails to focus employee attention on business objectives. Perceptions 
largely depend on the kind of exposure employees receive in relation to the concerned 
issue. In this case, STVPP practice and education are the factors responsible for 
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breeding such perception. It is a matter of despair for those concerned with 
advancement of STVPP system, that as few as 18% consider its primary objective as 
'accomplishment of business goals'. Similar message is evident from another finding 
that is quite related to the earlier one - that only 10% managers perceive the topmost 
objective to be 'alignment between employees and organization' (with regard to their 
goals). Managers in the software industry feel the heat of accomplishing targets, even 
without the express pressure put on them in the form of target dictates of STVPP. 
Therefore, in their minds, STVPP's primary objective is not so much to link pay with 
performance (only 2% for it), as it is do with driving performance ; even further than 
the identified boundaries (or what's been specified as predetermined targets). 
5.1,1,4 Comparison among the perception of human resource personnel, finance 
personnel and middle managers' group, regarding the most important purpose of 
STVPP. 
It is notable that there is a chasm between how 'linking pay to performance' as an 
objective is perceived by the management^  and the manner in which it is perceived by 
the middle managers. While 2/3rd human resources' respondents support this view, 
contrastingly, only 2% managers favour the same. This is a classic case of divide 
between the thought facet and the implementation facet. If HR's perception is 
concerned with the ideal scenario, managers' perception is more to do with 'what they 
see and feel on the ground'. This is evident in the above contrast; a clear case of an 
espoused objective, that has not been sufficiently absorbed in the same spirit in its 
implementation phase. The degree of contrast is too wide to be attributed to some 
unimportant non-issue. The bone of contention is that managers do not perceive STVPP 
as an instrument that is able to adequately link their pay to their performance results. 
Herein lies food for thought for the thinkers in the compensation arena. 
Most managers, more than half of them, believe that STVPP's objective is to 'drive 
employees' performance'. Evidently this is so, due to payout linkage with the 
5 Term 'management' here refers to the designers of STVPP, which in this case comprises both Human 
Resources personnel and the Finance personnel. Also, it is possible, that while HR and Finance are the 
frontrunners, they may actually be representing the views of some top cadre functionary (like that of a 
CEO/ED/MD) or that of the design group. The narrative concludes that use of term 'management' in 
referring to either HR or Finance, may not be off the mark, as they are likely to be indirectly presenting 
the views of top management or else may be expected to work in close tandem with senior members of 
management. 
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performance factors. Surprisingly only one quarter of managers (28%) perceive 
STVPP's role as connecting them to organization results - be it through alignment or 
by directing their attention to achieving business objectives. Clearly, the manner in 
which STVPP is operationalized, steers managers' perception into believing that its 
focus is to ensure that employees are able to meet their targets (52% perceive so) than it 
is to do with disseminating the philosophy of employee-business alignment (28% in its 
favour). 
Another aspect worthy of consideration is the pursuit of risk-mitigation-objective under 
the garb of short term variable pay plans. Finance group is more upfront in admitting to 
its pursuance (33% regard it as the primary purpose) as compared to the human 
resources' group, which is rather reluctant to openly accommodate it as one of the 
primary motives (none feel it is primary) of STVPP. It seems that having to admit 'risk 
mitigation' as one of the main objectives of STVPP, is, in HR's view analogical to 
committing a sin as grave as that of a saint admitting to pursuing a commercial motive 
in his service. Perhaps, the HR personnel feel that such admission (like role of STVPP 
in slowing down attrition, or strengthening the hold on employees) would take the 
sheen of nobleness away from STVPP, and instead make it look like a crass incentive-
like tool, for whipping employees and urging them to work harder. However, the 
reality is not lost on those who are subjected to it, as 18% managers consider retention 
as the chief purpose of STVPP. It is easy to see that even if retention is not mentioned 
as an explicit objective, managers are perceptive enough to get the whiff of it, may be 
because they are inhabiting the same system. Clearly, there are huge discrepancies 
among the human resources' group and the Finance' group, though they ail share the 
same side of the fence. Also, there are differences between the views of management 
and that of the middle managers'group. 
Also, the views of HR personnel and Finance personnel are not in complete harmony 
vv.r.t. primary objective of STVPP. For instance while HR's orientation is more at the 
micro-level ie at the level of employees. Finance's orientation is more at the level of the 
organization. It would be worthwhile to hold pre-design discussions among key 
function heads, as this would lead to harmony among their views, and also increased 
convergence among their perception of STVPP. 
5.1.2 Involvement in the process of STVPP 
The 'New pay' literature has ushered in 'employees' and 'crucial others' as vital 
candidates for involvement in pay process. Going by the sheer dogmatism and 
orthodoxy that has pervaded pay systems, it is nothing short of a watershed that -finally 
change is being embraced, and refreshingly, through the route of involvement of 
stakeholders, as one of the catalyzing agents. An all-round view of involvement in 
process of STVPP, ie throughout its lifecycle, is taken up. It has been assessed as to 
'who are involved', 'to what extent they are involved' and 'at which stages of STVPP 
they are involved'. Related results are reported. Potential benefits of involvement are 
also presented, since the actual practice of involvement is sparse - rather quite close to 
nonexistent. The practice (or the absence of it) therefore offered ample opportunity for 
dwelling on potentialities. Infact the issue of potentialities sprang up during the 
interviews, mainly because involvement-practice was found non-existent - as rare as 
the presence of a drop of water in a desert. So much so, some respondents regarded the 
involvement practice quite alien an idea, for its use w.r.t shaping up a pay mechanism, 
be it at any of its stages. 
5.1.2.1 Involvement of functions / personnel in the process of STVPP, in 
perception of the human resources function 
The human resource function is uniquely placed to offer views about nature of 
involvement that has occurred in the process of developing a short term variable pay 
plan. The reason for the same is, that it has primary, and also a predominant hold over 
STVPP development, management, and maintenance, and very often it has a vested 
interest in ensuring its effectiveness. 
5.1.2.1.1 Prevalence of involvement, in the design phase. 
Involvement in the design phase of'all functions' and particularly that of employees is 
given importance in 'New pay' conceptualization of variable pay system. Since 
variable pay system is seen as a solution to achieve business goals, it is professed that 
all concerned (be it the 'functions' or the employees) should participate in its design 
process. Employee involvement helps to precipitate feelings of partnership, which is an 
objective of STVPP. Against this background involvement-in-design has been studied. 
Related results are presented in table 5.2 below. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Involvement of functions / personnel at the design stage of STVPP (as perceived 
by the human resources function) 
Composition of 
design team 
Human 
Resources function 
Finance function 
Representatives of 
all functions 
(only) Concerned 
function / SBU 
Top Management 
Middle Managers 
External consultant 
Extent of involvement 
High 
involvement 
100% 
26.7% 
-
-
80% 
-
-
(to a) 
large 
extent 
-
6.7% 
0% 
13.3% 
-
-
-
Moderate 
involvement 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
(to a) 
small-
extent 
-
40.3% 
20% 
-
-
20% 
-
No 
involvement 
-
26.7% 
80% 
86.7% 
20% 
80% 
100% 
The above figures are indicative of% of organizations using a specific kind of practice. 
Involvement is considered vital to success of new variable pay programs. The logic 
being that with involvement, there comes ego-involvement, leading to an earnest desire 
to scrape for ways and means to achieve business goals or the targeted ends. Also, 
there comes along a growing sense of ownership towards organization, and thereby 
willingness to accept the risk-return sharing arrangement of STVPP. With this thought, 
involvement is given prime importance in variable pay literature. In the study 
conducted, it is found that mainly 'human resources function' has 'high involvement' 
in design. All organisations (100% of those sampled) have shown the tendency of 
involving HR function at a 'high level'. Next in line is finance function, that has 
considerable involvement, as 1 in 3 organisations involve this group, either 'to a large 
extent' or to at the level of 'high involvement'. In all, 73% organizations involve their 
Finance function in design phase, of which 40% do it 'to a small extent'. 
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Relatively limited involvement of 'Finance' in design may explain the difference in 
respective perspectives adopted by HR and finance, with regard to the question of 
'what is the primary purpose of STVPP'. 
Few organizations (20%) involve all business functions in carving out a variable pay 
plan, that too, the level of involvement is of a limited degree ie 'to a small extent'. It is 
clear that the practice of making customized STVPPs for a specific function or a SBU 
is virtually non-existent. This is brought out by the result that only 13% organizations 
follow such practice, that of involving the specific SBU or concerned function 'to a 
large extent'. A huge proportion (87%) of sampled organizations clearly do not involve 
'the specific SBU or function' in the customization of STVPP. This result leads one to 
wonder what kind of involvement would it be, where the target function is involved 
just 'to a small extent' - and in all likelihood, such involvement would be more like a 
cosmetic cover-up, a mere eyewash, or more accurately a bluff, to perk up the 
involvement figures. Evidently such involvement needs redressal measures to make 
this mechanism worthwhile. It is clear that either customization is not a regular practice 
with regard to use of STVPP, and within the boundary of customization, practise of 
involving the concerned department is sparsely used. However, if the intention is to 
design a plan that is suited to the needs of a SBU, it would be highly unlikely (rather 
questionable) to not involve the concerned SBU; assuming expectations / existence of 
goals, that may not be of the higher order like that of satisfaction or acceptance, but 
bare basic ones like ferreting out 'knowledge about specific work practices' and 
'insight about how best to achieve employee motivation'. 
In a nut shell, it seems customization with regard to STVPPs, for business units, is not a 
regularly used feature in the Indian Software industry. Top management has high 
involvement in 4 out of 5 cases; and there are only few instances - as less as 1 in 5, it 
has no involvement. Top management's role can be explained as that of an ultimate 
owner, which regards STVPP as a kind of business investment, and is interested in 
determining its commercial viability by means of its judicious evaluation. 
The human resource function is cast in the role of executive function, that is considered 
responsible for STVPP functioning and also for its results. Such role of HR is entirely 
consistent with its typecast image of policymaker of employee related issues. It is clear 
from the outset that this research study perceives variable pay in the broader framework 
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of New pay philosophy, that strives to align pay systems with the business objectives. 
Given this, the variable pay system should be as relevant for HR as it should be for any 
other function, in view of the common purpose it serves - that of pursuing enterprise-
level objectives, which is a collective goal. Such thought process should occur 
naturally, considering STVPP's positioning as a strategic lever instead of the 
commonly held perception about it, as a routine employee-related policy. It is apparent, 
that the latter view is the dominant thought, which explains low level of involvement of 
'others concemed'\ and a rather predominant role of HR group. It may be remarked 
with considerable certainty that given the scenario of low involvement of the non-HR 
entities, it could impede organisations' efforts to convey 'alignment' objective of 
STVPP. This also poses a major bottleneck for achieving the ideal of 'ownership 
feelings' among the pay plan audience. Another weakness of implementation is 
evident in the limited involvement of middle managers; 20% are involved 'to a small 
extent' and a huge 80% are completely out of bounds of involvement. It wouldn't be 
incorrect to say that the idea of'(possible) usefulness of involving managers in STVPP' 
was absolutely lost on middle managers - they disregarded it as one of the researcher's 
figment of imagination. Their expression was totally blank when probed about the 
potential benefits of involving managers in STVPP. This clearly shows that managers 
figure extremely low on account of (inculcation of) psychology of ownership objective 
of STVPP. This is buttressed by the finding reported in table 5.1, that none of the 
managers have reported 'inculcation of psychology of ownership feelings' as the key 
objective of STVPP. Part of the reason could be that none of the HR personnel too, 
perceive it as the key objective and also that only 6.7% perceive the 'alignment' 
objective, which can be said to be closest in its import to the ownership-objective. 
External consultants are not at all involved in use of STVPP. Ideally, use of a 
sophisticated STVPP that is designed as a strategic lever, would call for professional 
expertise, moreso since it strives to achieve business-employee alignment. It is 
conceivable that such exercise would involve critical process issues (like 
communication, decision making), and also it would require support of systems and 
* Jn these words - 'others concerned', reference is made to related parties h'ke function-specific 
departments, MIS, line managers, middle managers, business units, Finance department - since they are 
closely affected by the operation of STVPP and also because of their capability to exert positive 
influence on STVPP. 
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processes, in order to achieve sustainable recall o f alignment' objective. The finding, 
that the organizations have shown no inclination towards taking such help, should not 
be construed as a sign of self-sufficiency. Discussions with all parties concerned, when 
precipitated to touch the point of truth, revealed that, STVPP was used in a rather 
simplistic manner, where line-of-sight was visible to only the selected few, mainly by 
virtue of their job-design, or because of discussions carried out with their supervisor or 
for reasons that it was an unsaid desirable that governed the functioning of an 
organization. It also came to light that STVPP is not considered much different from 
incentives, just that the manner of variable pay structuring in salary is considerably 
different from the manner in which incentives are attached to the salary structure. 
There lies a strong suggestion in this finding - that of 'enhancing involvement of other 
units' since these too contribute to the goals of organization. In the least, it will be a 
positive step towards diluting the negativity among managers, and more importantly, it 
would render STVPP the quality of a valid instrument for meeting the espoused 
objectives, which, at present seems to be a distant call. In other words, when others are 
involved, then STVPP does not remain only HR's jurisdiction any longer - but assumes 
the nature of common ground, wherein others too can contribute towards turning 
STVPP into a successful business proposition. 
5.1.2.1.2 Prevalence of involvement, in the implementation phasle. 
Organisations rarely have laid-out rules to guide them about the exact nature of 
involvement for carving out a STVPP. Part of the reason is that involvement per se has 
not been considered important enough in its practice. More often than not, involvement 
mechanisms are commissioned as mere lipservice or perfunctory fixtures so as to 
comply with norms, that appear sporadically. For instance - with the surge of TQM 
wave, it had become essential to involve employees far and wide. However, it is only 
the other side of the coin ie those actually involved, who can better inform or enlighten 
researchers about whether such involvement is worthwhile or even if it is heartfelt? 
whether such involvement is serving its purpose of drawing richness from deep 
reserves of people's experiences? and most crucially, whether such involvement is 
igniting, the much coveted, 'psychology of ownership' in employees? With these 
themes in mind and to get a glimpse of the other side of the picture, the managers group 
and the finance group, were probed about their respective involvement in the STVPP 
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process (duely reported in tables 5.4 and 5.3 respectively). Thus, while the above two 
groups were questioned about their involvement in the entire process, the scope of 
investigation with the HR group was limited to questions on design phase only. During 
the preliminary study, when the researcher had mainly interacted with the HR, it had 
become evident a little too quickly, that STVPP, as a whole is more of HR's forte, and 
that finance has overall involvement - but from a distance, and that Top management is 
even farther away in its day to day interaction with policy administration, while it 
retains the overall authority over commissioning the scheme. Thus, it was not 
considered beneficial to probe with the HR group, the issue of involvement in 
implementation as they considered it by and large inconsequential as it meant only the 
execution of dictates decided earlier at the design phase. Nevertheless, other entities 
like Finance and middle managers were questioned about the specific stages of design 
as well as of implementation, where they were involved. This particular opportunity 
served as a double-check measure to confirm the nature of involvement of each group, 
and also, it offered a chance to secure detailed information about the specific stages 
where they were involved. 
Implementation phase of STVPP is the culmination of the design phase, and is 
underpinned by communication processes at various points of its execution. Broadly, it 
includes launch-time communication, (related) education/ training/ workshop/ 
discussions, and performance progress reporting. Implementation phase can be 
conceptualized as one that enacts the charter laid out in the design phase, and 
additionally includes aspects concerning 'calculation of payout amount' and 'plan 
review'. Under the banner of this definition of 'implementation' phase, its practice has 
been studied. 
5.1.2.2 Involvement in the process of STVPP, in perception of the finance function 
The 'finance'^  group was independently probed to understand nature of its 
involvement, not just in the design phase, but in the whole process of STVPP. 
Strangely, involvement is one such issue for which the laid-out dictates/ rules are not 
' As mentioned for HR, the term 'finance' function refers to the collective perception of finance 
personnel. For study purpose, their view was brought forth by its representative, chosen as sample. 
Colloquial language of the type used in the text above gives researcher a free hand in weaving thoughts 
and in nailing down the most accurate thought, without undue concern for preserving correctness of 
language. 
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totally reliable, and one is left to rely on perceptions of its target audience or in other 
words the takers of the mechanism. Thus, one side of the picture was supplied by the 
HR function, and the other part of it was obtained from the Finance function, which 
presented vital streaks of insight into its nature of involvement. 
There is reason to believe that this is the closest we can get to the factual information 
about breadth of finance' involvement in STVPP process. Perception of'finance' group 
is most relevant since it is the key stakeholder or participant, while HR's role is more 
widespread and generic, as it spans the umbrella of orchestrating other players' actions 
through the course of STVPP process. Also, while it is conceivable that HR's ideal-
speak may vary from the actual practice thus causing a discrepancy in reporting, the 
concerned stakeholder or the group actually involved is unlikely to commit errors of 
commission or omission. Details about involvement of finance, as gathered from the 
subject itself (in this case finance), are summarized in table 5.3 below. 
TABLE 5.3 
Involvement of Finance function in the process of STVPP (perceived by 'finance' 
function) 
Decisions about STVPP process 
Setting organization goals 
Deciding performance parameters 
Overall design process 
Supplying data on expenses incurred 
Assessment of organization goal achievement 
Computation of payout 
Detecting deviations from plan design 
Review of STVPP 
Overall STVPP process 
% of organizations who involve 
'finance' in (the) stated decisions 
of STVPP 
6.7% 
6.7% 
13.3% 
13.3% 
6.7% 
20% 
6.7% 
6.7% 
53.3% 
The above figures represent the % of organizations that follow the specified practice. 
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The human resources shapes the variable remuneration plan, concerns itself with day-
to-day administrative issues, and since finance is accountable for company profitability, 
it ensures that the variable remuneration plan is commercially viable. For this reason, 
finance function has a direct stake in the success of STVPP. 
Finance function has macro-level involvement throughout the STVPP process (53%). it 
is clear from above that 'finance' is intricately involved in the plan process, especially 
at those stages that have budgetary implications. It would be an appropriate assertion 
that 'Finance' has considerable presence in the plan process, as half the organisations 
involve this group throughout the STVPP process, which dispels notions of it carrying 
out a mere 'figure head' role. Discussions had brought out that finance' role in STVPP 
process is indispensable. Some of its key contribution are - to provide data on past 
performance, information on year-to-date expenses and information about goal-
achievement at regular intervals of time. In table 5.3, involvement figures presented 
against individual-plan-aspects represent those organizations that selectively involve 
their finance, only in select decisions about STVPP. Evidently, this information in 
isolation, sheds little light on finance' pivotal role in shaping the STVPP process. The 
preeminent role of finance in the context of STVPP came through very openly during 
discussions with HR function and the Finance function. While the HR group verbally 
emphasized finance' criticality to the success of the whole edifice - that of STVPP, in 
case of Finance, this fact became apparent through depth of its insight and remarkable 
clarity of its grasp about the overall process. In this regard, researcher would like to 
uphold the insight derived through interviews to the status of a lighthouse, that has later 
been underpinned with evidence of primary data, gathered during the study. 
5.1.2.3 Involvement in process of STVPP, in perception of middle managers 
One of the tenets of this study is that the variable pay system's expanse, having spread 
to include middle managers, should, in all fairness, endow upon managers the ability to 
exert control over their performance parameters - as this would afford them feeling of 
being in command, quite like being in the driving seat. Considering this, it is safe to 
assume that it is desirable to involve middle managers throughout the STVPP process. 
The process of STVPP is broadly bifurcated into two phases - the design phase and the 
implementation phase - so as to get a closer look at how much involvement is prevalent 
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at each of these stages. The table below (table 5.4) focuses its attention on reporting 
managers' involvement in both these phases. 
TABLE 5.4 
Involvement of middle managers in the process of STVPP (in perception of managers 
themselves) 
Decisions about process 
of STVPP 
Deciding performance 
parameters 
Setting performance 
targets 
Deciding threshold level 
Deciding the percentage 
of payout at various 
levels of performance 
Calculating payout 
Evaluating its overall 
process and outcomes 
% of organizations that involve 'managers', and the extent of 
such involvement 
High 
involvement 
-
-
-
-
(to a) 
large 
extent 
15.3% 
-
-
-
-
Moderate 
involvement 
21.3% 
-
-
-
-
(to a) 
small 
extent 
50% 
-
-
-
-
No 
involvement 
13.3% 
-
-
-
The above figures are indicative of% of organizations that follow a specific practice. 
As has been mentioned above, the interconnected nature of design and implementation 
phases of STVPP renders it meaningful to club these two phases as parts of the larger 
whole - the STVPP process. Data shown above (table 5.4) describes the extent of 
managers' involvement in the STVPP process. Due to criticality of involvement, which 
is emphasized in the 'New pay' literature, this aspect is examined in detail to gauge the 
extent of its use, at each of its stages. Indepth probing is helpful for purpose of 
systematically enhancing level of managers' involvement, particularly at those stages, 
that are found deficient in managers' input (by virtue of low involvement). 
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Of the stages listed above, managers are involved in 2 specific ones, these being -
deciding performance parameters, and setting performance targets. Both these stages 
concern individual-level responsibilities, while other stages ie the ones that do not 
involve middle managers, are all in the nature of policy-level decisions. 
A little thought-flexing into such pattern of managers' involvement, would reveal that 
traditionally, the performance management systems, that commenced with formal goal 
setting exercise, too utilized a similar pattern of involvement. It may be deduced that - a 
platform of robust PMS is necessary to secure employees' buy-in to the goal setting 
contract. Apparently, this is part of the reason that managers are involved in these 
specific decisions of STVPP. The involvement-data shown above amply reveals that 
the avenues for managers' involvement have shown little change, be it the earlier 
scenario of traditional PMS (performance management system), or be it the current 
scenario wherein STVPP is used in conjunction, as a pay disbursement mechanism. 
Another aspect deserving attention is of managers' involvement in evaluation of their 
performance results. This aspect, per se, does not belong to either STVPP design or to 
the implementation phase or even the evaluation phase. Data about it, though not 
relevant for immediate purpose of study, is useful for making valuable interpretations. 
With this view, it is hereby reported that all managers interviewed in the study admitted 
to their involvement in evaluation of their performance results. 
Details about extent of managers' involvement makes it apparent that half the managers 
are involved only to a 'small extent' and more than 2/3rd managers are involved either 
'to a small extent' or (they are) 'not involved at all". According to them, reasons for 
seemingly limited involvement of mangers include a) Organisations' inability to put 
into place specific processes soliciting active manager-involvement and b) justification, 
that they are indirectly involved through representation or senior level personnel. If 
anything, this figure of 63% clearly indicates that organizations in the software industry 
have not put together systematic processes for encouraging middle-manager-
involvement in STVPP process. Only 15% are involved 'to a large extent' while 21% 
are involved 'moderately'. The author would like to restate that the said figures are for 
involvement in setting 'performance parameters' and in determining 'target 
performance', apparently, none of which is concerned with the core aspects of STVPP 
process. The data above, leads us to conclude that managers' involvement is limited to 
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individual-relevant components of STVPP, and that the extent of involvement in these 
components is in a limited way, leaving much to be desired. A possible interpretation of 
the finding that 21% managers are involved 'moderately', is perhaps, that the 
'involvement mechanism' is discretionary, and possibly, it may be active, only in some 
pockets of organizations, that come across as stand-alone cases in form of few 
overenterprising supervisors or overzealous managers. 
The discrepancy between data on 'managers'-involvement', as provided by the HR 
group (table 5.2) and what managers themselves have offered (table 5.4), is so glaring, 
that it calls for an explanation. This can be metaphorically explained as looking at the 
same phenomenon through different glasses. HR*' has measured managers' 
involvement in the overall design of STVPP while managers have talked about 
involvement in certain specific stages of STVPP. Thus, due to difference in the horizon 
of perception they have adopted, there are differences between their views. A short 
term variable pay plan's conception and formulation is like a vast ocean, and against 
this backdrop, the two aspects of 'goal setting' (already talked about) that involve 
managers, look like two tiny particles, suspended in this enormous arena. This explains 
the finding that in HR's opinion, 20% organizations involve managers 'to a small 
extent'. 
There are 15.3% middle managers of the Indian software industry, who are involved 'to 
a large extent' in 'deciding their performance parameters' and 'in setting their target 
level'. It may be added in good measure that these two aspects relate directly to the 
performance management processes, that by itself is an adjunct to STVPP, and at best 
plays a supportive role in its ftinctioning. Thus, managers have perceived the extent of 
involvement in light of select stages of STVPP, and they are commenting on the extent 
to which they are involved in these specific stages. This accounts for the difference in 
the perception between the two. 
The term HR has been invariably used in place of the more appropriate term 'Human Resources 
function' as it sometimes helps in conveying the accurate meaning without losing the flow of language 
and sometimes it helps in accurately describing the behavior of HR function, through use of a more 
personalized form of reference. In the same manner, and for similar reasons extended in the previous 
statement, many a times the 'Finance' function too, has simply been referred as 'finance' without 
suffixing it with the term 'function' at every instance of its use. 
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This should aid the reader in accurately grasping the import of data relevant to 
managers' involvement in STVPP. Inevitably, a massive number of middle managers, 
as high as 87%, are involved in the two goal-setting-related aspects at levels that are 
equivalent of- 'small extent', 'moderate' or 'large extent'. The foregoing discussion 
sufficiently explains the reason for discrepancy between the views of HR and that of 
managers. 
5.1.2.3.1 Managers' preference for involvement in the STVPP process 
The motivation for writing this section is that it speaks volumes about managers' 
perception about the involvement issue, which is important to know, in view of low 
levels of their involvement in the STVPP process. It is pertinent to understand 
managers' viewpoint about why involvement may or may not be desirable. Their 
insight about the same has been presented in the discussion below, that follows table 
5.5. 
TABLE 5,5 
Middle managers' preference about involvement in the STVPP process 
Middle managers' preference pattern 
regarding involvement in STVPP process 
"they desire involvement" 
"they do not desire involvement" 
No Ideas' (unsure of their decision) 
Percentage of middle managers 
(favouring the stated responses) 
82.7% 
12% 
5.3% 
Majority of managers (approx 83%) favour the proposal about prospective involvement 
in STVPP process, which indicates a high degree of receptivity at their end. They 
believe that a 'state of high involvement', if practiced, would reap benefits of increased 
understanding, higher acceptance, stronger commitment and also better satisfaction -
all in relation to use of STVPP. 
A minority (12%)) perceives this proposal to be undesirable. Reasons for the same 
mainly concern untenability of the proposal, and doubts about their expertise in 
Those having no ideas as to desirability or otherwise of involvement, however, upon a deeper probe, 
cited reasons about unfeasibility of involvement, as the key bottleneck to its use. 
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handling of STVPP. A small section of managers (5.3%) were unable to judge their 
own position regarding the issue raised. The pattern of preferences exhibited by 
managers presents worthwhile food for thought, and a valuable learning for 
compensation designers to mull over. 
5.1.2.3.2 Potential benefits of managers' involvement in the STVPP process 
Two key respondent groups of the study - the HR and the managers, both have close 
experience with STVPP and are well-positioned to offer views about whether 
involvement of managers in this process would be a worthwhile idea or a wasteful 
proposition. In order to have a broader perspective of this issue, both these respondents 
were questioned about it. The related findings, analysis and relevant discussions are 
presented in the two sub-sections, detailed below. A word of caution is issued about the 
frame of reference, that each one used in framing their ideas. The HR has talked about 
involvement in the design phase, since this is a mammoth task of the process and is a 
vital precursor to the rest of its development. On the same plane, managers have talked 
about involvement in the overall process of STVPP, without getting into its partitioning 
into various phases. The stated difference in the respective frame of reference, adopted 
by the groups - HR and Middle managers, is useful for understanding their views in the 
correct perspective. 
5.1.2.3.2.1 Managers' perception about potential benefits of their involvement in 
STVPP process. 
Managers'" were probed for insight into benefits that would accrue, either to them or to 
the organization, resulting from their involvement in the STVPP process. This line of 
reasoning is the potential backbone for any involvement initiative that organizations 
may like to launch into, for its employees. Results based on managers' suggestions 
about merits of their getting involved, are summarized in table 5.6 below. 
'° At all instances, use of the complete phrase 'middle managers' has been disregarded, in favour of the 
more conversational term 'managers', for reasons of avoiding undue redundancy and for keeping the 
language-flow intact. 
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TABLE 5.6 
Managers' perception of the potential benefits of their involvement in STVPP 
process 
Potential benefits of managers' involvement in the 
STVPP process 
Increase in motivation 
Better understanding 
Customization of STVPP to specific roles 
Hightened interest in STVPP proceedings. 
Possibi 1 ity of innovating STVPP 
Better measurability of performance 
Higher acceptance 
Stream of regular feedback about STVPP performance 
Higher satisfaction with STVPP 
No benefits - as this is not feasible 
Percentage of 
middle managers 
10% 
26.7% 
6% 
14.3% 
6% 
8% 
9.7% 
2% 
12% 
5.3% 
The table above presents views of all managers (those sampled), regardless of the 
preference they showed about desirability of managers' involvement. Even more 
significant is the finding that 94.7% managers have credited the exercise of 'potential-
manager-involvement' with valuable benefits. Within this range, 82.7% managers 
favoured the actual implementation of manager-involvement initiative (see table 5.5). 
The gap between the two, those showing ideological preference (94.7%) and those 
showing practical-relevance and its (managers' involvement) utility (82.7%), shows 
that there are some managers who doubt the practicality of the idea and hold 
reservations against its actual use in organizations. Some of the reasons cited by this 
section of managers (those believing in the concept per se, but lacking confidence in 
possibilit}' of its actual use) include - "HR's self sufficiency at the task of managing 
STVPP process", "managers being already overloaded", "lack of managers' ability to 
deal with STVPP" and "lack of well designed systems /processes to support such a 
sophisticated mechanism." Though not readily expressed or admitted by managers, it 
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strongly appeared, that managers have yet to fully grasp STVPP's conceptualization in 
the frame of business strategy, and of its role as a strategic lever in the hands of 
management. 
63% managers perceive that involvement will lead to benefits of better understanding, 
increased acceptance, higher motivation and would also result in higher satisfaction. 
27% perceive that such a move will increase managers' interest level in STVPP. A 
significant number (22%) perceive that such communication channel (that of 
involvement), will give managers the opportunity to make STVPP innovative, work 
towards enhancing performance measurabiiity, and in general, make it more relevant 
for managers' roles. These findings clearly support the initiative of involving managers 
in STVPP process, as 95%) favour the idea and are able to pinpoint the most important 
benefit that could accrue from such a move. 
5.1.2.3.2.2 HR's perception about potential benefits of managers' involvement in 
design phase of STVPP. 
The human resources personnel, who have, by and large, complete say over STVPP 
process, are well positioned to suggest benefits that could accrue to the organisation or 
the managers, due to increased managers' involvement in the design phase of STVPP 
process. Analysis along this line of enquiry is presented below -
TABLE 5.7 
Potential benefits of middle managers' involvement in design phase of STVPP, as 
perceived by human resources function 
Potential benefits, resulting from managers' 
involvement in design phase 
No teething problems / no complaints / 
higher employee buy-in or stronger 
acceptance 
Increased transparency 
Clarity in business outlook. (For instance; 
one can begin to perceive link between 
project deliveries and revenue targets) 
Feeling of ownership, Feeling of being 
aligned with business goals 
No specific benefit 
Percentage of HR respondents (in favour of 
the stated opinions) 
40% 
13.3% 
6.7% 
26.7% 
13.3% 
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According to 87% of HR personnel, middle managers should be involved in designing 
STVPP. Such involvement will have salubrious effect on managers' group, in 
numerous ways. 40% of HR personnel believe 'involvement' will positively affect 
managers' acceptance of STVPP. 47% HR personnel, which is approximately half the 
size of HR fraternity, perceive that benefits of transparency and ownership-feelings will 
prevail. A minority (13.3%) regards managers not suitable for fruitful involvement. 
According to them, managers are not sufficiently experienced, and are therefore ill-
equipped to add value through their involvement. Some felt that involvement would 
confuse managers, and hence their involvement would yield no benefit. In sum total, as 
per HR personnel, who are at the helm of STVPP-related affairs, prospective 
involvement of middle managers is more likely to lead to positive outcomes than to 
become a cause of negative pitfalls. In this observation, lies a strong suggestion for 
incorporating involvement-initiative in developing STVPPs. 
5.1.3 Design and Implementation aspects of STVPP 
This is like the axis around which a short term variable pay plan revolves. It can also be 
correctly understood as the metaphorical brain of human body. Design and 
implementation aspects comprise the building blocks that help to institutionalize a 
variable pay plan. Analysis of aspects about STVPP design and implementation are 
presented in this sub-section (5.1.3). The table given below classifies this information 
into distinct categories for ease of understanding. Interpretation about the results is 
detailed in the subsequent description. 
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TABLE 5.8 
Design and Implementation aspects of STVPP 
S.No. 
5.1.3.1 
5.1.3.2 
5.1.3.3 
5.1.3.4 
5.1.3.5 
Design and Implementation aspects of STVPP 
Structure of STVPP (Variable pay structuring in relation to base 
pay/salary, Percentage of variable pay as a proportion of salary (CTC), 
composition of payout structure, level(s) of aggregation at which payout 
structure is defined, Threshold level target (as defined at the level of an 
employee), variable payout schedule", frequency of payout, form of 
payout delivery), Proposed changes to variable pay proportion. 
Additional aspects -
Line of sight with business goals - Whether managers' LOS is established 
(or whether it exists). Method used to establish (such) line-of-sight. 
Extent of control over performance parameters, Significance of threshold 
goal, Achievability of threshold goal, Existence of Systems for 
understanding managers' grievances about STVPP 
STVPP related Organisation-level details - Organisation performance 
parameters (along with their respective weightage). Threshold level for 
these parameters, variable pay schedule at organization level (ie payout 
percentage corresponding to varying levels of organization performance). 
STVPP fijnding - Source of ftinds, Variability of managers' payout in 
relation to changes in organization performance results (or its financial 
ability). 
STVPP Communication - Methods of communication used for conveying 
basic details about STVPP, Specific details about the plan that are 
communicated. Performance progress report in relation to manager 
" Variable payout schedule gives details about percentage of target variable pay that is payable, at 
varying levels of performance results. 
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S.No. 
5.1.3.6 
5.1.3.7 
5.1.3.8 
Design and Implementation aspects of STVPP 
performance as-well-as organization performance (includes performance 
status report, and Gap analysis'' reports); frequency of such reports, 
method used for communicating payout amount, and whether payout 
related explanatory information is tendered. 
STVPP Management - Plan ownership, Plan administration 
responsibility, Plan approving authority. 
STVPP-related review - Frequency of plan review. Reviewing authority 
STVPP-related future course - Desirability of linking variable pay to 
organization performance results, Issue of increasing managers' 
involvement. 
The design and implementation systems used in support of a short term variable pay 
plan are wide enough in its scope, as these extend way beyond the specifics of plan 
features. Aspects like how much involvement effort is invested, whether management 
considers it important that its employees fully understand the plan functioning and 
similar other concerns, make it imperative to study its related aspects too, in order to 
form a meaningful and wholesome picture out of it. Such is the magnitude of its 
functioning, that it had to be sliced into sub-themes of manageable proportions, for 
carrying out a focused examination. Collectively, it would give the reader insight into 
functioning of STVPPs, as applied in the Indian Software industry, w.r.t. their 
applicability for middle managers. 
5.1.3.1 Structure of STVPP 
The structure of STVPP is a veritable skeleton around which the overall plan is built. It 
comprises its basic features and the policy rulings that govern Its functioning. Though a 
little weird, the fact of the matter remains that the structure that organizations use 
differs so widely in its basic construct from one another, that it defies efforts to neatly 
Gap analysis refers to analysis of difference between 'current achievement' and 'threshold level target'. 
Such evaluation helps to emphasise the extent of shortfall, that needs to be fulfilled for meeting the 
threshold target. 
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crunch these into a summarized picture. The structural patterns of STVPPs' functioning 
at the sample organizations have been put together in table 5.9 below. 
Information on structure of STVPPs could not be summarised in terms of frequency or 
percentages or other kinds of descriptive statistics, due to the varied nature of plan 
types, used at the sample organizations. Wherever possible, analysis of information 
contained in the table has been provided. Typically, only a few elements of the plan 
could have been brought down in numerical form, while its other features would have 
called for a detailed elaboration of contents, to do justice to doing its analysis. Thus, in 
order to maintain homogenity in presentation of information, compete details of all 
STVPPs, that have been studied in the research, are provided. Having put down all of 
necessary information, the researcher is sure of preserving the originality of 
information about STVPPs. Table 5.9 below provides the related results. 
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The above shown types of structure of STVPP need to be understood in light of the 
convention that compensation policies and processes, are commonly inspired by the 
going practice in a particular industry. These are commonly picked up from industry 
operators, and plagiarized in the name of benchmarking. It is often seen that when 
industry personnel change jobs, they carry alongwith them the baggage of company 
rules and policies, every record of the breakthrough feats they had pulled in their 
wake, almost as naturally as if all these were a part of their physical being. It is clear 
in the specimen of policy structure shown above, that 67% or IIZ^^ organizations of 
the industry show variable pay portion as a percentage of CTC. 27% represent this 
portion as a lumpsum amount and approx. 7% show this amount in hybrid form, 
showing variable pay as partly 'a portion of salary' and partly, pulled out in form of 
project savings. Thus, an absolute comparison among the range of variable pay 
structures practiced by this industry, is not only difficult, but an exercise in futility. 
Majority of organizations, structure variable pay as a certain percentage of CTC; thus 
a generalization can be made at this point about manner of variable pay structuring 
vis-a-vis salary. On an average, organizations of the Indian software industry keep 
variable pay at 19.4% of their CTC. The average lumpsum variable pay, for those 
who use this kind of practice, the annual target amount is 1.33 lakh. Those keeping 
this portion as lumpsum, are equally divided among themselves between the practice 
of keeping it as a part of CTC and those keeping it outside the CTC. The decipherable 
trend from these facts and figures is that variable pay amount is no longer, nibbling at 
fringes of managers' CTC, it certainly is assuming a noticeable proportion of 
managers' salary, though not a very significant one as yet. 
80% organizations include the factor of individual performance in their variable pay 
structure. This is desirable considering man's selfish motive in seeking reward for his 
performance, however, as literature has repeatedly cautioned, inclusion of this factor 
causes employees to deflect from the common interest of collective goal. Its wide 
use can be explained in terms of legacy of old pay systems. 20% link variable pay to 
team/ project performance, which is a rather insignificant number, if the objective is 
to surge towards meeting business goals. To expand employees' horizon to 
encompass collective interest, it needs to be reflected in higher proportion of team-
based payout. Only 33% organizations tie variable payout amount to business unit/ 
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Line of business or division results, which shows limited scope/practice of sharing 
business unit results with managers. This could be due to their limited role in business 
unit functioning, a rather long line-of-sight or due to the difficulty of weaving a 
linkage between the two. After all, it is quite plausible and infact an understandable 
bottleneck, that most compensation professionals find it difficult to configure the 
processes required for crafting a variable pay structure, with its linkages at multiple 
levels of aggregation. Half the organizations (47% to be exact) follow the practice of 
tying individual-level variable payout to organization results. It seems the original 
philosophy of variable pay, that of tagging employees' payout to financial ability, 
indeed, has feet, and has its due place in practice of compensation plans. By 
extension, it is even more crucial to tie employees' payout to units that are closer in 
their line-of-sight - like a project team, or a business unit or a vertical, since these 
avenues offer employees better visibility of their contribution to business goals. It 
seems this practice has not picked up as only 20% to 33% organisations tie managers' 
payout at an intermediate level. The broad picture that emerges from this analysis 
reveals that organistions are well on the path of sharing collective results with 
employees, and in the process, passing on some stake in business results to managers 
too - however, its presence is yet to pick up a stronger foothold, to become noisy 
enough to get noticed. 
A majority (73%) of organizations do specify individual threshold level explicitly, 
which leads to the inference, that the system does intend to pull individual 
performance through its reins, and does not leave it unattended under the garb of 
focusing on larger canvas of striving for business goals. However, it is a matter of 
dismay that 54% of organizations, which is half the population size, tie managers' 
payout to a broad rating system (carrying maximum 5 points or gradations), that does 
not offer sufficient degree of detail or minuteness, to be able to finely distinguish 
between various levels of performance. A meticulously designed and quantified 
performance measurement system serves like a lighthouse, which can powerfully pull 
employees to stretch their performance. This quality is lost on currently used systems 
since the conventional rating system is still widely used, and which provides only 
broad indications about performance results. Additionally, another 20% map 
individual performance using even broader parameters like point system or criteria-
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based quadrant system. In all, 74% organizations using a cut-off level, of individual 
threshold target, use measurement systems like rating scale or point system for 
appraising performance results. 
Apparently, upside potential feature is not popularly used as a motivation device for 
individual employees. Mostly, the 'upside potential' feature is tagged to organization 
or business unit performance results, more often than one would find its occurrence 
for individual-linked payout. Probable reasoning is, that in order to apply upside 
potential in a formula-driven manner, it is a necessity that performance results be 
quantified. This condition is easily made true for organisation results, that are often 
financial in nature (Revenue, PAT etc), than it is for individual performance results 
(which in most cases is presented as broad parameters of ratings or points). 
66.7% organizations follow the practice of annual payout frequency, while 26.8% 
deliver the payout the on a quarterly basis. Only 1%, calculate the payout using a 
hybrid criteria of different frequencies for different factors of payout. The pattern of 
payout frequency reinforces the notion that organisation are steadfastly holding on to 
old pay systems, unwilling to make a transition to the newer and more flexible forms, 
that offer promise of higher potential for reinforcement of desired behavior 
outcomes. 
Proposed changes to variable pay proportion 
Revision of STVPPs is a common practice among its users. In order to gauge a 
measure of organisations' intention as to the future course of variable pay proportion 
(of salary) that they intend to sustain (or use), the HR personnel were questioned for 
inputs about the same. The related findings are presented below: 
TABLE 5.10 
Organisations' intention to amend tiie variable pay proportion for managers 
Whether organizations intend to increase the 
proportion of variable pay for middle managers? 
"no intention to increase the proportion of 
variable pay" 
"it is intended to increase the proportion of 
variable pay" 
Percentage of organizations, favouring the 
stated response 
73.3% (of these 6.7% intend to reduce VP 
proportion, and another 6.7% intend to 
convert its form to ' % of salary' basis, 
instead of its current form of lumpsum) 
26.7% 
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73% organizations have not favoured an increase in the variable pay percentage for 
middle managers. The industry practice about the prevailing variable pay percentage 
(applied for any particular section of employees) is taken into account before 
finalizing salary structures. This is so because prospective recruits specifically enquire 
how much percentage of their salary falls into variable pay, and usually in doing so, 
they are forewarned about the current practice at other prospective employer 
organisations. The IT talent is scarce and therefore it is difficult to source the required 
skill sets and finally procure them. Software industry is short of adequate manpower, 
which increases the bargaining power of prospective recruits in recruitment-related 
negotiations. This explains organisations' reluctance to increase the variable pay 
percentage for its managers. 
5.1.3.2 Additional aspects: 
This section is devoted to reporting findings about crucial aspects of managers' line-
of-sight. It also reveals findings on how much control managers have over the 
parameters of performance that determine their variable payout amount. An important 
aspect of STVPP, that is - the threshold goal, is examined from the perspective of 
managers. Specifically it is ascertained how they perceive its significance and whether 
they consider this level of goal as achievable. It has also been found if management 
has taken initiative in setting up specific systems for resolving managers' grievances 
concerning STVPP use. The above facts and figures have been reported in this 
section, alongwith the related analysis. 
5.1.3.2.1 Managers' line of sight with business goals 
The table below reports findings about how organizations establish managers' line-of-
sight with business goals. It is a worthwhile query aimed at finding whether specific 
processes are in place to ensure its development and sustenance or whether it is left 
undone, considering it would be developed by itself n due course of business 
functioning. It was important to understand extent of efforts invested in establishing 
or ensuring existence of managers' LOS, which is a crucial prerequisite and also a 
vital output of STVPP. Related findings are briefed below -
216 
TABLE 5.11 
Processes used for establishing managers' line of sight with business goals, 
perceived by the Human Resources Function 
Processes used by organizations to establish 
managers' LOS with business goals 
Explicit processes are used (mainly Goal-setting-
process) 
Explicit processes are not used (implicit methods 
are used) 
Percentage of organizations, 
that adopt the stated methods 
6.7% 
93.3% 
The intention of the question was to ascertain whether managers' LOS is 'explicitly' 
(and therefore purposively) established, or is it achieved through more subtle/implicit 
means. More than 90%) organizations do not use explicit processes to 
establish/formulate employee line-of-sight with business goals. This is due to popular 
belief among compensation designers that business' existing processes shall take care 
of it, in some implicit and unsaid way. The HR personnel believe that managers get 
visibility of their contribution to business goals, in implicit ways, that include the 
following. 
By way of assuming project responsibility 
Through progress meetings 
Through the specific manner of project design 
Through design of KRAs. 
Through variable pay structure (since it clearly brings forth linkages at 
various levels of aggregation) 
Through information shared about business plans 
Through routine business processes 
Project managers, at their discretion, may highlight work-related aspects 
that provide managers - line of sight with business goals. 
Through weekly progress meetings 
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The HR personnel, who are equivalent of a mouthpiece (for organisations), were (by 
and large) unaware of the importance of carving out line-of-sight processes for 
achieving success at STVPP programmes. This is probably the reason that over 90% 
of HR professionals work on STVPPs where explicit processes are not used for 
bringing to light managers' line of sight (table 5.11). Infact, the HR professionals 
could not readily correlate the need for 'systems for establishing LOS' with use of 
STVPP. This is a clear indication of a lack of sound knowledge-base about design 
process of variable pay systems, among compensation designers. 
Regardless of HR's efforts at creating/ establishing or even strengthening line-of-sight 
ability of managers, it is important to find whether managers perceive its existence or 
presence or if they are able to perceive any such linkage. Results about the same, 
garnered from managers' views are presented below -
TABLE 5.12 
Managers' perception of LOS with business goals 
Managers' perception about link between their 
goals and business goals 
"Such a link exists" 
"Such a link does not exist" 
Percentage of middle managers 
carrying the stated perception 
89.3% 
10.7% 
Majority of managers (90%) perceive such a link between their goals and business 
goals. Evidently this is the foundation of an organization system, and is easy to 
understand. Though only, 10% are unable to form such perception (about the linkage), 
it is nevertheless an issue of concern requiring intensive efforts. It wouldn't be off the 
mark to say that this is like a fissure in the surface of understanding-level, and if 
worked at sincerely, it could lead the compensation personnel or the trainers 
concerned, to other softer (or less threatening, or less severe cases) cases who require 
strengthening(or even deepening) of perception about their linkage with broad 
business picture. In a nut shell, researcher's view is that results that represent 
perception of managers, should be brought to the notice of HR personnel, for their 
understanding about how prevalent line-of-sight is, in their organizations. A precursor 
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to this exercise that begs attention, is that of enlightening HR personnel about the 
pivotal nature orcriticality of line-of-sight. 
5.1.3.2.1.1 Methods used for establishing manages' line of sight 
It is worthy of consideration and a matter of exploration to unravel which methods are 
used (in many cases unwittingly) for communicating to managers - their line of sight 
with business goals. Results about the same are briefed in table 5.13 below -
TABLE 5.13 
Methods used for establishing managers' LOS, as they themselves perceive it 
Methods used to communicate the link between 
managers' goals and business goals. 
Highlighted by supervisor (Discretionary 
practice) 
Implied through the following processes / 
forums 
• Goal setting exercise 
• Meetings or project level discussions 
• Performance review 
• Formal Induction process 
• Performance progress reports (this offers 
visibility) 
Percentage of managers who 
perceive existence of a link, in the 
stated manner 
10.6% 
78.7% 
Section of managers who do not perceive presence of such link-10.7% 
79% managers perceive that their line of sight with the business goals is implied. This 
neatly aligns with organisations' practice of not using formal processes for 
establishing employee line-of-sight with business goals. Efforts by supervisors in this 
direction (10.6%)) can at best be described as discretionary and adhoc. Established 
processes are required for reinforcement of line-of-sight, which is not sufficiently 
fulfilled by adhoc practices. The figure of 10.7% shown in the last row is mentioned 
for giving complete picture of entire manager population. These managers (10.7%) 
are those who do not perceive that any such link exists, and are thus beyond the scope 
of this table, due to their irrelevance. Their inclusion in the table is more for reasons 
of completeness than for their implication for study results. 
The finance personnel were also probed as to the methods organisations use to 
establish mangers' line of sight. Findings in this regard are summarized in table 5.14 
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below. To be precise, setting up of line-of-sight would not fall in the domain of 
finance portfolio. However, since finance personnel also represent a point in the chain 
of command of organisational hierarchy, they are rightly positioned to give views 
about organizations' processes regarding use of methods , for sculpting managers' 
line of sight. 
TABLE 5,14 
Processes used to establish managers' line of sight with business goals, perceived 
by finance function 
Whether organizations explicitly link middle 
managers' goals with business goals? 
"Explicit processes are used" 
"Such link is implied" 
"There is no such linkage" 
Percentage of organizations, 
using each of these patterns. 
40% 
33.3% 
26.7% 
With regard to methods used for establishing managers' line of sight, there is 
divergence between the views of Finance and that of HR function. While 93% of HR 
respondents expressed that organizations do not have specific processes to establish 
employees' LOS, 40% finance personnel expressed that such processes did infact 
exist and were indeed being actively utilised. There is reason to give credence to 
views of HR function since it is closely involved with processes and systems related 
to employee functioning and development. 40% finance personnel who perceive that 
formal processes exist for setting up LOS, can be viewed as cases who may have 
initiated this as a discretionary practice, at their own will, as far as permitted by their 
own jurisdiction. After all, it does not take exceptional intelligence to figure out that 
such connectivity with business goals would help an employee, as motivation would 
be better, and feeling of ownership would also dawn upon them. With or without the 
use of STVPP, line of sight is anyways, a desirable construct. It is likely that finance 
personnel (the 40% who have expressed presence of formal systems) have 
experienced the use of these formal processes within their function or in other 
functions. Sensing the use of such systems, may have led this section of finance 
personnel (2/5"") to believe that such formal systems were indeed, in place. 
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Nevertheless, the observed divergence points to the need for wider participation (as 
well as presence) o f finance' personnel in the process of STVPP. 
5.1.3.2.2 Control over performance parameters of variable payout 
It has been found out from managers, that in their view how much control they exert 
over their parameters of performance that work to determine their variable payout 
amount. The related results are reported. Normally it would be expected that a feeling 
of high control would give managers a feeling of high inalienability over their fate, 
which in this case, relates to amount of variable payout they manage to earn. Table 
5.15 presents the results in this regard. 
TABLE 5.15 
Extent of control managers have over the performance parameters that 
determine their payout amount, as they themselves perceive it 
Extent of control 
Complete control 
To a large extent 
Partly 
To a small extent 
No control 
over performance parameters Percentage of middle managers, 
favouring a particular response 
2% 
24.7% 
57.3% 
14% 
2% 
Performance parameters include team-based performance parameters and individual-
based performance parameters. Degree of control is usually high over individual-
based parameters (which is natural to expect) and is relatively low in case of team-
based parameters (due to shared interest in target goal). This may be one of the 
reasons that only 2% (almost negligible) managers feel complete control while a 
considerable number - a quarter of managers, perceive the degree of control 'to a 
large extent'. Considerable number of managers (approx. 60%) perceive the degree of 
control to be 'partial' and 16% have reported even lesser degree of control (which is 
either o 'to a small extent' or 'none'). 
The findings above provide ample scope for plan designers as also the line 
supervisors to investigate the matter and probe the reasons and also the likely 
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measures for ensuring managers are able to perceive higher degrees of control over 
determining their payout amount. 
5.1.3.2.3 Significance of threshold level goal 
The question about significance of threshold level goal was raised in order to 
understand how threshold-concept is perceived by plan designers, since data on actual 
performance vis-a-vis threshold level performance is crucial to the study, it was 
examined if its understanding in practice matched its description provided in the 
subject literature, and also for using it as the benchmark for later assessment of 
managers' understanding about threshold-goal. For all practical purposes, if the 
system is to work as intended, the perception of the organisation (shown through HR 
in this case) about what threshold stands for, should match the understanding that 
managers develop about it. In case the two are at cross, this would show lack of 
perfect communication. Table 5.16 below summarizes what according to 
organizations, is the significance of threshold goal. 
TABLE 5.16 
Significance of threshold level goal, viewed by organization (represented by the 
human resources group) 
Significance of threshold level goal 
"A milestone" 
"Minimum performance expectation of an 
organization" 
Percentage of organizations, 
(expressing a specific view) 
6.7% 
93.3% 
It is plain to see that the above two options though quite similar in their connotation, 
present just a shade of difference in their respective meanings. 93% consider it as the 
minimum expectation, that must absolutely be met (for financial ability and hence 
business' viability) while a small proportion - that of 7%, consider it as a milestone. 
While both phrases convey the meaning that it is a milestone, a very insignificant 
minority (7%) are not able to perceive that it is the minimum requirement; for them it 
is one milestone that most likely gives message about a concomitant event, which in 
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this case is activation of payout delivery. There is no difference between 
understanding about threshold among practitioners and its conceptualization in 
literature. By and large, all HR personnel adopt a uniform view in their understanding 
of threshold-level significance. 
Both, the HR function and the finance function are like mouthpiece of the 
organization, about its policy-speak. In this regard it is only desirable that both these 
be approached for their views about organisations' intentions. The only difference 
being that while HR may have the benefit of a closer look at shaping and also the 
actual use of STVPP, it is the Finance function that takes overall charge of the 
situation since it holds the key to its budgetary implication, that is the act of releasing 
the payout amount. For these reasons, as mentioned above, views of both groups are 
credible and also would enable understanding another edge, that of discrepancy 
between what the Uvo think. While this is not the most important intent in examining 
their views, this should be helpful in understanding how much the two groups are 
synchronized in this common venture. Table 5.15 presents results about views of 
finance function, which is somewhat like the second voice of an organisation. 
TABLE 5.17 
Significance of threshold level goal, viewed by organisation (represented by 
finance function) 
Significance of threshold level goal 
To motivate employees to achieve certain predefined 
minimum level of performance. 
Point beyond which (ie less than which) the company 
loses its ability to pay. 
Percentage of organizations, 
favouring the stated view 
6.7% 
93.3% 
It is easy to see that in the significance of threshold goal, couched is the finance' 
raison d'etre for instituting STVPP, which is to protect organisations' 'ability to pay'. 
Fact that 93% have expressed that the threshold gives indication about when to start 
disbursals of payout, clearly indicates the motive to keep safe the 'financial ability to 
pay'. There is no difference about perception of threshold-Ievel-goal between how HR 
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regards it and how the Finance views it. The only difference is in the perspective they 
adopt - HR has explained threshold taking a view of the employees and finance has 
explained threshold taking a view of the organization budget. While Finance is mainly 
concerned with 'ability to pay' (93%), Human Resources function understands the 
same requirement in terms of performance expectations. While the former adopts a 
more macro level view of STVPP, the latter (i.e. HR) chooses to focus on the micro 
aspect of STVPP, which is at the level of employees. 
It was endeavoured to find how well managers understand the significance of 
threshold level goal. Their understanding is crucial for the reason that they are the 
doers, the prime subjects who are to be motivated through the use of this 
compensation mechanism, hence the importance of accurate cognition by this section. 
Table 5.18 below presents results related to managers' level of understanding of 
threshold level goal. 
TABLE 5.18 
Managers' understanding of purpose of threshold level goal, as they themselves 
perceive it 
Managers' understanding of purpose of 'threshold 
level goal' 
Minimum performance level, required to activate 
the stream of variable payout 
% of managers in favour of 
the stated view. 
All 100% 
All managers understand the significance of threshold level correctly, which is a good 
sign considering threshold's landmark importance in working of STVPP. The 
probable reason for such high level of understanding is that this subject usually 
figures prominently in discussions during recruitment process. Another fact of the 
matter is that, salary related issues are the meat of discussion during negotiations 
carried out through the selection process and also during talks at the time of 
finalization of candidates. The feature is more heightened in the IT industry due to 
seemingly high bargaining power of employees in the Information technology field. 
Above all, conversation with respondents (all three groups) revealed that variable pay 
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is a particularly thorny issue for employees, and for this reason it is like a problem 
child for HR professional. Given this background, discussions related to variable pay, 
of which threshold issue, figures among the priority topics, are bound to register 
prominently in one's memory. The foregoing narrative establishes importance of 
variable pay for both, its administrators and its target audience. In this picture, 
understanding of threshold registers clearly with managers, since it is the gateway to 
the treasure of variable pay. Also, organizations in this industry have shown amazing 
sincerity in sticking to the rule of 'no payout below threshold', thus the sacrosanct 
nature of threshold, in eyes of managers. 
5.1.3.2.3.1 Achievability of threshold level goal 
In view of the critical role of threshold in determining whether payout is to be 
released or withheld, it would be expected that managers would like to achieve this 
landmark and also be well-assured in advance that the level of goal is achievable, and 
within their reasonable reach. At the least, it would offer them psychological security 
that their well-earned money is recoverable, and is not a fading mirage that they 
would have to endlessly chase. Results about whether managers consider this level of 
goal achievable and the kind of difficulty they perceive in meeting this level, are 
reported on the basis of managers' perception about the issue. Table 5.19 given below 
reports this aspect of threshold. 
TABLE 5.19 
Achievability of threshold level goal, perceived by middle managers 
Extent of achievability of threshold goal 
Completely achievable 
Achievable to a large extent 
Partly achievable 
Achievable to a small extent 
Not achievable 
Percentage of middle 
managers, reporting the 
particular preference 
12% 
31.3% 
38% 
17.3% 
1.3% 
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Often there is a mix of team-based goals and individual-based goals, each of which 
has a different level of threshold goal. The team-based goal could belong to a business 
unit, a division or to the organization. (3ften managers have clear visibility of 
individual level goals and are able to comment on threshold achievability at this level. 
It is perhaps due to their limited line-of-sight of the group-level goal, that they have 
little idea about the threshold-level-achievability of the team-based goal. 
Overall, the degree of threshold achievability is reasonably satisfying, since 43% 
perceive it to be 'largely' achievable or 'completely' achievable. More than one third, 
consider this level of goal 'partly achievable'. A possible explanation could be that 
those who are at the helm of affairs, for instance a project head or a team head, are 
likely to have clearer visibility of the team goal, since the same may be merged with 
their individual level goal. Infact, at the higher echelons of hierarchy, the individual 
goal and the team goal progressively begin to converge. This helps to explain the 
finding that 1 out of every 5 managers perceive that the team goal / individual goal is 
completely achievable. It is likely that those perceiving lower levels of threshold 
achievability may be having limited visibility of the team goal, which may have been 
fogged by their position lower in the chain of command. For this reason, while they 
may be able to assert about achievability of individual goal, the same confidence may 
evade them when talking about team level goal. When all the facts are put together, 
findings show that 43% managers have placed significant confidence in achieving 
their threshold level goal, and others have placed only limited confidence in 
achievability of threshold goal. 
5.1.3.3 STVPP related organization-level details 
This section focuses on results about organisation-level performance parameters, 
which includes their respective weightage, threshold level goal, and the applicable 
payout schedule. Results reported here provide a picture of organizations' assessment 
of its macro level performance, so as to decide the amount of payout budget, and at 
the same time keeping the minimum operating margins of the organization intact. 
Table 5.20 gives results on organization performance parameters, utilized for purpose 
of STVPP. 
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Table 5.20 
Organization level Performance parameters (with reference to the period -
2004 to 2007) 
(figures are in terms of% of target goal) 
Orgn, 
Code 
CI 
C2 
C3 
C4 
Performance 
Parameters 
Turnover'^ '^  
Revenue 
Profit After Tax 
(PAT) 
PBIT (Profit Before 
Interest and Tax) of 
Business unit (0.5) 
PBIT (Profit Before 
Interest and Tax) of 
organisation (0.5) 
Revenue 
Threshold level 
Goal 
75% 
Information not 
available^^ 
Information not 
available 
70% 
70% 
Organization-level variable 
payout schedule ' 
75% payout at organization's 
threshold level. 100%> payout at 
100%! goal accomplishment. No 
upside potential is available 
Information not available 
At performance level 70% of 
target and below, there is no 
payout, at 71% to 80% perf - 90% 
payout , at 81%) to 90% perf -
95% payout, at 91% to 100% perf 
- 100% payout, at 101 to 110% 
perf - 110% payout, at 110% -
120% perf- 120% payout (capped 
at this level). 
For Unit-linked component, maximum payout deliver)' 
in a single financial year is capped at 125%. 
For company-linked component, current year's payout 
amount is capped at 125% of target payout; any 
excesses flow into a variable pay kitty. 
For company- linked component, 90%) - payout is 
assured. 10% remaining component is later evaluated 
for adequacy of results, and accordingly payout is 
made. The is not a laid-out rule for threshold of 
company-linked-component. 
Payout schedufe, in between the stated landmarks, can be calculated on a pro-rata basis. 
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Gross Contribution = Turnover - Direct Costs. 
23 
in some cases, organization refused to reveal the figures due to reasons of confidentiality. In such cases, the 
conventional industry practice will be taken as the defaul; practice. 
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Orgn. 
Code 
C5 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
CIO 
Performance 
Parameters 
PBT (Profit Before 
Tax) 
Turnover 
Revenue (.5) 
PAT (5) 
Revenue 
Profit After Tax 
(PAT) 
Revenue (.33) 
PAT (.33) 
EPS (.33) 
Sales (wt. ranges .6 
to .7) 
PAT (wt. ranges .3 
to .4) 
Threshold level 
Goal 
85% 
80% 
80% 
80% 
50% 
no threshold 
90% 
no threshold 
no threshold 
Organization-level variable 
payout schedule^' 
For 85% to 100% perf - payout is 
between 85% to 100% of target payout, 
for 100% to 120% of target, payout is 
correspondingly similar at 100% to 
120% of payout. 
The linkage between performance goals 
and payout is linear. There are 3 broad 
slabs of performance - 10% to 85% of 
target, 86% to 100% of target and 101% 
to 120% of target; for all these there is a 
linear linkage with payout, at similar 
levels (in terms of %> of target payout). 
From threshold to target, there is linear 
linkage with payout. Thereafter it is in 
increasing proportion - at 130% target 
achievement, payout is 150% and at 
150% target achievement, the payout is 
200%). in between, proportionately the 
payout calculation is performed 
Regardless of quantum of profit, payout 
delivery is done. For Revenue levels 
ranging between 70%) - 85%, payout is 
86% to 100%), for revenue between 
86% to 120%, payout is 100%. Upside 
potential capped at 120%) of revenue. 
Linkage between performance and 
payout is linear. For instance for 
performance between 90%) to 110% of 
target, payout is between 90% to 110%) 
of target payout. Likewise, payout at 
other levels of performance is 
determined. 
Between range of 60%o to 85% of 
performance, payout ranges anywhere 
between 100% to 110% of payout^" 
Complete payout schedule is not 
available. 
Payout schedule was not explicitly mentioned. The schedule mentioned here is culled out from past 3 year 
performance information of organization. 
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Orgn. 
Code 
Cll 
C12 
C13 
C14 
C15 
Performance 
Parameters 
Revenue (.5) 
PBT (Profit Before 
Tax) (.5) 
Revenue (.5) 
PBT (Profit Before 
Tax) (.5) 
Revenue (.4) 
Profit After Tax (.6) 
Profit After Tax 
(PAT) 
Overall Revenue 
Growth (.33) 
Profitable Revenue 
Growth in offshore 
business (.33) 
EBITDA'' Growth 
(.33) 
Threshold level 
Goal 
60% 
60% 
no threshold 
no threshold 
75% 
75% 
75% 
75% 
75% 
75% 
Organization-level variable 
payout schedule '^ 
Linear linkage between performance 
and payout. No upside potential is 
defined. 
It is implicitly believed that minimum 
performance expectations are being met. 
For this reason, variable payout is paid 
out, on a monthly basis, to employees. 
No threshold is set at the organization 
level. At organization level, as such 
variable pay budget is not shown as a 
distinct component. Such bifurcation 
into fixed and variable is only at 
individual level. 
Below threshold - payout is 0, from 
threshold upwards to target 
performance, payout bears a linear 
linkage, and at performance higher than 
target - the payout is discretionary. 
Linear linkage between performance 
and payout till the point of target. 
Upside potential is defined till 125%. 
Even for this excess stretch, the linkage 
between performance and payout 
remains linear. 
For performance between 70% to 100% 
of target, payout is between 86% to 
100% of target payout, and for 
performance levels beyond 100%, 
payout is not defined. 
50%) organisations define upside potential In their payout schedule. Of these, 14.3% 
accelerate payout beyond 100% performance at a rate disproportionately higher than 
increases made to performance. Remaining 35.7%) of this 50%) bracket, give variable 
payout in a linear fashion even when performance crosses 100%. 
25 Earnings before hterest, Tax and Depreciation. 
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Overall, there is little homogeneity among the payout schedules designed at the 
organization level. In many cases the payout schedule is not completely defined, in 
some cases information is not fully tendered and in some cases the payout schedule 
was culled out based on past three years' performance and payout data. Given the 
confidential nature of such information, organizations were generally reluctant to part 
with data. For this reason, information provided in the above table (5.20) is partly 
descriptive and partly quantitative. Description is provided to make good the 
apparent anomalies or even gaps in data provided in the table. 
5.1.3.4 STVPP funding 
This section reports findings about plan funding and also how managers' payout 
varies in relation to ups and downs in business results. In essence, this sections tells us 
about how the software industry provisions its funds for variable payout, and whether 
the relation between business performance and managers' payout is as dynamic as the 
term 'risk-return sharing' (often associated with use of variable pay) implicitly 
professes. Table 5.21 below shows results about the funding sources used for feeding 
STVPPs (in relation to its use for middle managers). 
TABLE 5.21 
Organisations' source of funds for variable payout (w.r.t. STVPP) 
Source of funds 
Salary Budget 
Performance results that are achieved over and 
above previous year's performance figure. 
Partly 'salary budget' and partly 'monetary 
gains attributable to use of STVPP'. 
Salary budget + Project-based benefits 
Percentage of organizations, using 
the specific source 
80% 
6.7% 
6.7% 
6.7% 
The most pervasive method for sourcing payout funds is the salary budget. 80% 
organisations use only this method while another 13.4% use this method in 
conjunction with Project-based benefits, or gains attributable to STVPP-use. Thus, the 
total number of users of this method is upward of 90%. Clearly the conventional 
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method of using salary budget to disburse variable payout remains preponderant. If 
nothing else, at the bare minimum it leads us to conclude that majority of STVPPs 
have continued to use the cast of traditional pay systems, in their manner of sourcing 
funds. Salaries are a budgeted expense, except that in the specific case of STVPPs, the 
actual payout may vary from the target payout amount (which is fixed at the 
yearbeginning). To say the least, this is just one of the instances to show, that STVPPs 
continue to live in the mould of traditional pay practice, and severely lack any flavor 
that they can claim as their own. 
A drift away from use of traditional 'salary budget' method is evidenced in use of 
funding sources like 'Project-based benefits, performance-gains over and above 
previous year's results and gains due to STVPP-use'. There are 7% users for each of 
these methods, which is a relatively small number, if the objective is to increasingly 
proliferate use of STVPPs for achieving alignment between internal systems, pay 
practices and business strategy. 
5.1.3.4.1 Variability between middle managers' payout and business results 
Results about nature, and the extent of variability between managers' payout and 
business results have been reported in table 5.22 shown below. The kind of linkage 
witnessed gives definite messages about, how dynamic STVPPs are allowed to be, in 
their functioning. The table below gives break-up about percentage of organisations 
corresponding to each pattern (or kind) of variability between the two variables. A 
propon:ionate relationship between the two (ie when managers' payout is allowed to 
move in sync with business results) enables managers to repose their trust in the 
functioning of the scheme, while a non responsive relationship, which is inherently 
against the formulaic nature of STVPPs, runs counter to efforts at nurturing faith in 
the system. 
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TABLE 5.22 
Extent of variability between managers' variable payout amount and 
organisations' business results 
Extent to which variable payout of middle 
managers varies in proportion to the financial 
results of the organization 
Varies to some extent (which is not in the same 
proportion ie variability is disproportionately 
less) 
Varies in the same proportion (ie variability is 
proportionate) 
Does not vary (no variability or nonresponsive 
nature of payout,to changes in business results) 
Percentage of organizations, 
using a particular kind of 
practice. 
26.7% 
40% 
33.3% 
In a purely formula driven variable pay plan, that leaves no scope for tinkering / 
discretion or subjective decision, the payout amount of an employee would vary with 
organisation's results in the same proportion. 27% organizations vary the payout 
amount less than proportionately in response to variation of business earnings. This is 
where most organizations cut corners and save on the additional funding that should 
have rightfully been directed to, and padded up employees' payout kitty. This 
indicates an element of discretion in deciding how much of above-target business 
gains should be passed on to managers. 2/5"^  of organisations justly vary payout in 
proportion to variation in business results. However, there are 1/3^ '' organizations 
which prevent such variation from happening, and as a result, they disallow passing of 
benefits of higher business gains to managers. Strength of such organisations accounts 
for 1/3^*^  of the sample, which in itself is a considerable size. An alternative 
explanation for such strata of organisations could be the lack of linkage between 
managers' payout and organisations' results. Such practice of not tying payout to 
business results defies the very logic, and the founding philosophy of instituting 
variable pay systems. 
5.1.3.5 STVPP communication 
This section reports results pertaining to communication about STVPP, in terms of its 
methods used, details communicated and whether performance progress reports are 
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emphasized. It is also specifically reported if organisations carry out gap-analysis 
between 'current achievement' and 'threshold goal', as it gives indication of 
importance accorded to necessity of meeting the threshold goal. Frequency of 
progress reports is crucial for impressing upon managers the criticality of stretching 
performance for meeting threshold and ultimately for meeting the overall business 
target. The scope of plan communication also includes communication about the 
payout amount, in that how the information is communicated and whether it is backed 
by explanatory information - information that an employee with economic interest in 
the organization would look for (for substantiation and as justification). 
5.1.3.5.1 Methods used for STVPP related Communication 
Methods used for communicating STVPP details sends an implicit message about the 
importance given to its 'communication' aspect j^er^e. Table 5.23 below gives results 
about 'communication methods' used for elaborating STVPP to employees. 
TABLE 5.23 
Methods of communication used to convey STVPP related details (w.r.t. use for 
middle managers) 
Methods of communication 
Thru Intranet 
At the time of induction 
At the time of goal setting 
At the time of performance review 
Through policy document 
Through presentation / open house 
Other methods like discussion with line 
manager or unit head. 
Percentage of organizations, using 
the stated methods for 
communication about STVPP. 
80% 
60% 
40% 
46.7% 
20% 
40% 
13.3% 
Evidently, details of STVPP are communicated through multiple channels that 
organizations use, and at various instances ie during recruitment, induction and 
performance management processes. Part of the reason is that employees insist on its 
clear communication as it pertains to a part of their salary. 80% organizations use the 
intranet method, perhaps, due to managers' easy familiarity with this method, and 
because of ease of communicating any updates through this method. It seems the 
method of using policy document has now become archaic (only 20% use it) and its 
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disuse has given way to extensive use of technology-driven methods like intranet. Part 
of the reason could be that the nature of the industry is such that it prefers technology-
efficient or technology-compatible methods of communication. 
Discussions on STVPP are integral to goal-setting sessions, performance review 
sessions and also to the induction process, due to its criticality to the stated processes. 
There is a quite disfavor regarding use of discussion methods , as only 13.3% 
organizations adopt this method. Ideally, such communication that involves face-to-
face contact, and is solely focused on explanation about STVPP, should be most 
effective in enhancing understanding of managers. The pattern of communication 
shown through findings above leads us to conclude that organizations are certainly 
communicating STVPP details to employees, through methods that employees value, 
or ones that easily catch their attention or those laying small demand on resources. 
5.1.3.5.2 Details about STVPP that are communicated 
Findings related to the content of communication carried out in support of STVPP 
introduction and also its education, are reported below. There was no access to the 
actual secondary data in form of communication material dispatched to employees. 
Thus, the next best option was to source information from its originator ie the HR 
functionaries. Table 5.24 below presents the related findings. 
TABLE 5.24 
STVPP details communicated to managers 
Type of details communicated, in support 
of STVPP 
Objective of STVPP 
Working details about STVPP 
General Business information 
Percentage of organizations, following a 
particular communication practice. 
93.3% 
86.7% 
93.7% 
Most organizations, almost 80% to 90%, communicate the abovementioned 
information to managers in a fairly comprehensive way. Really speaking, the core 
communication requirement is just to talk about the objective of STVPP. Its working 
details occur only next, in the order of priority, and these are helpful for 
understanding the inlaid operation of the system - 87% communicate this aspect. 
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Even more remote in communication requirement is the need to understand the 
'general business information'. The benefit of understanding the business scenario is 
that when employees are armed with such knowledge, they can be put on the same 
pedestal as that of a business partner. Also, the connection is quite clear. If one is 
expected to have indepth understanding of a system that supports business objectives, 
then it is logical that one understands the industry dynamics - as it helps in rightly 
placing STVPP in the scheme of things. Minus the information about business 
scenario, one is left wondering what a compensation plan has to do with the 
achievement of business objectives. Given this background, it is considered important 
to communicate the above aspects about business functioning and about STVPP use, 
as these support variable pay system's functioning. 
It is in the interest of the reader and is also an ethical requirement on the part of the 
researcher, to reveal certain insights to the reader, which are not evident by medium 
of numbers alone. The above facts, those that relate to communication-about-STVPP, 
are neither false nor fabricated and also not mitigated in their impact. However, these 
lack the vital kernel of truth that a researcher hunts for in such an endeavour. 100% of 
respondents, which in this case are group of HR personnel, who hold the prestigious 
portfolio of heading compensation and benefits wing of software organizations, 
answered this question with reluctance and nonchalance. Their answer could very 
well have been in the negative, however, they chose to affirm that all related aspects 
(those mentioned in table 5.24) were indeed communicated. It appeared from their 
tone as if they were to say "all this trash is very well available in a sea of information 
available to managers". It can be analogized to a government saying that "we have 
communicated the budget through newspaper". Such a comment while being 
technically valid, is not entirely true, as such communication lacks the spirit needed to 
explain issues, so as to make someone really understand its content. In sum total, the 
above query was not given much attention by organizations, and it was summarily 
said that companies usually conveyed all these aspects (as part of routine business 
practice). It was evident that communication was considered a non-issue in the 
framework of STVPP systems, thus did not call extraordinary attention of the 
compensation planners. 
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5.1.3.5.3 Communication of performance progress reports 
It is in nature of reinforcing the predetermined objectives, if the process of sending 
performance progress reports is actively used to support target achievement. Similar is 
the case with STVPP, in case of which sending regular performance progress reports 
impresses upon employees the urgency or the necessity of meeting the threshold goal 
and ultimately the requirement of achievement the business goal. For these reasons, 
STVPP needs to ensure considerable thoroughness (that comes with a meticulous 
approach) in churning out performance progress reports so that managers are always 
ingnited into action, in a bid to atleast meet the threshold-goal. With this purpose in 
mind, results about regularity of performance progress reports, and the level of 
precision of such reporting, are presented below -
TABLE 5.24A 
Practice of communicating performance progress to managers 
Whether reports about the 
following are communicated 
on a regular basis ? 
Progress achieved on account 
of organisation goals 
Progress achieved on account 
of employee-level goals 
Gap between organization 
level threshold and till-date 
performance achievement 
Gap between individual level 
threshold and till-date 
performance level 
Yes 
(and also miinner 
of reporting) 
100% 
(formal reports) 
100% 
(forma! reports) 
33.3% 
(infonnal 
reports) 
26.7% 
(informal 
reports) 
If yes, then the frequency of 
such reports 
- 26.7% convey this, annually. 
- 73.3% convey this, quarterly. 
- 66.7% convey this, biannually. 
- 33.3%) convey this, quarterly. 
Reporting timeframe is 
discretionary/at will 
Reporting timeframe is 
discretionary / at will 
No 
-
-
66.7% 
73.3% 
(figures are in terms of% of organizations that follow a particular practice) 
It is a universally accepted performance tracking practice to communicate 
performance progress at the organization level and also at individual employee level. 
What is of interest in case of STVPP is that there should be an added momentum in 
conveying these reports, in order to impress upon employees the necessity of 
meeting the threshold goal, as also the business target. The results show In this, it has 
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been found out that rather few organizations engage in such practice of conveying 
'gap' related information, as only one third organizations (33.3%) follow this practice, 
that too through informal means. Such critical information being sent through 
informal means, does suggest, rather strongly - a lack of seriousness in 
communicating this information. There are a large number of organizations, 2/3rd in 
number, who simply do not follow the practice of conveying gap-related information. 
Needless to say, it leaves much to be desired at the organisation's end, which is the 
hub of policy making and is also considered accountable for its adherence. 
At the individual level too, only one quarter of organisations (26.7%) follow the 
practice of conveying gap-related information, that too through use of informal 
means. Problems of slack occur when loose methods like informal means are used. 
A huge number, 73.7% organisations, simply do not have methods to convey gap-
related information to its employees. HR's rhetorical response to the question about 
the systemic-void, is its crisply packaged baritone that "Performance information is 
routinely available on the intranet (and) the middle managers' KRAs are so designed 
that they can themselves assess their performance results and also calculate the gap-
from-threshold." It is plain to see that there is no specific thrust upon meeting the 
threshold level goal. 
Formal means of communicating organisation's progress include annual reports. 
Quarterly reports, Weekly business review meetings and the lesser formal methods 
include discussions with the unit heads. Thereafter, it is the discretion of unit heads to 
communicate such information down the chain of command. Their degree of latitude 
over what information to pass on, would be higher over the 'content of discussions 
and meetings', than it would be in case of formal reports containing information of 
public nature. 
Individual-level performance progress is communicated through formal methods like 
midterm review and Quarterly performance reports. Informal means of assessing 
progress or performance-gap (from threshold) are discretionary and may be used by 
some supervisors at their own will. 
73% organizations produce their organization-performance-status reports on a 
quarterly basis, a practice aligned with general accounting systems. Few organisations 
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(27%) follow a less rigorous reporting practice - wherein the frequency of 
performance progress reports is annual. V i^th regard to managers' performance, 2/3rd 
organizations follow mid term review, which gives employees a chance to discuss 
their performance results after very 6 months. One third of organizations are more 
tenacious in their performance reporting systems as they report their progress every 
quarter. These findings are quite in sync with industry practice; however, wherever 
the focus on goal achievement is to be sharpened, frequency of reporting should be 
charged with more agility, and reporting should be intense enough to get noticed. 
5.1.3.5.4 Communication about payout amount and related details 
in a routine compensation programme, it would not be vital to ponder how payout 
information is communicated, since it is only a matter of conveying numbers, with 
little surprises in store. In case of STVPP, it is an important matter as to how the 
payout related information is conveyed. To rekindle its importance, it is briefly 
specified here that variable payout amount is a by-product of business results and 
employees' contribution to it. In light of this, it would be natural on part of employees 
to expect the payout information to be padded with sufficiently concrete explanation 
about how the amount has been calculated. Such additional information would lend 
more credibility to STVPP and earn management trust from its employees. To be 
more accurate, given the background information about how payout amount is 
calculated, the whole system of STVPP would start making sense to the employees. 
Findings about how payout information is communicated and whether it is 
accompanied by additional information, are presented in table 5.24 below. 
TABLE 5.24b 
Methods used for communication about the actual payout amount 
Methods of communication for information on actual 
payout amount 
Letter given to HODs 
Self-help-type 'variable pay calculator', made 
available at managers' computer screen 
Letter given to employees /or by means of email 
By medium of the Pay slip itself 
Percentage of organizations, 
that use the listed methods. 
6.7% 
6.7% 
73.3% 
13.3% 
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If STVPP related communication was considered as an indicator of employee-
organisation partnership, then, open & transparent communication about payout-
calculation would be expected. Also, one would expect organizations to tender 
additional explanatory information about payout amount, however, this would 
happen, only if (one of) STVPP's objectives were to inculcate 'psychology of 
ownership' in employees. Evidently, conventional methods still rule the roost. 7% 
organizations give such information to HODs, another 7% capacitate their managers 
to do the calculation themselves (with the benefit of organisation and BU performance 
figures supplied), 13% send this information through payslip, and 73.3% 
organisations prefer direct employee contact to convey such information; sent either 
through letter or by means of email. Careful scanning of these findings leaves one to 
infer that none of the methods is specifically focused on providing underlying 
explanation. The underlying premise in elaboration about communication method is 
the belief that the type of method used conveys volumes about importance given to 
any particular type of communication. In other words, the method of communication 
used, is one of the tangible methods for assessing importance given to a particular 
piece of information. 
5.1,3.5.5 Systems used for knowing managers' grievances about STVPP. 
Table 5.25 below reports results about which systems, organizations use for 
understanding managers' grievances concerning STVPP use. The more important 
question addressed here is of knowing about organization's initiative to understand 
any concerns managers may have in relation to STVPP functioning. 
TABLE 5.25 
Systems used to understand managers' grievances about STVPP 
Whether employees are approached to 
understand their grievances about STVPP? 
No 
Yes 
Percentage of middle managers 
100% 
Nil 
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Organizations do not specifically ask employees about their grievances in relation to 
STVPP-use. No specific thrust is laid on knowing how satisfied employees are with 
the STVPP. Just as HR does not go about asking employees about their satisfaction 
with various policies in its kitty, similarly it gives no special attention to variable pay 
system too. The finding brings out a larger issue, that the STVPP is considered no 
different than other company policies. This is disturbing and cause of concern 
considering the enormity of goal that STVPP is entrusted with and the criticality of 
impact of its results. 
5.1.3.6STVPP management 
STVPP management is integral to its functioning and requires careful attention, in 
order to achieve effectiveness in STVPP-use. This section results about findings on 
STVPP's ownership, administration, and approving authority, as evidenced in the 
sample of organizations of the Indian software industry. These findings are presented 
in table 5.26 (given below), and have been consolidated in terms of percentage of 
organizations using a particular kind of authority for managing different aspects of 
plan management. In particular, the range of authority-types includes prominently the 
Human Resources flinction, the finance function, the function heads, the BU heads 
and the Top management. 
TABLE 5.26 
Type of 'involvement-pattern' used in STVPP Management 
Functions /Entities involved in 
varied aspects of STVPP 
management. 
Human resources flinction 
Finance function 
Top Management 
Business unit heads / function 
heads 
Aspect of STVPP management 
Overall 
Ownership 
100% 
-
-
-
Administration 
responsibility 
100% 
13.3% 
-
-
Approving 
authority 
60% 
26.7% 
60% 
13.3% 
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Evidently, HR holds a position of prominence in STVPP management. The only sign 
of dip in its dominance (or pervasiveness) is on account of its lesser say in 'plan 
approval', otherwise it is 100% involved in its administration, and is also vested with 
its ownership responsibility. 
Finance' role is a little less concerned with the meticulous administration of STVPP 
and it largely embraces responsibility of overall plan functioning and that of ensuring 
its success/viability, for purposes of STVPPs' long-term sustenance. The assertion 
about finance' pre-eminent position, is based on insight derived from interviews, a 
facet of reality that has not been adequately captured through its numbers. 
The findings shown in table 5.26 (above) are a projection of views held by the HR 
personnel. More to the point, this is how the responsibility chart of STVPP may have 
been constructed, which is like a policy framed by organisations for managing their 
inhouse STVPPs. The figures above (table 5.26) sketch a rather appalling picture 
about finance's responsibility for the plan's administration and also for its approval. 
Since the researcher had interviewed the CFOs too, it provided a basis for comparing 
the figures professed in the policy statement (table 5.26 above) against the 
perception held by the finance, concerning STVPP management. 
It was apparent through interview discussions that finance had significant insight into 
its working. The discrepancy between the perceived role of finance (the one expressed 
by HR) and the actual contribution of finance, may have been due to underestimation 
of finance' potential to meaningfully contribute to STVPP management. The 
interview discussion offered a clear tesdmony to Finance' laser-like insight into 
finance STVPP process. The interview discussion with the Finance personnel 
provided ample evidence of its complete grasp of STVPP's functioning. The richness 
of ideas derived from finance makes it a deserving candidate for occupying a key role 
in STVPP management. 
Top management is mainly involved in plan approval - 2/3rd organizations follow this 
practice. It is a matter of grave concern that given the common nature of STVPP 
objectives, only 13% organizations consider it important to involve other functions' 
heads or the other BU heads. Nature of STVPP being highly pertinent to all functions, 
one would expect equal or atleast significant participation from all the stakeholders. 
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5.1.3.7 STVPP-related Review 
Plan review is a necessary element of the process which feeds into its improvement 
process. Two related elements include - where the reviewing authority resides, and 
what is the frequency with which review is carried out. The above two aspects have 
been examined in the frame of reference of the Indian software industr)', specifically 
in relation to use of STVPP for the middle managers. The context is vital to mention 
since it is conceivable that review would be differently programmed for senior level 
audience (may be more aggressively done) than its conduct at the middle level. These 
findings as observed in the context of the study are presented in table 5.27 below. 
TABLE 5.27 
STVPP review 
Reviewing authority 
Top management 
Human resources 
function 
Finance function 
Function heads 
Frequency of plan 
review 
Annually 
Bi-annually 
Need-based 
% of organizations involving the stated participants as part 
of review team 
66.7 
66.7 
6.7 
6.7 
%oforganizations that review their STVPPsatthe 
defined frequency levels 
93.3% 
6.7% 
13.3% 
STVPP review is a crucial stage with important messages for the next design cycle. 
The top management gains an upper hand at this stage, since 2/3'^ '' organisations 
involve them in its review exercise, and an equal number of organisations involve HR 
team in its review. Though the role of HR has been prominent right through the 
conception, development, administration and management stages of STVPP, the role 
of top management springs up as particularly important at the review stage. This 
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could be due to the deterministic nature of this stage, one that aids the decision 
mailing about next year's plan. Involvement of function heads has been in a small 
way, through the plan development cycle, and remains low at the review stage as 
well. 
In view of the critical role of finance function, it comes as a surprise that only 7% 
organisations actually involve them in the review phase. Unlike design phase, which 
is occupied with sculpting and crafting a STVPP, plan review is the stage which calls 
for adjudging the overall viability of the plan and seeing if its use makes economic 
sense. This question calls for a thorough answer as to why finance is not on the 
official review team, when it is perhaps the most vital player in the team, that puts 
together a STVPP, and taking care of its cyclic iterations through its use at 
organizations. 
A thumping majority represents the practice of annual plan review, while a stray case 
here or there may stand for bi-annual reviews, a minority which is represented by 
6.7% of organisations. 13.3% keep the review-related options open, by pegging its 
review frequency on a need-basis. The only bothersome aspect concerning such low 
frequency is that how would a STVPP possibly remain aligned with business strategy 
if it was to be reviewed merely once a year. This finding presents another noticeable 
opportunity to look at the difference betv e^en STVPP's literary prescriptions and its 
practice, as seen in the software industry. 
5,1.3.8 STVPP-related future course 
It has been endeavoured to venture into the fijture course of STVPPs, since for all 
practical purposes, these systems continue to thrive and have become a fact of today's 
compensation practice. In particular, it has been found from managers if they would 
prefer to have their variable pay linked to organizations results. The nerve centre of 
this question rests on managers' acrimony towards tying their payout to an aspect, that 
they are unable to fully control. Subject literature has laid confidence in the power of 
employee involvement as a magic wand that can solve related problems. Managers' 
themselves have been probed as to their preference for activating the involvement 
mechanism that would draw them closer into the compass of STVPP process. 
Findings pertaining to the above two issues - the question of tagging managers' 
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payout to organisation's performance results and tiie question of increasing their 
involvement in the affairs of STVPP, have been reported below (table 5.28), using 
the context of Indian software industry. 
TABLE 5.28 
Managers' preference for including organization linked parameter in their variable 
payout structure 
Managers' preference for inclusion of 
organization-linked-parameter in their variable 
pay structure 
"Organisation-linked component should be a 
part of managers' variable payout structure" 
"Organisation-linked component should not be 
a part of managers' variable payout structure" 
Percentage of managers in favour 
of the stated preference patterns 
74% 
26% 
Unmistakably, majority of managers are in favour of having their payout tied to 
organisation's results. Reasons for such preference' predominance could be varied. 
One, to a hypothetical question like this, most individuals portray a favourable 
posture, second, it is quite possible that the payout derived from this particular 
component has had a favourable past record. Another possibility is that managers 
have the benefit of a short line of sight with organisations' results. These prospects 
were probed with managers, and most prominent answer to the enquiry emerged that 
their concerns were driven by pecuniary considerations. Perhaps, managers have 
formed their judgment about this matter, in view of their experience of the past 
record/ trend of payouts. 
The presence of a quarter of managers, approx 26%) on the other side of the fence , 
those not preferring such a link with organisation performance, indicates presence of 
a sizeable number of managers, who oppose the view. In other words, according to 
their experience or hearsay, it is not a favourable proposition for managers. That, 26% 
managers, do not favor the proposal, indicates presence of dissent among managers, 
which is significant enough to warrant management's attention, as to its causes. It 
can be said with certainty that findings related to managers' preference for inclusion 
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of organization-linked-component indicate a significant majority in its favour. Form 
of dissent projected by otiier section of managers ie those who disfavour it (the 26%) 
is a potential danger to the stability of the program, and therefore calls for 
confrontation with this opinion and deserves a solution, for minimizing its presence. 
In light of managers' dismal level of involvement in the process of variable pay 
system, it was natural to probe the reasons that underlie the findings. Considering that 
part of the blame for this hiatus in processes can be attributed to organization-apathy, 
it was also thought wise to probe if managers desired such involvement at all. Their 
receptivity to the literary giant 'involvement', was found out by searching for answers 
in their opinions. Results on their attitude towards issue of their deeper involvement 
in the STVPP process are presented below in table 5.29. A little background should 
help the reader in getting the perspective of this finding right. Managers' abysmally 
low-involvement in STVPP process, even in the higher-end organizations of the 
industry, caused researcher to mull over all kinds of causes. As it appeared, HR 
personnel too saw wisdom in the idea. The conundrum remained as to where the snag 
for low-involvement lay. On this platform managers were targeted for their opinion. 
In doing so, the picture for reasons of managers' low involvement came out quite 
clearly, as will be observed from the discussion, later in the text. Very briefly the 
answer to this classic question is that the idea of 'involving middle managers' in 
STVPP process has simply not crossed anyone's mind in any of the quarters, be it the 
top management, the managers, the HR, or the finance function. It is unlikely if any 
other of STVPP's stakeholders would have given it any consideration. Moving 
logically, table 5.29 below presents related results about managers' views on issue of 
their involvement, as to their pattern of preference . 
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TABLE 5.29 
Managers' preference for increasing their involvement in the STVPP process 
Managers' preference regarding increasing their 
involvement- level in STVPP process 
"Managers should be involved deeper into the STVPP 
process" 
"Managers should not be involved deeper into the 
STVPP process" 
"No ideas about it" 
Percentage of managers 
in favour of the stated 
responses 
83% 
12% 
5% 
it is a favourable report that managers have provided on their intent to intensify their 
involvement in the STVPP process. A huge 83% managers support the suggestion 
that their involvement should be intensified in the STVPP process. It seems this kind 
of suggestion directly emanates from the small inner voice that we all have, which is 
our conscience. This is the voice of truth, that propels us to utter what we feel in our 
gut, regardless of practicality or feasibility or appropriateness of what we have to say. 
Managers, in full awareness of the reality of slackness inbred in compensation 
systems, still uphold the ideal that their 'involvement' be increased; more than 4 out 
of every 5 managers (numerically) believe so. A small percentage, which is 1/lOth 
the sample size (12% to be exact) perceive any deeper involvement (than the current 
level) as undesirable. Half this number, which is like 1 in every 20 managers, are at a 
loss of ideas as to how the proposal or the idea of 'deeper involvement' should be 
treated. It is possible they are too encumbered by its practical side or simply are too 
indifferent to it, or very plainly are actually at a loss of intelligible ideas to be able to 
formulate their opinion about it. To clinch the results, the popular opinion among 
managers is strongly in favour of increasing their involvement in the STVPP process. 
5.1.4 Motivation through STVPP 
Motivation caused by STVPP-use is an offshoot of its design and implementation 
systems that include host of issues. Motivation level of mangers as a fallout of the 
variable pay system, has been investigated through analysis of perception of the 
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organisation members, chiefly the respondents chosen for the study purpose. Its 
findings concern how STVPP intends to motivate managers, the motivational effect of 
STVPP on managers, and how this aspect can be improved to increase its 
effectiveness. These results are presented in this section, in tables given below. 
5.1.4.1 Achieving employee motivation through STVPP, in perception of the 
human resources personnel 
Primarily, it has been found out that how organization intends to motivate its 
managers through the medium of STVPP. In particular, the intention of plan designers 
has been uncovered through this investigations. Related findings are presented in table 
5.30 below. 
More than half the organizations use the incentive lever of STVPP to motivate middle 
managers. A minority (13%) consider it important to instill feelings of accountability 
and responsibility in managers. One third organizations reportedly emphasize 
employees' LOS for causing motivation, while 93% do not use any formal processes 
to establish LOS. If organisations are implicitly enhancing employee LOS and 
projecting this aspect for enhancing motivation, it is suggested that use of formal 
methods of setting LOS can significantly enhance organisations' efforts at increasing 
employee motivation. 
TABLE 5.30 
Projection of STVPP, as a motivational tool of organization (in view of the 
human resources function) 
Varied projections of STVPP, for causing 
motivational impact among managers 
STVPP, in the form of an incentive.'^ '' 
STVPP's sharp focus on KRA design 
STVPP offers opportunity for capability-
building. 
STVPP highlights employee contribution to 
organisation's goals 
STVPP endows upon managers a feeling of 
accountability and responsibility. 
Percentage of organizations, 
that use the stared kind of 
projection 
53.3% 
6.7% 
6.7% 
33.3% 
13.3% 
^' Similar nature projections include : STVPP use for differentiation between pay levels (based on 
performance.), STVPP offers opportunity for earning extra income 
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It is an interesting finding that more tiian half the compensation designers bank on 
STVPF''s incentive lever than playing its line-of-sight card for motivation (only i/3rd 
use it). The two methods of manager-motivation are pitted against each other, with a 
strength of 53% and 33% respectively. This particular finding is directly picked from 
the horse's mouth, which is the HR function, in this particular case. A clear inference 
is that, such is the intention, and therefore such is STVPP's practice. The finding that 
emerges from the above table is that organizations are projecting STVPP as an 
incentive schedule to managers rather than putting focus on its softer aspects like -
line of sight with business goals, sharper focus on KRA design, higher frequency of 
performance reporting , more rigorous performance monitoring et al. Interesting or 
incidental benefits of STVPP are its focus on KRA design (like doing it more 
meticulously) and enhancement of managers' capability (13.3%i use these methods). 
Organisations have also been probed as to their insight about how to make STVPP 
more motivating. In particular, its human resources personnel, have been questioned 
about it since their advice can be educational in nature. STVPP can be analogized as 
the horse that the HR function rides, so, it is best to ask HR as to how to tame the 
horse in a desired way. Carrying the analogy further, taming of horse, can be 
compared to modifying the plan, to make it more motivating. Results, in this regard 
have been reported in table 5.31 below. 
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TABLE 5.31 
Enhancing STVPP's motivation by means of suggested improvements, perceived 
by organization (represented by the human resources function) 
Suggestions for improving motivational effect of STVPPs 
Measures concerning 'improvement in communication' 
and those concerning 'achieving higher levels of 
transparency'. 
Measures concerned enhancing 'managers' controllability 
over performance measures'.^ ^ 
Measures that concern 'making STVPP more dynamic' 
(for instance using 'lead indicators of performance' in 
addition to using 'lag indicators' like profits, revenue etc) 
Measures for customizing STVPPs to managers' roles 
Measures focusing on reduction of costs , so that more is 
available for sharing 
Measures concerning improvements in goal-setting 
processes and performance-measurement-processes 
Percentage of 
organizations, 
favouring a specific 
view 
26.7% 
13.3% 
20% 
6.7% 
6.7% 
26.7% 
27%) of compensation personnel perceive that the most important improvement to 
STVPP could be made in the area of communication and an equal number (ie 27%) 
perceive the need for improvement in goal setting and performance measurement 
processes. Relatively few (13.3%) have suggested the need for increasing managers' 
controllability of performance parameters. Suggestions have been made to make 
STVPP more employee friendly (13%) through measures like introduction of plan 
variations customized to managers' roles, and by reducing its cost base, so that more 
is available for sharing. HR function which acts like guardian of STVPP perceives the 
need for making it more dynamic (13.3%)) through measures like use of lead 
indicators, restructuring VP outside CTC, and making increasing the payout 
frequency. 
" One of the ways could be by including measures closer in line of sight, like measures at the vertical 
or LOB level. 
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5.1.4.2 Achieving employee motivation through STVPP, in perception of the finance 
personnel 
The finance function plays an important role in the upkeep of STVPP, mainly due to 
its intricate linkage with the budget and also its inevitable effect on cash-movement, 
which inturn has a bearing on the health of company budget. 
It has been found from the finance function as well, that what could be the possible 
improvements to enhance STVPP's motivational effect on managers. Related findings 
reflecting finance function's viewpoint on measures for improving STVPP's 
motivational impact, have been presented below. 
TABLE 5.32 
Enhancing STVPP's motivation by means of suggested improvements, perceived 
by organization (in view of the finance function) 
Suggestions for improving motivational effect of 
STVPPs 
No improvement is required 
Component of 'variable pay' should be kept aside 
from CTC^^ieoutofCTC) 
Improvement in related communication programme, 
and measures for enhancing managers' line-of-sight 
TO 
STVPP should be made more dynamic" 
Increased measurability of performance 
Percentage of organizations, 
favouring a specific view 
6.7% 
13.3% 
33.3% 
26.7% 
20% 
One-third of finance personnel perceive need for enhancing 'communication system' 
and 'employee LOS' as measures for improvements to STVPP. 21% have expressed 
the need for making the system more dynamic - so as to make it more relevant to the 
concerned unit's functioning. Few (13.3%) have expressed the need for structuring 
^' This point was checked with managers through informal discussion whether they would want 
variable pay outside the salary. Also it was put to finance and HR personnel too. Almost all agreed, 
while middle managers supported it vehemently, that variable pay should not meddle with their salary. 
Salary should be an assured sum, and this performance-drive game should be played with a separate 
sum that is kept outside their rightful salary. This suggestion came across very strongly at middle 
managers level and they voiced the concern that their subsistence depended on their salary, and that 
such risk should not be imposed on them. Very clearly, the author affirms that this is due to poor LOS, 
that such negative remarks come from middle managers. 
" Includes suggestions favouring - use of separate kitty to fund variable payout, making threshold goal 
more relevant to the business units's/division's stage of growth 
250 
variable pay apart from the (routine or default) CTC structure. Crucially, 20% have 
expressed the need for objective performance measurement. A small percentage 
comprising 7% organizations perceive that there is no need for making improvements 
to the current STVPP operating in their organizations. It is worthy of consideration 
that more than 50% suggestions are concerned with improving related processes 
concerning STVPP like communication programme, establishment of line-of-sight 
and performance measurement. 
5.1.4.3 Achieving employee motivation through STVPP, in perception of the 
managers 
This sub-section focuses on what are the aspects of STVPP that managers find most 
motivating. While table 5.30 presents views of organization about manner of 
motivation it intends to convey through this tool, this particular table (table 5.33) 
provides an alternative view of the same picture by presenting how managers have 
perceived this message from the organization. This information is useful as it helps 
designers know what mangers have made of the STVPP communication and exactly 
how they draw motivation from this pay mechanism. Table 5.33 provides the related 
analysis. 
TABLE 5.33 
Managers' pattern of motivation with regard to their perception about 
STWP 
Aspect of STVPP that managers find most 
motivating 
Its incentive aspect 
Feature of Frequent feedback 
(their) urge to earn back their variable pay amount in 
full 
Increased performance measurability 
No motivation 
Perform ance-based -pay d i ITerent iat ion 
Its surprise element 
Both incentive aspect and the feeling of 
responsibility, (that the system endows them with) 
Feeling of responsibility (endowed by the system). 
Increased performance-focus 
Percentage of managers, 
with a certain opinion 
28% 
0.7% 
7.3% 
8% 
32% 
4.7% 
2% 
6.7% 
3.3% 
6.7% 
According to 28%) managers, they are most motivated by the incentive aspect of the 
variable pay plans. Other aspects that they find motivating include 'better 
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performance measurability', 'pay differentiation', 'feeling of responsibility' and 
'desire to earn back variable pay amount in full". One third of managers (32%) 
reportedly feel no motivation from the variable pay plans. This is a point of 
disturbance and a potential area that is lying dormant, and needs to be mobilized if 
significant advances are to be made in the effectiveness of STVPP. Flimsy reasons 
like 'surprise element that motivates' (though only 2%) are also offered as its effects, 
which only goes to show what a mockery has been made of its conceptualization and 
its intended philosophy. Results above provide ample ground for revamping 
perceptions of managers, through not only didactic means, but by practicing STVPP 
differently - in a manner that is fair and just, with all protocols observed. 
The employees, in this case the managers (for the study puporse) are at the receiving 
end of the variable pay plan, which is operationalised by the organization. It is only 
fair to take their perspective about how the plan can be improved for its higher 
motivational impact. Thus, it is important to understand what, according to them 
needs to be done, in terms of tweaking the plan, so as to make it motivating for the 
managers. The findings in this regard, that describe managers' suggestions are briefed 
in table 5.34 below. 
TABLE 5.34 
Enhancing STVPP's motivation by means of suggested improvements, perceived 
by middle managers. 
Suggestions for improving motivational effect of 
STVPPs 
Customisation of STVPP to specific roles 
Increased communication - to make the process 
transparent 
Payout opportunity should be made more 
lucrative 
Encouragement should be used 
Timely payout 
Higher manager-participation in the process of 
STVPP 
Variable Pay component should be configured 
separately from the routine salary 
Increased objectivity of performance 
measurement 
STVPP process should be made simpler 
Percentage of middle managers 
favouring a specific view 
6.7% 
31.3% 
11.3% 
18% 
2.7% 
3.3% 
16.7% 
22.7% 
17.3% 
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The highest number of suggestions are in favour of making the process more 
transparent (31%) through increased communication. This means 1 in very 3 middle 
managers perceive the need for better communication and the need for making the 
process open and transparent. Another area of concern is objectivity in performance 
measurement. 23% managers i.e. 1/5* feel that measurement should be more 
objective. This would be required for sufficient pay differentiation also. 6.7% felt that 
variable pay should be distinct from their salary. This would give managers a feeling 
of security that their salary is guaranteed, and the VP part, which is at risk, is out of 
their salary. Not many managers have asked for making the system more lucrative, 
only 11%) have asked for it. This suggests that majority of managers prefer 
improvements in other aspects of STVPP, not necessarily those bearing a monetary 
impact. 73%i managers expressed the need for making STVPP more meaningful and 
relevant, through its customization to roles, increased transparency, use of 
encouragement, increasing their participation, and by rendering higher objectivity to 
performance measurements. This clearly suggests that managers view STVPP as a 
system which is wider in scope than just incentives. Their preferences for 
improvement support the need for communication and involvement as measures that 
can significantly enhance motivational power of STVPP. Emphasis on employee 
contribution, appreciation, and giving them feeling of responsibility are similar nature 
initiatives that could make STVPP more meaningful for managers. 
Section 2 
5.2 Impact of STVPP on managers' performance 
This section is devoted to the study of performance impact of short term variable pay 
plan on managers' performance. In order to achieve this end, the 'impact' factor has 
been studied both perceptually and using objective measures of data. On the 
perceptual front, views of human resources personnel, finance personnel and that of 
managers have been found out. In doing the above analysis, a triangular basis 
encompassing managers, HR function and the finance function, has been adopted. 
The performance data about managers' performance for 2 years has been studied and 
impact of STVPP found out. Another dimension to studying impact is to assess the 
surplus in goal achievement in comparison to the threshold goal - which is the 
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minimum requirement. Thus, the spread (excess or deficit) between the two 'threshold 
level construct' and 'goal achievement' has been found out for the two year period. 
The finding is of significance simply because it goes to show how much an 
organisation achieves over and above its minimum expectation. The exercise has been 
done individually for all sample organizations. It is also sought to ascertain the extent 
of correlation between managers' degree of control over performance parameters and 
the impact that STVPP has on their performance results. Such endeavour would 
enlighten the designers as to whether selection of performance parameters would 
directly impact the performance results of managers. The underlying idea is to 
leverage the critical factors so as to enhance effectiveness of STVPPs. 
This section, therefore examines managers' performance using perceptual basis, based 
on objective performance data, and gauges the extent of impact by contrasting the two 
figures - level of performance and threshold level goal. Additionally 'control over 
performance parameters' has been examined to check if there exists any correlation 
with managers' performance. 
5.2.1 Hypotheses about perceived impact of STVPP on Managers' Performance 
5.2.1a Whether STVPP has a positive impact on managers' performance, in perception 
of human resource personnel 
Hon : Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' performance, 
as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
HAM Short term variable pay plan has a positive impact on managers' 
performance, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
HR function is well positioned to offer observations about what may have been the 
impact of an aspect of policy/system on employee performance, because it has the 
privilege of conducting free-flow discussions - concerning work, other work related 
issues, with HODs, supervisors, middle-level and the low-rung employees. Thus, they 
are able to experience first-hand employees' perceptions about a particular 
organizational aspect. 
The human resource personnel, in particular, those taking care of the compensation 
sub-function were probed to understand from them what in their perception was the 
impact of STVPP on performance of managers. There are aspects about culture that 
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are well sniffed by those operating in the same environment. HR due to its unique 
position of handling employee related functions, its ability to feel the pulse of 
STVPP, and the fact that it engages in umpteen conversation with employees at ail 
levels, endows them with the special ability to form a reasonably reliable perception 
about how managers perceive a particular aspect of organization functioning. 
Metaphoricallly, it could be called the gift of sixth sense, which HR develops as if 
by way of osmosis, wherein it absorbs experiences of others at an unconscious level. 
If one word could grab what we are looking for from the HR personnel, it would be 
their perception about how managers feel about STVPP. Given below in table 5.35 
are the descriptive statistics concerning Human resources' perception of the impact of 
STVPP on managers' performance. Following is the output of a one-sample t-test. 
The mean impact value, as perceived by the human resources group, is compared with 
value 3, which is the position of 'undecisiveness' or a non-committal view that 
connotes 'no impact in either direction - favourable or unfavourable 
TABLE 5.35 
One-Sample Statistics for H_IEP 
H_IEP 
N 
15 
Mean 
3.4333 
Std. Deviation 
.55474 
Std. Error Mean 
.14323 
The mean value for the sample of human resources personnel is 3.4, which is slightly 
higher than the pre-considered value 3. Given below are the results of one-sample t-
test in table 5.36. The standard deviation among HR respondents' views, concerning 
STVPP's impact on manager performance, stands at .55. Clearly it shows that there 
are a section of HR personnel who neither affirm nor they negate the proposition that 
STVPP exerts positive impact on managers, just as there are some who clearly agree 
about possibility of such relationship to be true. 
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TABLE 5.36 
One-Sample Test (between calculated HIEP and the 'no-impact' value) 
HJEP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
3.025 
Df 
14 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.009 
Mean 
Difference 
.43333 
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 
Lower 
.1261 
Upper 
.7405 
Although the results are statistically significant, the support for the hypothesis is very 
feeble. Nevertheless, the t test results above show that there is failure to reject the 
alternative hypothesis and thus the null hypothesis is rejected. This leads us to support 
the notion, that according to the HR personnel, STVPP has a positive impact on 
managers' performance. In view of HR personnel, STVPP has had moderately 
beneficial impact on managers' performance. While they have not offered complete 
agreement to the proposition (about STVPP's positive impact on managers' 
performance), nevertheless they have shown modicum of support for it. 
Basis the above result, it is safe to assume that in view of the HR personnel, a lot 
more needs to be reformed or value-added to STVPP, in order for the system to exert 
positive impact of a higher order on managers. 
5.2.1b Whether STVPP has a positive impact on managers' performance, in perception 
of fmance personnel 
H, 012 Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' performance, 
as perceived by Finance personnel. 
H A 1 2 . Short term variable pay plan has a positive impact on managers' 
performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Table 5.37 below gives descriptive statistics on Finance' perception about the above 
sub-hypothesis (HAI2) that STVPP has a positive impact on managers' performance. 
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TABLE 5.37 
One-Sample Statistics forFJEP 
F_IEP 
N 
15 
Mean 
3.2500 
Std. Deviation 
.77344 
Std. Enor Mean 
.19970 
In view of finance personnel, they have shown quite little support for the view that 
STVPP has a positive impact on managers' performance. While Finance' views are of 
value, it is possible that finance personnel have just a peek into perceptual impact of 
STVPP on managers' performance. Part of the reason could be the nature of 
responsibility of Finance, where its primary responsibility is to manage the company 
budget, and such responsibility may offer it little avenue for intensive interaction with 
colleagues, juniors or those working in different area of responsibility. 
The S.D. value for the variable F_IEP stands at .8, indicating presence of views that 
disagree with the view about positivity of STVPP-impact, and at the same time, it also 
points to presence of highly favourable views that have shown significant support for 
the above view. In a nut shell, the mean value of 3.25 indicates that the finance 
personnel are not confident of STVPP's positive impact on managers' performance. 
Table 5.38 below gives the t-test value about comparison of mean finance' perception 
about impact on managers' performance with a point of no-impact on managers' 
performance. 
TABLE 5.38 
One-Sample Test (between calculated F_IEP and the 'no-impact' value) 
FJEP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
1.252 
df 
14 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.231 
Mean 
Difference 
.25000 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
-.1783 
Upper 
.6783 
In the above test the p - value being higher than .05, there is failure to reject the null 
hypothesis, and thus the alternative hypothesis is rejected. According to the above test 
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results, STVPP has no impact on managers' performance, in view of the finance 
personnel. Statistically test results show that the null hypothesis can't be rejected. 
However, the test results are not of significance since the calculated value of p which 
is .231 is not lesser than the predetermined significance value of .05. Thus, while null 
hypothesis is not rejected, the results are not statistically significant. 
5.2.1c Whether STVPP has a positive impact on managers' performance, as 
perceived by them 
H 013 • Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' performance, 
as they themselves perceive it. 
H A 1 3 ' Short term variable pay plan has a positive impact on managers' 
performance, as they themselves perceive it. 
There are two parts of the output. The first part gives descriptive statistics for the 
variables. The mean perceived impact of STVPP on managers' performance is 3.4 and 
the standard deviation of the impact on managers' performance is .644. The standard 
error of the mean (the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of means) is 
.0526 (.644/square root of 150 =.0526) 
TABLE 5.39 
One-Sample Statistics for M_IEP 
MJEP 
N 
150 
Mean 
3.3907 
Std. Deviation 
.64437 
Std. Error Mean 
.05261 
The second part of the output gives the value of the statistical test: 
TABLE 5.40 
One-Sample Test (between calculated MIEP value and the 'no-impact' value) 
M_IEP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
7.425 
Df 
149 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
.39067 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower 
.2867 
Upper 
.4946 
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The test results show that the calculated value being less than the predetermined 
significance value of .05, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the results 
are statistically significant. This leads us to conclude that based on test results, we 
infer that according to managers' group, there is impact of STVPP on their 
performance results. It is reiterated that the results are statistically significant, and that 
our theory does not match the data. 
The null hypothesis is rejected resulting in the acceptance of the alternative 
hypothesis. Statistically there is support for the hypothesis that a short term variable 
pay plan has positive impact on managers' performance. This can be proved since the 
mean score for impact on performance stands at 3.3907. This figure tells us that 
according to managers, on an average, there is a somewhat-agreement that the impact 
of STVPP on their performance is positive. 
Since the average managers' view hovers even lower than 3.5, it would be safe to 
assume that managers have given a verdict that is cautioned (and clearly guarded), 
showing lack of complete confidence in STVPP's ability to exert positive impact on 
their performance. It follows from above that according to managers there is ample 
scope for enhancing the motivational power of a STVPP. This would require 
introspection into changes required to affect STVPP, for enhancing its motivational 
value. 
5.2.Id Comparison of perception held by human resource personnel, finance 
personnel and the managers, w.r.t. perceived impact of STVPP on managers' 
performance 
There are differences among the perception held by human resource personnel, 
finance personnel and managers, w.r.t. perceived impact of STVPP on managers' 
performance. 
The perceived mean Impact according to three groups is 3.43, 3.25 and 3.4 
respectively. Statistically significant results have been found that the system of 
STVPP does indeed exert a positive impact on managers' performance, in view of HR 
personnel and managers. In case of Finance personnel, it has been found that 
according to them STVPP has no impact on managers' performance. 
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If opinions of the three groups were to be rated for accuracy / credibility, it appears 
managers' opinions would rate higher, since they are the prime subjects in this 
discussion. 
Also, one of the arguments for defending differences in perception could be that there 
is less of feedback from managers to the HR, regarding how favourable STVPP is 
towards managers. Table 5.25 supports this, as at 100% organisations, there are no 
explicit systems to solicit / understand managers' grievances regarding STVPP. Thus 
this gap can be pinned down to lack of feedback from managers. 
Thus, feedback from managers to the human resources function should help in 
bridging the gap between their perception, and also would serve to provide useful 
(read meaningful) suggestions for modifications to the plan. 
5.2.le Difference among perceptions of managers, Human Resources personnel, 
and Finance personnel, with regard to the impact of STVPP on managers' 
performance. 
Ho?: There is no significant difference among the perception of the managers, the 
Human Resources ftinction, and that of the Finance function, about the impact of 
STVPP on managers 'performance. 
HA?: There is a significant difference among the perception of the managers, the 
Human Resources function, and that of the Finance function, about the impact of 
STVPP on managers' performance. 
One-way ANOVA test has been used to find if there are significant differences 
among the mean scores of the three groups viz : 'human resource personnel', 
'finance personnel', and 'managers' with regard to their perception about impact of 
STVPP on managers' performance. Test of null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between the means, is performed with an F statistic. 
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TABLE 5.41 
ANOVA on managers, HR and Finance groups concerning their perception 
about impact of STVPP on managers' performance 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Sum of 
Squares 
.312 
74.550 
74.862 
Df 
2 
177 
179 
Mean Square 
.156 
.421 
F 
.371 
Sig. 
.691 
The test statistic is the F value of .371. Since the test statistic is much smaller than the 
critical value (2.51), there is failure to reject the null hypotheses at the 0.05 level. It is 
concluded that there is no (statistically) significant difference among the population 
means. There is evidence that the expected values in the three groups do not differ. 
The test results lead us to infer that the three types of groups "the middle managers", 
"the human resources personnel" and "the Finance function" have similar perception 
regarding impact of STVPP on performance of middle managers. They all think 
similarly. Statistically, not much support exists to indicate if there are worthwhile 
differences between their perception. 
Post-hoc analysis has been carried out to look for patterns not specified apriori. The 
objective was to find patterns in the three subgroups of the sample. Student-Newman-
Keuls test was administered to make all pairwise comparisons. 
TABLE 5.42 
Post-hoc analysis 
Group 
3 
1 
2 
Sig. 
N 
15 
150 
15 
Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 
3.2500 
3.3907 
3.4333 
.625 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
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Group 1 represents middle managers, group 2 represents HR personnel and group 3 is 
for the finance personnel. SPSS presents the results of the post-hoc tests in form of 
sets of groups. The groups that are shown within one single set are not significantly 
different from each other. In this case, each of the three groups 1, 2 and 3 are not 
significantly different, and are therefore bunched together in a single subset. 
The Newman-Keuls test confirms this impression statistically: that the three groups: 
the managers, the human resources personnel, and the Finance personnel, all three 
groups perceive the impact of STVPP on managers' performance, in a similar manner. 
They all agree in affirmative and attest to the positive impact, that STVPP has on 
middle managers' performance - however this degree of positivity is, metaphorically 
speaking, 'a mere nod of the head', and by no means 'an emphatic affirmation'. The 
average view of the three groups put together, can be pinned to a point between 
'state of indecision' and 'a posture of simple agreement (no superlatives attached)', 
about positive impact on managers' performance, indicating the tentative nature of 
belief/affirmation in the stated proposition. The Human Resources personnel (M= 
3.43) rank little higher than middle managers (M= 3.39), who inturn are followed by 
Finance personnel, by a small margin of difference (M= 3.25). The ensuing 
differences are imperceptible, giving no concrete basis to establish differences in their 
viewpoint. 
5.2.2 Comparison between 'managers' actual performance' and the 
'applicable threshold goal', in reference to their past performance 
Following further, from the interpretation derived in the last table about perceptual 
impact on managers' performance, extent of excess or deficit between threshold and 
goal achievement has been found out. In a way, the extent of this spread gives 
management, a realistic cue about how it could potentially maneuver the fixing-up of 
threshold, so as to optimize aspects about the STVPP. 
The actual performance data of managers was compared with their threshold level 
goal to assess excess achievement (over and above the threshold benchmark). 
Detailed performance data of middle managers for the two year period between 2005 
and 2007 is available in annexure 5.2. Average performance of managers (at any one 
sample organization) is compared with threshold level (of that particular organization) 
to assess extent of overachievement; this has been done for years 2005-06 and 2006-
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07. The pattern of managers' performance is depicted in chart 5.1, for the year 2005-
06, and in chart 5.2 for year 2006-07. 
Chart 5.1 
Average performance of middle managers at sample organisations, during year 2006-
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The average performance achievement of middle managers of the Indian Software 
Industry, for the year 2005-06 stands at 89.8% of target. The average threshold for 
these organizations for the same year is 69%. There is a clear case of 
overachievement of performance to the extent of 20.8% of target (Chart 5.1). As 
mentioned, this spread or excess between threshold and achievement of performance 
results has many implications. Clear inference can be drawn, that the stretch level 
packed in threshold level, could be tightened by intensifying the threshold bar -
pushing it upwards. Another healthy modification, that would work towards 
enhancing its motivational power, would be to set up narrower slabs, so as to offer 
significant premium to managers for crossing a lower slab and latching up to a higher 
one. In other words, more milestones need to be set-up to showcase advancement, 
each of which needs to be reinforced in teims of higher reward value for that stretch 
of performance between any two intervals. This would help achieve the objective of 
performance differentiation, and also render STVPP the character of a more 
responsive and creditable compensation mechanism. 
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Likewise comparison between threshold and achievement-level for the subsequent 
year i.e. 2006- 07 has been performed and its findings depicted through the chart 
presented below. 
Chart 5.2 
Average performance of middle managers at sample organisations, during year 2006-07 
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The average performance for middle managers for the year 2006-07 is at 92.3% of 
target. The average threshold for organizations for the year is 69%. There is a clear 
overachievement of performance by middle managers to the extent of 23.3% of target. 
Average performance of managers increased in year 2006-07 by 2.5% over the 
previous year. Since the level of threshold remained same across organizations for the 
period, the level of average overachievement too increased by 2.5%. 
The average performance of middle managers, considering the two year period, is 
9 1 % across organizations, while the average threshold level across organizations is 
69%. Based on these figures, the average level of overachievement of managers 
(achievement - threshold ) is 22%, across organizations, considering the two year 
performance period. Clear suggestion is that organizations can consider this 
performance range for tinkering with the threshold level performance. The measure 
will pose challenge to high performers - making the plan more dynamic, and come 
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across as a genuine motivation tool for the mediocre performers, since tliey would be 
able to perceive extra reward for surpassing each milestone. As suggested above, such 
progressive payout schedules that pack higher levels of challenge for mangers, 
preferably need to be accompanied by significant rewards for top performers. 
5.2.3 Correlation between managers' perceived impact of STVPP on 
their performance and the extent of control managers have over 
performance parameters of their variable pay. 
Hoi5 : Managers' perceived impact of STVPP on their performance has no 
correlation with the extent 0/their (managers'Jcontrol over the performance 
parameters of their variable pay. 
: Managers' perceived impact of STVPP on their performance has a positive 
correlation with the extent 0/their (managers') control over the performance 
parameters of their variable pay. 
An evaluation was made of the relationship between 'perceived impact of STVPP on 
managers' performance' and 'the extent of control managers have over performance 
parameters of their variable pay'. 
TABLE 5.43 
Pearson' correlation coefficient between 'managers' perceived impact of STVPP on 
their performance' and 'extent of control managers have over performance 
parameters of their variable pay'. 
H 
M_IEP 
M_DC 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
M_IEP 
1 
150 
-.036 
.662 
150 
M_DC 
-.036 
.662 
150 
1 
150 
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Results - An analysis using Pearson's correlation coefficient indicates a statistically 
insignificant relationship between 'perceived impact of STVPP on managers' 
performance' and 'extent of control managers have over the performance parameters 
of their variable pay' r(148) = -.036. The significance was computed at 0.05 level, and 
results show that the significance value of .662 being greater than .05, it is not a 
statistically significant correlation. Thus, value of p (two-tailed) being greater than 
.05, we retain Ho and conclude that the variables are unrelated. 
The direction is easily seen by the sign of the r value. The above is a case of negative 
correlation indicating that high scores on 'managers' degree of control over 
performance parameters of their variable pay' are associated with low scores on 'the 
perceived impact of STVPP on their performance'. 
It is concluded that the above test is non-significant. This once again proves that the 
correlation coefficient is insignificant. The test findings fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no correlation control over performance parameters and 
impact on performance. The alternative hypothesis is thus rejected. 
Conceptual Interpretation - The test results reveal that there is no relationship 
between the two variables, as r is -.036 i.e. around 0. There is no relation between 
'extent of control a manager has over his performance parameters' and 'the perceived 
impact STVPP on his performance'. 
In other words, if a manager has high degree of control over his performance 
parameters of variable pay, it does not necessarily mean that the manager would 
perceive positive impact of STVPP on his performance. Said differently, regardless of 
how much managers are able to influence the performance parameters leading to their 
payout, it does not necessarily mean that it would affect the impact STVPP has, on 
their performance. 
Discussions with managers clearly brought out managers' desire to have high 
influence over their performance parameters. It is likely that if the above is achieved, 
it would exert a positive impact on managers' level of satisfaction and consequently 
their level of motivation. As far as performance results are concerned, these are 
tangible outputs, physical evidence which eventually determine how much payout a 
manger gets. A manager strives to maximize this payout amount regardless of the 
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presence or absence of potentially motivating elements of STVPP. This explains why 
'ability to control performance parameters' bears no (or little) correlation with 
STVPP's perceived impact on performance results. 
Section 3 
5.3 Perceived impact of STVPP on organization 
performance 
Analogical to the axiomatic truth that the taste of pudding lies in (its) eating, the 
worthwhileness of a business system is tested by its impact on the bottomline. A short 
term variable pay plan is only as good as its overall impact on organisation's 
performance. For this reason, while the focus of this study is fixed on knowing the 
pay system's impact on middle managers' performance, it would be unwise to not to 
examine the overall impact the system bears upon the organizations' results. This 
section is focused on examining this dimension of STVPP's effectiveness. 
In particular, this section presents findings about the extent to which organisations' 
objectives in operating STVPPs have been accomplished; this finding uses 
perceptions of the key respondent groups of the study, as its prime basis. On the basis 
of organisation performance data over the three year period, 2004 to 2007, assessment 
is made about extent of STVPP's impact on overall performance. It needs mention 
herewith that the study does not claim attribution of such results to STVPP-use. The 
determining criteria is the accomplishment of threshold goal, fixed for overall 
business performance. Such a state of business result gives a clear message that when 
an organization is operating STVPPs, it is able to achieve its benchmark ie the 
threshold level. Performance over and above this point, is that stretch or expanse of 
performance, which compensation planners can use as their canvas for innovating the 
system. This theory has been laid out as the basis for understanding the impact of 
STVPP on organization performance. 
5.3,1 Hypotheses about perceived impact of STVPP on Organization performance 
5.3.1a Whether STVPP has a positive impact on organization performance, in 
perception of human resource personnel 
Ho2i: Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisation 
performance. 
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H A 2 I - Short term variable pay plan has a positive impact on organisation 
performance, as perceived by Human Resource personnel 
The table below gives descriptive statistics for perceived impact of STVPP on 
organization performance, in view of human resource personnel 
TABLE 5.44 
One-Sample Statistics (for H_IOP) 
HJOP 
N 
15 
Mean 
3.8167 
Std. Deviation 
.72866 
Std. Error Mean 
.18814 
In view of human resources personnel, they quite agree that STVPP has had a positive 
impact on organisation's performance. Human Resources' unique advantage of it 
being the chief designer and the administrator of STVPP, positions it well enough to 
have an aerial view about the health of the system and also its impact on organization 
performance. The mean figure of 3.8 indicates expression of considerable agreement 
in favour of STVPP's positive impact on organisation performance. 
The standard deviation among HR personnel's views is .73, indicating presence of 
views that quite strongly agree about STVPP's impact being beneficial for 
organization performance. Similarly, this also indicates that there are some HR 
personnel who hold tentative views about its impact on organization performance. 
This is the section of HR personnel that carries doubt as to STVPP's contribution to 
organization performance, and thus it makes no commitment, either way - positive or 
negative, about how much STVPP adds value in terms of enhancing organization 
performance. 
Table 5.55 below gives results of one-sample t -test to test differences between 
hypothesized mean value 3, and the mean impact of STVPP on managers' 
performance in view of Human resources personnel. 
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TABLE 5.45 
One-Sample Test (between calculated HIOP and the 'no impact' value) 
H_IOP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
4.341 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.001 
Mean 
Difference 
.81667 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.4131 
Upper 
.2202 
The calculated value p at .001, being less than the significance value .005, gives a 
clear indication that the test results are significant in their finding that STVPP exerts a 
positive impact on organisations' performance, in view of HR personnel. The null 
hypothesis is rejected, since data does not match the theory, and therefore there is 
failure to reject the null hypothesis. 
5.3.1b Whether STVPP has a positive impact on organization performance, in 
perception of the flnance personnel 
H022: Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisation 
performance. 
HA22: Short term variable pay plan has a positive impact on organisation 
performance, as perceived by Finance personnel 
Given below in table 5.56 are the descriptive statistics for the variable F_IOP ie 
Impact of STVPP on organization performance, in view of finance personnel 
TABLE 5.46 
One-Sample Statistics (for F_IOP) 
FJOP 
N 
15 
Mean 
3.9667 
Std. Deviation 
.42117 
Std. Error Mean 
.10874 
The 
finance personnel have expressed considerable agreement about the notion that 
STVPP exerts a positive impact on organization performance. In this regard, finance' 
view deserved to be credited with credibility since it closely watches the movement of 
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company budget and meticulously tracks systems or processes that affect the budget. 
The S.D. value .4 indicates that there are cases showing small degrees of consent 
favouring the view, and also there are cases where the level of agreement is 
considerably strong. 
Table 5.57 gives results of T- test, that compared the mean impact of STVPP on 
organisaitons' performance, in view of finance personnel with the hypothetical 
position adopted of no-impact, which is also the null hypothesis. 
TABLE 5.47 
One-Sample Test (between calculated F_IOP and the 'no impact' value) 
F_IOP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
8.889 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
.96667 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
.7334 
Upper 
1.1999 
The P value at .000 is considerably less than the significance level at .005, which 
leads us to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, the alternative hypothesis that STVPP has 
a positive impact on organisations' performance, in view of finance personnel, has not 
been rejected, and is upheld. 
Statistically significant results are found through the test value above, that favours 
finance personnel's position that the system of STVPP has a positive impact on 
organization performance. 
5.3.1c Whether STVPP has a positive impact on organization performance, in 
perception of middle managers 
Ho23 : Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisation performance. 
HA23 : Short term variable pay plan has a positive impact on organisation 
performance, as perceived by managers. 
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Table 5.58 below, gives results about the mean impact of STVPP on organisations' 
performance, in view of managers. It offers descriptive statistics to support the results 
found out. 
TABLE 5.48 
One-Sample Statistics (for MIOP) 
M_10P 
N 
150 
Mean 
3.1250 
Std. Deviation 
.44754 
Std. Error Mean 
.03654 
According to managers, mean impact of STVPP on overall organization performance 
is 3.1250. The inference being that on an average there is just little agreement about 
the view that STVPP has positive impact on organization performance. It is clear that 
managers have not taken a very positive view about the impact of STVPP on 
performance in general. This is well supported as the mean impact on their own 
performance is 3.4067, and that on the organization performance is 3.1250. The two 
figures are comparable and can be said to represent managers' feeble support about 
performance impact of STVPP. 
It is reasonable to surmise that managers would comment with greater degree of 
certainty about their own performance than their ability to comment on performance 
impact on organization. The conservative support rendered to STVPP merely 
reinforces managers' discontent with the overall operation of STVPP, and is seen to 
be getting pronounced in form of cumulative negative impact on organization 
performance. Evidently, while managers do agree that the impact on organization 
performance Is positive, at the same time they hold reservations about its efficacy and 
therefore the score is less than 4 (which would have meant a clear agreement about 
the impact being positive). 
Table 5.59 below calculates the t statistic to find out whether the mean impact of 
STVPP on organisation performance, in view of managers is considerably different 
from the hypothesized value at 3, which is the point of no impact. Table 5.59 analyses 
the relevant results. 
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TABLE 5.49 
One-Sample Test (between calculated M lOP and the 'no impact' value) 
M_IOP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
3.421 
Df 
149 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.001 
Mean 
Difference 
.12500 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower 
.0528 
Upper 
.1972 
The p value at .001, being lesser than .005, proves that the resultant differences 
between the mean value and the hypothesized value are not by chance (since its p is 
.001), and that there are real differences between the two groups. Thus, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis can't be rejected. Infact 
statistically, these results are significant. 
The supported hypothesis leads us to infer that a short term variable pay plan has 
positive impact on organization performance, in view of managers. 
5.3.1d Difference among the perception of managers, Human Resources 
function, and the Finance function, with regard to the impact of 
STVPP on organization performance. 
Ho8 : There is no significant difference among the perception of the managers, the 
Human Resources function, and that of the Finance function, about the impact 
of STVPP on organization performance. 
HAS : There is a significant difference among the perception of the managers, the 
Human Resources fiinction, and that of the Finance function, about the impact 
of STVPP on organization performance. 
One-way ANOVA test has been used to find if there are significant differences among 
the average mean scores of managers, human resource function and the finance 
function with regard to the perceived impact of STVPP on the performance of 
organisation. Test of null hypothesis that there is no difference between the means, is 
performed with an F statistic. Table 5.60 below gives the related results. 
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TABLE 5.50 
ANOVA on managers, HR and Finance groups concerning their perception 
about impact of STVPP on organisations' performance 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Sum of Squares 
14.863 
39.760 
54.624 
Df 
2 
177 
179 
Mean Square 
7.432 
.225 
F 
33.083 
Sig. 
.000 
The test statistic is the F value of 33.083. An F table has been used to compute that 
the probability for an F of 33.083 with 2 and 177 df is .000, using an a of .05 ie 
F.o5;2,177 = .000. SPSS shows the F-probability only to three digits; the fact that it 
says .000 here means that the F-ratio is so highly significant that the p value is less 
than .0005 and hence too small to show, not that it is actually 0. 
Since the test statistic is much higher than the critical value (2.51), we reject the null 
hypothesis. We conclude that there are statistically significant differences among the 
population means. Evidently, there are considerable differences among the perception 
held by managers, the Human Resources personnel and the Finance personnel about 
the impact of STVPP on organisation's performance. 
Post-hoc analysis has been carried out to look for patterns not specified a priori. The 
objective was to find patterns in the three subgroups of the sample. The Student-
Newman-Keuls test was administered to make all pairwise comparisons. These are the 
results of the post-hoc tests; SPSS presents the groups in sets. The groups contained 
within a specific set are not significantly different from one another. In this case, 
groups 2 and 3 are not significantly different, thus are clubbed together in a single 
subset. Group 1 is different from the others and is therefore held in a separate subset. 
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TABLE 5.51 
Student-Newman-Keuls"'' 
Group_Type 
1 
2 
3 
Sig. 
N 
150 
15 
15 
Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 
3.1250 
1.000 
2 
3.8167 
3.9667 
.302 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
The overall ANOVA is significant, which tells us that there is some difference among 
the three groups, in terms of their perception about the impact of STVPP on overall 
organization performance. Inspection of the means suggests that the 'managers' agree 
to a very small extent that STVPP has a positive impact on organisation's 
performance. On the other hand, the 'Human Resources personnel' and the 'Finance 
personnel' (quite) strongly agree about this particular aspect. The Newman-Keuls test 
confirms this impression statistically: managers are less positive about performance 
impact of STVPP compared to the perceptions held by 'human resource personnel' 
and 'finance personnel' respectively. 
It requires explicit mention that the strength of opinion of the Human resources 
personnel is lesser only by a small degree, when compared to perception of 'Finance 
personnel', and such difference is by no means significant. 
Test results shown above establish differences among the three groups concerning 
how they perceive STVPP's impact on organization performance. The managers have 
a less optimistic perception as compared to the Human Resources and the Finance 
personnel, both of whom think alike on the issue. 
The latter two groups, by virtue of similarity in their perception about the issue raised 
above, form a homogenous set. It is reasonable to believe that a function-head (or that 
of a subflinction) has a closer view of organization performance compared to the line-
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of-sight middle managers have. This gives reason to give credence to the objectivity 
of HR's views and that of finance, since these respondent-types were represented by 
head-level functionaries. 
5.3.2 Comparison between organization performance result and 
organization-level threshold goal 
In addition to the above perceptual data, objective data about organization 
performance for the three year period has been contrasted with its threshold goal to 
assess extent of overachievement about orgnisation goals. Such comparison enables 
one to pin down the impact in terms of whether the plan's minimum requirements 
were met or not, and in either case, gives indication about the extent of shortfall or 
excess. Detailed information about organisations' performance data for the period 
2004 to 2007 is available in annexure 5.3 and the same is summarily depicted in chart 
3 below. Organisation performance is depicted in terms of a composite figure which 
reflects all the parameters of organisation. This data crunching has been done for ease 
of understanding, and without causing loss of vital information for purposes of 
understanding impact of STVPP. 
Chart 5.3 
Organisation performance over the period - 2004 to 2007 
140% 
120% 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
Average uveractiievement 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 
Organization code 
-•-Average threshold* level goal (2004-05, 2005-06,2006-07) 
Performance for the year, 2004-05 (in terms of'% of target goal') 
Performance for the year, 2005-06 (in terms of'% of target goal') 
Performance for the year, 2006-07 (in terms of'% of target goal') 
'•*"" Average Overachievement 
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The average organization performance for the three year period is at 93% of 
target.(See chart 3 above) When compared against average threshold of 78%, the 
overall average of overachievement stands at 15% of target. This is the extent of 
overachievement organisations enjoy, as this is derived from difference between 
performance result and the threshold level, when their performance level is compared 
against their threshold level. This is also the organisations' comfort zone that they can 
gainfully utilize for escalating challenge element of STVPP - by making threshold 
target stiffer to achieve, rendering it the impression of'something to be achieved with 
difficulty'. As things stand, threshold achievability is a non-issue in the eyes of 
managers as well as the organisations watchdogs (in this case CFOs). It's a child play 
for them to meet this level. Threshold, in their belief is like a false target, something 
like a false wall having the appearance of concrete but in reality having a fragile 
character. 
Section 4 
5.4 Managers' understanding about the purpose and working of 
short term variable pay plan. 
This section reports findings about managers' level of understanding with regard to 
overall STVPP's philosophy and functioning. For ease of comprehension and in 
interest of better organizing the information presented, the same has been divided 
into 2 broad subsections, each one focusing on a distinct aspect of mangers' 
understanding - that of its purpose and its functioning. 
5.4a Managers' understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan. 
This section reports findings about managers' understanding of the purpose of short 
term variable remuneration, as they perceive the organisations' intention in 
implementing these. Primarily, their understanding has been assessed by checking 
their knowledge-level about it. Another indicator has been used to buttress the results 
obtained from the former assessment, which relates to managers' understanding about 
their line-of-sight with business goals. 
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5.4a.l Managers' knowledge of the purpose of STVPP 
Table 5.1 gives an account of managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP, 
that was directly tested by asking them for a vivid description about it. Section 5.1 
includes this component since design of a STVPP heavily depends on the mooted 
purpose. Current section 5.4a examines the same aspect with a view to gauge depth of 
managers' understanding about this critical aspect. The results are detailed in Table 
5.1 which is followed by relevant analysis. To reiterate at this point, mainly for 
purposes of relevance, the major result is that more than half the managers perceive 
the key purpose to be the "motive to drive employee performance". There is little 
recall of its more progressive forms like achieving business objectives (18% for it), 
alignment (10% for it) and instilling team-working spirit (none for it). It is 
bewildering to know that only 2% managers perceive its objective is to provide pay a 
performance justification; which goes to show the tenuous relationship between the 
variables of pay and performance. 
5.4a.2 Managers' understanding about their line-of-sight with business goals 
In table 5.12 and 5.11, managers' line-of-sight issue and processes used for it have 
been discussed. As mentioned for section 5.4a.l, these are crucial aspects of plan 
design and implementation, hence their placement in that section. However, aspect of 
line-of-sight is crucial since it is an indicator of how well one understands the overall 
purpose of STVPP. Managers were probed about how they comprehended the link 
between their roles and the business objectives and what was the methodology 
deployed to achieve this end. This essentially is the central axis of the STVPP process 
around which a healthy system functions. There is merit in probing line-of-sight 
question, as it essentially reveals if managers have a deep enough understanding about 
the purpose, and thus have insight about their fitment in organisaiton's functioning. It 
is altogether a different question if managers are able to mentally forge a link between 
their line-of-sight and the use of STVPP, which if achieved would place their 
understanding at a level par excellence. Such kind of understanding would mean their 
ability to describe the system at an instinctive level, examining which, is nevertheless, 
beyond the immediate scope of this research study. 
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As mentioned above, table 5.11 and table 5.12 respectively provide results about 
managers' line-of-sight with business goals. By and large, results are of the nature 
that 89% managers perceive such linkage with business goals, however, within this 
segment of 89%, as high as 93% of these express that implicit methods are used to 
achieve such linkage. This latter finding sets the tone of management's nonchalance 
towards elevating STVPP to the mould of a formal structure. This also goes to show 
how organization continue to cling to the off-beat traditional pay systems, that had 
little to do with employee-relation practices in context of compensation systems. 
5.4a.3 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' 
understanding of purpose of STVPP on tiieir performance result 
5.4a.3a Whether managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP has a 
positive impact on their performance,, in view of human resources personnel 
Ho3i Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance. 
HA3I Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has a 
positive impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
Table 5.62 below gives the descriptive statistics for the variable H U P E P ie impact 
of understanding of purpose on performance of managers, in view of human resources 
personnel. 
TABLE 5.52 
One-Sample Statistics for H_UP_EP 
H_UP_EP 
N 
15 
Mean 
3.6000 
Std. Deviation 
.56625 
Std. Error Mean 
.14620 
HR personnel have shown some measure of agreement about the view that if 
managers have an understanding of the purpose of STVPP, then it would have a 
positive impact on their performance. While it is by no means their whole hearted 
agreement, it does signify expression of positive support in this direction. The 
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standard deviation is .56, indicating presence of HR professionals, some of whom 
think that such understanding may or may not affect performance positively; at the 
same time it also signifies presence of views showing considerable belief in 
contribution of'understanding of purpose' to 'higher employee performance results.' 
Table 5.63 below provides results of one-sample t test to ascertain if there are 
significant differences between the hypothesized impact of 3 (i.e. no impact) and the 
mean impact, that the understanding of purpose has o n performance of managers. 
TABLE 5.53 
One-Sample Test (between calculated H_UP_EP and the 'no impact' value) 
H_UP_EP 
T 
4.104 
Df 
14 
Test Value = 3 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.001 
Mean 
Difference 
.60000 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
.2864 
Upper 
.9136 
The t-test results shown in table 5.63 reveal that the p value being less than 
significance value .05, the probability is very low that the group mean is different 
only due to chance factor. This shows that the above group is indeed different from 
the null hypothesis. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected while there is failure to reject 
the alternative hypothesis. The test results that are significant, show that in viw of HR 
personnel, understanding about purpose of STVPP does have a positive impact on 
managers' performance. The mean value of 3.6 shows that the level of agreement on 
this score is not very strong - it is moderate, as position of 3.6 is equivalent of part 
agreement about the proposition. Nevertheless as already stated the results are 
statistically strong. 
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5.4a.3b Whether managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP has a 
positive impact on their performance, in view of finance personnel 
Ho32 Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance. 
HA32 Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has a 
positive impact on managers' performance, as perceived by finance personnel. 
Table 5.64 below gives descriptive statistics about the variable F_UP_EP ie impact 
of understanding of purpose on performance of managers, in view of Finance 
personnel. 
TABLE 5.54 
One-Sample Statistics (for F_UP_EP) 
F_UP_EP 
N 
15 
Mean 
3.5111 
Std. Deviation 
.61550 
Std. Error Mean 
.15892 
The finance personnel perceive, not really with any degree of conviction or what 
could be called even a single-minded-agreement', but their belief is inclined in the 
direction that if managers have a good understanding about the purpose of STVPP, 
then it would have a positive impact on mangers' performance. The S.D. value of .6 
shows that there are some Finance personnel who have a clouded view (read unclear) 
about the impact of knowledge-of-understanding on manager performance, just as 
there are cases of Finance personnel who have expressed strong support in favour of 
the hypothesized relationship between understanding-level and impact-on-
performance. 
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TABLE 5.55 
One-Sample Test (between calculated F U P E P and the 'no impact' value) 
F_UP_EP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
3.216 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-taiied) 
.006 
Mean 
Difference 
.51111 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.1703 
Upper 
.8520 
The t-test results shown in table 5.65 reveal that the p value being less than 
significance value .05, there is significant support in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis, as the null hypothesis stands rejected. This clearly goes to show that there 
is a small probability that such differences are a result of chance factor. In such an 
eventuality, it is interpreted that the mean of the group presented above is 
significantly different from the hypothesized value of 3, and that these results are 
statistically strong. In plain language this shows that finance personnel believe that 
managers would show positive impact in their performance results if they clearly 
understand the purpose of STVPP. This has statistically strong backing and therefore 
is a worthwhile result. 
5.4a.3cWhether managers' understanding about the purpose of STVPP has a 
positive impact on their performance, in view of managers. 
Ho33 ; Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has 
no impact on managers' performance. 
HA33 : Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has 
a positive impact on managers' performance, as perceived by 
managers. 
Table 5.66 below gives descriptive statistics about the variable IV1_UP_EP ie impact 
of understanding of purpose on performance of managers, in view of managers. 
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M_UP_EP 
One-Sam 
N 
150 
TABLE 5.56 
pie Statistics (for M_UP_EP) 
Mean 
4.2627 
Std. Deviation 
.34535 
Std. Error 
Mean 
.02820 
The average score of managers' level of agreement on this account is 4.2627. 
Managers have shown considerably high degree of agreement about the view that 
understanding of purpose of STVPP has a positive impact on their performance. It 
may be inferred that given such perception of managers, it would be fruitful on the 
part of organization to ensure that managers gather a good understanding about the 
purpose of STVPP. It may also be inferred that managers are keen to have sound 
understanding of the purpose, so as to be able to positively impact their performance 
results. 
Table 5.67 below shows results of one sample t test to compare the difference 
between the mean impact on mangers' performance and the hypothesized value 3. 
The t test is performed below is in relation to the variable M_UP_EP ie perceived 
impact of understanding of purpose on performance results, in view of managers. 
TABLE 5.57 
One-Sample Test (between calculated M_UP_EP and the 'no impact' value) 
M_UP_EP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
44.779 
Df 
149 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.26267 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
1.2069 
Upper 
1.3184 
The p value of .000 being lower than significance level value .005, the null hypothesis 
is rejected and there is failure to reject the alternative hypothesis. The test results have 
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shown quite strong support for the hypothesis that a clear understanding about the 
purpose of short term variable pay plan has a positive impact on managers" 
performance. 
The finding shows a clear path to the organizations that investment in educating 
managers about the purpose of STVPP could go a long way in exerting positive 
influence on managers' performance. A useful inference is that managers are likely to 
be just as concerned with the 'working' of STVPP, since it is instrumental in 
determining the payout amount. 
A triangulated basis of understanding perceived impact of involvement in design on 
understanding of purpose, has been used. Similar to the pattern followed in testing 
above hypotheses, this enquiry has been made with the human resources personnel, 
the finance personnel and the managers. Section 5.4a.5 detailed below tests various 
hypothesis using the stated basis. 
5.4a.4 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement 
in design process of STVPP on their understanding about its purpose 
5.4a.4a Whether managers' involvement in design has a positive impact on their 
understanding of purpose of STVPP, in perception of human resources 
personnel. 
Ho3i : Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has 
no impact on managers' performance. 
HA31: Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has 
a positive impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Human 
Resource personnel. 
Table 5.68 below gives descriptive statistics about variable H I n D U P that stands for 
proposition that if managers are involved in design of STVPP, then it would 
positively impact their understanding of STVPP purpose. 
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TABLE 5.58 
One-Sample Statistics (for H_InD_UP) 
H_InD_UP 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.4333 
Std. 
Deviation 
.38344 
Std. Error Mean 
.09900 
HR personnel have shown considerable support to the idea that managers' 
involvement in design phase of STVPP would help managers in gaining 
understanding of its purpose. The average HR view on this account is 4.4.and its 
S.D.value is .4. The extent of dispersion is distinctly noticeably, and the extent of 
support in its direction is quite weighty, a robust figure of 4.4 (mean value), it is 
emphasized yet again that looking at the current pale picture of managers' 
involvement in design (20% involved to a 'small extent'), it is a perhaps an eye-
opener for HR personnel, who may have realized that such proposed involvement of 
mangers would be a step in the direction of enhancing their understanding about 
STVPP-purpose. 
It is uncertain whether HR is well aware of the hiatus that exists between respective 
perceptions of purpose, held by HR and those held by managers. To researcher's best 
of knowledge, this is like HR's blind area, if we conceptualise a Johari window in 
context of the two. May be the kind of findings reported here would give them insight 
about the gulf, converting more of 'blind' area into the 'open' area, that is presently 
not visible to them. Table 5.1 makes it clear that while more than half the managers 
perceive the main purpose as 'to drive performance', 2/3rd of HR personnel perceive 
the main objective is to 'provide performance linkage to their pay levels'. This is 
analogical to looking at a prism from different facets. While HR is convinced that the 
chief objective is to render it the colour of equity, by offering incremental pay at 
varying levels of performance; managers, at their end, perceive STVPP as a tool that 
is designed to drive them to an endless quest for higher levels of performance. Such 
disparities can be ironed out with due reporting of each others' viewpoint across open 
forum of discussion. 
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Table 5.69 shows results of one-sample statistics for the variable HJnD_UP. The T -
statistic contained in the table allows us to infer if the results obtained are 
statistically significant and whether there really exists any difference between the 
hypothesized value of 'understanding about purpose' and the actual level of 
understanding of purpose due to the factors stated, in perception of the human 
resource personnel. 
TABLE 5.59 
One-Sample Test (between calculated HInDUP and the 'no impact' value) 
H_lnD_UP 
T 
14.478 
Df 
14 
Test Value = 3 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.43333 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower 
1.2210 
Upper 
1.6457 
The above results of the one sample t test prove that there are statistically significant 
differences between the hypothesized value 3 and the found out value of H_InD_UP. 
The results are statistically significant since probability of such a difference being 
caused by chance is very low at .000. The results show that in perception of HR 
personnel, if managers are involved in the design process, then it would lead them to 
better understand the purpose of STVPP. 
5.4a.4b Whether managers' involvement in design has a positive impact on their 
understanding of purpose of STVPP, in perception of finance personnel. 
Ho32: Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance. 
HA32 : Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has a 
positive impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Finance 
personnel. 
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Table 5.70 below presents descriptive statistics for the variable F_InD_UP that stands 
or the proposition that managers' involvement in design of STVPP leads to better 
nderstanding about the purpose of STVPP, as perceived by the finance personnel. 
The related figures are presented below: 
TABLE 5.60 
One-Sample Statistics (for F_InD_UP) 
F_InD_UP 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.3167 
Std. Deviation 
.42748 
Std. Error Mean 
.11037 
Finance personnel emphatically agree and favour the supposition that managers' 
involvement in the design phase contributes to an increased level of understanding 
about the purpose of STVPP. The mean value is 4.3, with a S.D. of .4, that goes to 
show there exists some divergence among managers' views as to the relationship 
between involvement and understanding of purpose. To make the issue of S.D. more 
vivid, some finance personnel are a little short on reposing confidence in ability of 
involvement to contribute to understanding of purpose, and there are some others, 
who contrastingly provide strong support to the above relationship. In a nut shell, as 
the mean value of 4.3 suggests, there is considerable agreement they show in the 
relationship cited above (between InD and UP). 
Table 5.71 below shows results of one-sample t test that compares the hypothesized 
'no impact' position with the perceived impact by finance personnel, about impact of 
involvement in design on understanding of purpose on part of managers. Table 5.71 
presents the related results. 
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TABLE 5.61 
One-Sample Test (between calculated F I n D U P and the 'no impact' value) 
FJnD_UP 
T 
11.929 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Test Value = 3 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.31667 
95% Confidence interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
1.0799 
Upper 
1.5534 
The p value being less than .05 shows that the above results are statistically 
significant, i.e. there are real differences between the hypothesized stance of having 
no impact and the value of variable F_InD_UP ie impact of involvement in design on 
understanding about the purpose of STVPP. Results are significant as the mean value 
of the variable at 4.3 indicates that finance personnel whole heartedly agree with the 
stated proposition and they believe in the likelihood of the same. 
5.4a.4c Whether managers' involvement in design has a positive impact on their 
understanding of purpose of STVPP, in perception of managers 
Ho33: Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has 
no impact on managers' performance.. 
HA33 : Clear understanding of the purpose of short term variable pay plan has 
a positive impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Finance 
personnel. 
Table 5.72 below gives descriptive statistics about variable lVl_lnD_UP, that 
represents the proposition that involvement in design of STVPP results in clear 
understanding of the purpose of STVPP, in perception of managers themselves. 
TABLE 5.62 
One-Sample Statistics (for M_InD_UP) 
M_lnd_UP 
N 
150 
Mean 
4.0973 
Std. Deviation 
.37128 
Std. Error Mean 
.03031 
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Test results provide statistically strong support to prove that the 2 means, discussed 
above, are very much at variance with each other. This shows that in view of 
managers, if they are involved in the design of STVPP, then it would have a positive 
impact on their understanding about its purpose. The basis for the result lies in the low 
probability of such differences having been occurred by chance factor. Said 
differently, the difference between the mean value of M_lnD_UP and the null 
hypothesis value is real and too strong to be considered as a play of chance factor. 
The test results support the hypothesis that managers' involvement in the design 
process of STVPP has a positive impact on their understanding about the purpose of 
STVPP. If design is the skeleton of a STVPP, then it can be conveniently said that the 
underlying purpose clarifies the reason why the behemoth or the whole machinery of 
STVPP is designed or the very reason for its existence. The description puts us on a 
pedestal where we can clearly discern the relationship between involvement and 
understanding. The mean score of managers' perception in support of this view stands 
at 4.0973. It may be inferred that managers more-than agree about the view that if 
they are involved in the design process then it would positively impact their 
understanding about the purpose of STVPP. The finding supports the truism that 
when you practice something, you learn the insides of it. In this case, when managers 
have a chance to be involved in the design process of STVPP, their understanding 
about its purpose deepens. This is well proven on the basis of hypothesis results, 
having their basis in managers' perceptions. The finding is useful since understanding 
about purpose of STVPP is important for its own sake and by extension, it is also 
helpful for enhancing managers' interest level in understanding the working of 
STVPP. 
Table 5.73 below performs one-sample t test to compare the means of the two 
groups, one, the value hypothesized and presented as null hypothesis, that the 
proposition is not true, second, mean of the group that upholds the relationships stated 
in the proposition. The test results are presented in table below, that refer to the 
variable M InD UP. 
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TABLE 5.63 
One-Sample Test (between calculated M_InD_UP and the 'no impact' value) 
M_Ind_UP 
Test Value = 3 
t 
36.198 
Df 
149 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.09733 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
1.0374 
Upper 
1.1572 
5.4a.5 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement 
in implementation process of STVPP on their understanding about 
its purpose 
5.4a.5a Whether managers' involvement in implementation has a positive impact 
on their understanding of purpose of STVPP, in perception of human resource 
personnel 
Ho6i : Managers' involvement in the implementation of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
HA6I : Managers' involvement in the implementation of short term variable pay plan 
has a positive impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human 
Resource personnel. 
Given below are the descriptive statistics for the variable H_Inl_UP, that connotes 
that the managers' involvement in the implementation of STVPP leads to clearer 
understanding about its purpose among them, as perceived by the HR personnel. 
TABLE 5.64 
One-Sample Statistics (for H_InI_UP) 
H_Inl_UP 
N 
15 
Mean 
3.9500 
Std. Deviation 
.33004 
Std. Error Mean 
.08522 
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HR personnel have expressed belief and shown agreement that if managers are 
involved in the implementation phase of STVPP, then it would positively affect 
managers' understanding about its purpose. The relevant standard deviation is .3, 
indicating considerable homogeneity among views of HR personnel, however, there 
are cases of HR personnel who shy away from giving a clear agreement to the 
proposed relationship and there are yet others who have expressed significant support 
favouring the given proposition. 
HR's views, in case of involvement in design, for similar ends, stood at a high of 4.4, 
indicating considerably higher level of support. The respective S.D. value of .4 is 
comparable to the current one of .3, in case of involvement in implementation phase. 
Somewhat similar relationship or disparity was observed in case of similar variables 
w.r.t. manager satisfaction. Consider this - Value of H_InD_ES is 4.3, while that of 
H_In]_ES is lesser, at 4. Similar scenario is witnessed w.r.t. understanding of purpose, 
as the comparable values for design and implementation are at 4.4 (for H_lnD_UP) 
and 3.95(for H_InI_UP) respectively. 
TABLE 5.65 
One-Sample Test (between calculated H_InI_UP and the 'no impact' value) 
HJnI_UP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
11.148 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
.95000 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower 
.7672 
Upper 
.1328 
The above test results support the alternative hypothesis as the probability of 
difference in means is too small to have occurred by chance. This gives reason to 
believe that there is a statistically significant support for the alternative hypothesis. 
The null hypothesis thus rejected. Interpreting the test results, leads to evidence that 
the HR personnel believe that if managers are involved in the implementation of 
STVPP, then it would positively impact their understanding about its purpose. Also, 
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the mean value of the variable being 3.95, it shows that the HR personnel have 
offered clear agreement to support the hypothesis. 
5.4a.5b Whether managers' involvement in implementation has a positive impact 
on their understanding of purpose of STVPP, in perception of finance personnel 
Table 5.76 provides the descriptive statistics for the variable F_lnI_UP which stands 
for finance personnel perception on whether managers' involvement in 
implementation has a healthy affect on their understanding of its purpose. 
TABLE 5.66 
One-Sample Statistics for FJnI_UP 
F_InI_UP 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.1333 
Std. Deviation 
.32550 
Std. Error Mean 
.08404 
The group comprising senior finance personnel shows clear agreement to the 
proposition, that managers' involvement in the implementation stage contributes to 
increasing managers' understanding about its purpose. The S.D. value of .3 indicates 
few personnel hold reservations in tendering clear support, and that there are some 
who have shown quite a degree of support in its favour. 
Comparison between F_InD_UP (M = 4.3) and F_InI_UP (M = 4.1) figure reveals 
that there is just a little higher strength of opinion favouring involvemet-in-design 
over involvement-in-implementation for their respective perceived iimpact on 
managers' understanding about its purpose (exact difference being only .2). 
Table 5.77 below reports results of one sample t test to determine differences in mean 
between 'no impact' position and that there is positive impact of managers' 
involvement in implementation on understanding of STVPP's purpose. The test is 
carried out in reference to variable F Inl UP. 
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TABLE 5.67 
One-Sample Test(between calculated FInlUP and the 'no impact' value) 
F_Inl_UP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
13.485 
df 
14 
Sig.(2-
tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.13333 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
.9531 
Upper 
.3136 
The above test results reject the null hypothesis, since p value is less than .05, and 
thus there has been failure to reject the null hypothesis. The results are statistically 
significant and there is a high level of agreement among the finance personnel about 
the stated proposition, considering M = 4.13, and S.D. is rather small at .33, pointing 
towards high degree of convergence among views of the finance personnel. 
5.4a.5c Whether managers' involvement in implementation has a positive impact 
on their understanding of purpose of STVPP, in perception of managers 
The table below (5.78) provides descriptive statistics for the variable MInlUP, that 
stands for 'opinion of managers about whether their involvement in design would 
lead to a better understanding of purpose of STVPP, among them'. 
TABLE 5.68 
One-Sample Statistics for M l n l U P 
M_Inl_UP 
N 
150 
Mean 
3.5617 
Std. Deviation 
.54027 
Std. Error Mean 
.04411 
The average level of agreement among managers about the contribution made to 
understanding of purpose is higher in case of involvement-in-design (4.0973) than in 
case of involvement-in-implementation (3.5617). The difference between the two is 
understandable as design activity is a direct offshoot of the stated purpose. Though 
closely related to the design activity, the implementation process is primarily 
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concerned with effective execution of STVPP. Thus, design process is a closer 
manifestation of underlying philosophy or purpose as compared to the implementation 
process. This sufficiently explains the reason for discrepancy between the perceived 
impact on understanding of purpose, due to participation in design and 
implementation phases respectively. 
One sample test results, showing t-statistic to determine if there are significant 
differences between null hypothesis distribution and the group represented by the 
mean of MJnI_UP, are presented below in table 5.79. 
TABLE 5.69 
One-Sample Test (between calculated M_InI_UP and the 'no impact' value) 
MJnl_UP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
12.732 
Df 
149 
Sig.(2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
.56167 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
.4745 
Upper 
.6488 
The test results are significant since the p value is less than significance level .05. The 
above test supports the hypothesis that managers' involvement in the implementation 
process has a positive impact on their understanding about the purpose of STVPP. 
The null hypothesis is thus rejected. The mean score of managers' perception about 
the hypothesis is 3.5617. It may be inferred that managers quite agree with this view, 
while at the same time it deserves mention that this level of agreement is by no means 
an indicator of their unanimous view. This suggests that more needs to be done apart 
from involvement in implementation, to enhance their understanding about the 
purpose of STVPP. Some powerful ways could be active discussions, regular and 
focused business reports that bring out STVPP's role in achieving business objectives, 
establishing employees' line of sight and other measures to reinforce their 
understanding about the articulated purpose statement. 
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5.4b Employee understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan. 
A variable pay plan is like a business model wherein employees contribute to business 
performance and basis the performance results and their contribution to it they get 
rewarded. This seemingly simplistic statement requires lot of detailing and 
groundwork, beginning with business outcomes, the financial ability to pay, 
configuring measure of employee contribution and narrowing down the details to 
calculation of the payout amount. This sub-section is focused on reporting findings 
about how well managers understand the working details of operating a short term 
variable pay plan. In particular, it reports findings about managers' understanding 
about how the variable pay component is structured as a part of their salary, their 
perceived understanding about the working of STVPP, and their understanding about 
the purpose of planting threshold level goal in the plan structure. Additionally relation 
between understanding about working of STVPP and variables like managers' 
involvement in design, and what has been the perceived impact on their performance, 
has been found out, in order to look for valuable or noticeable relationships that add to 
understanding about criticality of managers' understanding of the working part of 
STVPP. These findings are discussed in this section, in the sequence they have been 
mentioned in the foregoing sentence. 
5.4b.I Managers' understanding about variable pay structure, as a component 
of their salary 
The expanse of'working details' of STVPP is much wider than what one would know 
from managers' understanding about how variable pay component is structured as 
part of their salary. It, nevertheless, is a basic requirement for a deeper level of 
understanding of its working details. Using this as one of the basis, extent of 
managers' understanding of STVPP's working has been found out. It is reiterated, that 
this finding is restricted only to how well they understand the structuring of variable 
pay in their salary. For benefit of clear perception, it is repeated that such 
understanding or this aspect of understanding offers only a peek into managers' grasp 
of the working details of STVPP. Related findings are presented in table 5.52 below. 
The assessment is based on their knowledge of variable pay structure, as it applies to 
them. Their level-of-understanding score is presented below, in its weighted form. 
The table also offers opportunity for a cross company comparison to be able to 
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discern if there are perceptible differences between managers' understanding across 
sample organizations. If this be the case, it would clearly pin the blame or the 
accolades on company-specific policies. The relevant findings and analysis are 
provided in table below. 
TABLE 5.70 
Level of managers' understanding about structuring of variable pay component, 
as a part of their salary 
Sample 
organizations 
CI 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
CIO 
Cll 
C12 
C13 
C14 
C15 
Overall Average 
Mean 
4.7 
4.6 
4.4 
3.9 
4.4 
3.3 
3.8 
4.5 
3.6 
4 
4.1 
4.3 
4.2 
4.6 
4.5 
4.2 
Standard 
deviation 
0.64 
0.49 
0.49 
0.84 
0.66 
1.19 
1.02 
0.5 
1.02 
0.77 
0.7 
0.78 
0.87 
0.66 
0.5 
0.87 
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In 33% of sample organizations, tiieir respective standard deviation scores are 
liigher than tiie overall S D of the sample set. This shows that in 1 of every three 
organisations, managers' understanding level varies widely from the average-
manager-understanding at their respective organizations. The extent of spread is 
higher than the overall standard deviation of the sample set. In other words 1 of 
every 3 organisations show wider variation among their manager population, which 
is higher than the variation among entire set of manager population, when put 
together. 53% of sample organizations have an average score of +4.2, indicating 
that the mean understanding score at these organizations is higher than the overall 
mean understanding level among managers. This may be because it concerns their 
salary and this aspect is very clearly discussed during recruitment and also at the 
time of post-joining discussions. This shows when something is vividly 
communicated to managers in a one-to-one manner, the resultant level of 
understanding is likely to be high. 
5.4b.2 Managers' perceived understanding about overall working of 
STVPP - A cross company comparison 
Understanding about the 'working aspect' of STVPP runs much wider in scope than 
a basic understanding about its structure, and that of its placement in the framework 
of one's compensation. Findings about their perceived understanding level about 
overall working of STVPP are presented below in table 5.81. 
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TABLE 5.71 
Managers' perceived understanding about the worldng details of STVPP 
Sample 
Organizations 
C] 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
CIO 
Cll 
C12 
C13 
C14 
C15 
Overall Average 
Mean 
3.4 
3.5 
3.2 
3.8 
2.8 
3.0 
2.8 
3.1 
3.0 
3.9 
4.0 
2.4 
3.9 
3.8 
3.7 
3.4 
Standard 
deviation 
0.97 
0.71 
1.03 
0.92 
0.42 
1.15 
0.92 
0.74 
1.15 
0.74 
0.67 
0.84 
0.57 
0.92 
0.82 
0.93 
The overall average understanding middle managers have about the working of 
variable pay systems is at 3.4. The overall standard deviation is .93, that shows there 
is quite a divergence among the understanding level of managers. Said simply, on an 
average managers' score varies by degree of .93 from 3.4. Thus, there is considerable 
spread among managers' scores, as some may be close to 2.47 (between 'small 
extent' and 'partly'), while others may be at a high of 4.33 (higher than 'large 
extent'). There are 27% organisations in the sample, whose S.D. is even higher than 
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the overall S.D., meaning, in such organisations, managers significantly differ from 
the average score, leaving some with very poor understanding , and some with a high 
score of understanding. That means, extreme cases of very low or very high 
understanding can be found in every 3 out of 10 organisations in the Indian Software 
Industry. 
This points to a weak role organizations' communication systems play in enhancing 
employee understanding. The divergence in levels of understanding may be due to 
discretionary practices adopted by some of the line managers or this could be due to 
managers' own extraordinary interest in the subject that enhanced their understanding. 
The average understanding of middle managers about the structure of variable pay is 
higher than 'to a large extent'. The same is not true for their understanding about its 
working, which is just little higher than a 'partial' level of understanding. Reasons for 
the same are that 'working details' are much broader in scope than just the structure 
of variable pay. Also, the 'structure of variable pay' and 'what percentage it forms is 
as a part of salary' are issues that are talked over and over again and tenaciously 
negotiated over during salary discussions. It would be safe to say with certainty that 
salary structure is clearly communicated to new joinees. The same is not true w.r.t 
working details of STVPP, perhaps due to its much wider scope and the fact that such 
communication would require ample clarity among the designers and a steely 
determination among management members to carry out such communication 
exercise. According to views of Heads of Compensation & Benefits at the sample 
organizations, 86.7% % organisations of the software industry communicate 'working 
details of variable pay systems' to managers. However, its understanding is only 
'partial', on an average. Herein arises the need for organizations to constantly assess 
whether managers are understanding what is communicated to them and that also if 
the organisations' systems are in good health, and whether these are achieving the 
intended effect on managers. 
5.4b.3 Managers' understanding of the purpose of threshold level goal 
Another relevant indicator of understanding-of-working-of-STVPP is the extent of 
understanding managers have about the purpose of threshold level goal. It is reiterated 
that this factor is an indicator of whether understanding about the working of system 
is a healthy one or is it shallow, being restricted to its knowledge at a superficial level. 
298 
How well one understands the purpose of threshold goal, gives indication about one's 
understanding of the system at an elementary level. Even rudimentary understanding 
about its working would expect one to adequately understand the purpose of including 
threshold goal in the scheme of things that govern the payout amount. 
For reasons mentioned above, managers' understanding about the threshold level goal 
has been examined. Its findings are presented below in table 5.82. 
TABLE 5.72 
Managers' understanding about the 'purpose of threshold level goal' 
Sample 
organizations 
CI 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
CIO 
Cil 
C12 
C13 
CM 
C15 
Overall Average 
Mean 
4.5 
4.9 
4.9 
4.9 
5 
4.7 
5 
4.9 
5 
5 
4.9 
5 
4.9 
5 
5 
4.9 
Standard 
deviation 
0.7 
0.32 
0.32 
0.32 
0 
0.48 
0 
0.32 
0 
0 
0.32 
0 
0.32 
0 
0 
0.31 
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The most prominent category of response, one that has occurred with highest 
frequency (in comparison with those tendering other Jcinds of views) reflects the 
section of managers, who have complete understanding about the threshold-purpose 
(modal value being 5). The mean value about understanding-of-threshold is close on 
its heels at a very minor difference of .1, its value being 4.9. The standard deviation of 
.31, which indicates there is very little dispersion of managers' scores form the mean 
score. Thus, most managers' understanding of threshold hovers around 'complete 
understanding' about it. Such a healthy score on account of understanding of 
threshold-purpose, could be attributed to discussions/ explanations on the subject, 
perhaps during the negotiation process, during the goal setting process and finally at 
the time of periodic performance reviews. 
5.4b.4 Understanding of working details of STVPP on three planes - variable 
pay's structuring into ones's compensation, its overall working details and the 
purpose of threshold goal - A relative view 
Middle managers' average level of understanding about the variable pay structure is 
4.2, about its working details - it is 3.4, and about its threshold level - it is 4.9. Were 
they not to understand threshold, this would mean significant loss of money to them 
due to their ignorance. Threshold level achievement opens gateways for the stream of 
variable payout amount. This is the cut-off performance point and only on surpassing 
this point, the handover of payout can commence. This aspect is bound to figure up in 
discussions when salary break-up between fixed and variable components is 
discussed. Also, this is a matter of consideration during goal setting process too. This 
may explain why understanding about it is so high i.e. close to complete. 
Understanding of structure is little less in comparison, but stands at higher than 'to a 
large extent' and indicates a comfortable position. What is disturbing or atleast an 
area in need of attention is the relatively low level of understanding about its working 
details. It stands at 3.4, which is a considerably weak figure in comparison, and calls 
for measures at improving communication about it. Formal means of communication 
as well as informal means, like using casual discussions, or even business meetings 
could be used as mechanisms to reinforce understanding about working, and also to 
offer additional information wherever need is felt. For such education to happen, it 
has to transpire through each nerve of the organization, the importance of driving 
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home the message about how variable pay component spans the journey between 
business targets and actual payout amount in a commercially viable manner. 
5.4b.5 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers ' 
understanding of working details of STVPP on their performance 
5.4b.5a Whether 'understanding about working details of STVPP' has a 
positive impact on 'employee performance', in view of human resources 
personnel. 
Ho4i Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
HA4I : Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has a 
positive impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
Table 5.83 below gives descriptive statistics about variable H_UW_EP, that stands 
for HR personnel's perception about whether the understanding of working about 
STVPP by the managers, would have a positive impact on their performance results. 
TABLE 5.73 
One-Sample Statistics for H_UW_EP 
H_UW_EP 
N 
15 
Mean 
3.7556 
Std. Deviation 
.34427 
Std. Error Mean 
.08889 
HR personnel, on an average, have expressed considerable support for the 
hypothesized impact of 'understanding about working details of STVPP' on 
'employee performance results'. The standard deviation at .3 brings out that there are 
some HR professional who are quite unsure of their stance and at best expressed 
feeble support in such relationship. Also, it points to a section of professionals, who 
have shown full support in the favour of this relationship between UW and EP. 
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With regard to above, a comparison between level of support in case of 
'understanding of purpose' (H_UP_EP = 3.6) and the impact in case of 
'understanding of working details', (H_UW_EP = 3.75) makes it clear that according 
to HR personnel, it is quite likely that understanding about STVPP would contribute 
to better performance of middle managers. There is only a shade higher support for 
'understanding about working details' over 'understanding about purpose', in ternis 
of ability to impact employee performance. The standard deviation for understanding-
of-purpose score is .6, while the figure for understanding-aboiil-working is .3, 
indicating that HR personnel are more divided on the issue of 'performance impact 
due to understanding of purpose' than divergence among them about 'performance 
impact due to understanding of working details'. Simply said, their views are more in 
a//gnment about 'impact of understanding-of-working on performance' than their 
views in relation to 'impact of understanding-of-purpose on performance'. 
Given below in table 5.84 are the t -test result for difference of mean value of 
H_UW_UP and the hypothesized value 3. Its results are presented in the table. 
TABLE 5.74 
One-Sample Test (between calculated HUWEP and the 'no impact' value) 
H_UW_EP 
Test Value = 3 
t 
8.5 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-taiied) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
.75556 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.5649 
Upper 
.9462 
The above test results disprove the null hypothesis and instead support the alternative 
hypothesis, that if managers' understand the working details about STVPP , then it 
would have a positive impact on mangers' performance results. The finding is in 
reference to the perception of the Human Resource personnel. The results are 
statistically significant since the p value (at .000) is less than the significance value of 
.05. 
5.4b.5b Whether 'understanding about working details of STVPP' has a 
positive impact on 'employee performance', in view of finance personnel. 
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Ho42 : Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
HA42: Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has a 
positive impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Finance 
personnel. 
Table 5.85 below provides descriptive statistics about the variable F_UW_EP, which 
represents finance' personnel perception about whether managers' understanding 
about the working details of STVPP has a positive impact on their performance 
results. 
TABLE 5.75 
One-Sampie Statistics for F_UW_EP 
F_UW_EP 
N 
15 
Mean 
3.9111 
Std. Deviation 
.52654 
Std. Error Mean 
.13595 
The group of finance personnel, have supported the supposition that an understanding 
about the working of STVPP, would have a positive impact on managers' 
performance. The S.D. value of .5 indicates that there are some finance personnel who 
only half-heartedly agree to the conceived relationship, and there are others who 
forcefully support the stated relationship. In nut shell, finance personnel perceive that 
if mangers gather an understanding about the working of STVPP, it would have a 
positive impact on their performance result. The findings could be used gainfully, as 
managers' current level of understanding about working-of-STVPP is 'partial' (mean 
value 3.4, for details see table 5.53), and either the compensation designers or the 
department level functionaries could take steps to work on managers' grasp over the 
working aspect of STVPP. 
Table 5.86 gives result of the one-sample t-test, that compares the mean value of 
F_UW_EP with the hypothesized value 3. Related results and analysis are presented 
below: 
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TABLE 5.76 
One-Sample Test (between calculated F_UW_EP and the 'no impact' value) 
F_UW_EP 
Test Value = 3 
T 
6.702 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
Mean Difference 
.91111 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.6195 
Upper 
.2027 
The significance value of .05, being greater than the probability found out (of .000) 
leads us to conclude that the results found above clearly reject the null hypothesis, and 
at the same time, there is failure to reject the alternative hypothesis. This leads us to 
conclude that according to perception tendered by finance personnel, they hold a 
belief that given managers' understanding about the working details of STVPP, it 
would be instrumental in enhancing their performance results. 
5.4b.5c Whether 'understanding about working details of STVPP' has a 
positive impact on 'employee performance', in view of managers. 
Ho43 Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' performance, as managers perceive it themselves. 
HA43: Clear understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan has a 
positive impact on managers' performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Table 5.87 below gives descriptive statistics about variable M_UW_EP which 
represents mangers' percepfion about the proposition that their understanding about 
the working details of STVPP would have a positive impact on their performance 
results. 
TABLE 5.77 
One-Sample Statistics for M_UW_EP 
M_UW_EP 
N 
150 
Mean 
4.1480 
Std. Deviation 
.31382 
Std. Error Mean 
.02562 
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It may be inferred from the results obtained, that managers clearly agree that given a 
clear understanding about the working details of STVPP, the resultant impact on their 
performance would be positive. The level of agreement in support of the stated view 
is a little higher than 4 - at 4.180. it is managers' belief that sound understanding 
about the working of STVPP would put managers in a favourable position for 
maximizing their payout amount. 
It is worth mentioning that managers have shown a higher level of agreement about 
contribution of knowledge of purpose to performance results as compared to the 
performance-impact contribution made out of understanding of the working details of 
STVPP. 
The inference is that the managers better endorse the importance of understanding the 
purpose of STVPP, as compared to the importance they given to understanding of 
working details. The difference between the two is marginal but adequate enough for 
indication about managers' viewpoint. This interpretation appeals to one's reason -
since understanding of purpose is likely to lead employees to experience beneficial 
effects on their performance results. 
Perceived understanding about working is considered less important only by a minor 
degree. This difference is only miniscule as understanding about working of STVPP 
helps in understanding about how performance outcomes will be translated into 
payout amount, and is thus of considerable importance in its own right. Its only when 
the perceived importance of the two is contrasted, that the difference between the two 
becomes perceptible and thus noticeable. 
Table 5.88 below gives results of one-sample test, that compares the mean values of 
M_UW_EP and the hypothesized value 3, to determine if significant differences exist 
between the two. 
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TABLE 5.78 
One-Sample Test (between calculated MUWEP and the 'no impact' value) 
M_UW_EP 
Test Value = 3 
t 
39.236 
Df 
149 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.14800 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower 
1.0974 
Upper 
1.1986 
The p value of.OOO being lower than the significance level of .05, clearly shows that 
the two groups belong to different sample distributions. 
Clearly the null hypothesis has been summarily rejected, thus strongly favouring the 
hypothesis that the understanding about working of short term variable pay plan has a 
positive impact on managers' performance. The test results are in reference to 
perception of managers. T he results are statistically significant and also there is 
strong support in its favour from the managers' group. They have shown clear 
agreement on the proposition, and the average spread from the average view is limited 
since S.D. value is rather controlled at a figure of .3. 
5.4b.6 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement 
in the design process of STVPP on their understanding about its 
working details 
5.4b.6a Whether managers' 'involvement-in-design' has a positive impact on 
'managers' understanding about STVPP's working details', in view of the 
human resources personnel. 
H, 0121 
H A121 
Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan 
has a positive impact on managers' understanding about the working 
of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
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Table 5.89 below gives descriptive statistics about the variable H_InD_UW, that 
represents HR personnel's perception about whether managers' involvement in the 
design process of STVPP would have a beneficial impact on their understanding 
about the working details of STVPP. It follows that if the hypothesis finds support 
then it would be a worthwhile effort involving middle managers, since it would have 
ramifications for managers' understanding of working details of the variable pay 
system. 
TABLE 5.79 
One-Sample Statistics for H_InD_UW 
H_lnD_UW 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.2444 
Std. Deviation 
.34427 
Std. Error 
Mean 
.08889 
HR personnel have shown a high degree of confidence in ability of 'involvement-in-
design' as a means for enhancing managers' understanding about its working details 
(of STVPP). The relevant S.D. value is limited at .3, indicating considerable 
commonality among members' views. However this also brings out existence of less 
confident views and also signs of significantly strong support, in its favour. 
Comparable figures in favour of involvement-in-design, leading to outcomes of better 
understanding of purpose, higher satisfaction, stand at 4.4 and 4.3 respectively. 
Juxtaposed here, the mean value of 4.2 for 'impact on understanding-of-working', 
leads us to infer that managers' involvement in design of STVPP is a worthy idea. 
According to HR personnel, there is strong support that, if implemented, it would lead 
to outcomes of better satisfaction and also higher understanding about purpose and 
about working details of STVPP process. 
Given below (table 5.90) are the test results of hypothesis, pertaining to role of 
managers' involvement in design phase of STVPP, in enhancing their level of 
understanding about the working details of STVPP. 
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TABLE 5.80 
One-Sample Test (between calculated H_InD_UW and the 'no impact' value) 
HJnD_UW 
T 
14.000 
Df 
14 
Test Value = 3 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.24444 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
1.0538 
Upper 
1.4351 
T-test results found above support the alternative hypothesis, and reject the null 
hypothesis. The results are statistically significant; additionally the support tendered 
by HR personnel in its favour is considerably positive and quite emphatic in its tone. 
P value at .000, that is lesser than the level of significance at .05, goes to add strength 
to the test results, giving the testimony that such differences in mean are not by 
chance. 
The results lead us to interpret that in view of the HR personnel, if managers are 
involved in the design phase of STVPP, it would be beneficial to them, since their 
understanding about working details of STVPP would be enhanced. 
5.4b.6b Whether managers' 'involvement-in-design' has a positive impact on 
'managers' understanding about STVPP's working details', in view of the 
finance personnel. 
H0122: Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
HAI22: Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan 
has a positive impact on managers' understanding about the working 
of STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel 
Table 5.91 below gives descriptive statistics about variable F_InD_UW, which 
stands for finance personnel view about whether managers' involvement in design 
would lead them to gain a better understanding about the working details of STVPP. 
308 
TABLE 5.81 
One-Sample Statistics for FJnDUW 
FJnD_UW 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.0889 
Std. Deviation 
.52654 
Std. Error Mean 
.13595 
The mean value of F_InD_UW is 4.1 indicating that the finance personnel agree on 
the notion that if managers are involved in the design of STVPP then it would 
positively impact their understanding about its working details. S.D. value of .53 
shows that while some of the finance personnel are little tentative about verbalizing 
its positivity, there are some who have unequivocally offered significant support in 
this direction. The metaphorical peaks and troughs of opinions give food for thought 
to supervisors and compensation planners for further action. The mean value of 4.1 
makes it amply clear that the average view of the 'finance' group strongly supports 
the supposed relation between the two variables (InD and UW). 
Table 5.92 below gives t test results concerning differences between mean values of 
variable F_InD_UW. One of the values is the hypothesized value 3 and another one is 
the actual mean value found out through perception held by Finance personnel on this 
proposition. 
TABLE 5.82 
One-Sample Test (between calculated F_InD_UW and the 'no impact' value) 
F_InD_UW 
T 
8.009 
Test Value = 3 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
.08889 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.7973 
Upper 
1.3805 
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According to the t-test results found in table 5.91 above, the null hypothesis has been 
rejected that there is no impact between the two variables InD and UW in view of 
finance personnel. The alternative hypothesis is not rejected, that professes that 
according to the finance personnel, managers' involvement in the design of STVPP 
process would help them in attaining sound understanding about the working details 
of STVPP. These results are statistically significant (since p < .05), and finance 
personnel have shown clear agreement about this proposition. 
5.4b.6c Whether managers' 'involvement-in-design' has a positive impact on 
'managers' understanding about STVPP's working details', as they 
themselves view it 
Hoi23; Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on their level of understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
HAI23-' Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan 
has a positive impact on their level of understanding about the working 
of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Table 5.93 below gives descriptive stiitistics about variable M_Ind_UW, which 
stands for managers' own view about the hypothesis whether their involvement in 
design of STVPP would lead them to attain better understanding about working 
details of STVPP. 
TABLE 5.83 
One-Sample Statistics for M_InD_UW 
/^I_Ind_UW 
N 
150 
Mean 
4.1080 
Std. Deviation 
.43574 
Std. Error Mean 
.03558 
Managers have shown clear agreement in favour of this view as their mean score on 
this account is 4.108. Managers believe that if they are involved in the decisions 
related to the design process, then it would positively affect their understanding about 
the working part of STVPP. Since the design and the implementation processes of 
STVPP are closely intertwined, design processes are often crafted in view of their 
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subsequent execution. For this reason, it is easy to comprehend why an individual 
involved in the design process is likely to gather a good understanding about its 
working processes. 
Table 5.94 below provides t -test results about whether difference between the mean 
of managers' view is significantly different from the null hypothesis. 
TABLE 5.84 
One-Sample Test (between calculated M l n D U W and the 'no impact' value) 
MJnd_UW 
Test Value = 3 
T 
31.43 
Df 
149 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.10800 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
1.0377 
Upper 
1.1783 
The results support the hypothesis that managers' involvement in the design process 
of STVPP has a positive impact on their understanding about the working of STVPP. 
The null hypothesis is thus rejected. The test results are significant since the p value is 
less than the significance value .05. Also, managers have tendered unequivocal 
support to this view, since the mean value is 4.1; also there aren't significant 
variations among the managers' group from the mean view, since S.D. is limited to 
the point of .44. 
5.4b.7 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement 
in the implementation process of STVPP on their understanding 
about its working details 
f!.4b.7a Whether managers' 'involvement-in-implementation' has a positive 
impact on 'managers' understanding about STVPF's working details', in view of 
human resources personnel. 
Ho!3i : Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the M'orking of 
STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
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HAI31 : Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay 
plan has a positive impact on managers' understanding about the 
working of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Table 5.95 below gives descriptive statistics about the variable H_lnI_UW, that 
stands for HR personnel's views about whether involvement of managers in the 
Implementation phase leads to a sound understanding about working details of 
STVPP. 
TABLE 5.85 
One-Sample Statistics for H_InI_UW 
H_InI_UW 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.4444 
Std. Deviation 
.37090 
Std. Error Mean 
.09577 
HR personnel have displayed considerably high level of agreement, over the view that 
managers' involvement in implementation of STVPP would enable them a better 
understanding about the working details of STVPP. The mean value of H_lnI_UW is 
4,4, indicating the group's firm conviction about the linkage between the two 
variables (Inl and UW). Its S.D. of .4 brings highlights presence of palpable variation 
among views of the group. There are some who have expressed clear support for the 
conceived relationship, and there are others who have offered plain agreement, 
without adding to it measure of extra strength. 
The comparable figure for the effect it has on understanding-about-purpose stands at 
3.95, while that of impact on understanding about the working-details stands at 4.4, 
showing a strong role of the implementation stage, in leading mangers to understand 
the operational details of STVPP system. 
Another useful perspective is to check the difference between perceived impact on 
'understanding-about-working', owing to involvement in design and implementation 
phases respectively. The comparable figures for these two situations are an average of 
4.2 and 4.4 respectively. Evidently, the impact on 'understanding about working' is 
slightly higher during implementation phase than the level of understanding gained 
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from involvement in the design phase. However the difference between the impact of 
the two stages is marginal and does not amount to any substantive gap, that would 
allow us to come out with a meaningful inference. 
Table 5.96 below gives results of the t - tested carried out to test significance of 
differences between mean value of H_Inl_UW and the hypothesized value of 3 (that 
is a 'no impact' posture). 
TABLE 5.86 
One-Sample Test (between calculated HInlUW and the 'no impact' value) 
HJnI_UW 
Test Value = 3 
T 
15.083 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.44444 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
1.2390 
Upper 
1.6498 
T-test results shown above in table 5.96 support the alternative hypothesis, and reject 
the null hypothesis. The results are statistically significant, which lead to the inference 
that according to the HR personnel, managers' involvement in the implementation 
phase of STVPP, earns them the benefit of better understanding about its working 
details. The mean HR view on this account is of significant agreement about the 
proposed view, with some variance among group members' views (S.D. value .4) 
5.4b.7b Whether managers' 'involvement-in-implementation' has a positive 
impact on 'managers' understanding about STVPP's working details', in view of 
finance personnel. 
H 0132: 
H, A132 : 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay 
plan has a positive impact on managers' understanding about the 
working of STVPP, as perceived by finance personnel. 
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Table 5.97 below gives descriptive statistics about variable F_InI_UW. This variable 
represents the view that managers' involvement in the implementation phase of 
STVPP would help them to gain a sound understanding about the working details of 
STVPP, in view of the Finance personnel. 
TABLE 5.87 
One-Sample Statistics for FJnlUW 
FJnI_UW 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.2667 
Std. Deviation 
.55205 
Std. Error Mean 
.14254 
The financial personnel have shown considerably strong support favouring the 
proposition that managers' involvement in implementation of STVPP would increase 
their understanding about its working details. The S.D. of the same is .6 indicating 
presence of sample elements with considerably less belief in the proposition, and also 
it points towards those showing considerable support in favour of the said 
relationship. 
In the same context, the value of variable F_InD_UW is 4.1, which brings out slightly 
lesser support for impact of involvement-in-design compared to the impact 
involvement-in-implementation (4.3) has, on understanding of working of STVPP. 
The respective S.D. of F_InD_UW and F_InI_UW are .5 and .6, both of which are 
comparable, expressing similar variation pattern among the sample population being 
studied. 
Table 5.98 below, gives results of one-sample t test about differences between the 
hypothesized mean(which is the null hypothesis ) and the mean value of the variable 
F Inl UW. 
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TABLE 5.88 
One-Sample Test (between calculated F Inl UW and the 'no impact' value) 
F_InI_UW 
Test Value = 3 
T 
8.886 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
Mean Difference 
1.26667 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
.9610 
Upper 
1.5724 
The test results support the alternative hypothesis that if managers are involved in the 
implementation of STVPP, then it would positively affect their understanding about 
its working details. The test results are in reference to views of finance personnel. The 
results are statistically significant, which leads us to affirm the result that if managers 
are involved in the implementation phase of STVPP, then they would be better 
positioned to understand the working details of STVPP. Such are the views of finance 
personnel at the sample organizations of Indian software industry. 
5.4b.7c Whether managers' Mnvolvement-in-implementation' has a positive 
impact on 'managers' understanding about STVPF's working details', in view of 
managers. 
Hoi33 : Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the working of 
STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
HA 133 ; Managers' involvement in implementation of short term variable pay 
plan has a positive impact on managers' understanding about the 
working of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Table 5.99 below gives descriptive statistics about the variable M_InI_UW. This 
variables represents managers' own perception that if they are involved in the 
Implementation phase of STVPP, then it would positively impact their understanding 
about the working details of STVPP. 
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TABLE 5.89 
One-Sample Statistics for MInlUW 
M_InI_UW 
N 
150 
Mean 
3.9947 
Std. Deviation 
.33334 
Std. Error Mean 
.02722 
The mean score that represents managers' level of agreement is 3.9947, which is 
almost 4 indicating considerable agreement among managers. It indicates that on an 
average managers agree with the point of view that if they are involved in the 
implementation of the STVPP process, then it would positively affect their level of 
understanding about its working or the operational details. It may be inferred there is 
a clear verdict in favour of the stated hypothesis. 
If a comparison is made between the impact of 'involvement-in-design' and the 
impact of 'involvement-in-implementation' on managers' level-of-understanding 
about working of STVPP, then basis this, it may be inferred that the design stage 
exerts a shade higher effect than the implementation stage. However, the difference 
between their potential-to-impact understanding-level is marginal. Design and 
implementation phases both provide significant insight about working of STVPP, and 
perhaps it is due to their interrelatedness, that the difference between level of support 
for each of these is minimal. It is beneficial to reiterate that the difference between the 
two is merely indicative of their relative importance, and is by no means the arbiter 
for establishing supremacy of any one phase over the other. 
Table 5.100 below gives t -test results about differences between two sets of means -
one is the hypothesized value (ie the null hypothesis) and the other o ne is the mean 
value of the variable M_InI UW ,that has been found out. 
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TABLE 5.90 
One-Sample Test (between calculated M_InI_UW and the 'no impact' value) 
M_lnI_UW 
Test Value = 3 
T 
36.546 
Df 
149 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
.99467 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.9409 
Upper 
1.0484 
The test findings support the hypothesis that managers' involvement in the 
implementation process of STVPP has a positive impact on their understanding about 
the working of STVPP; the same is based on the perception of managers. The null 
hypothesis is thus rejected. These results are statistically significant since the p value 
at .000 is lesser than the significance value of .05. The results above lead to the 
interpretation that if managers are involved in the implementation phse of STVPP, it 
would be helpful to them in gaining a better and healthier understanding about the 
working details of STVPP. The results are claimed in context of perception of 
managers about the subject. 
Section 5 
5.5 Managers' satisfaction with short term variable pay 
plan. 
This section focuses on findings related to mangers' satisfaction level with use of 
STVPP. Mainly, their satisfaction has been interpreted on the basis of three kinds of 
indicators that provide useful cues about managers' satisfaction level. These include -
'extent of control over performance parameters' (that determine the payout amount), 
Achievability of threshold level goal, and perceived impact of STVPP on 
performance. Also, certain relationships have been examined, in order to ascertain the 
presence of any discernible pattern, that potentially leads us to a credible finding / 
revelation. 
5.5.1 Managers' 'extent of control' over performance parameters of variable pay 
The table below, reports findings about 'extent of control' managers have over the 
performance parameters that constitute their variable pay structure. The aspect of 
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'degree of influencability' impinges on managers' satisfaction level, with use of 
STVPP. IT is cautioned that while it is not a conclusive basis to determine satisfaction 
level, it s a contributory factor and it affects the extent of satisfaction among 
managers. Related findings and its analysis are briefed below -
TABLE 5.91 
Managers' 'extent of control' over performance parameters of variable payout 
amount 
Sample 
organizations 
CI 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
CIO 
CI I 
C12 
C13 
C14 
CIS 
Overall Avg. 
Mean 
3.2 
3.0 
2.4 
2.6 
2.6 
3.1 
2.5 
2.7 
2.4 
3.5 
2.2 
3.1 
2.4 
2.7 
3.0 
2.76 
Standard Deviation 
0.79 
0.47 
0.52 
0.7 
0.7 
0.57 
0.71 
0.48 
0.7 
0.97 
0.63 
0.74 
0.52 
0.48 
0.47 
0.71 
The average level of control experienced by managers is at the point 2.76, which 
indicates less than 'partial' degree of control. This is not a favourable position, where 
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managers would normally prefer to be placed. Human nature is to want to exert near-
complete control over factors that determine their fate, in an organisation scenario, 
that are governed by its culture, work practices, systems and processes established, it 
is not so much a matter of whether one has internal or external locus of control, as it is 
the reality of the organsiation culture that dictates how much control managers can 
possibly exert over their performance parameters. Using the data shown in the table 
5.57 above, it is clear, that most managers experience only partial control over their 
performance parameters. Mean value at 2.76 indicates, that put together the average 
view is on a further downside compared to the modal value. The standard deviation is 
considerable, at .71, indicating that there is a worthy difference among managers with 
regard to the level of control they have exert over their respective performance 
parameters. At 60% of sample organizations, the average degree of control is lesser 
than the overall average (which is lower than point of'partial' control). This is an area 
of concern that is bound to negatively affect managers' perception towards the 
variable pay system. 
5.5.1a Correlation between extent of control managers have over the 
performance parameters of their variable pay and their level of satisfaction with 
STVPP. 
An evaluation was made of the relationship between 'managers' level of satisfaction 
with STVPP' and 'the extent of control they have over the performance parameters of 
their variable pay'. 
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TABLE 5.92 
Pearson' correlation between 'managers' control over performance parameters' 
and their 'level of satisfaction with STVPP'. 
M_DC 
M_LS 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
MDC 
1 
150 
.172* 
.035 
150 
M_LS 
.172* 
.035 
150 
1 
150 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The first row contains the Pearson's (r) value. The second row contains the two-tailed 
probability. The third row shows the number of pairs of observations on which each r 
value is computed. 
Results - An analysis using Pearson's correlation coefficient indicates a statistically 
significant linear relationship between "managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP'' 
and "the extent of control they have over the performance parameters of their variable 
pay" r(148) = .172. The significance is less than 0.05 (.035), thus this is a statistically 
significant correlation. Thus, p (two-tailed) being lesser than .05, we retain the 
alternate hypothesis and conclude that the variables are related. 
The direcfion is easily seen by the sign of the r value. The above is a case of positive 
correlation indicating that high scores on 'mangers' degree of control over 
performance parameters of their variable pay' are associated with high scores on 
'level of managers' satisfaction with STVPP'. However, since r2 is about 0.0295, it is 
safe to interpret that there exists reasonable degree of association between the two 
variables, and that the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero ( p < 
0.05). Also, we can say that 2.3% of the variability in 'managers' level of satisfaction 
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with STVPP" can be explained by differences in 'degree of control over performance 
parameters of their variable pay'. 
It is concluded that the above test is significant. 
P.E. = 0.6745* 1 - r ^ / V N 
= 0.6745 * (1 - (.036 * .036)) / VfsO 
= .055 
The absolute value of Pearson's correlation coefficient r = .036 is less than 6 times the 
probable error (ie .33). This once again proves that the correlation coefficient is 
insignificant. Thus, the test findings fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
correlation between managers' degree of control over the performance parameters of 
their variable pay and the perceived impact of STVPP on their performance. The 
alternative hypothesis is thus rejected. 
This means that 'degree of control over performance parameters' is only one of the 
factors leading to satisfaction with STVPP. Apparently, satisfaction, more 
importantly, depends on factors like level of involvement, level of understanding, and 
the ultimate barometer being the amount of variable payout. Process issues like 
whether adequate explanations are tendered in support of payout calculation, how 
much education about business is imparted, how much training about STVPP is given, 
would also play a role in determining satisfaction with STVPP. Thus the null 
hypothesis stated above has been rejected and the alternative hypothesis stands 
accepted. 
Another interpretation of the above relation is that there could be a scenario that a 
manager has high levels of satisfaction with STVPP, but the degree of control over 
performance parameters is low. This scenario is possible when a manager's payout 
depends on the collective output of the vertical, division or the organization, which 
would lead to low degree of control. Satisfaction, in its own right, could rank high, if 
communication systems and involvement mechanisms are strong and the payout 
amount is handsome. In other words, all the factors (mentioned above) that go into 
satisfaction with STVPP may be high and yet it is possible that degree of control over 
performance parameters is low. 
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In other words, the above test establishes the limited role 'control over performance 
parameters' plays in determining mangers' level of satisfaction with STVPP. This 
also means, that if STVPP is to be sustained for long period use, other factors of 
satisfaction (in relation to STVPP) deserve equal amount of attention by the 
management. 
5.5.2 Managers' perception about degree of achievability of the threshold level 
goal 
Another aspect that is a potential mirror (or an indicator) of satisfaction with variable 
pay systems is the degree to which the threshold level goal is achievable. This level of 
goal, if pegged too high, causes undue anxiety due to doubts, it is bound to cast, about 
its achievability. This is one more point, a useful one, for drawing inferences about 
managers' level of satisfaction towards STVPP. Threshold level can be analogized to 
a lock that must be opened before accessing the treasure that lies inside. In the same 
manner, the threshold goal must necessarily be surpassed for payout stream to be 
activated to life. The researcher observed during her discussions with managers and 
also with HR personnel, that among many rules that organisations routinely bend and 
meddle with, the ones concerning threshold level are few of the most robust ones that 
must necessarily be obeyed and followed without any tampering. Basis this candid 
disclosure, it wouldn't be wrong to say that if threshold is set at a level too high to be 
achievable, then managers would naturally begin to harbor ill-will against the 
organization, and before long they will launch a revolt against the very institution of 
STVPP. From views of all respondents, it was evident that managers are fiercely 
cautious of their total claim over their payout amount, and hence, any bottleneck that 
they face in acquiring this amount, is bound to trigger in them feelings of resentment, 
hatred and acrimony towards its source.. 
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TABLE 5.93 
Managers' perception about extent of achievability of threshold level goal 
Sample 
Organizations 
CI 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
CIO 
Cll 
C12 
C13 
C14 
C15 
Overall Avg. 
Mean 
3.4 
3.5 
3.2 
3.8 
2.8 
3.0 
2.8 
3.1 
3.0 
3.9 
4.0 
2.4 
3.9 
3.8 
3.7 
3.4 
Standard 
deviation 
0.97 
0.71 
i.O 
0.92 
0.42 
1.15 
0.92 
0.74 
1.15 
0.74 
0.67 
0.84 
0.57 
0.92 
0.82 
0.95 
The average perception of this group, stands at a value of 3.4, indicating a tilt upwards 
from partial achievability of threshold. The overall standard deviation is .95 which 
indicates presence of cases that perceive threshold achievability to be lower, and also 
points to presence of cases perceiving its achievability to be higher. A reason for a 
rather subdued or conservative posture could be explained by the inclusion of 
company-level or business-unit-level performance parameter in variable pay structure, 
with which they have limited line-of-sight and thus little idea about its threshold 
achievability. A purposive step towards working on line-of-sight issue could rectify 
the situation, and would render the system the flavor of fairness as managers would 
then be relate their goals to the organisation's goals. 
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5.5.3 Correlation between managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP and the 
perceived impact of STVPP on their performance. 
An evaluation was made of the relationship between 'level of managers' satisfaction with 
STVPP' and the 'perceived impact of STVPP on their performance'. 
Hoi4 Managers' perceived impact of STVPP on their performance has no correlation 
with managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
HAH : Managers' perceived impact of STVPP on their performance has a positive 
correlation with managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
TABLE 5.94 
Pearson' correlation between 'managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP' and 
'perceived impact of STVPP' on their performance. 
M_LS 
M_IEP 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
M_LS 
1 
150 
.042 
.613 
150 
MJEP 
.042 
.613 
150 
1 
150 
The first row contains the Pearson's (r) value. The second row contains the two-tailed 
probability. The third row shows the number of pairs of observations on which each r 
value is computed. 
Results - An analysis using Pearson's correlation coefficient indicates a statistically 
insignificant linear relationship between 'level of managers' satisfaction with STVPP' 
and the 'perceived impact of STVPP on their performance' r(148) = 0.042. The 
significance is greater than 0.05 (.613), thus this is not a statistically significant 
correlation. Thus, p (two-tailed) being greater than .05, we retain Ho and conclude that 
the variables are unrelated. 
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The direction is easily seen by the sign of the r value. The above is a case of positive 
correlation indicating that high scores about 'mangers' level of satisfaction with 
STVPP' are associated with high scores for 'perceived impact of STVPP on their 
performance'. However, since r^  is about 0.0012, it is interpreted that the strength of 
association between these two variables is very weak, and that the correlation 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero ( p > 0.05). Also, we can say that 
0.12% of the variability in 'perceived impact on managers' performance' can be 
explained by the differences in their 'satisfaction level with STVPP'. It is concluded 
that the above test is non-significant. 
P.E. = 0.6745 *( l - r2) /^ /N 
= 0.6745 * (1 -(.042 * .042))/ Vl50 
= .122 
The absolute value of Pearson's correlation coefficient r - .042 is less than 6 times the 
probable error (ie .732). This once again proves that the correlation coefficient is 
insignificant. Thus, the test findings fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
correlation between 'managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP' and 'the perceived 
impact of STVPP on their performance'. The alternative hypothesis is thus rejected. 
In terms of understanding the above relationship conceptually, it is readily apparent 
that the perceived impact of STVPP on managers' performance is not accompanied by 
a similar upward movement of 'managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP'. Simply 
put, the two variables do not go hand in hand. This suggests that other variables like 
payout amount, nature of performance feedback, perceived equity in distribution of 
payout, perceived understanding about the relation between payout and performance, 
and similar other factors may be exerting their influence on 'managers' level of 
satisfaction with STVPP'. These are just possibilities and need to be tested rigorously 
for making any conclusive statements about these. 
A deeper analysis would lead one to infer, that basis managers' perception, the 
'impact of STVPP on their performance results' has imperceptible relation with 'their 
level of satisfaction with STVPP'. The statement holds considerable relevance, when 
viewed in light of the views offered by managers about the same. Many managers 
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stated explicitly that STVPP inspires performance results by means of putting 
pressure on them, and that it had little or no effect on their motivation level. Most 
agreed that STVPP inspired fear in them, put pressure on them to achieve the target, 
kept them alert all the time and sort o/kept them on their toes all the time. In other 
words, they perceive it more as a symbol of fear, than as a medium of motivation for 
bringing out better results. Managers' reasoned that if payout amount was lesser than 
the target payout, it causes loss of pride and self-esteem. Monetarily, payout cut is not 
so much a cause of concern, as compared to Moss of face' it causes due to 
'recognition-value' that it has come to symbolize. Thus, those falling short on payout 
amount, are more likely to experience lack of appreciation than a feeling of loss for 
lesser money handed to them. 
It is important to have a glimpse of psychology of managers to understand the relation 
between the two variables. Managers feel that the variable pay portion of their CTC is 
a rightful-due and should thus be reclaimed. This is analogous to a child's insistence 
for taking back the candies and toys that originally belonged to him. Quite similar is 
the reaction of managers, evident in their perpetual response when asked about its 
motivational value, that "There Is no motivation. This is my money and hence I must 
have it back". 
This establishes that managers, in their perception, consider variable pay as a 
guaranteed part of their pay, and therefore disregard it as an add-on element of pay. 
For this reason, managers strive to redeem their variable payout amount by working 
hard to attain it. This aspect came out loud and clear based on discussions held with 
managers during course of interviews. 
5.5.4 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement 
in design process of STVPP on their level of satisfaction with STVPP 
5.5.4a Whether managers' involvement in design has a positive impact on their 
level of satisfaction with STVPP, in perception of human resources personnel. 
Ho5i: Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
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HA51; Managers' involvement in tiie design of short term variable pay plan lias a 
positive impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
Table 5.105 below gives the descriptive statistics for the variable H_InD_ES , that 
represents the view that managers' involvement in design of STVPP would help in 
reaping benefits of better satisfaction level for the managers. The view is tendered in 
perception of the human resource personnel. 
TABLE 5.95 
One-Sample Statistics for H_InD_ES 
H_InD_ES 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.2889 
Std. Deviation 
.35337 
Std. Error Mean 
.09124 
The average view among the HR personnel is that of considerably high agreement 
that managers' involvement in design would contribute to higher levels of satisfaction 
with STVPP. They have offered significant support to the view, with little standard 
deviation (that of .35) indicating considerable convergence among the opinions 
expressed. 
It is interesting to contrast the HR personnel's popular/average view (about 
involvement in design and resultant impact of satisfaction) with what according to 
them are the potential benefits to be gained from intensifying managers' involvement 
in the design process of STVPP. 2/3'^ '' HR personnel believe that such enhanced level 
of managers' involvement would reap benefits like "no teething problems in STVPP-
use", "feeling of ownership" and "alignment with business goals" (Table 5.7). 
As per the HR respondents, managers' are presently involved only to a small extent, 
in the design process, that too, the compass of involvement is limited to only 20% of 
manager population (see table 5.2). It is possible that such pitiable level of manager 
involvement, may be part of the reason, that HR personnel have considered the idea of 
higher involvement in design process as admirable, which, according to them, would 
help managers in gaining higher levels of satisfaction with STVPP-use. 
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Table 5.106 below gives results of one-sample t-test to compare the mean values of 
null hypothesis group and that of variable H_InD_ES. 
TABLE 5.96 
One-Sample Test (between calculated HInDES and the 'no impact' value) 
HJnD_ES 
t 
14.127 
Df 
14 
Test Value = 3 
Sig. (2-taiied) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.28889 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
1.0932 
Upper 
1.4846 
The test results are significant as the p value is lesser than .05, which is the 
determined significance level. Thus, null hypothesis stands rejected and there is 
failure to reject the alternative hypothesis. The results are statistically significant and 
also there is high level of agreement among the HR personnel about the perceived 
impact of mangers' InD on ES (M = 4.3, S.D. = 0.4). It follows from the test results 
that HR personnel can work towards increasing managers' level of satisfaction (with 
STVPP) by putting in systems and procedures to involve them increasingly and even 
deeper, inn the design process of STVPP. 
5.5.4b Whether managers' involvement in design has a positive impact on their 
level of satisfaction with STVPP, in perception of finance personnel. 
Ho52 : Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
HA52: Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan has a 
positive impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Table 5.107 below gives the descriptive statistics for the variable F_InD_ES , that 
represents the view that managers' involvement in design of STVPP would help in 
reaping benefits of better satisfaction level for the managers. The view is tendered in 
perception of the finance personnel. 
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TABLE 5.97 
One-Sample Statistics for F_InD_ES 
F_lnD_ES 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.0667 
Std. Deviation 
.36078 
Std. Error Mean 
.09315 
The finance personnel have shown clear agreement in support of the view that should 
managers be involved in the design of the STVPP, it would have a positive impact on 
their satisfaction with STVPP-flinctioning. S.D. of .36 indicates that most a section of 
finance personnel offer only half-hearted agreement to this viewpoint, and it also 
points to expression of considerably strong support in favour of this relationship. 
It is possible that such perception held by finance is based on a surmise that 
involvement-measure may come in handy to erode some bitterness that managers 
inevitably feel towards the STVPP system. Also, while finance may not be directly in 
the role of an employee-guardian, it, by the virtue of its enormous hold on STVPP, 
and the fact that it has special ability to keep close tabs on STVPP performance (due 
to ability to monitor and actually feel the movement of numbers in company budget, 
its ability to correlate such movements with STVPP related outflow, and its power to 
apply pressure points on budget through STVPP control) acquires a special ability to 
have a feel of how employees perceive the compensation system and how they 
implicitly judge it against parameters of (mainly) equity and economic value. 
Table 5.108 below gives results of one-sample t-test to compare the mean values of 
null hypothesis group and that of variable F_InD_ES. 
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TABLE 5.98 
One-Sample Test (between calculated F_InD_ES and the 'no impact' value) 
F_lnD_ES 
Test Value = 3 
T 
11.451 
df 
14 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.06667 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.8669 
Upper 
1.2665 
P value at .000 being lesser than the significance value of .05 leads to the 
interpretation that the test results are of significance and these give a clear signal that 
the two means are indeed different. The null hypothesis is thus rejected, in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis. The results therefore stand to mean that the finance 
personnel believe that managers' involvement in design of STVPP would help 
increase their satisfaction with STVPP. Results are statistically significant, which is 
also borne out by high level of agreement (about the view) found among the Finance 
personnel, 
5.5.4c Whether managers' involvement in design has a positive impact on their 
level of satisfaction with STVPP, in perception of managers. 
Ho53: Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan has no 
impact on managers' satisfaction, as they themselves perceive it. 
HA53 : Managers' involvement in the design of short term variable pay plan has a 
positive impact on managers' satisfaction, as they themselves perceive it. 
Table 5.109 below gives the descriptive statistics for the variable M_InD_ES , that 
represents the view that managers' involvement in design of STVPP would help in 
reaping benefits of better satisfaction level for the managers. The view is tendered in 
perception of managers, themselves. 
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TABLE 5.99 
One-Sample Statistics for M_InD_ES 
MJnD_ES 
N 
150 
Mean 
3.9867 
Std. Deviation 
.36170 
Std. Error Mean 
.02953 
The mean score of managers perception on this account is 3.9867 which is close to 4. 
Evidently, managers have a strong desire to participate in the design process and 
provide inputs about STVPP development. Apparently, managers perceive themselves 
able to provide worthy suggestions, and thus their reasons for making positive 
deductions about resultant satisfaction level. 
Table 5.110 gives results of one-sample t test, conducted to look for differences of 
significance between the mean value of variable M_InD_ES and its hypothesized 
value of 3. 
TABLE 5.100 
One-Sample Test(between calculated MInDES and the 'no impact' value) 
M_InD_ES 
Test Value 
t 
33.409 
= 3 
Df 
149 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
.98667 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.9283 
Upper 
1.0450 
The test results provide clear support in favour of the alternative hypothesis, and 
reject the null hypothesis. Results show that managers agree that their involvement in 
design of STVPP would have a positive impact on their level of satisfaction with 
STVPP. 
Results are statistically significant since p value is lesser than significance value of 
.05. The average view among the managers' group on this account is of agreement 
about the proposition. This shows there is a ready acceptability among the managers' 
group towards initiative of their involvement in the design phase of STVPP. 
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5.5.5 Hypotheses about perceived impact of managers' involvement 
in implementation process of STVPP on their level of satisfaction 
with STVPP 
5.5.5a Whether managers' involvement in implementation has a positive impact on 
their level of satisfaction with STVPP, in perception of human resource personnel. 
Ho6!: Managers' involvement in the implementation of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
HA61; Managers' involvement in the implementation of short term variable pay plan 
has a positive impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Human 
Resource personnel. 
Table 5.111 below gives descriptive statistics about the variable H_lnl_ES. The 
variable represents HR personnel's perception about whether managers' involvement 
in implementation phase of STVPP would result in better count of their satisfaction 
with STVPP. 
TABLE 5.101 
One-Sample Statistics for H_InI_ES 
H_lnI_ES 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.0000 
Std. Deviation 
.65465 
Std. Error Mean 
.16903 
HR personnel have expressed clear agreement favouring the view that managers' 
involvement in the implementation stage of STVPP, would help them with higher 
levels of satisfaction with STVPP. The S.D. about this variable is .65, indicating 
considerable dispersion among the views of the sample population being studied. 
Evidently, there are a section of HR personnel who have shown tentative belief in 
ability of such involvement for increasing managers' satisfaction. Ail the same, there 
are some HR personnel, who consider such involvement to be vitally important, and 
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they quite strongly agree that such involvement could increase managers' satisfaction 
level. 
Such involvement of managers has found stronger support from HR personnel, when 
it concerns the design phase, compared to when it is about the involvement phase. The 
respective mean scores for the two variables are 4.25 and 4 respectively (the variables 
are H_InD_ES and H_InI_ES). Another relevant difference is concerning the level of 
S.D., that stands at .35 and .6 respectively. Evidently, there is less disparity or 
variance in views concerning the design stage as compared to implementation stage 
for which there are larger gaps or spread among HR personnel's views. 
Thus, HR personnel have shown higher favour towards involving mangers in the 
design stage than level of support for their involvement in the implementation phase. 
A possible reason for overwhelming support favouring managers'-involvement-in-
design-and-implementation, in eyes of its key designer - the HR, may be due to 
virtually non-existent levels of managers' involvement in the STVPP process. For 
purpose of elaboration, it is reiterated that managers' involvement in design is lo a 
small extent (involving 20% managers), and there is no involvement of this section at 
the plan's implementation stage. Fact that managers are currently out of loop of 
involvement of a compensation programme that concerns themi, may have given food 
for thought to the HR personnel to tender a generous opinion favouring such a lofty 
idea, which at present is only a worthwhile ideation , however, not sufficiently good 
enough, to have been rolled into regular practice. 
Table 5.112 gives results about one -sample t test carried out to determine 
differences between the mean value of H_InI_ES and its hypothesized value 3. The 
results of the test are useful for testing the above hypothesis. 
333 
TABLE 5.102 
One-Sample Test (between calculated H_InI_ES and the 'no impact' value) 
H_InI_ES 
Test Value = 3 
T 
5.916 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.00000 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.6375 
Upper 
.3625 
The test results above show significant support for the alternative hypothesis and 
reject the null hypothesis. Results are statistically significant, since the p value (of 
.000) is less than level of significance .05. The results lead to the inference that 
managers' involvement in the implementation phase of STVPP would be a helpful 
step in enhancing their satisfaction with STVPP. This is in view of the HR personnel, 
and hence it would be easier to gamer support to roll in such a mechanism designed to 
gamer managers' initiative for the same. 
5.5.5b Whether managers' involvement in implementation has a positive impact 
on their level of satisfaction with STVPP, in perception of finance personnel. 
Ho62: Managers' involvement in the implementation of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
HA62 : Managers' involvement in the implementation of short term variable pay plan 
has a positive impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance 
personnel. 
Table 5.113 below gives descriptive statistics about the variable FIn lES. The 
variable represents finance personnel's views about whether managers' involvement 
in the implementation phase of STVPP would result in their increased satisfaction 
level with STVPP. 
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TABLE 5.103 
One-Sample Statistics for F_InI_ES 
F_InI_ES 
N 
15 
Mean 
4.0889 
Std. Deviation 
.51125 
Std. Error Mean 
.13200 
The finance personnel clearly agree that if managers are involved in the 
implementation of STVPP then it would have a positive impact on their satisfaction 
level with STVPP. They have shown clear agreement to the supposed relationship 
between the two variables. The S.D. about their views is .5, which shows there is 
noticeable degree of divergence, wherein few finance personnel show weak 
agreement in its support, while there are others who hold considerably strong opinion 
about the perceived impact of involvement-in-implementation on satisfaction-level of 
managers. 
There is no difference between mean values of F_lnD_ES and F_InI_ES scores, as 
both stand at 4.1, indicating complete agreement or clear support that such 
involvement would have positive impact on managers' satisfaction. The respective 
S.D. scores are .4 and .5 indicating noticeable divergence or variance among the 
views of sample population of finance personnel. This shows that managers' 
involvement in either phase, be it design or implementation, there is clear agreement 
as to its positive impact on satisfaction level. Also, in general, there is palpable 
variance among finance personnel, as to the degree of agreement they offer in support 
of the hypothesized relationship. Nature of divergence ranges between those who 
show feeble support and those who show significant support, in favour of the 
viewpoint discussed. 
Table 5.114 below shows results of one-sample t test t ascertain if there are 
significant differences between value of variable F_lnI_ES and its hypothesized 
value 3, that of no impact (which is the null hypothesis). 
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TABLE 5.104 
One sample test (between calculated FIn lES and the 'no impact' value) 
FJnI_ES 
Test Value = 3 
T 
8.249 
Df 
14 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
1.08889 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
.8058 
Upper 
1.3720 
Tests results in table 5.114 above favour the alternative hypothesis that such 
involvement of managers in the implementation phase of STVPP would help in 
enhancing their satisfaction feelings towards STVPP. The null hypothesis asserting no 
impact of involvement, stands rejected. These results are statistically significant since 
the p value is lesser than the significance value of .05. Results show healthy 
agreement among finance personnel about positive impact of managers' involvement 
in implementation phase on their level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
5.5.5c Whether managers' involvement in implementation has a positive impact 
on their level of satisfaction with STVPP, in perception of managers. 
Ho63: Managers' involvement in the implementation of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
HA63: Managers' involvement in the implementation of short term variable pay plan 
has a positive impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by Finance 
personnel. 
Table 5.115 below gives descriptive statistics about the variable M_Inl_ES. The 
variable represents managers' views about whether their involvement in the 
implementation phase of STVPP would result in their increased satisfaction level 
with STVPP. 
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TABLE 5.105 
One-Sample Statistics for M_InI_ES 
M_InI_ES 
N 
150 
Mean 
3.6787 
Std. Deviation 
.65493 
Std. Error Mean 
..05348 
The average score of managers' perception on this account is 3.67867. It can be 
inferred that managers quite agree on the point that their involvement in the 
implementation process would have a positive impact on their satisfaction level with 
STVPP. 
Design and implementation processes of STVPP can very well be seen as the two 
sides of the same coin. It may be perceived that involvement in design is of more 
significance and value (mean score 3.98667) as compared to involvement in 
implementation (mean score 3.67867), in the eyes of managers. What is planned at the 
design stage gets executed at the implementation stage. This is not to diminish the 
value or the vitality of the implementation process, but an effort to put both parts of 
the process in the appropriate perspective, to enable comprehension about how the 
two phases differ in their value. 
Upon closer scrutiny it is apparent that managers have shown higher degree of 
consent as to impact-of-involvement-in-design on satisfaction in comparison to the 
impact that involvement in implementation has on satisfaction. At the same time it is 
also clear that the importance accorded to the two variables differs only marginally, 
which helps to establish the close interdependence between these two phases. In a nut 
shell managers have shown a considerable level of agreement about the perception 
that their involvement in design or implementation processes of STVPP would bear a 
positive impact on their level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
Table 5.116 below gives results of one-sample t-test that helps to know if there are 
real or noticeable or worthwhile differences among the two mean groups. 
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TABLE 5.106 
One-Sample Test (between calculated MInlES and the 'no impact' value) 
MJnI_ES 
Test Value = 3 
T 
12.691 
Df 
149 
Sig. (2-taiied) 
.000 
Mean 
Difference 
.67867 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower 
.5730 
Upper 
.7843 
The test results support the hypothesis that when managers are involved in the 
implementation process of STVPP, then it has a positive impact on their level of 
satisfaction with STVPP. The null hypothesis has been rejected, in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis. The test results are statistically significant. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
The design and implementation aspects of STVPPs have been studied by examining 
as individual aspects, which are the plan features. The tvw phases are tightly 
interlinked and hence, these are clubbed together. There are significant differences 
among the perceptions of the three groups (that of managers, human resource 
personnel and the finance personnel) concerning their perception about the purpose of 
STVPP. Disturbingly, dismal recall is obtained about the objectives of 'achieving 
business objectives' and that of'supporting team culture'. 
Predominantly, 'human resources function' is involved in the STVPP process. 
Managers' involvement is almost negligible. However, both - the human resources' 
group and the managers' group have asserted that it would be a step in the positive 
direction if initiative of employee-involvement is implemented earnestly. 
Design and implementation aspects at individual employee level, and at organisation 
level have been separately presented in different tables. While there are similarities in 
plan aspects across sample organizations, many of them have made the plan unduly 
complex, making a perfect comparison among the plans almost impossible. Plan 
administration patterns are also presented. Not just the pay plan structure, but in 
addition, related processes of employee communication, systems for setting up their 
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line-of-sight, and other aspects like degree of control over performance parameters, 
proposed changes to STVPP etc. have also been studied and analysed. STVPPs are 
projected to managers more like incentive levers, and other perspectives of how these 
can cause ownership feelings , alignment-feelings are not prominently projected. On 
their part, managers too perceive STVPP's 'incentive aspect' as the means for causing 
motivation. Among measures of improvement, managers feel strongly for measures 
like 'making the system manager-friendly', and 'improving transparency of 
communication processes'. 
There are differences among the perception held by human resource personnel, 
finance personnel and managers, w.r.t. perceived impact of STVPP on managers' 
performance. Barring finance group, all other groups perceive the impact to be 
positive. Two year performance data, when compared against the threshold level, 
clearly brings out a palpable stretch of excess - that of considerable overachievement. 
On this account, STVPP has succeeded in more than serving its intended purpose. 
Insignificant (and negative) results are found for correlation between 'managers' 
degree of control over performance parameters' and 'perceived impact of STVPP on 
their performance'. 
Stronger support is found for STVPP's impact on organization performance, 
compared to the extent of support extended for its impact on managers' performance. 
Also, as in the case of managers' performance, considerable overachievement is 
found in case of organisations' performance results too. It is emphasized, 
overachievement is specified in relation to difference between goal achievement and 
threshold. 
Managers' recall of STVPP's progressive-nature objectives is rather limited. Various 
hypotheses concerning impact of 'understanding about purpose and impact of 
understanding about the working-aspects' on the performance results, are tested. By 
and large results support the hypothesis that, a higher understanding of STVPP has a 
positive impact on employee performance results. Direct and indirect methods are 
used to assess understanding level about purpose, and about working details of 
STVPP. 
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Similar approach of using direct and indirect questions is used for assessing 
managers' satisfaction with STVPP. Hypotheses about impact of involvement-in-
design and impact of involvement-in-implementation, on the performance results, 
have been largely supported. Significant correlation is found between degree of 
control over performance parameters and level of satisfaction with STVPP. However, 
insignificant relationship has been found between 'level of satisfaction with STVPP' 
and 'impact on managers' performance', which brings forth the role of other factors, 
apart from performance, in increasing managers' satisfaction with STVPP. 
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Chapter 6 
Findings and Discussion 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter is focused on presenting the results, which is the final outcome of the 
study, that it can claim as its unique contribution to the field of compensation research. 
Along with the results, relevant findings from past research have been juxtaposed, and 
effort is made to integrate the past and present scenarios, so that the reader is able to 
garner an integrated picture about nature of impact of variable pay systems. 
While the task of melding the past and present research is a mammoth one, that calls 
for high levels of analytical ability and also requires razor-sharp perception, 
nevertheless, sincere effort is made to present an integrated picture, so as to present 
concise findings, that crunch up research efforts in this direction, till this period. A 
reader would benefit from such generalization, as it would be easier to assimilate and 
integrate these results in ones mental framework. 
These findings are presented along the lines of the 5 objectives identified in the study. 
This is also the framework, on which the analysis chapter (chapter 4) is based. Thus, it 
should help the reader to clearly correlate the analysis part with their respective end-
results. Each sub section caters to each of these objectives, that are - study of design 
and implementation systems, impact of STVPP on managers' performance, impact of 
STVPP on organisations' performance, assessment of managers' understanding about 
the purpose and working details of STVPP, and an assessment of their satisfaction level 
with use of STVPP. 
Section-1 
6.1 Design and Implementation Systems of Short Term Variable Pay 
Plans (also referred as STVPPs) 
The design and implementation systems of a short term variable pay plan, the very 
phrase itself, begs the question as to why these two, so-to-say simple, and mechanical 
steps are couched in the elaborate frame of a process. The instinctive answer to the 
342 
simple question is that - variable pay, which is referred as New variable pay by 
Schuster and Zingheim, who worked hard to give the old concept, a shot of new life, is 
considered a simple but effective lever, that can motivate even non-executive cadre 
employees, to work synergistically in direction of business goals. In simple language, 
employees are made to feel like partners in business, who share in the risks as well as 
the rewards of running an organization. Roughly, while incentives can be analogized to 
the skeletal structure of a human body, the New variable pay can be analogized as a 
newer form of body, complete with blood and flesh. This establishes the importance of 
studying design and implementation systems as distinct processes. Details about design 
and implementation, and motivational principles underlying these, can be referred 
from section 2.10.2 and section 2.10.3 respectively. The findings of this section are 
briefed below -
6.1.1 Purpose of instituting STVPP 
• 67% of organizations (chiefly represented by human resources function) of the 
Indian Software Industry perceive that the most important purpose of STVPP, as 
practiced in their organization, is to link pay with performance (Table 5.1). 
• Such unanimity with regard to a singular purpose of STVPP, is not seen among the 
finance personnel. The only majority visible in this section is of a sub-group, whose 
strength is only 1/3^ '' of its total size. This section perceives that its most important 
objective is 'risk mitigation' (Table 5.1). It is surprising that finance personnel 
could muster the courage to come out with the pursuance of this objective so 
openly, (as rarely do professionals make a public admission of it) since this 
particular motive puts the organization in cast of a shrewd businessman, 
something, which the organizations would not like to live by. However, such 
admission could be due to finance' role of dealing with clear numbers, that train 
them not to mince words, and put across truth in its bare and the simplest form. 
While not a considerable number - 27% of finance personnel perceive that its main 
objective is to drive employee performance (Table 5.1). 
• Half the managers perceive that its key objective is to drive employee performance 
results. 
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• It is difficult to draw conclusion about the purpose statement of a STVPP, since the 
three different groups diverge on this aspect. The difference between their views is 
not substantive, since it is more like each one looking at that part of the sun, the 
way they view it from their position. Human resources' preoccupation with the HR-
relevant objectives, accounts for majority of them perceiving its key objective to be 
- linking pay with performance. Since HR function is closely involved with the task 
of designing performance payout schedule, this is the likely reason for its holding 
such perception. Finance, on its part, gets a clear mandate from top management, 
regarding how much operating margins are to be maintained, after clearing off the 
obligations towards other stakeholders. Thus, finance tries to protect the reserves, 
by playing with the variable budget, stretching and pulling it, in order to maintain 
predetermined levels of profits and at the same time reserving just enough for fixed 
nature payments. Managers view the system as one that constantly pushes them to 
meet the designated target level, else they get deprived of their payout amount. For 
this reason, according to them, the variable pay system drives managers towards 
higher levels of performance. 
• It is clear, that the three groups perceive the most important objective of STVPP, 
differently. However, this difference can be attributed to the different portfolios 
each one holds and the objectives they strive for. Based on the study results, it may 
be concluded that a regular participation of all the three groups would help them 
converge towards higher levels of commonality or better agreement among their 
perception. 
• It is a disturbing finding that while Abosch(1998) has offered vehement support for 
attaining objective of 'psychology of ownership' through variable remuneration, 
and even otherwise psychological ownership feelings have been found as an 
outcome of profitable work units (Harter, 1999); this research brought out no recall 
for 'ownership objective' and also found limited support for 'alignment' objective. 
It appears that the objective of achieving alignment through means of variable pay 
systems is not achieving worthwhile results. In the same tone, Kathryn (1993) too 
emphasized that it order to be effective, the compensation strategy needs to be oriented 
to organisation's structure, work culture and goals. 
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6.1.2 Involvement in the process of STVPP 
6.1.2.1 Prevalence of involvement, in view of the human resource personnel 
• The human resource personnel, at all the organizations (100% of these), have a high 
degree of involvement in design of STVPP (Table 5.2). This brings out the 
dominant role human resources function plays in shaping a variable pay plan. 
However, this is also a disturbing finding, since it further cements the typecast 
image of HR as a policymaker. If organizations' endeavour is to project STVPPs as 
a process, which is equally relevant for all functions, then it would be desirable to 
make the design team more representative. 
• One third of finance personnel are involved in its design, either to a large extent or 
they have an even higher level of involvement (Table 5.2). As high as 2/3rd of this 
group is involved either to a small extent or not at all (Table 5.2). It is an ethical 
requirement that researcher brings out the disconnect evident at this stage, between 
the official figures about finance' involvement, and its true significance in relation 
to the functioning of STVPP. One-to-one interactions with finance personnel (all of 
them being CFOs) brought to light certain aspects about STVPP, that reflected their 
sharp insight into the system's functioning. Talking about BSC (Balanced 
scorecard) methodology used for setting up LOS, the CFO of a Pune based firm, 
remarked that "it takes the employee through some jungle and some indirect link is 
then shown to them." The same gentleman, talking about variable pay's criticality, 
remarked that "sometimes members of top management are more interested in 
variable pay, than in shares, because they see a direct impact of their actions on 
company's performance". These are living examples of finance personnel's insight 
into the system's working, an aspect which is not reflected prima facie in their 
official-participation-figures regarding design of STVPP. 
• However, on paper, it is the HR personnel that has 100% claim for its development. 
It is noteworthy that barring top management, no other group has higher than 27% 
representation in the high involvement group. - (Table 5.2). 
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• Top management has a high degree of involvement in design of STVPP, in 4 out of 
5 organisations. There are 20% organizations that do not use top management's 
involvement in the design phase of STVPP (Table 5.2). 
• Middle managers are involved to a small extent in 20% of organisations, and in 
remaining ones, they have no involvement (Table 5.2). Lawler (1981) and 
Bullock(1983), have suggested that participation in development of pay plan 
strengthen pay-for-performance perceptions in employees. This should be useful 
for organizations, since 67% HR personnel perceive this as the key objective of 
STVPPs (see sec 6.1.1).Reasons for the resultant strength of pay-for-performance 
perceptions include - knowledge about the plan, higher commitment to the plan, 
feeling of control over the plan and higher trust in the system (Lawler, 1981). 
6.1.2.2 Involvement of finance function in STVPP process, as they themselves 
perceive it 
• In 13% organizations, finance personnel are involved throughout the process (Table 
5.3). Other organizations involve their finance personnel only at certain specific 
stages of the STVPP process. For instance - At 13% organizations, 'finance' is 
involved in terms of supplying relevant data to the user departments, in 20% 
organizations it plays a part in computing the payout amount, in 7% organizations, 
'finance' is involved in functions like setting organization goals, deciding 
performance parameters, assessing organization goal achievement, detecting 
deviations from plan design, and in another 7% organizations, it is involved only at 
the plan review stage(Table 5.3). As high as 53%o organizations of the Indian 
software industry involve their finance in the overall STVPP process (Table 5.3). 
This indicates finance' pervasive role, over the entire umbrella of STVPP process. 
6.1.2.3 Involvement of middle managers in STVPP process, as they themselves 
perceive it 
• The middle managers are involved in mainly two aspects of STVPP-related 
decisions. These include - 'decision s about their performance parameters' and 
'decisions about their target level' (Table 5.4). Within this limited space of 
involvement (i.e the scope of decisions that entail their involvement), as high as 
50%) are involved to a small extent, and there are good 13%) who have no 
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involvement even in these aspects (Table 5.4). There are 36% managers, who are 
involved moderately (21.3%) or to a large extent (15.3%) in these decisions (Table 
5.4). 
• While these two decisions are certainly crucial to a variable pay plan, it requires a 
deeper analysis about how central is their role to the overall STVPP design and 
implementation process. At first, these decisions are of individual-level relevance, 
and therefore, their ramification is no further than the radius spanned by one single 
employee. Aspects like deciding the blanket threshold level, the performance 
payout schedule, plan evaluation that have far greater applicability, are kept out of 
the reach of middle managers' involvement. 
6.1.2.4 Managers' preference for involvement in the STVPP process 
• Evidently, managers' involvement in the STVPP process is sparse (Table 5.4). It 
brings forth a striking contrast, that when questioned about how desirable it was to 
involve them, as high as 83% managers expressed desire to be involved in the 
STVPP process (Table 5.5). 12% managers did not show desire for involvement, 
while 5% were at a loss of ideas and couldn't offer any concrete opinion (Table 
5.5). 
6.1.2.5 Managers' perception about potential benefits of their involvement in 
STVPP process. 
• Approximately, 95% managers perceive that their involvement would be beneficial, 
while 5% believe that there wouldn't be any benefit, since the proposal is not 
feasible (Table 5.6). 27%) managers perceive that such involvement would enable 
them to better understand the process of STVPP. Only 6% feel that such 
involvement would bring benefits of higher degree of customisation of the pay plan, 
i.e. bringing it closer to their specific role requirements. In all likelihood, STVPP is 
given the look of a policy statement, something of permanence, which may be the 
reason that only 6% conceive that one of the benefits would be customization. 
Similarly, only 6% perceive that such involvement would lead to plan innovations 
(Table 5.6). Other benefits expected to accrue due to involvement include - higher 
interest level in STVPP (14%), better acceptance (10%) and increased satisfaction 
(]2%>) among the manager segment.- (Table 5.6). 
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6.1.2.6 HR's perception about potential benefits of involving managers in the 
design phase 
• 87% of human resources personnel perceive that such involvement of managers 
would be beneficial (Table 5.7). 40% of them perceive that it would ease out the 
implementation of STVPP, since there wouldn't be any teething problems in rolling 
out these plans (Table 5.7). A good 27% HR professionals perceive that it would 
develop in managers feelings of ownership and feelings of alignment with business 
goals (Table 5.7). What is disturbing is that only 7% perceive that such involvement 
would result in managers developing a better business outlook (Table 5.7). Let the 
issue be examined in another fashion. If only 7% would earn the benefit of better 
business perspective, then there are two distinct possibilities. Either organizations 
do not design variable pay plans as a strategic lever in the vei'y first place ie with no 
concern for industry or business performance, or the HR does not conceive 
managers' involvement to be deep enough to reach its core decisions. In either case, 
the design team needs to be sensitized to this deficiency of the plan process. 
6.1.3 Design and Implementation aspects of STVPP 
Due to the broad expanse of design and implementation aspects of STVPP, these have 
been subdivided into distinct themes, for ease of understanding. 
6.1.3.1 Structural elements of a short term variable pay plan 
The findings are presented under the subheadings of distinct aspects of variable 
remuneration plan. 
Variable pay structuring (in relation to base pay/ salary) and % of variable pay as a 
proportion of salary (CTC) 
• 67% organizations structure variable pay as a particular percentage of employees' 
CTC (Table 5.9). Many finance professionals objected to this form of structuring as 
it breeds entitlement mentality among managers. For instance - The CFO of a 
Gurgaon-based software company remarked "companies do so, in order to show to 
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employees, how high they are paying them. Put as such, employees come to expect 
it and take it as granted. So, even a cut of 1.5 on 50 pinches them." 
• On an average, the sample organizations allocate 19.4% of CTC as the variable 
component, for their middle managers (Table 5.9). 
• More than a quarter of software organizations, show this component in form of a 
lumpsum amount. (Table 5.9). 
• 7% have shown this component as a combination of 'salary' and 'project savings' 
(Table 5.9). 
Proposed changed to variable pay proportion 
• 73% organizations do not intend to further enhance proportion of variable pay in 
managers' salary. Of this section, 6.7% intend to reduce the variable pay 
proportion, and another 7% intend to change its form to percentage basis ( as a 
proportion of salary/CTC) (Table 5.10). 26.7% organizations intend to increase the 
proportion of variable pay, for its middle managers (Table 5.10). 
Level(s) of aggregation at which payout structure is defined 
• 80%) organizations include individual performance factor in their variable pay 
structure. (Table 5.9). 
• 20%) link variable pay at the level of team or project performance (Table 5.9). 
• 33%o organizations tie the payout amount to business unit/ LOB or division results 
(Table 5.9). 
• 47%) of organizations tie variable pay to organization results (Table 5.9) 
The above facts once again attest to the legacy of traditional pay systems, since 80% 
retain the payout's linkage with individual-based results. Considering the difficulty in 
establishing line-of-sight, it would be expected that organizations would be more 
interested in setting up payout linkages at intermediate levels like that of 'project' , 
Business Unit or Line of business. A considerably higher number have forged payout's 
linkage at the organisation level, which is surprising considering the difficulty in 
establishing line-of-sight over such a long stretch, between individual roles and 
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organisation's performance framework. However, it does go to show, organisations" 
concern for risk mitigation by deploying variable pay tool. 
Managers' preference for including organization linked parameter in tiieir variable 
payout structure 
74% of managers are in favour of having their payout tied to organisations' results. 
26% managers do not prefer having an organization-linked component to their salary 
(Table 5.28) 
Threshold level target, at individual level 
• 74% of organizations explicitly specify individual level threshold (Table 5.9). 
• 54%) of organizations tie managers' payout to a broad rating system (carrying 
maximum 5 points or gradations) (Table 5.9). 
• 20% organizations map individual performance using even broader parameters like 
point system or other home-grown criteria-based systems like using a matrix or a 
quadrant as their bases (Table 5.9). 
The organizations that set individual level threshold, by and large use subjective criteria 
for performance assessment. Infact the entire sample using individual level threshold 
deploys only rating based criteria or even broader (read more subjective) criteria. At 
the middle level, nature of responsibility is more of supervision, than exclusively in 
terms of bottom-line figures. This explains why their performance is measured through 
a broad scale and not in terms of percentage of goals. . 
Range of upside potential, at the level of individual-level performance-payout schedule 
• 47% of sample organizations offer upside potential, for earning payout amount, that 
crosses the target payout. The average level of maximum payout (ie level at which 
payout amount is capped) offered by these organizations is 123%) of target payout 
(Table 5.9). 
Nature of payout schedule at individual level 
• Each organization uses a sort of personalized form of payout schedule ; some have 
tied rating scales to lumpsum amount, some have used only broad milestones (like 
having a pay schedule having 3 milestones) and in between payout is defined as 
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proportionate, some have partitioned the payout into two halves - like revenue 
responsibility and behavioural aspects, each of which carries a different schedule, 
and in one particular case, threshold is tied to operating margin wherein the excess 
flows into variable pay kitty (Table 5.9). The purpose of such elaboration is to 
highlight the varied and the complex range of individual-level payout schedules, 
that make it difficult to generalize these in form of one specific type of pay 
schedule. 
Performance parameters at organizations' level, organization-level threshold and, 
organization-level performance-payout schedule 
Varied kinds of performance parameters are used at organization level, some of which 
include Turnover, PAT, PBIT and PBT. Also, the composition of the performance 
parameters varies, as the sub-components combine in varying proportions - for instance 
the ratio of revenue and profit may differ across organizations, and also this ratio may 
vary from year to year, even for singular organization entities (Table 5.20). For these 
reasons, its generalization is difficult. 
The overall average threshold at organization level is 78%, considering a three year 
period, between 2004 and 2007 (Table 5.20). Varied kinds of payout schedules are 
deployed at organization level too, and hence it is not feasible to form generalization 
out of it (Table 5.20). 60% organizations offer upside potential at the organization 
level, of which 53% offer average upside potential at 119% of target payout, while 
remaining 7% have an unexceptionally high average of 200% of target payout (Table 
5.20) Of this 60% bracket, \7% accelerate payout beyond 100%) performance at a rate 
disproportionately higher than increase in performance results. Remaining 43% give 
variable payout in a linear form, even when performance crosses 100%. 
The payout schedule at organization level, is broadly defined, with fewer slabs, having 
wider berths, all of which makes it easier to administer the payout calculation, but does 
not offer substantial incentive, in terms of sharper or vivid intervals. 
Frequency of payout 
• 66.7%) organizations follow the practice of using annual frequency of variable 
payout, while 26.8% deliver the payout on a quarterly basis (Table 5.9). 
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• 7% organizations use a mix of time intervals for different components of variable 
pay (Table 5.9). 
The often cited argument against ability to shift to a short-interval payout system, is the 
issue of difficulty in administering the process. Going by reinforcement theory tenets 
(section 2.82), motivation would be higher if payout closely follows identified events or 
behaviours. However, under the predominance of rating system, it is difficult to tag the 
payout amount to a specific event; only a recognition scheme can provide that kind of 
directness and immediacy, to follow a specific event/behaviour. However, under the 
constraint of rating system, frequency of review exercise (ie formal appraisal exercise) 
would have to be increased, so as to couple or adjoin each laudable event (can be called 
as performance instance) with payout delivery. This is the closest organizations can 
reach up to, in order to offer high motivational value through reinforcement of 
performance results. 
Form of payout delivery 
All organizations make their variable payout in cash form (Table 5.9). This is a 
consistent finding, since variable pay is more or less treated as a part of salary and for 
this reason, its payout is in cash form. 
6.1.3.2 Line of sight 
Managers' line of sight with business goals 
More than 90% organizations do not use explicit processes to establish/formulate employee 
line-of-sight with business goals (Table 5.11). A mere 7% use explicit processes to establish 
managers' line of sight with business goals (Table 5.11). Those who use explicit methods, 
mainly use goal setting process as the medium to establish managers' line-of-sight. 
Managers' perception of LOS with business goals 
Majority of managers (90%) are able to perceive their line-of-sight, since they believe 
that such a link exists between their goals and business goals (Table 5.12). There are 
10% managers, who do not believe such a link exists between their goals and the 
organisation's goals (Table 5.12). 
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Methods used for establishing manages' line of sJRht 
These findings are based on managers' perception about how their line-of-sight is 
established with business goals. 79% managers perceive that their line of sight with 
business goals is implied through methods like - Meetings or project level discussions, 
Goal setting exercise, Performance review, Formal Induction process, and Performance 
progress reports (Table 5.13). In case of 11% managers, such a link is conveyed by 
respective supervisors, who, it seems so, may be following the practice on a 
discretionary basis (Table 5.13). 10.7% managers do not perceive that any such link 
exists (Table 5.13). 
The issue of methods used for establishing line-of-sight, was probed with the finance 
group too. 40%) Finance personnel expressed that explicit processes are used for 
establishing managers' line-of-sight. One-third of the group perceives that such a link is 
implied, and that no explicit processes are used for establishing such a link. A relatively 
high number (27%) of finance personnel believe that no such linkage exists between 
managers' goals and organisation's goals (Table 5.14) 
6.1.3.3 Managers' control over performance parameters of variable payout 
2% managers believe they have complete control over their performance parameters, A 
quarter of managers, perceive the degree of control being, 'to a large extent'. 60% of 
managers perceive the degree of control to be 'partial' and 16%) have reported even 
lesser degree of control ie control to 'a small extent' or 'no control' (Table 5.15). 
6.1.3.4 Threshold level goal 
Significance of threshold level goal 
93%) human resources personnel consider threshold level as the minimum expectation, 
that must absolutely be achieved (for financial ability and hence business' viability) 
while a small proportion - 7%, consider it simply as a milestone. The two phrases 
convey similar meaning, apparently just showing a little twist in choice of words used 
(Table 5.16). 
The same aspect of threshold's significance was examined from point of view of 
finance personnel too. 93% have expressed, that the threshold goal gives indication 
about when to start disbursals of payout, while 7%o believe that pegging a threshold 
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level serves the purpose of stretching employees to achieve this minimum point of goal 
(Table 5.17). These figures are referring to the same aspect, with a slight difference in 
the perspective that some of the respondents have adopted. While the majority 
perceives it from the perspective of organization budget, very few have chosen to 
comment about it from the employees' perspective. 
Similar aspect of significance about threshold was probed with the managers too. All 
managers understand it as the 'minimum performance level required to activate the 
commencement of variable payout amount' (Table 5.18). 
Achievability of threshold level goal 
One-third managers perceive threshold is achievable 'to a large extent', and one-fifth of 
the group perceives it as 'completely achievable'. A huge number, 55% of managers, 
consider this level of goal as either 'partly achievable' or 'achievable to a smaller 
extent (Table 5.19). 
6.1.3.5 STVPP funding 
80% organisations source their payout from salary budget. Another 13.4% use this 
method in combination with Project-based benefits, or gains attributable to STVPP-use. 
Thus, the total number of users of this method is upward of 90%. (Table 5.21) This 
shows that the conventional method of using salary budget to disburse variable payout 
remains dominant. 
7%) organizations, use each of these methods viz :'Project-based benefits (in 
conjunction with salary budget), performance-gains over and above previous year's 
results, and gains attributable to STVPP-use (in conjunction with salary budget) (Table 
5.21). 
It seems unlikely that an organization would be able to source its entire payout budget 
from gains made to organization results, over and above previous years' results. The 
kitty would be too small a stretch to fund the entire payout, considering that middle 
managers' segment alone, have a variable pay expense, to the tune of 19.4%) of their 
CTC (Table 5.9). It is unlikely that organizations would be able to earn such huge 
incremental gains over previous year performance, on an annual basis, to be able to 
fund such mammoth payout expense. As researcher admitted earlier, respondents have 
354 
been ver)' touchy about sharing data, and in this particular case, it comes across as an 
error of cognition or judgment on part of respondents. In order not to sully the entire 
results, it appeared best to disregard this particular component as inconsistent and not 
feasible. 
Variability between middle managers' payout and business results 
27% organizations vary the payout less than proportionately in response to variation in 
business earnings (Table 5.22). As one of the senior finance personnel of a Hyderabad 
based organization remarked "variable pay really drives performance at the senior 
level, while not giving similar push at the middle level. The 20% who lead, ought to be 
rewarded for driving it hard, rest 80% only follow". While the comment was left in 
mid-thought, it really means that - the 80% who follow, need not be paid in the same 
proportion (as if it would be too benign on their part to be fair to them). It is argued that 
in absolute terms, salary differences do take care of paying senior management a 
premium for their risk-bearing capacity, and for this reason, organizations could very 
well use a common formula for all employees, for forming a just equation between 
performance results and payout amount. Having done so, employees are likely to 
consider such distribution fair, and it would also deepen impressions about STVPP's 
original philosophy of'inculcating ownership feelings' and of achieving 'Alignment'. 
2/5th of organisations justly vary payout in proportion to variation in business results 
(Table 5.22). However, there are l/3rd organizations who absolutely prevent such 
variation from happening, and as a result disallow passing of benefits of higher 
business gains to managers (Table 5.22). 
6.1.3.6 STVPP-related communication 
Methods used for STVPP related Communication 
STVPP details are communicated through multiple channels. 80% organizations use the 
intranet method, which is also the most popularly used (among other methods). 20% 
organizations communicate through the policy document, 40% do it through a 
presentation or hold an open house, a good 47% discuss it at the time of performance 
review, and another 40% discuss it at time of goal setting, and a huge 60% discuss it 
during the goal-setting process. A meager 13.3% use discussion method for such 
communication (Table 5.23). The study results are not in complete harmony with the 
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usual communication practice used for traditional compensation programmes. In a 
landmark study, Sibson and company(1989) in their national survey of organizations 
found that 66% organizations use the method of one-to-one meetings, 59% use group 
meetings, 32% use company newsletters, 26% use brochures and 20%) use grapevine 
method. The mix of communication channels used for variable pay programmes show 
signs of imbalance, and straying away from usual practice, due to near-absence or very 
limited use of discussions method. It is likely that in absence of direct one-to-one 
communication or discussions, employees' skepticism towards variable pay system 
could be further fueled. 
Details about STVPP that are communicated 
There was no access to the actual secondary data in form of communication material 
dispatched to employees. These findings are arrived at on the basis of survey of HFL 
personnel's views. 
Almost 80% to 90% organizations communicate the objectives, working details about 
STVPP, and also general business information. The exact figures are - 93.3%) for 
Objective of STVPP, 86.7% for working details about STVPP, and 93.7% for General 
Business information (Table 5.24). For this particular finding, all respondents (ie 15 in 
number) regarded the issue of such communication as highly unimportant, really a non-
issue, something that did not even require research (according to them). Their manner 
of answering this question was nonchalant and callous. This is the clear benefit of one-
to-one personal interviews, that have ability to see through numbers, like lasers, and 
reveal the real finding. Factually, all organizations are communicating the above three 
aspects, however, mainly impersonal methods are used, and only 13%) use discussion 
methods (Table 5.23). If the method of personal discussions were used, it would help in 
achieving objectives of 'ownership feelings' and 'alignment'. Evidently, these are not 
the priority objectives, since none of HR personnel perceive 'psychology of ownership 
feelings' as the most important objective, and only 6.7%o consider 'alignment' as the 
most important objective (Table 5.1). 
Communication of performance progress reports 
It is a universal practice to communicate progress reports on account of organization 
performance and also at the level of employee; all sample organizations follow this 
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practice. 2/3rd organisations do not churn out 'gap analysis' reports, as such, and 
remaining l/3rd use only informal means for conveying gap information (Table 5,23). 
As repeatedly mentioned, gap information refers to (level of achievement - threshold); 
it emphasizes the criticality of meeting threshold level goal. Similar in nature, 73% 
organizations do not use gap analysis reports for managers, and the remaining lot of 
27%, use informal reports for conveying this information (Table 5.23). 
Formal means of communicating organisation's progress include annual reports, 
Quarterly reports, Weekly business review meetings and the lesser formal methods 
include discussions with the unit heads (Table 5.23). 
Individual-level performance progress is communicated through formal methods like 
midterm review and Quarterly performance reports. Informal means of assessing 
performance-gap, are followed on a discretionary basis (Table 5.23). 
73% organizations communicate about organization-performance-status on a quarterly 
basis, while 11% do so annually. With regard to managers' performance, 2/3rd 
organizations follow mid-term review. One third organizations use performance 
reporting systems, that report managers' progress every quarter. These findings are 
quite in sync with industry practice; however, wherever the focus on goal achievement 
is to be sharpened, frequency of reporting should be charged with more agility, and 
reporting should be intense enough to get noticed. (Table 5.23) 
Communication about payout amount and related details 
7% organizations give information about payout amount earned by employees, to the 
HODs, through a letter. Another 7% let their managers do the calculation themselves 
through a self-styled software made available to employees. Also, relevant figures on 
performance indices are supplied to them. 13% organizations, communicate about the 
payout amount, through a payslip. 73.3% organisations directly inform managers about 
their payout amount, either through a letter or e-mail (Table 5.24). 
Systems used for knowing managers' grievances about STVPP. 
Organizations do not specifically ask employees about their grievances in relation to 
STVPP-use. No systems are set specifically towards this purpose (Table 5.25). 
Commonly it is assumed that if it is an area of concern or trouble for the managers, then 
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either - that they would bring it forth themselves, or that such issues are often reported 
in employee satisfaction surveys. 
6.1.3.7 STVPP management 
• The human resources has overall ownership of the plan in 100% organizations. It 
also has administration responsibility in 100% organizations. Only 60% 
organizations give HR the approving authority. (Table 5.26) 
• Finance has administration responsibility in 13.3% organizations, and it has 
approving authority in 16.1% organizations (Table 5.26) 
• Top management is mainly involved in plan approval - 2/3rd organizations follow 
this practice (Table 5.26) 
• Only 13%) organizations involve other functions' heads or the other BU heads, 
wherein their role is mainly as plan's approving authority (Table 5.26) 
6.1.3.8 STVPP-related Review 
• 2/3rd organisations involve the top management in its review exercise, and an equal 
number of organisations involve HR team in its review. Only 1% organisations 
involve the Finance function and similar number of organizations involve the 
function heads in the review exercise (Table 5.27) 
• 93.3% review their variable pay plans annually, 6.7%) organizations do so bi-
annually and another 13.3%) review their plans on a need-basis (Table 5.27) 
6.1.3.9 Motivation through STVPP 
How organisaitons project STVPP as a motivational tool, in view of human resources 
personnel? 
More than half the organizations use the incentive lever of STVPP to motivate middle 
managers. A minority (13%o) motivate them by instilling feelings of accountability and 
responsibility. One third organizations emphasize employees' LOS for causing 
motivation. 6.1% organizations motivate managers by focusing on the KRA design, and 
another 6.7% do so by highlighting that such a plan offers an opportunity for capacity 
building (Table 5.30). 
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How organisations can improve STVPP's motivational power, in view of human 
resources personnel? 
• 27% of compensation personnel perceive that the most important improvement to 
STVPP could be made in the area of communication, and an equal number (ie 27%) 
perceive the need for improvement in goal setting and performance measurement 
processes (Table 5.31). 
• 13.3% have suggested the need for increasing managers' control over their 
performance parameters (Table 5.31). 
• 6.7%) organizations each suggested measures of customizing pay plans to managers' 
roles, and that of'reducing the cost base' (Table 5.31). 
• 13.3%) perceive that such plans should be made more dynamic, through measures 
like use of lead indicators, restructuring VP outside CTC, and increasing the payout 
frequency (Table 5.31). 
How organisations can improve STVPP's motivational power, in view of finance 
personnel? 
• One-third of finance personnel perceive need for enhancing 'communication 
system' and 'employee LOS' as measures for improvements to STVPP. 
• 27%) have expressed the need for making the system more dynamic. 
• 13.3%)) have expressed the need for structuring variable pay, apart from the CTC 
structure. 
• 20%) have expressed the need for objective performance measurement 
• 7%) organizations perceive that there is no need for making improvements. 
• Overall, more than 50%) suggestions are concerned with improving related 
processes concerning STVPP like communication programme, establishment of 
line-of-sight and performance measurement (Table 5.32) 
Aspect of STVPP that the managers find to be most motivating., in view of managers 
• According to 28%) managers, they are most motivated by the incentive aspect of the 
variable pay plans. 
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• 8% are motivated due to 'better performance measurability', 4.7% due to 'pay 
differentiation', 3.3.% feel motivated due to 'feeling of responsibility' and 7.3% are 
moved by the 'desire to earn back variable pay amount in full". One third of 
managers (32%) reportedly feel no motivation from the variable pay plans. 
• 6.7%) are motivated as there is better focus on performance, another 6.7%) perceive 
that they are motivated by both incentive aspects and feeling of responsibility, and 
a very small percentage (.7%) are motivated by the aspect of frequent feedback 
(Table 5.33) 
Enhancing STVPP's motivation by means of suggested improvements, perceived by 
middle managers. 
• 31% suggestions are in favour of making the process more transparent through 
increased communication - (Table 5.34) 
• 23%) managers i.e. l/5th feel that measurement should be more objective. - (Table 
5.34) 
• 16.7 %o expressed that the variable pay component should be structured outside their 
salary - (Table 5.34) 
• 6.7% felt that variable pay should be distinct from their salary - (Table 5.34) 
• 1 P/o have asked for making the system more lucrative - (Table 5.34) 
• In all, 73%o managers have expressed the need for making STVPP more meaningful 
and relevant, through its customization to roles (6.7%)), increased transparency 
(31.3%), use of encouragement (18%o), increasing their participation (3.3%), and by 
rendering higher objectivity to performance measurements(22.7%i).- (Table 5.34) 
• Few (2.7%)) have expressed concern that payout should be done on a timely basis. -
(Table 5.34) 
Section- 2 
6.2 Impact of STVPP on manaagers'performance 
• According to the HR personnel, STVPP has a positive impact on managers' 
performance. Although the results are statistically significant, the support for the 
hypothesis is very feeble.(Table 5.35 and Table 5.36) 
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In view of the finance personnel, STVPP has no impact on managers' 
performance. It is also found that these test results are not statistically 
significant.(Table 5.37 and Table 5.38) 
According to managers' group, there is impact of STVPP on their performance 
results. The results are statistically significant, however, degree of support in its 
favour is weak. (Table 5.39 and Table 5.40) 
The three types of groups "the middle managers", "the human resources personnel" 
and "the Finance function" have similar perception regarding impact of STVPP on 
performance of middle managers. They all think similarly. Statistically, not much 
support exists to indicate if there are worthwhile differences between their 
perception (Table 5.41). The Newman-Keuls test confirms this impression 
statistically, that the three groups: the managers, the human resources personnel, 
and the Finance personnel, all three groups perceive the impact of STVPP on 
managers' performance, in a similar manner. (Table 5.42) 
The average performance achievement of middle managers of the Indian Software 
Industry, for the year 2005-06 stands at 89.8% of target. The average threshold for 
these organizations for the same year is 69%. There is a clear case of 
overachievement of performance to the extent of 20.8% of target (Chart 5.1 and 
Annexure 5.2). 
The average performance for middle managers for the year 2006-07 is at 92.3% of 
target. The average threshold for organizations for the year is 69%. There is a clear 
overachievement of performance by middle managers to the extent of 233% of 
target.(Chart 5.2, Annexure 5.2) 
Average performance of managers increased in year 2006-07 by 2.5% over the 
previous year. Since the level of threshold remained same across organizations for 
the period, the level of average overachievement too increased by 2.5%. (Annexure 
5.2). 
The average performance of middle managers, considering the two year period, is 
91% across organizations, while the average threshold level across organizations is 
69%. Based on these figures, the average level of overachievement of managers 
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(achievement - threshold) is 22%, across organizations, considering the two year 
performance period. (Annexure 5.2). 
• There is a statistically insignificant relationship between 'perceived impact of 
STVPP on managers' performance' and 'extent of control managers have over the 
performance parameters of their variable pay' (Table 5.43). The above is a case of 
negative correlation indicating that high scores on 'managers' degree of control 
over performance parameters of their variable pay' are associated with low scores 
on 'the perceived impact of STVPP on their performance'. 
Section- 3 
6.3 Perceived impact of STVPP on organization performance 
• Test results are significant in their finding that STVPP exerts a positive impact on 
organisations' performance, in view of HR personnel (Table 5.54 and Table 5.55). 
Also, there is an expression of considerable agreement in favour of STVPP's 
positive impact on organisation performance, that has been found among this group. 
• The finance personnel have expressed considerable agreement about the notion that 
STVPP exerts a positive impact on organization performance. Statistically 
significant results are found, that favour the finance personnel's position that the 
system of STVPP has a positive impact on organization performance. (Table 5.56 
and 5.57) 
• According to managers, on an average, there is just little agreement about the view 
that STVPP has positive impact on organization performance. It is inferred that a 
short term variable pay plan has positive impact on organization performance, in 
perception of managers. These results are statistically significant. (Table 5.58 and 
5.59) 
• There are statistically significant differences among the perception held by 
managers, the Human Resources personnel and the Finance personnel about the 
impact of STVPP on organisation's performance (Table 5.60) 
• There is some difference among the three groups, in terms of their perception about 
the impact of STVPP on overall organization performance. The 'managers' agree to 
a very small extent that STVPP has a positive impact on organisation's 
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performance, while the 'Human Resources personnel' and the 'Finance personnel" 
(quite) strongly agree about this particular aspect. The Newman-Keuls test confirms 
this impression statistically: managers are less positive about performance impact of 
STVPP compared to the perceptions held by 'human resource personnel' and 
'finance personnel' respectively (Table 5.61). 
• It requires explicit mention that the strength of opinion of the Human resources 
personnel is lesser only by a small degree, when compared to perception of 
'Finance personnel', and such difference is by no means significant. The managers 
have a less optimistic perception as compared to the Human Resources and the 
Finance personnel, both of whom think alike on the issue. 
• The average organization performance for the three year period is at 93% of target. 
When compared against average threshold of 78%, the overall average of 
overachievement stands at 15% of target. (See chart 5.3 & Annexure 5.3) 
Section - 4 
6.4 Managers' understanding about tfie purpose and working of 
short term variable pay plan. 
6.4a Managers' understanding about the purpose of short term variable pay 
plan. 
• The major result is that more than half the managers perceive the key purpose to be 
the "motive to drive employee performance". There is little recall of its more 
progressive forms like achieving business objectives (I8%i for it), alignment (IO%i 
for it) and instilling team-working spirit (none for it). Only 2% managers perceive 
its objective is to provide pay a performance justification (Table 5.1). 
• 89% managers perceive line-of-sight linkage with business goals. Within this 
segment of 89%o, 93%) of them expressed that implicit methods were used to achieve 
such linkage (Table 5.11 and Table 5.12) 
• There is statistically significant result to show that in view of HR personnel, 
understanding about purpose of STVPP does have a positive impact on managers' 
performance.(Table 5.62 & 5.63). There is support about the issue among this 
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group. The mean value of 3.6 shows that the level of agreement on this score is not 
very strong - it is moderate (Table 5.62 & 6.63). 
• The finance personnel perceive, not really with any degree of conviction or what 
could be called even a single-minded-agreement', but their belief is inclined in the 
direction that if managers have a good understanding about the purpose of STVPP, 
then it would have a positive impact on mangers' performance. 
• Finance personnel believe that managers would show positive impact in their 
performance results if they clearly understand the purpose of STVPP. This has 
statistically strong backing and therefore is a worthwhile result (Table 5.64 and 
5.65). 
• Managers have shown considerably high degree of agreement about the view that 
their understanding of purpose of STVPP has a positive impact on their 
performance. The test results have shown quite strong support for the hypothesis 
that according to managers, their clear understanding about the purpose of short 
term variable pay plan has a positive impact on managers' performance. (Table 
5.66 and 5.67) 
• HR personnel have shown considerable support for the idea that managers" 
involvement in design phase of STVPP would help managers in gaining 
understanding of its purpose. Statistically significant results are found out, that 
show that in perception of HR personnel, if managers are involved in the design 
process, then it would lead them to better understand the purpose of STVPP. (Table 
5.68 and 5.69) 
• Finance personnel emphatically agree and favour the supposition that managers' 
involvement in the design phase contributes to an increased level of understanding 
about the purpose of STVPP. Statistically significant results are found to show 
that , in view of finance personnel, if managers are involved in the design of 
STVPP, then it would have positive impact on their understanding of its purpose 
(Table 5.70 and 5.71). 
• Managers, more-than agree about the view that if they are involved in the design 
process then it would positively impact their understanding about the purpose of 
STVPP (Table 5.72 and 5.73).There is statistically strong support to prove that 
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according to managers, if they are involved in tiie design of STVPP, then it would 
have a positive impact on their understanding about its purpose (Table 5.72 and 
5.73). 
• The group comprising senior finance personnel shows clear agreement to the 
proposition, that managers' involvement in the implementation stage contributes to 
increasing managers' understanding about its purpose. The results are statistically 
significant and there is a high level of agreement among the finance personnel 
about the stated proposition. Also, there is high degree of convergence among 
views of the finance personnel (Table 5.76 and Table 5.77) 
• Significant results are found that support the hypothesis that managers' involvement 
in the implementation process has a positive impact on their understanding about 
the purpose of STVPP (Table 5.78 and 5.79) 
6.4b Employee understanding of the working of short term variable pay plan. 
• Managers have a high level of understanding about how variable pay is structured 
as a part of their salary. There are some managers who have complete 
understanding on this aspect, and there are some who have little-more-than-
moderate level of understanding about how variable pay is structured as a part of 
their salary (Table 5.80) 
• Managers have an understanding about the working details of variable pay 
system, which is only higher than 'partial'. There is considerable divergence 
among the understanding level of managers. Some managers have an 
understanding which is considerably less than the partial level, and there are some 
managers whose understanding level is little-higher than 'large extent'. (Table 
5.81) 
• On an average, managers' understanding about the purpose of threshold level goal, 
is near complete. There is little variance among managers' views in this regard. 
(Table 5.82) 
• HR personnel, on an average, have expressed considerable support for the 
hypothesized impact of 'understanding about working details of STVPP' on 
'employee performance results'. There are some HR professionals who are quite 
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unsure of their stance and at best expressed feeble support in such relationship. 
Also, there is a section of HR professionals, who have shown full support towards 
it. Test results have significantly shown that, HR personnel believe that if managers 
understand the working details about STVPP, then it would have a positive impact 
on mangers' performance results. (Table 5.83 and 5.84) 
• The group of finance personnel, have supported the supposition that an 
understanding about the working of STVPP, would have a positive impact on 
managers' performance. There are some finance personnel who only half-heartedly 
agree to the conceived relationship, and there are others who strongly support the 
stated relationship. Statistically significant results have been found, that according 
to finance personnel, if managers understand the working details of STVPP, it 
would be instrumental in enhancing their performance results.(Table 5.85 and 5.86). 
• Managers clearly agree that given a clear understanding about the working details 
of STVPP, the resultant impact on their performance would be positive. Results are 
significant, that managers believe that their understanding about the working of 
short term variable pay plan would have a positive impact on their performance. 
They have shown clear agreement on the proposition, and the average spread from 
the average view is rather limited.(Table 5.87 and 5.88). 
• HR personnel have shown a high degree of confidence in ability of managers' 
'involvement-in-design' as a means for enhancing their understanding about its 
working details. There is considerable commonality among members' views. Some 
of the HR personnel are less confident, and there are some who have shown 
significantly strong support, in its favour. In view of the HR personnel, if managers 
are involved in the design phase of STVPP, it would be beneficial to them, since 
their understanding about working details of STVPP would be enhanced. The 
results are statistically significant (Table 5.89 and 5.90). 
• Finance personnel clearly agree on the notion that if managers are involved in the 
design of STVPP, then it would positively impact their understanding about its 
working details. There are some finance personnel, who have shown partial 
agreement to the supposition, and there are some who have unequivocally offered 
significant support in this direction. According to the finance personnel, managers' 
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involvement in the design of STVPP process would help them in attaining sound 
understanding about the working details of STVPP. These results are statistically 
significant, and finance personnel have shown clear agreement about this 
proposition (Table 5.91 and Table 5.92). 
• Managers have shown clear agreement in favour of the view that if they are 
involved in the decisions related to the design process, then it would positively 
affect their understanding about the working part of STVPP. Managers have 
tendered unequivocal support to this view, and there aren't significant variations 
among the managers' group from the mean view. It is found out that mangers 
believe that their involvement in the design process of STVPP would have a 
positive impact on their understanding about the working of STVPP. These results 
carry statistical significance (Table 5.93 and Table 5.94). 
• HR personnel have displayed considerably high level of agreement, over the view 
that managers' involvement in implementation of STVPP would enable them a 
better understanding about the working details of STVPP. There is presence of 
palpable variation among views of the group. There are some who have expressed 
clear support for the conceived relationship, and there are others who have offered 
plain agreement, without adding to it measure of extra strength. The results are 
statistically significant, which lead to the inference that according to the HR 
personnel, managers' involvement in the implementation phase of STVPP, earns 
them the benefit of better understanding about its working details (Table 5.95 and 
Table 5.96). 
• The financial personnel have shown considerably strong support favouring the 
proposition that managers' involvement in implementation of STVPP would 
increase managers' understanding about its working details. Some finance 
personnel have considerably less belief in the proposition, while some have shown 
considerable support in favour of the said relationship. Statistically significant 
results are found, that according to the Finance personnel, if managers are involved 
In the implementation phase of STVPP, then the mangers would be better 
positioned to understand the working details of STVPP (Table 5.97 and Table 
5.98). 
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• On an average managers agree with the point of view that if they are invoived in the 
implementation of the STVPP process, then it would positively affect their level of 
understanding about its working or the operational details. Some of them have 
shown partial agreement to this view, and some have shown high agreement about 
the view. Statistically significant results are found that, managers believe that their 
involvement in the implementation process of STVPP has a positive impact on their 
understanding about the working of STVPP (Table 5.99 and Table 5.100). 
Section- 5 
6.5 Managers' satisfaction with sliort term variable pay plan. 
Managers' degree of control over performance parameters 
• On an average, managers have, little less than partial, degree of control over their 
performance parameters. There is considerable spread or variance among managers' 
views, indicating that there is a worthy difference among managers with regard to 
the level of control they have exert over their respective performance parameters. 
Some of them perceive degree of control 'to a small extent' while there are some 
who perceive level of control, to be considerable (Table 5.101). 
Relationship between "managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP" and "the extent of 
control they have over the performance parameters of their variable pay". 
• It is found that there is a statistically significant correlation between "managers' 
level of satisfaction with STVPP" and "the extent of control they have over the 
performance parameters of their variable pay". This is a case of positive correlation 
indicating that high scores on 'mangers' degree of control over performance 
parameters of their variable pay' are associated with high scores of 'level of 
managers' satisfaction with STVPP'. 2.3% of the variability in 'managers' level of 
satisfaction with STVPP' can be explained by differences in 'degree of control over 
performance parameters of their variable pay'. These test results are significant. 
(Table 5.102) 
Managers' perception about degree of achievability of the threshold level goal 
• The average perception of managers, regarding achieyability of threshold level 
goal, is little higher than partial level. It is found that there is considerable variance 
among managers' views. Some managers perceive that degree of achievability is 
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little more than 'to a small extent', while some believe this degree to be even higher 
than 'large extent' of achievability. (Table 5.103) 
Correlation between managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP and the perceived 
impact of STVPP on their performance. 
• There is a statistically insignificant relationship, found between 'level of managers' 
satisfaction with STVPP' and the 'perceived impact of STVPP on their 
performance'. The two variables are unrelated. This is a case of positive correlation 
indicating that high scores about 'mangers' level of satisfaction with STVPP' are 
associated with high scores for 'perceived impact of STVPP on their performance'. 
The strength of association between these two variables is very weak. It is 
concluded that the above test is non-significant. The perceived impact of STVPP on 
managers' performance is not accompanied by a similar upward movement of 
'managers' level of satisfaction with STVPP'. Simply put, the two variables do not 
go hand in hand. (Table 5.104) 
Whether managers' involvement in design has a positive impact on their level of 
satisfaction with STVPP 
• The average view among the HR personnel is that of considerably high agreement 
that managers' involvement in design would contribute to higher levels of 
satisfaction with STVPP. They have offered significant support to the view, and 
there is considerable convergence among the opinions expressed. The results are 
statistically significant, indicating that in view of the HFl personnel, managers' 
involvement in the design of STVPP would enhance their level of satisfaction (with 
STVPP). (Table 5.105 and 5.106) 
• The finance personnel have shown clear agreement in support of the view that 
should managers be involved in the design of the STVPP, it would have a positive 
impact on their satisfaction with STVPP-functioning. Some of them have offered 
only half-hearted agreement to this viewpoint, and there are some who have offered 
considerably strong support in favour of this relationship. It is found that finance 
personnel believe that managers' involvement in design of STVPP would help 
increase their satisfaction with STVPP. Results are statistically significant, which is 
also borne out by high level of agreement (about the view) found among the 
Finance personnel. (Table 5.107 and 5.108). 
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• It is found that managers believe that if they participate in the design process, then 
it would have a positive impact on their resultant satisfaction level. Extent of 
variance within the sample group is limited. Statistically significant results are 
found that managers agree that given their involvement in the design phase of 
STVPP, it would have a positive impact on their level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
(Table 5.109 and 5.110). This finding can be used to build upon Beer et al.'s (1984) 
advocacy that satisfaction and also motivation is a function of whether employees 
perceive equity in distribution of reward. The finding that involvement in design 
process would aid satisfaction level could also be actuated through its effect on 
mangers' perception of equity in distribution of reward. 
Whether managers' involvement in implementation has a positive impact on their level 
of satisfaction with STVPP. 
• HR personnel have expressed clear agreement favouring the view that managers' 
involvement in the implementation stage of STVPP, would help them with higher 
levels of satisfaction with STVPP. It is indicated that there is considerable 
dispersion among the views of HR personnel. There are a section of HR personnel 
who have shown tentative belief in ability of such involvement for increasing 
managers' satisfaction. Also, there are some HR personnel, who consider such 
involvement to be vitally important, and they quite strongly agree that such 
involvement could increase managers' satisfaction level. It is found that managers' 
involvement in the implementation phase of STVPP would be a helpful step in 
enhancing their satisfaction with STVPP. This is in view of the HR personnel, and 
these results are statistically significant. (Table 5.111 and 5.112). 
The finance personnel clearly agree that if managers are involved in the 
implementation of STVPP then it would have a positive impact on their satisfaction 
level with STVPP. They have shown clear agreement to the supposed relationship 
between the two variables. There is noticeable degree of divergence, wherein few 
finance personnel show weak agreement in its support, while there are others who hold 
considerably strong opinion about the perceived impact of involvement-in-
implementation on satisfaction-level of managers. Results show healthy agreement 
among finance personnel about positive impact of managers' involvement in 
implementation phase on their (managers') level of satisfaction with STVPP. These 
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results are statistically significant.(Table 5.113 and 5.114). It is found that managers 
quite agree on the point that their involvement in the implementation process would 
have a positive impact on their satisfaction level with STVPP. Some managers agree to 
this view only partially while some agree to this perspective significantly. Statistically 
significant results have been found to prove that managers agree that if they are 
involved in the implementation process of STVPP, then it would have a positive impact 
on their level of satisfaction with STVPP. The test results are statistically significant. 
6.6 Review of Hypotheses 
TABLE 6.1 
Review of Hypotheses 
S.No. 
Hon 
Hoi2 
Hoi3 
Ho2I 
Ho22 
Ho23 
Ho31 
Hypotheses 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' 
performance, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' 
performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on managers' 
performance, as they themselves perceive it. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisation's 
performance, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisation's 
performance, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Short term variable pay plan has no impact on organisation's 
performance, as perceived by managers. 
Clear understanding of purpose of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as perceived by 
Human Resource personnel. 
Result 
Rejected 
Failed to reject 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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S.No. 
Ho32 
Ho33 
Ho41 
Ho42 
Ho43 
Ho51 
Ho52 
Ho53 
H06I 
Hypotheses 
Clear understanding of purpose of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as perceived by 
Finance personnel. 
Clear understanding of purpose of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as they themselves 
perceive it. 
Clear understanding of working of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as perceived by 
Human Resource personnel. 
Clear understanding of working of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as perceived by 
Finance personnel. 
Clear understanding of working of short term variable pay plan 
has no impact on managers' performance, as they themselves 
perceive it.. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by 
Human Resource personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as perceived by 
Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as they 
themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as 
perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Result 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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S.No. 
Ho62 
Ho63 
Ho7 
Ho8 
Hoioi 
Ho 102 
Ho 103 
HOI 11 
Hypotheses 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as 
perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' satisfaction, as 
they themselves perceive it. 
There is no significant difference among the perception of 
managers. Human Resources function, and that of Finance 
function, about impact of STVPP on managers' performance. 
There is no significant difference among the perception of 
managers, Human Resources function, and that of Finance 
function, about impact of STVPP on organization 
performance. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding of the purpose 
of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding of the purpose 
of STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding of the purpose 
of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding of 
the purpose of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
Result 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Failed to reject 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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S.No. 
HOI 12 
H0113 
H0121 
H0122 
H0123 
H0131 
H0132 
H0133 
HoH 
Hypotheses 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding of 
the purpose of STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding of 
the purpose of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the 
working of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the 
working of STVPP, as perceived by Finance personnel. 
Managers' involvement in design of short term variable pay 
plan has no impact on managers' understanding about the 
working of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding 
about the working of STVPP, as perceived by Human Resource 
personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding 
about the working of STVPP, as perceived by Finance 
personnel. 
Managers' involvement in implementation of short term 
variable pay plan has no impact on managers' understanding 
about the working of STVPP, as they themselves perceive it. 
Managers' perceived impact of STVPP on their performance 
Result 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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S.No. 
Hoi5 
H016 
Hypotheses 
has no correlation with their (managers') level of satisfaction 
with STVPP. 
Managers' perceived impact of STVPP on their performance 
has no correlation with the extent of their (managers') control 
over the performance parameters of their variable pay. 
Extent of managers' control over performance parameters of 
their variable pay has no correlation with their (managers') 
level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
Result 
Failed to reject 
Failed to reject 
6.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has focused on providing the findings threadbare. Background pertaining 
to tests and procedures used is sufficiently provided in the analysis chapter (chapter 5). 
There are no substantive differences among the three groups (managers, HR personnel 
and finance personnel) regarding their understanding (or perception) about the purpose 
of STVPP. The HR group is mainly involved in the design process, and only some 
organizations involve finance at this stage. Top management is considerably involved 
in the design process, while no importance is given to middle managers' involvement in 
design process. Reporting about the gap-analysis exists mainly at the macro level of 
STVPP funcfioning. Middle managers' involvement is only for purposes of deciding 
their individual-level performance parameters, and for deciding their individual-level 
target goals. Huge majority of managers believe that their prospective involvement in 
the STVPP process would be beneficial, and is therefore desirable. Many of them, 
however, raised concerns as to its feasibility. Majority of HR personnel too perceive 
such involvement initiative as helpftil. 
The design and implementation aspects have been studied for rendering clarity about 
nature of these plans, as these are practiced in the Indian software industry. These plans 
are varied across organizations, mainly with differences that are more in terms of the 
figures used, than in terms of differences in methodology adopted. Apparently, these 
differences among the systems of design and implementation are not significant. 
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STVPP communication is mainly carried out througli intranet, with little focus o n 
discussion method, that holds infinitely more potential for effectiveness. All relevant 
plan details are duely communicated. Performance progress reports of individuals are 
conveyed during formal appraisal exercise, and as such reports about gap analysis are 
not provided. Organisation progress reports, though accessible to employees all the 
while, are explicitly communicated only when financial statements are prepared and 
officially announced. Gap analysis, in case or organization too, is not provided. 
Majority of organisations provide payout related information in the same manner in 
which regular payout amount is communicated to employees. Added information for 
explaining calculation of payout amount is largely not provided. The Human resources 
group is mainly involved in plan design and plan administration. Top management is 
inevitability involved at an overall ownership level. Finance' involvement is more at 
the level of maintaining the company budget, than at the level of design and 
implementation nitty-gritties. 
Most organisations motivate managers by emphasizing its incentive value. The 
communication systems, if upgraded, can significantly enhance its motivational value 
for managers. There is scope for enhancement in this aspect of STVPP processes. 
Perceptually, variable pay plans have had a positive impact on managers' performance, 
only the finance group is little less optimistic about this results. On an average, 
managers' performance level is 90%, while their threshold is at 70%, giving a clear 
margin of 20%) as overachievement. However, it is emphasized yet again, causation 
can't be established. It has been found that mangers' performance results can't be 
impacted by increasing managers' influencability over their performance parameters. 
The three groups perceive that STVPP has a positive impact on organisation's 
performance, while managers are little less optimistic about it, as compared to the other 
two groups. Oragnisations' achievement is 78% (for the period in consideration) and 
when compared against average threshold of 93%, it leaves a clear 15% goal 
achievement, in the form of overachievement. 
Managers mainly regard STVPP as a tool for driving their performance results. In their 
view, it is not so much a tool for supporting achievement of business objectives. 
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Majority of them perceive existence of their iine-of-sight, however, it is not expMcitly 
communicated through a process or a system. 
Perceptually, managers' understanding is fairly high about the superficial aspects like 
understanding about its structure, purpose of threshold and overall working. They have 
little idea about payout determination and also about how the process works in a top 
down manner beginning at the level of organisation budget, that culminates in their 
payout amount. 
Managers' satisfaction level bears a correlation with degree of control over 
performance parameters. It is found that managers agree that their involvement in the 
STVPP process, would increase their level of satisfaction with STVPP. 
In the next chapter, a summary is provided of the results and the learnings obtained 
from the study. These should be helpful to those who use short term variable pay plans 
or are contemplating their use, and it should also be of considerable interest to the 
academic community, as it amplifies this particular subject in considerable detail, and 
crystallizes some of its facets, that are often (and unknowingly) overlooked or 
diminished in their importance despite their criticality 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Background 
It all began with a quest for increasing productivity and performance of employees and 
that of the organizations. 'New pay' systems that form the backbone of variable pay 
systems, were cast in conditions of intense competition, that occurred in America in the 
1980s (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992). There was a productivity crisis, and in their own 
way, compensation designers thought they could salvage their organizations by using 
pay systems that would focus on the larger goal of organization performance. Possibly, 
'New Pay' systems were endeared due to traditional pay systems' failure to 
accommodate the tumultuous changes occurring in nations, economies, organizations 
and its employees. On second thoughts, it appears that traditional plans could have been 
turned around, even with use of principles of reengineering. For instance - one 
direction could be to rehaul the base pay systems by a simple move like keeping 
fraction of merit increase as permanent, and keeping chunk of it non-permanent. 
Perhaps, the traditional pay systems carried the negative image of being overbound by 
complex rules, while 'New pay' systems carried the image of a slick new change 
initiative, that had the advantage of being propagated by a white face. The situation is 
not too different from, how Indian shopkeepers would react to foreign customers, and 
also how Indian students would perceive foreign authors' books vis-a-vis their 
respective Indian counterparts. Despairingly, the British Raj, has left us Indians, with 
the ingrained attitude of subservience - of bowing down to anything smooth and suave, 
that is new and catching-on. The first entry route of variable pay systems in Indian 
Industry for white-collar employees, made its way through the MNCs that began 
operating in the software & seiyices sector of Indian industiy. Their compensation 
systems, got transfused in the entire software sector, and by and by, other Indian 
industries too, caught on to the growing trend of using variable pay systems. 
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As things stand, variable pay systems are entrenched in Indian industry, however, it is a 
question marie, as to how effective these are in serving their intended purposes. The 
results of this study, that answer some of the crucial questions pertaining to its 
effectiveness, are summarized in the sections given below. 
7.2 Design and Implementation systems of Short term variable pay 
plans 
The results of the study are particularly relevant at this time due to promised growth of 
the Indian IT industry. The Indian IT industry is poised to grow to touch revenues of 
$225 billion by 2020, and it is also identified that there is additional potential worth 150 
billion dollar, provided various measures are taken, namely transforming business 
environment, infrastructure development and talent development ("IT-BPO revenue", 
2009). The finding is based on a joint report by Mckinsey and Nasscom, which is 
considerably futuristic and is titled - Perspective 2020. Of the three measures cited, 
talent development is apparently controllable or influenceable, towards which 
compensation is a recognized and established contributor. The above finding sets the 
tone for measures to impact performance results by means of involvement in pay 
programs, and also by deliberately working on increasing influencability over 
performance parameters, since it is known to correlate positively with satisfaction with 
pay program. Variable pay use, in light of the findings of its ability to positively 
influence performance results, could aid in combatting some of recognized threats to 
India's economy, primary one being shortage of employable talent. Implicit in this 
recognition is also the lacuna of their inability to hold on to talent, and letting it fritter 
away due to various reasons that may bristle an employee or attract him/her to greener 
pastures. This particular failing is largely controllable, and in some measure amenable 
to action at organization level measures. 
STVPP design and implementation systems 
One of the unique aspects of variable pay plans is the emphasis they place on the plan 
development and design process (McAdams & Hawk, 1994). The STVPPs have been 
studied comprehensively for the purpose of understanding how these are structured and 
how these are implemented. This much background was required since the enquiry was 
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about its impact on managers' and organisations' results. It proved helpful for purposes 
of contrasting their design aspects with the theoretical constructs, and also for 
comparing these with managers' perception about the plans. 
It is widely believed that variable pay plans give the best message when plans are 
designed to ensure that organizations achieve measureable financial gain, and also 
when employees receive payout awards (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992). According to the 
authors, this is critical to new variable pay. Figure 7.1 encapsulates how this philosophy 
of STVPP is transmitted to employees by way of its functioning. 
Fig 7.1 
Achieving partnersliip feelings through payout mechanism 
The act o/'employees 
receiving awards' 
'Measurable financial gain' 
to organization. 
r The above two, occur at the same J ) 
Payouts are given, only 
when an organization 
benefits on account of its 
bottonJine. 
It becomes clear to all, that 
variable pay plan is adding 
value. 
Strong support to variable 
pay system, especially 
among employees who 
participate in these. 
Feeling of partnership 
builds - since employee 
payout and organizations' 
gain, are shown as 
occurring together. 
Purpose of STVPPs 
The above figure, in a way presents the philosophy on which a variable pay plan is 
built. This study has found that 7% organizations' project their STVPPs with the 
objective of 'achieving alignment between employee goals and organisation's goals'. 
None of the organizations reported the objective of'psychology of ownership feelings'. 
The study results make it apparent that the above philosophy of variable pay plans, is 
practically not communicated through the objectives' statement. Quite logically, 
managers also have failed to perceive 'ownership feelings' as the objective of STVPP. 
However, 10% managers had reported 'alignment' as its key objective. There have 
been past researches that have put only light emphasis on the need for better 
empowering employees by deepening their line of sight with business goals. For 
instance - Filipczak (1996) suggested that management should combine such incentive 
schemes with initiatives like giving employees increased opportunity for offering inputs 
in their jobs, and also employees should be given higher regard. To say the least, this is 
a very remote suggestion, only indirectly connected to the need for increasing 
managers' line-of-sight. More than a communication issue, it appears to be a matter of 
faulty conceptualization. Industry needs to realize that if a variable pay plan is 
projected in the manner as depicted above, then employees would exhibit higher buy-in 
to the program. 
The study has found that due to absence of variable pay plan's projection as a means of 
generating partnership feelings in employees, this system is equated to incentives by 
most employees. Consider the following facts that will make the argument more 
relevant. 
- 87% organizations use the objectives of 'linking pay with performance' or for 
reasons of 'driving employee performance'. 
- 53% organizations project their pay plans as an incentive lever for motivating 
managers. 
1 So as to avoid glitches in understanding, HR's views have been taken to mean organisation's views. 
On a purely official basis, this should be true since at all the sample organizations, the human 
resources function has the administration responsibility and also the ownership of these systems. 
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- 41% managers are motivated by either the incentive aspect or performance 
differentiation or because of better measurability of performance. These three 
aspects are very well true for incentives too. Glaringly, 32% managers are not 
motivated by STVPPs at all. 
The above three points clearly show that variable pay plans are projected to employees 
as incentive plans. This explains the relatively low level of motivation, that managers 
derive from these systems. Thus, variable pay is presented to employees, more like a 
carrot (as Alfie Kohn, put it,), than an intrinsic motivator. If variable pay continues to 
be used as an extrinsic motivator, then it would be nothing more than incentives, which 
are known to kill intrinsic motivation in the long run. 
When strategic planning perspective is used, that aims to enhance feelings of 
accountability, responsibility and partnership feelings, then variable pay systems induce 
intrinsic motivation too, in employees. Another conclusion is that the three groups 
perceive the most important objective of STVPP, differently. It may, therefore, be 
concluded that a regular participation of all the three groups would help them converge 
towards higher levels of commonality or better agreement among their perception. Based 
on the results of this empirical study, that points towards a lack of shared 
understanding about the purpose of STVPP, it may be concluded that there is a distinct 
need for increasing transparency of information systems and communication 
programmes associated with STVPP design and implementation. 
Involvement in the STVPP process 
It is concluded that mainly the human resource flinction is involved in the design 
process of STVPP. Finance is involved more at the macro level of plan design. 
Managers are involved in the process, in a very limited way. A look at these figures 
goes to prove that organizations really have not changed their systems with introduction 
of variable pay systems. The above patterns of involvement inspire a feeling of deja vu, 
in the sense, that, this has always been the kind of involvement, that has been 
prevalent in the industry. HR has always made policies concerning employees, finance 
has always been involved at budgetary level, and employees have always been involved 
in setting their targets and deciding their performance parameters. It may be concluded 
that patterns of involvement would need to be intensified if the pay plan is to be 
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projected as a strategic initiative. Three empirical studies provide some support for 
participation in the implementation of pay plans( Jenkins & Lawler, 1981; Lawler, 
1981 ; Bullock, 1983; Gabris & Mitchell, 1988; Gabris, Mitchell, & McLemore, 1985). 
The results of this study are in line with the suggestion made by these studies. Heneman 
(1992) believed that enough confidence could be placed in the generalizability of 
these findings, as the studies took place in very diverse settings. 
Organisations would welcome such measure, since both HR group and managers' 
groups have shown overwhelming support in favour of proposed involvement of 
managers in STVPP process. This finding is in line with Heneman's (1992, p. 179) 
observation, in context of merit pay plans, that "Successful implementation involves 
participation in the development of the pay plan by the parties who will be affected." 
-The so-called "soft", human-oriented measures such as employee attitudes are credible 
predictors of their behavior (Luthans & Peterson, 2001). This study has found 
overwhelming support for increasing managers' involvement in STVPP process. This is 
strongly supported by Gallup's impressive empirical evidence of measured employee 
involvement, and desirable organizational outcomes. They observed the trend over the 
years, and found the relafionship true and credible (Buckingham and Coffman, 1999). 
Design and Implementation aspects 
- Majority of organizations tie variable pay to individual performance results. A large 
number of these, tie payout amount to organisation's results too, but the linkage at 
other intermediate levels of organizafion, is limited. To tighten linkages at various 
levels of aggregation, many issues are involved - that of increasing line-of-sight, 
that of increasing involvement, more transparency in communication systems, 
education about STVPPs, clear conceptualization and communication of the policy 
purpose, objective performance measurement systems etc. Once these aspects are 
adequately addressed, managers would be more receptive to the transition from 
individual-linked payout to group-linked payout. In this regard, the study concurs 
with the research finding of Kristine and Mark (2003) that the variable pay 
programs that truly reward individual performance are more beneficial to the 
organization. The issue of appropriately rewarding individual performance can be 
adequately addressed, even while structuring payout structure at multiple 
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aggregation levels, by means of an appropriate performance management system. 
Past researches too have emphasized the need for effective performance 
measurement sytem (Armstrong and Stephens, 2005), 
Most organsiations tie payout calculation to rating system. More objective measures 
of performance are needed for establishing employee trust in the system. 
Half the organizations offer upside potential, while the other half do not. Many such 
results of the study make one wonder why organizations use variable pay systems, 
when there is unwillingness to play in the true spirit of the game? If variable pay 
system is truly a 'risk-reward equation', then upside potential should be 
considerable, and it should be tied to progressively higher levels of target goal, that 
are made clear and specific. Goal setting theory's principles of using challenging 
and clear goals, can be gainfully used, by offering upside potential opportunity, 
against goals that are both - challenging and specific. Taking it a step further, as 
per expectancy theory, if the level of goal is shown as attainable (from effort to 
performance), and if clearly communicated (instrumentality will be higher), and 
also if sufficient pay differentiation is performed (valence will be higher), then 
overall expectancy will be higher. Also, as per Skinner's reinforcement theory, in 
addition to the above desirables, contingency must be maintained, rather, it should 
be actively forged between performance and payout, and also the frequency of 
payout should increase. The CFO of a Mumbai based software organization 
remarked, that once the organization paid payouts, even when the organization had 
earned just 34% of target goals. Instances like these erode the conviction of 
employees in variable pay plans, and the contingency between behavior and reward 
is severed. According to the CFO, it was their CEO's largesse that every year, 
organizations religiously made the payouts, regardless of performance results 
obtained. To complete the example, this particular orgnisation, uses a broad matrix 
to map performance, and also, it does not define payout potential. This shows that 
those who make payouts using discretionary basis, they disregard the performance-
payout contingency principle, in the very first place. They proceed with the system, 
just as it were the traditional merit pay based system, that allows ample room for 
subjective and loose relationship between performance and payout. 
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Performance payout schedules are defined in terms of usually 3 broad milestones, 
and in between these slabs, payout is determined proportionately. 
Organisation level threshold, on an average is 78% of target. 
Most organizations give payout amount on annual basis. For increasing its 
reinforcement power, it needs to be paid out more regularly, and if possible based 
on specific performance measurements, that organizations would like to improve. 
It is a process' weakness that most organizations convey line-of-sight implicitly, 
and there is lack of any formal system, towards this end. While managers very well 
perceive that they are connected to business goals, the impression can be made far 
clearer with introduction of formal systems and processes, that are adhered to 
regularly. 
Most managers have only partial control over their performance parameters. This is 
likely to lead to feelings of a blurred line-of-sight with business goals. 
Managers have clear understanding of the purpose of threshold. Communication 
about threshold level is an essential element of review-related discussions; thus the 
resultant high level of assimilation about this aspect. 
Till now, many instances have been cited that go to prove that variable pay systemi 
is implemented in the manner of 'old wine (packed in) in a new bottle'. Practices 
surrounding STVPPs are like the remnants of the old merit pay system, that have 
not been rehauled. Another such example is that most organizations source the 
payout amount from salary budget. Few organizations, source payouts from project 
based gains, that could be attributed to STVPPs. Need for appropriate variable 
remuneration design has been brought out amply by researchers Hill (1993) and 
Hudson & Hudson(2005). 
Most organizations communicate STVPPs through intranet. Such communication 
lacks the depth, that often accompanies the discussion method. Also, a face-to-face 
method would impress upon managers the importance of STVPPs. Most 
organizations do not convey performance-gap related infonnation, and others, who 
do so, resort to use of informal means. 
Usually organizations communicate information about payout amount through a 
letter or a pay-slip that informs them about other salary components. By and large, 
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explanatory information, that reasons out how the payout amount is calculated, is 
not offered to employees. 
- There is a need to focus on information-sharing, including business, financial, 
competitive, performance and planning information. Impact of pay communication 
on satisfaction levels is not so clear (Heneman, 1992). However, Lawler (1972 & 
1981) clearly indicated that empirical studies indeed supported that employee 
satisfaction with pay plans was higher when transparency was better. For this 
reason, an effective communication plan needs to be designed (Britton, 1997 ) as it 
links the critical business success factors with employees' payout amount (Anfuso, 
1995 ) in the minds of employees. 
- The HR function plays a key role in STVPP design and plan management. Finance 
function plays a central role, due to its hold over the company budget. Involvement 
of finance could be increased, as it would help the two functions in reaching higher 
levels of agreement between their views. 
- It is concluded that STVPPs' motivational value could be enhanced by improving 
the communication systems about it. 
7.3 Impact on managers' performance 
Hypotheses about impact of STVPP on managers' performance have tested positive. 
Managers and HR personnel consider that this pay system has a positive impact on 
managers' performance. This particular hypothesis has not been proved true w.r.t 
perception of the Finance group. However, the latter result was found to be statistically 
insignificant. This is reinforced by the further finding that there are no significant 
differences among the perception of the three groups regarding impact of STVPP on 
managers' performance. 
The average managers' performance results for the period covered, touch 91% of target 
level. When this is compared against the average threshold of 69%, there emerges a 
clear overachievement of 22%. There is reason for jubilation since STVPP's minimum 
expectation has been far exceeded. An element of stretch could be gainfully included in 
the threshold level, as it would be helpful to the organization and it also woutd be a 
challenge for the high performers. Taking a cue from Locke';3 goal-setting theory (see 
Locke et. al.,1968), goals are motivating when they are specific, challenging and 
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accepted by employees. Goal specificity can be achieved by tying payout to an 
objective measure of performance, element of challenge an acceptability, both can be 
enhanced by involving managers in the initiative of raising their goal level. In line with 
this initiative, it would be wise to spread out the payout schedule in thinner slices of 
varying performance levels and varying levels of payouts, to offer clearer, keener and a 
deeper shade of differentiation between different levels of performance. Such 
difference has trophy value too, in addition to its obvious economic value. 
Negative correlation is found between managers' control over performance parameters 
and perceived impact of STVPP on their performance. However, the results are 
statistically insignificant, thus no concrete direction is available from this result. 
7.4 Perceived impact on organisations' performance 
Attribution is difficult to achieve in assessing the performance effects of pay systems. 
For this reason, the perceived impact has been studied. The hypotheses about impact of 
STVPP on organisation's performance have tested positive, indicating that the system 
is working well for the organization. However significant differences are found among 
the perception of the three groups, concerning impact of STVPP on organisation's 
performance. Managers are less positive about these results compared to the results 
obtained from the HR and the Finance group. 
Organisations have exceeded their threshold target, on an average by 15% of their 
target. There has been consistent overachievement across the period covered in the 
study. One of the Hyderabad based firm's HR respondent, had pertinently remarked 
that "organization's threshold is purposively kept low, since if this level is not 
achieved, then the investors would kill us". Thus, in order to not to face the wrath of 
investors, threshold is deliberately kept suppressed. Results show that most 
organizations achieved their threshold target, during the period covered in the study. 
Some firms have such high level of confidence in their ability to meet the threshold, 
that they pay part of organization-linked-parameter as a committed sum, spread 
throughout the course of the year. It is clear that organizations can accommodate 
ample stretch element in their threshold level, and they can also use the opportunity to 
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build such a payout schedule that offers lucrative compensation at above-target levels 
of performance. 
7.5 Managers' understanding about STVPP 
Hypotheses that clear understanding about purpose of STVPP would have a positive 
impact on managers 'performance has been supported. This suggests that organizations 
need to invest effort in ensuring that managers have a sound understanding about the 
basic purpose of STVPP. Similarly hypotheses have also supported the need for 
managers to understand the working details of STVPP, as this too has a positive impact 
on managers' performance. 
This means that organizations would be well advised to train and educate managers 
about the purpose as well as the working details of STVPP. One of the areas that 
deserves attention is that of, their line-of-sight with business goals. While most 
managers understand the fundamentals of line-of-sight, it is not very much valued by 
them. An explicit intervention by the organization is needed, to formally emphasize the 
aspect of 'how employees contribute to business goals'. Further, the variable pay 
program can be built on the foundations of this principle (of managers' contribution). 
By doing so, managers would be in a position to understand the win-win or the lose-
lose construct that underlies variable remuneration, and they would also be able to 
develop 'ownership feelings' and perceive 'alignment' with business goals. 
Another aspect, worthy of consideration, is that of managers' understanding about the 
purpose of threshold goal, for which, all managers have shown complete recall. This 
makes it clear, that if an aspect is communicated through discussions, then, 
understanding about it, is built at a very high level. 
Having looked at the understanding levels of both, the human resources group and the 
managers group, it is clear that the latter, in a large measure, depends on the former. 
Thus, the primary issue that needs to be tackled is - about what is the objective that 
organizations wish to pursue through STVPP. This is the appropriate forum to recall 
Abosch' (1998) remark that a hallmark of a successful variable pay program, is an 
unmistakable clarity about what organizations wish to achieve. There are differences in 
understanding about purpose, within the HR group. At first such anomalies need to be 
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ironed out, so that organizations can say in one single voice, what is the objective of its 
STVPP. A second issue to be dealt with, is the variance in perception between the 
Finance group and the HR group. One of the means of ironing out differences among 
them, is to increase finance' involvement at the micro level too. 
In many cases, it came across, that the typical role boundaries were - that HR took care 
of the policy, and at the time of payout, finance was involved in disbursement of 
payout. Additionally, another area of finance' participation is, that of providing data 
about expenses-till-date or other information to enable user departments in their 
planning exercise. The top management can assert the need for Increased involvement 
of other functions too, since it has the approving authority over STVPP in a 
considerable number (60%) of organizations. 
There is support for the hypotheses that managers' involvement in both the design and 
the implementation phases of STVPP, has a positive impact on their level of 
understanding about STVPP, as it positively affects their understanding of its purpose 
and also about its working details. 
Heery E.( 1996) emphatically remarked that a union presence can support the 
Employee Involvement practices that New pay writers want. This also suggests the 
background that EI initiatives are not very forthcoming from the management ie why 
Union presence helps. The clear connotation of the above remark is that the kind of 
involvement initiatives that can see a New pay program succeed, require complete buy-
in of top management. In order to achieve such unconditional support, either there is 
'push' factor applied through use of organized groups at managers' end or the top 
management willingly initiates involvement initiative, through use of "pull" factor. 
7.6 Managers' Satisfaction with STVPPs 
It is concluded that managers have limited control over the performance parameters that 
determine their variable payout amount. The presence of a mix of team-based 
parameters and individual-based parameters explains the reason for a dip in their degree 
of influencability. The very philosophy of variable pay system is about forging 
partnership feelings between employees and organization. For such partnership to take 
place and for it to thrive, it is expected that linkages would be built at multiple levels of 
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aggregation. The solution, therefore is, to build processes and systems that help 
managers in building their line-of-sight with such units. Once managers are able to 
perceive their fitment into the larger performance framework, their perceptions about 
degree of influencability are likely to register beneficial results. 
• // is concluded that positive correlation exists between how much control managers 
exercise control over their performance parameters and their level of satisfaction 
with STVBPP. The clear inference is that by increasing degree of control, 
satisfaction can be affected. It is found that 2.3% variability in satisfaction can be 
explained by the degree of control. Hence, to that extent, satisfaction level can be 
increased by working on managers' degree of control. Once again, setting up line-
of-sight will come into play, when enhancing controllability over performance 
parameters. It will be an important precursor and also an important fallout of 
increasing the degree of control. 
• Managers' degree of achievability of threshold goal is little higher than partial. On 
one hand most managers, infact all of them, barring few stray cases, achieved their 
threshold goal, while on the other hand they perceive degree of achievability to be 
not much higher than partial. There seems to be a paradox, a conflict between the 
reality and what they have professed. The reason for the discrepancy is that the 
threshold goal often comprises goals at various levels of aggregation. While all of 
these may be reasonable to achieve, managers donot have sufficient knowledge 
about how achievable the goal at the unit level or at the organizations level is. For 
this reason, while they are able to assert that they shall be able to achieve their 
individual level goal, they are often confounded as to what to say about 
achievability of unit level goals, BU level goals or LOB level goal. This may have 
lowered their level of achievability, which ultimately averaged at around 'partial' 
level. The argument is testified by the finding that there is considerable variability 
among managers' perception on this account, since for some managers, the project 
level goal may align perfectly with individual level goal. For ex: A training 
manager, in one of Gurgaon based companies, who was heading the training 
division, confirmed that for him, the target achievement of the project was 
equivalent to his personal level of achievement. The two aligned perfectly. The 
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reasons for variability among views is that some managers are farther away from 
higher levels of aggregation, while some are closer. This variability is really on 
account of spread of sample elements across the middle management level stretch. 
// is concluded that there is insignificant correlation found between managers' 
satisfaction with STVPP and the STVPPs' impact on their performance results. It is 
emphasized that while relationship is found to be positive, the results are non-
significant. This shows that the results can't be relied upon. The reason for 
disconnect can be explained. In most cases, infact in all cases, STVPP's perceived 
impact on performance has been positive. The reason is that most of them fear that 
they may lose part of their payout lest they should not perform. Loss of variable 
pay, means to them a terrible loss, since, it is a like a loss of face, loss of privilege, 
and for these reasons, they strive hard to earn their variable payout in as high 
proportions as possible. Infact, it wouldn't be farther fromi the popular perception, 
to consider STVPPs as embodying traits of Stalin or Hitler, from whom people 
wished to be relieved, but they could not assert their wish. Drawing the parallel 
between the two, it may be said that the managers are captivated by STVPP system, 
but, nevertheless, it has a positive impact on their performance, since their life is at 
stake. In this particular case of pay systems, their variable payout amount is at 
stake. Securing this amount back is critical and very vital for them, since they 
consider it a part of their guaranteed pay, which they would not like to forego. 
A very clear inference is that if some risk acceptability is to be built among 
managers, then variable payout has to be implemented using other bases than CTC. 
The closer the link between the two, the higher the entitlement mentality it fosters 
on part of managers. Many managers have held grudges against the STVPP, in the 
words like "I am motivated by the urge to earn back my variable payout", or "this 
system keeps me alert, I am able to focus on the goals, since on it depends, how 
much of my payout will be actualized". Almost laughingly, the only positivity 
associated with payout amount was, that "it is the surprise element that exhilarates 
me". The usual trend is to disburse this amount as a single consolidated cheque at 
the yearend or at the end of quarter. Managers often like to have this so-to-say extra 
income, that they can straight away bank in form of a clear deposit. A clear 
inference is that if willingness among managers towards treating payout as a 
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performance-contingent component, is to be built, then, the first logical step is to 
structure it differently. As per the currently used structures, where payout is tagged 
to CTC, managers almost consider it like their birthright, and for this reason, they 
misconstrue the pay plan as nothing but a pretext on part of management to 
withhold part of their salary. Their attitude towards this component is just filled 
with bitterness. 
• The first mammoth task, that the organisations face is to change managers' 
perception about this component. It is ludicrous that while STVPP is used for 
performance purposes, neither the HR, nor the managers perceive it as a serious 
performance-driven initiative. Most HR personnel believe that the purpose of this 
system is nothing more but to drive employee performance. While this goal too 
culminates in overall organisation objectives, however, the thought pattern does not 
stem from the objective of hitting at the business objectives. There is a sea of 
difference between the orientation and perspective, that can tilt minds in directions 
that are different from those intended by organizations. 
• One HR personnel remarked that the objective (of inculcating ownership feelings) 
was like a "motherhood statement", and in the same sense, the Finance personnel of 
the same organization, in exasperation remarked "we are like dummies, HR tells us 
to pay this much payout, so we do it. We do not question them". While this 
gentleman had actually refused to give details on other questions, towards the end 
he offered rich insight, that more than compensated for his lack of cooperation or 
his stiffness. He remarked (infact he almost howled) "payout should be treated like 
a prize. The amount needs to be big enough, with sufficient differentiation too. 
Otherwise, it is all bullshit". That says a lot about how STVPP is practiced in 
reality, and how it is conceived in literature. Studies have shown that major change 
initiatives do not take shape, and may be shelved at the last stage despite elaborate 
preparation, if the top manager is not fully supportive. Thus, for such a system like 
STVPP, that has a long enough history, piles of literature in its support, but poor 
acceptability from the administrators, a feeling that is multifold accentuated in 
employees' perception, strong interventions are required on part of top management 
to build positive disposition towards STVPPs. This study has found that plan design 
and plan administration, both are responsibilities of HR, while in many cases the 
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approving authority rests with the Top management. Thus, this change initiative too 
needs to begin from the top level itself. As of now, external consultants' role is not 
prevalent and is not practised for instituting STVPPs. However, if the system is to 
be turned around with the zeal that often accompanies OD initiatives, then one 
positive step would be to hire external consultants' services, who are always 
brimming with ideas, that require outlet for operationalisation. 
7.7 Theoretical contribution of the study 
Hypotheses have been supported that if managers are involved in the design or in the 
implementation phase of STVPP, then it would have a positive impact on their level of 
satisfaction with the STVPP. This holds true with both the aspects. It is clear that as of 
now their involvement does not even qualify as worthy of being called 'on the fringes'. 
Absolute surprise and mockery registered the faces of HR personnel and also managers, 
when they were confronted with this issue of involvement, from the researcher. As 
proven by the above hypotheses, if they are involved, it would affect their satisfaction 
positively. Like McAdams and Hawk (1994) said, that satisfaction with variable pay 
program can make or break a program, this step would be in the direction of increasing 
managers' receptivity towards the programme. 
A short term variable pay plan can become an integral component of business strategy 
if it is continuously supported. Considerations for such a step include - Management 
involvement and support. Employee involvement in plan introduction, communication 
of performance, w.r.t. the plan measures. Top Management support can significantly 
contribute to the successful implementation of a pay plan. Such support can consist of 
atleast three features - a) linking pay plan to strategic mission of the organization. For 
instance this feature is observed at Pratt and Whitney (Schneier, 1989), where payout is 
explicitly tied to business goals of the organization, b) endorsement of the plan by the 
top decision makers in the organization. This factor is one of those attributed to the 
success of compensation plan for managers in New York city (Allan and Rosenberg, 
1986). c) use of performance-contingent rewards for all employees, importantly, using 
the same philosophy, as is used for the payout plan for top management. For instance -
ensuring controllability over performance parameters and use of lucrative payout 
potential amounts (Hinkin, Podsakoff and Schriesheim, 1987). 
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A mechanism of Employee involvement in meeting business objectives, is an element of 
a competitive and productive organization.(McAdams & Hawk, 1994). Results of the 
study have found that, at present, the involvement of middle managers in the process of 
designing or implementing short term variable pay plans is dismal, rather negHgible. 
The existing level of their involvement is in aspects that are more related to their 
performance management systems, than to the fabric of variable pay system. Moreso, 
there is complete receptivity about the idea of proposed managers' involvement, among 
the HR personnel and also within the circle of middle managers. 
The following model^ of managers' involvement is suggested, that organisations can 
employ in their organisations. Three of its key features are - a) Basket of short term 
variable pay plans, that offer them choice of various programmmes b) Freedom to 
choose the suitable variable pay program, and c) Open communication about the pay 
plans and the ensuing calculation processes. The model, called the variable pay plan 
choice-model, is presented below (figure 7.2): 
Figure 7.2- The variable pay plan choice-model 
Increasing levels of 
Transparency 
Awareness and Access 
The idea of the pyramidical model is inspired from Lerche (2007, p9), that used a similar structure, but 
for a different subject and in different context. 
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The model has three levels, that are described below: 
Awareness and access - At this level, information about various short term various pay 
plans is detailed and it is freely available. Details about the plans are offered, that give 
managers the freedom to choose the type of pay plan, they desire. The specific 'variable 
pay-to-fixed pay' proportion may be predetermined, so as to avoid any conflict of 
interest between employees and management. The choice would essentially be among 
the levels of aggregation, to which, the payout amount is tied. For instance - Different 
kinds of variable pay structure can be carved out, each having varying percentages of 
organisation-linked component. Business unit linked component, team linked 
component, and the individual-liked component. 
Points and Status - At this level, it would be explained, how points would be 
calculated for varying levels of performance. At all times, a certain indicator or a metric 
(something like sensex reflecting the health of a company), would be readily calculable, 
reflecting managers' performance results, according to the predefined variable pay 
structure. This would be a composite performance index, culled out from performance 
results at all levels of aggregation. Knowledge of such performance result, would give 
managers the chance to know the status of their performance, at any given point of 
time. 
Payout mechanism - At this level, it would be shown how points can be converted into 
rewards. Different formulae may be used for different components. For instance - the 
conversion formula would be differently defined for each level of aggregation. Actual 
amount of reward would depend on the level of performance result. 
Conceivably, an even higher level of choice would be the option to choose the kind of 
salary mix, an employee would want for himself/herself. This means - the freedom to 
determine the respective proportions of fixed and variable components. In other words, 
an employee could decide for himself the mix of 100% fixed pay with no component of 
variable pay. Such a move would earn variable pay system, a more benevolent image, 
unlike the present one, where variable pay systems are often seen as coercive systems 
bullying employees into forcible acceptance of the pay system. 
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Researchers and practitioners, often reflect symptoms of obsession with "business 
alignment", yet, one rarely hears about how to motivate employees to draw out what 
John Purcell calls "discretionary commitment", which drives goals in our modern 
service economy (Purcell, 2003). It is a question worth thrashing out, that considering 
our speedy transformation into the service economy, aren't instruments like STVPP 
needed to draw out the discretionary element from the employees. The broader issue is, 
that organisatons' systems in entirety, need to practise initiatives, to motivate 
employees to deliver a little extra, which may be referred as untapped potential or 
discretionary element or their commitment. One such initiative would be to enhance 
managers' line-of-sight by undertaking relevant initiatives, in this direction. Such an 
endeavour is summarized in figure 7.3. Successful Variable pay plans (or VPPs) create 
a link between company objectives and individual's daily actions. This is 
diagrammatically shown below, as to how the same can be achieved. 
Figure 7.3: 
Variable pay system linkages that 
enhance employee line-of-sight 
Variable Payout 
Structure 
It has to be shown how targets 
fit into organisation's 
performance framework. 
Line of Sight 
Possible ttirougli -
•Employee Involvement 
•Intensive communication 
•Employee education 
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It is important for employees to see this connectivity or else they would see no reason for 
instituting risi<-reward lini<age between organisation and employees. It is clear from 
above that the above equation that aims to enhance line-of-sight, also results in creation 
of 'psychology of ownership' among employees. Such line-of-sight is known to impact 
employee buy-in in favour of the system, that atleast would make employees conducive 
to working under the system. 
A 2007 Hewitt study* reported 91.8% of organisations as users of VPPs. Soon it will 
become a universal compensation practice covering all organizations and employees. It 
will be prudent on part of organisations to carefully design and implement these 
systems and pay attention to minor issues that can significantly affect its success rate. 
For instance - the 2007 Hewitt study highlighted that the prime challenge of VPPs was 
"the implementation issue of poor communication of ...objectives and measures to 
employees" (Human Capital, 2008, p. 42). Similarly there are issues of involvement, 
understanding, education (w.r.t. employees) waiting to be attended. All it takes is a 
genuine desire to put these into a process and ensure their diligent implementation. 
Doing so would plug the gap between theor>' and practice, and make these more 
likeable and effective. 
In a nut shell, the following results have been found for the study, that have been 
proven through the hypothesis laid out for the study. 
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Fig 7.4 Model for enhancing managers' performance through use of 
STVPP 
Involvement of managers in 
implementation process of 
STVPP 
Involvement of managers in 
design process of STVPP 
Managers' 
influencability over 
performance 
parameters 
»• 3 O 
1 s <• 
f' 
1 § 
IVIanagers' satisfaction 
with STVPP 
i 1 
Positive Correlation 
— "0 
3 1/1 
"S ? 
1 
Managers' Understanding 
about working details, and 
about purpose of STVPP 
3 In 
° 1 
Managers' performance 
^ 
? o 
3 In 
• 
Organisation performance 
The study concludes with the results that there is lot of value in organisation's efforts to 
put mechanisms for involving managers deeper into the process of short term variable 
pay plans. This positively impacts their understanding about the STVPP, which in turn 
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positively affects their performance results. For practical guidelines and development 
purposes, this study suggests that the top management must help to create an 
environment in which the managers can be both emotionally involved (ie form strong 
ties to work, supervisors and organization) and cognitively involved (ie express feelings 
of STVPP philosophy, and are provided with information and feedback). 
Further, the study ends on the note that it would be a worthwhile effort to calculate the 
ROl of instituting involvement mechanism. Nevertheless, it is apparent that such 
initiative would result in better employee acceptance of the system. Researcher would 
like to conclude that the distinct advantage of traveling across the country and meeting 
different kinds of managers was that it offered the benefii: of sharp insight into 
managers' views. At present, as these systems are implemented, managers are bitterly 
averse to the use and sustenance of short term variable pay plans. This counts more 
than performance results, since attitudes directly impact the culture of place they 
inhabit. In the least, it may be certainly said that managers' increased involvement in 
the process of STVPP, would work like magic in displacing their negative feelings with 
a feelings of receptivity and positive disposition. However, future research would do 
well to test the impact of involvement mechanisms on employee attitudes towards 
STVPP, since its positive impact on performance results is already proven in this study. 
7.8 Scope of future study 
The results of the study can be gainfully used in future in light of promising findings 
that future growth in the IT industry would largely accrue on account of untapped 
verticals such as healthcare, public sector, media and utilities ("IT-BPO revenue", 
2009). Just as the software industry now offers a fertile ground for studying variable 
pay plans, in future, these to-be-groomed sectors could learn from the knowledge 
gathered till then and plough these back for value addition. These verticals could then 
be examined in a focused manner for fUrther understanding the efficacy of variable pay 
systems. 
1. Measurement of plan success-
• McAdams and Hawk (1994) in their study of 2200 variable pay plans, were able to 
measure the plan success in terms of financial results, in addition to calculating 
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metrics of satisfaction and nonfinancial results. They calculated metrics like 'gain-
per-employee-per-year', 'payout-per-empioyee-per-year', and 'payout-to-gain-
relationship', to arrive at the financial measures of plan success. In order to arrive at 
these calculations, the authors used the following financial figures that were 
provided to them by their sample organizations - Total value gain in one year, 
performance-payout schedule, base pay figures of employee participants, total 
declared payout amount, value of gain in productivity terms. Despite the luxury of 
being able to procure such data, the authors admitted candidly that the respondents 
had great difficulty in reporting the value of their gains, that could be attributed to 
STVPP use. 
With regard to above, the researcher would like to mention that similar kind of 
studies need to be carried out in Indian set-up too , to make a meaningful 
contribution in the field of compensation reseach. This would require better systems 
at organizations that are more measurement oriented, and also a willingness at their 
end, to share such information liberally, with the researchers. Such studies need to 
be carried out in Indian industries too, since variable pay systems are used rapidly, 
across industries. Therein lies a huge scope for conducting studies that can calculate 
with precision, the total gain value of a variable pay plan, and also the gain value 
per employee. This inturn should help organizations to make a more informed 
choice about which type of variable pay plan to use for their specific purposes. 
Similar study framework as the one used in this study, could be gainfully used for 
long term cash based or long-term stock based variable pay plans. 
Organisations pursue different objectives with use of variable pay plans (or 
performance-reward plans).McAdams & Hawk (1994) demonstrated that the most 
important planned outcomes (in the order of importance are): To improve business 
performance, To Foster teamwork, To improve performance-reward linkage, to 
improve morale, to improve communications, and to create an empowering 
environment. Just as this study has focused on the plans that focus on improving 
business performance, similarly other studies could pick up other objectives as their 
starting point, and pursue research on performance impact of such plans. 
This study has conclusively found that involvement initiative would exert a 
positive impact on managers' performance. It needs to be tested if the involvement 
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initiative would similarly work well for lower levels of management too. With 
knowledge about utility of involvement for lower levels of management, it can be 
gainfully decided, the extent to which such initiative would work well for them. 
7.9 Concluding Paragraph 
The chapter lays the philosophical background for institution of New pay systems and 
embeds in the narrative implementation of variable pay systems as its primary tool. The 
goal of 'achieving partnership feelings' is like a noble and a key objective of STVPP, 
which, much to the despair of all stakeholders, has eluded the designers of the systems. 
Not unexpectedly, its recall is non-existent. It is proposed that a simple mechanism like 
observing a proportionate or a close relationship between payout amount and the 
company's financial gain, can promote 'psychology of ownership' in employees. 
Primarily organisations consider its main objective as 'linking pay with performance'. 
Mainly the human resources function takes ownership of these systems, and fulfills its 
administration needs. Finance plays a crucial role in ensuring STVPP's ability to keep 
the compensation budget tightly reined. Overall, finance takes macro level 
responsibility of the STVPP. It is found that STVPP has a positive impact on managers' 
performance, and also on oganisations' performance. 
It is found that the managers' satisfaction with STVPP is positively correlated with 
managers' ability to influence the performance measures that determine their payout 
amount. Involvement is most desired, since the study found truth in the hypothesis 
that involving managers impacts their understanding, and further hypothesis of 
understanding having positive impact on performance results is also proven. Thus, this 
study finds a distinct route to improve performance, which is by means of higher 
involvement. 
The link with the past practice of tying payout to individual performance in a majority 
or predominant manner, needs to be weakened, in order to embrace involvement. 
Increased payout linkages at group level of aggregation will perhaps be suitably 
coupled with need for higher involvement. Another symptom of sticking to past, is the 
practice of having performance rating systems, still running the show (ie used widely). 
When marching ahead to a scenario of higher involvement, higher stake in group 
performance, and yet wanting greater control over performance parameters (since it 
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correlates positively with satisfaction with STVPP), it is urgently required that 
performance measurement be made objective, and such a move could be easily 
followed by horde of communication systems for increasing transparency too. Higher 
transparency could then be accompanied with a change in communication method from 
purely intranet method to using the discussion method too. 
Something appears amiss in the findings that despite an overachievement to the tune of 
22% (derived by subtracting threshold from the achievement level), there is little 
positive regard regard among mangers towards STVPP. Like goal theory says loud and 
clear that challenging goals motivate, similarly threshold needs to be stretched up and 
mangers needs to sense the challenge in meeting this landmark. Really the prescription 
of challenging(also specific), reasonable yet achievable goals needs to be 
operationalized. In consonance with this measure, the payout amount would have to be 
choreographed synchronously to make it look like a close relationship, that is dynamic 
and acutely sensitive to differences in performance level. The study concludes with 
suggestions for future research that are mainly in nature of suggesting industry to make 
available meticulous metrics for carrying out more quantity-prone measurements, so 
that in future researchers would not need to elaborate to such great extent to make their 
point, while letting numbers speak for them. 
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Annexure 2.1 
COMPENSATION TERMINOLOGY, IN REFERENCE TO TOTAL 
REMUNERATION STRUCTURE 
Remuneration element / scheme 
1. COMPENSATION 
1.1 Fixed remuneration 
1.2. Variable remuneration 
1.2.1 Short-term variable pay plans 
1.2.1.1 Profit-sharing 
- First-return plans 
- Threshold plans 
-Operational (budget) plans vs. Performance 
Definition and description 
• Cash-based remuneration. 
• Benefits and intangible remuneration are 
excluded. 
• Non-discretionary or merit-based fixed 
remuneration. 
• Normally contractually agreed. 
• Does not vary according to the performance or 
results. 
• Contingent on discretion, performance or 
results achieved. 
* Motivates performance. 
• Alleviates pressure on long-term fixed salary 
cost. 
• Delivered through variable pay plans or 
schemes*. 
• Paid within one accounting period or upon an 
event. Scheme duration is normally equal to or 
shorter than one year. 
• Profit-based. 
• Egalitarian distribution and formula-based. 
"Pay shareholders first" principle. 
• Objective financial or discretionary 
measurements. 
» Identification of participants is difficult. 
• Long line of sight for participants. 
• Works better if it is applied organisafion-wide. 
• Incentive begins with the first Rupee earned, 
e.g. 10% of profits earned. 
• Incentive accumulates once a fair return has 
been achieved, e.g. 10% above Rs.5 million. 
• No profit matrix used. 
• Specific to the business plan. 
• Operational plans are unstable and subject to 
external factors, specifically industry sector's 
volatility. 
Remuneration element / scheme 
- Peer company comparisons 
1.2.1.2. Performance-sharing 
- Gain-sharing 
- Goal-sharing 
1.2.1.3. Individual performance- based schemes 
-Management by Objectives 
- Output-based schemes 
1.2.2 Long-term incentives 
Deflnition and description 
• Selected measures for comparison. 
• Comparison relative to peers' results. 
• Remove some of the volatility caused by 
external factors. 
• Rewards based on performance. 
• Typically egalitarian: participants share on the 
same basis. 
• Share in the performance gain. 
• If quantitative improvement happens over set 
baselines, for one or more measures, 
participants share in the gains achieved. 
• Goals are future-orientated business objectives 
and performance targets in which participants 
share if the targets are achieved. Not against 
history. 
• A predetermined amount is paid for the 
achievement of the team/organisational goals. 
" Goals could be set beyond one-year time 
horizon or as multiple targets. 
• Single or multiple goals could be set. 
• Use individual performance as the basis for 
payouts. 
• More measures with a short line of sight are 
used. 
• The incentive focu,5es on the participant's 
performance. 
• Employee-development technique with the 
superior and subordinates or group of 
subordinates jointly identifying and establishing 
common performance goals as a basis for 
directing behaviour. A unique feature is the 
process of involvement of subordinates in the 
setting of performance goals. 
• An incentive tied to the individual meeting 
specific objectives and based on performance 
against established standards. 
• MBO plans communicate specific goals and 
objectives and focus efforts on meeting them. 
• Individual performance is primarily the 
distribution mechanism. Funding targets could 
be different. 
• Between 2 and 5 years. 
• Motivate long-term value creation and overall 
organisational performance. 
Remuneration element / scheme 
1.2.3. Bonus plans 
1.2.4 Activity-based incentives 
2. BENEFITS 
3. EXPERIENCE OF WORK (INTANGIBLE 
REMUNERATION) 
Definition and description 
• Balance short term and long-term 
performance. 
• Useful to attract and retain talent, 
• Long line of sight reduces effectiveness as 
incentive scheme. 
• May be used in forms of stock or as cash 
payout. 
• Bonus plans are delivered after the fact. 
• Distribution of the bonus is normally 
discretionary. 
• Bonus allocation is based on expected 
behaviour. 
• Key forms include bonus schemes and 
recognition schemes. 
• Payment of a portion of margin, earned on the 
product/service, funds the payout. 
• Maount is Paid regardless of profitability. 
• Key forms include commission and piece rate 
systems. 
• Commission - Supplements cash 
compensation, and is usually based on sales 
volume or profit margin. 
• Piece rate - Performance payment based on 
production by an individual worker 
• Protect the standard of living of the employee 
and his/her family. 
• Include Income protection programmes like 
health care plans, welfare plans and retirement 
plans, and grant of pay for reasons of sickness 
and vacation, and that are within the statutory 
limit. 
• Non-financial rewards associated with 
working. 
• Satisfy the "higher-order" needs of people. 
• Often neglected area for motivation and 
behaviour change. Variable remuneration is 
not traditionally associated with intangible 
remuneration. 
• Its facets include recognition, Work/ life 
balance, organisational culture, training and 
development and work environment. 
Adapted from WorldatWork (2003b) 
Annexure 2.2 
This annexure details the different approaches available for different types of 
variable pay plans. 
TABLE A 
Profit-Sharing Plan Approaches 
Plan Approach 
1. First-dollar Plans 
(sharing all profits) 
2 Threshold Plans 
3 Operating Budget Plans 
4 Peer Company Comparisons 
5 Financially funded goal 
sharing. (Belcher, 1996) 
6 EVA as the basis of payout. 
Description 
• Start paying on the first rupee of profits earned. 
For instance: 10% of Gross operating profit will be 
distributed to eligible employees. 
• Payout begins after the threshold level performance is 
achieved. 
• Threshold is usually a fair return on investment. 
For instance: 10% of gross profit over $ 5 million will be 
distributed to eligible employees. 
• There is no profit metric. 
• An operating budget can be used as a substitute of that 
metric. 
• Comparison is made with competitor or peer companies 
on select measures of performance. 
• Based on relative performance, a fund is created. 
• Senior Management selects 
-The performance measures <md 
-Group of competitor or peer companies. 
• Payout potential is determined by a measure of 
profitability. 
Payout is tied to additional goals that are controllable by 
employees. Employees are thus able to 'earn' their bonus by 
doing so 
• Economic value added (EVA) (Tully, 1993) may be used 
as the basis of payout. EVA is defined as after -tax 
operating profit less the company's total cost of capital. It 
quantifies the return that shareholders are earning relative 
to alternative investment options of comparable risk. 
TABLE B 
Performance-sharing plan Approaches 
Plan Approach Description 
Goalsharing • Payouts based on achievement of predetermined goals. Goal 
definition is at team/ organisation level. 
• Goals are future-oriented business objectives defined as 
performance targets. These are not set against historical 
performance levels. Payout schedule is defined for various 
levels of goal achievement. However, It uses fewer levels as 
compared to gainsharing. 
• Goals are set for each performance measure (e.g. financial 
performance, quality, customer satisfaction, process 
improvements). 
• A blended or balanced scorecard is used to track 
performance. 
• Single or multiple goals could be set. 
• Goals could be set beyond one-year time horizon or as 
multiple targets. 
2 Gainsharing • Payouts represent a share of the financial gains achieved 
through improvement in group or organisational performance 
measures. 
• Typically measure controllable cost or units of output, not 
profits, which gives a better line of sight. 
• Payout is based on savings generated in cost or 
improvements in productivity. 
• Baseline performance levels are determined against which 
performance is measured. 
• If quantitative improvement happens over set baselines, for 
one or more measures, participants share in the gains 
achieved. 
• May pay out incentives without the business making profit. 
• Measures improvements in small increments ie defines 
performance goals at many levels of achievement. 
• Examples of performance variables are cost, productivity, 
resource utilization, safety. 
• Improvemait is calculated in rupee terms which is shared 
with employees. 
• Influence organisational behaviour through their high level 
of participant involvement. 
• Employee ownership is a further characteristic of gain-share 
schemes. 
• Changes in the structure of work are required due to 
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Plan Approach 
3 Winsharing 
4 Scheduled 
Payout plans 
Description 
increased complexity in work structures 
• Pay out more frequently than self-funded bonus schemes 
(Lawler, 1990). 
• Includes financial measures and performance measures 
related to customer, operations or people. 
• Goals for operational measures serve as a gate for 
availability of variable pay. 
• Close relationship between the financial performance of the 
organisational unit in which the plan exists and award 
payments. 
• Winsharing pays only if bottom line goals are met. 
• Term 'win' in its label success signifies ultimate success, 
that allows for sharing. 
• Bonus payments are determined for many small increments 
of improvement, quite like a gainsharing program with the 
gains grouped into steps, and the associated payouts defined 
and communicated in advance. 
• It lies between goalsharing and gainsharing w.r.t number of 
levels at which goals improvement is predetermined. 
TABLE C 
Individual Performance-Based Plan Approaches 
Plan Approach Description 
1. Performance against predetermined 
objectives: 
(e.g. management by objective (MBO) 
plans) 
Rewards are earned for tlie accomplisliment of 
predetermined goals and objectives set for the 
individual. 
2 Output-based 
(historically known as 
piece-rate plans) 
Rewards are earned based on a predetermined amount 
awarded for each "unit" an employee produces. 
Effective for positions where : 
• The scope of the job is narrow with specific 
individual duties. 
• The position is responsible for producing outputs 
in a repetitive fashion. 
• The individual has some control over either the rate 
at which outputs are produced and/or the quality of 
each output. 
3 Commission A predetermined incentive amount for each discrete 
unit of sales made by the salesperson, it is commonly 
expressed as a percent of each sales revenue, percent 
of gross margin (profit), or a rupee amount per unit 
sold. 
a)Typically used.for salespeople or individuals who 
influence the sale. 
b)EfFective sales incentive plans must be matched to 
the type of responsibilities expected of the 
salesperson. These areas of responsibility generally 
fall into one of three categories - customer 
identification, customer service and customer 
persuasion. 
c) Commissions typically represent a higher 
percentage of cash compensation than other incentive 
types. In some cases, 100% of the individual's cash 
compensation is earned through commissions. This is 
known as straight commission. 
d) Designed to: 
" Reward individual effort and drive results. 
• Create singular focus on sales volume. 
• Motivate sales success by tying the incentive 
directly to sales results. 
Annexure 2.3 
This annexure gives the objectives and the considerations, for different types of short 
term variable pay plans. 
Profit-Sharing Plan 
Objectives 
1. Foster employee identification with organisation's success. 
2. Create a common focus on important financial objectives. 
Considerations for Profit Sharing Plans 
1 Promote Awareness / Focus 
• Highlight the key financial objectives and goals for the performance 
period of the organisation. 
• Promote understanding of financial measure and of how people affect it. 
2 Pay out only when company has profit 
• Ensure financial responsibility by paying out only when the company's 
financial results warrant. 
• Organisation profit is one of the key performance measures that 
shareholders and key stakeholders look at. 
3 Employee ability to influence overall profits 
• Awards are based on group or corporate performance, and not on 
differences in individual performance. 
• Many plan participants may have little or no ability to have a material 
impact on company profits. 
• Results affected by external factors (e.g. economic, legislative) that are 
outside the control of employees may have a substantial impact on the 
plan. 
• Employees may focus on obtaining short-term financial results, which in 
fact may be detrimental to the long-term health of the organisation. 
4 Simple administration 
• One plan with corporate measures can be managed centrally, keeping 
administrative costs low. 
• can include all employees in the same plan, making communication and 
education easier. 
• Typically only one or two financial measures are used. 
Performance-Sharing Plan 
Objectives 
1. Foster employee identification with organisation's success- Increase employee 
identification with organisation's success, as measured by multiple factors. 
2. Increase employee understanding - Increase employee understanding of what is 
important to the organisation by communicating the basis upon which success 
is measured. 
3. Promote a more balanced approach - Promote a more balanced approach in 
measuring organizational improvement by requiring an organisation to improve 
in multiple areas, and not focus solely on financial measures. Improvement in 
one measure should not be made at the expense of another measure. 
Considerations for Performance-Sharing Plans 
1 Promote Awareness / Focus 
• Highlight the key objectives and goals for the performance period of the 
organisation. 
• Promote a common understanding among employees. 
• Promote teamwork in accomplishing multiple objectives. 
• Viewed as a "win-win" for both the company and employees 
• Link performance and rewards 
2 Self-Funding 
• Payments can be "funded" by the financial gains made as a result of 
implementing the plan. 
9 
3 Employee ability to influence overall performance 
• The ability of plan participants to have a material impact on selected 
measures should be considered. 
4 Flexibility of design 
• Plans provide considerable flexibility of design, rather than emphasizing 
any single aspect of company operations. 
5 May increase administrative requirements 
• Requires considerable time and effort at the start of the performance 
period to document anticipated performance levels. 
• It is important to research performance measures for practicality and 
performance history. Implementing measurement systems may be very 
expensive or operationally impractical. 
• Plans with multiple measures are more complex and require an effective 
communication and education plan. 
Individual Performance-Based Plans 
Objectives 
1. Focus on personal performance improvement. 
2. Increase employee understanding of what is important to the organisation by 
communicating the basis upon which success is measured. 
3. Links rewards with personal performance. 
Considerations for Individual Performance-Based Plans 
I. Reinforcement of performance culture 
a. Accomplishment is directly controlled by the individual 
b. Diminish entitlement mentality which base pay programs often produce. 
c. Promote competition within workgroups (could be positive or negative) 
10 
2. Narrow vision 
a. May focus individual on personal goals to the exclusion of 
organizational goals. 
3. Wide variations in pay 
a. Wide variations in pay among employees is possible 
b. High achievers may equal or exceed pay levels of supervisors 
c. Pay levels may not correlate with tenure (discounts seniority) 
4. High levels of administration 
a. Management commitment required to set, monitor, and assess goals on 
an individual basis. 
b. Complicated to calibrate the relative difficulty of individual plan 
objectives. 
c. Difficult to budget and may be problematic if a high percentage of 
employees exceed individual objectives. 
d. Require sound measurement system and ongoing review. 
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Annexure 4.1 
This annexure lists the questions raised during the preliminary study of the 
research process. 
Questions for Preliminary Study 
You may kindly answer the following questions about short term variable pay plans (ie 
pay plans that are for duration of a year or less) 
Questions related to general use of variable pay plans 
1. What is the main reason for using short term variable pay plans? 
a. Whether 'achieving organizational objectives' is one of its primary 
objectives? (to be raised if this option does not come forth in response 
to the main Q.l asked) 
Does the organization formally design its short term variable pay plans? 
Is the plan documented? 
Is the payout amount contingent on employee performance and the 
organizational performance? 
5. Does the pay plan show the various levels of payout, that are payable for 
meeting predetermined levels of goals? A dummy table is shown below. If yes, at how 
many intermediate levels, such relationship is defined, or is it deemed to be 
proportionate. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Level of performance 
Threshold level 
Target level 
Other levels of performance 
Corresponding Payout 
6. Are goals/ performance targets cascaded down in the following manner? 
Goals at Organisation level 
Goals at functional/ BU/ Division level 
Goals at project level 
Goals at individual level 
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7. Are performance measures cascaded down in the following manner? 
Organisation performance measures 
Performance measures at functional/ BU/ Division level 
Performance measures at Project level 
Performance measures at individual role level 
Are employee performance measures shown as contributing to key performance 
measures of organization, and whether such relationship is shown to be 
quantifiable./ measurable ? 
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES 
(in terms of) 
• Financial performance 
• Quality 
• Productivity 
• Cost Management 
• Customer values 
• Other measures 
CONTRIBUTION 
TO 
FINANCIAL MEASURES OF 
ORGANISATION, relating to 
any of the following : 
• Profitability 
o EX:PAT 
• Cost Management 
OTHER MEASURES 
• Customer satisfaction 
and value 
• Quality 
• New Product / 
Service development 
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J 
Questions related to using variable pay plan for middle managers 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Na 
5. 
Is short term variable pay used for middle managers? 
Which hierarchical levels are covered under the term 'middle management'? 
Is performance of middle managers quantifiable? 
Is threshold goal and target goal, clearly defined for middle managers? Yes; 
Is there a particular function or a division, that is likely to have 
'quantifiable' goals or is amenable to 'performance measurability'? 
6. Is a payout schedule (like the one shown above) defined for all levels of middle 
management? 
Questions related to availability of information about orgamisafion performance: 
1. Is annual target goal determined at the organization level? Yes No 
2. Is threshold goal determined at the organisation level? Yes No 
3. Is information about '% of organization target goal a.chieved' and 'threshold 
level', feasible to collect. Yes No 
Questions related to use of specific Employee related practices under variable pay 
system 
1. Is specific communication directed at employees for making them understand 
the plan specifics? 
2. Are managers involved in the design or implementation (execution) of variable 
play plan? 
3. Does the organization ensure whether employees are satisfied with use of short 
term variable pay plan? Does it attempt to find their level of satisfaction? 
4. Does the system rest on the following foundation: 
Variable Pay 
Line of Sight 
' Threshold goal: this is the minimum performance requirement, that must be achieved. Payout occurs 
after achieving this level of goal. 
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Perspective of Human Resources Group Annexure - 4.2a 
Dear Respondent, 
I am pursuing PhD on the subject 'Short term variable pay plans' from the Aligarh Muslim 
University. In this regard, I need to have your views about these systems, about how these are 
practiced in your organization. The key criteria or condition that differentiates such plans from 
other kinds of variable pay plans or schemes commonly used, is that - under such plans, the 
payout is made within the duration of a year or less. There is just a shade of difference, but 
almost similar in connotation is another similar condition that under such plans, the 
performance results are measured within a year's period or at shorter intervals. Only such 
plans are covered in the study, as these truly represent the character of short term variable pay 
plans. 
The above elaboration technically demarcates STVPP type of plans from other miscellaneous 
kinds of variable pay plans that commonly float in the industi^. With this little brief, the 
respondents are requested to offer their honest opinion and only the factual information as that 
alone can serve the purpose of the study. 
This questionnaire is divided into two sections. Section A is designed to gather your inputs on 
certain objective-type questions, while Section B aims to understand your viewpoint on certain 
other important aspects about short term variable pay plans. In other words while Section A is 
objective-type in nature, that requires you to just put a tick mark, Section B is more focused on 
your descriptive views, and requires you to tender you opinion on the issue raised. 
AH these details relate to the short term variable pay plan, used by organizations, during 
the financial year 2006-07. 
Section - A 
Kindly read the following statements and indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement to 
these on the scale given alongside each statement. Please tick (V) in the appropriate box only. 
The possible responses, along with their legends or shortforms used, are described below -
SA- Strongly Agree, A- Agree, NAND- Neither Agree nor Disagree, D- Disagree, SD-
Strongly Disagree. 
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s. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Code No. 
H_LS5 
H_LS6 
H_LS3 
HJEPl 
H_IEP2 
H_IEP4 
H_IEP5 
H_10P 1 
H_IOP 2 
H_IOP 3 
HJOP 4 
H_UP_EP2 
H_UP_EP4 
H_UP_EP5 
H_UW_EP2 
Statements 
Managers have high degree of control over the 
performance parameters that determine their variable 
payout amount. 
Managers believe that STVPP is like a business 
solution that is designed in the interest of both - the 
managers and the organization. 
Overall, managers are satisfied with the use of 
STVPP. 
With the implementation of STVPP, managers have 
acquired clarity about their performance goals. 
STVPP has contributed to enhancing managers' 
desire to learn more in order to meet their tasic 
requirements and perform well. 
With the implementation of STVPP, managers' level 
of motivation towards their work has increased. 
Overall, STVPP has had a positive impact on 
managers' performance. 
Use of STVPP has resulted in increased alignment 
between organization's business objectives and 
employees' performance targets. 
Use of STVPP has contributed to enhancing 
employee retention. 
Use of STVPP has contributed to making the 
organisation's work culture more performance-
oriented. 
The organization has fully achieved its intended 
objectives of implementing STVPP. 
If managers clearly understand that the main purpose 
of a short term variable pay plan is to support the 
achievement of business objectives, then it will 
enhance their desire to learn more in order to fulfill 
or exceed their task requirements and perform well. 
If managers clearly understand that a short term 
variable pay plan links employees with the 
organization by sharing with them the risks and 
rewards of running the organization, then it will 
increase their level of motivation towards work. 
If managers clearly understand the overall purpose of 
instituting short term variable pay plan in the 
organization, then it will have a positive impact on 
their performance. 
If managers clearly understand that the organization 
must achieve its threshold level target in order to 
have the necessary funding required to make variable 
payouts, then it will increase their level of motivation 
towards work. 
SA A NAND D SD 
16 
s. 
No. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Code No. 
H_UW_EP4 
H_UW_EP 5 
HJnD_ESl 
HJnD_ES3 
H_InD_ES5 
H_lnl_ESl 
H_lnl_ES2 
H_lnI_ES3 
HJnD_UPl 
H_InD_UP2 
H_InD_UP4 
Statements 
If managers clearly understand how the variable 
payout amount varies with the overall financial 
ability of the organization, then, it will increase their 
level of motivation towards work. 
If managers clearly understand the overall working 
of short term variable pay plan, then it will have a 
positive impact on their performance. 
If managers are involved in determining their 
performance parameters, then they are more likely to 
perceive STVPP as a business solution that is 
designed in the interest of both - the employees and 
the organization. 
If managers are involved in determining their 
threshold level goal, then they are more likely to 
perceive this level of goal as reasonably achievable. 
If managers are involved in overall design of 
STVPP, then their overall satisfaction with STVPP is 
likely to be higher. 
If managers are involved in regular communication 
of performance progress reports, then they are more 
likely to perceive that the main purpose of STVPP is 
to achieve business objectives. 
If managers are involved in the actual calculation of 
variable payout amount, then they are more likely to 
perceive that STVPP is fairly administered on the 
basis of laid out rules, without any influence of 
managerial discretion. 
If managers are involved in the overall evaluation of 
STVPP, then they are more likely to perceive that the 
main purpose of STVPP is to achieve business 
objectives. 
If managers are involved in deciding their 
performance parameters, then they will be better able 
to realize the need for aligning employees' 
performance targets with the organisation's business 
objectives, for achieving the goals of STVPP. 
If managers are involved in determining the 
threshold level goal, then they will be better able to 
understand the role of threshold level goal in 
achievement of business objectives of the 
organization. 
If managers are involved in the overall design of 
STVPP, then they will be better able to realize the 
need for aligning employees' performance targets 
with the organisation's business objectives, for 
achieving the goals of STVPP, 
SA A NAND D SD 
17 
s. 
No. 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Code No. 
H_lnD_UP5 
H_InI_UP2 
H_lnI_UP 3 
HJnI_UP 4 
H_Inl_UP 5 
H_InD_UW 2 
H_InD_UW 5 
HJnD_UW 3 
H_lnl_UW 2 
H_InI_UW 4 
Statements 
If managers are involved in the overall design of 
STVPP, then they will be better able to understand 
the purpose of STVPP. 
If managers are involved in the regular 
communication of performance progress reports, 
then they will be better able to understand that the 
main purpose of STVPP is to support the 
achievement of business objectives. 
If managers are involved in the actual calculation of 
variable payout amount, then they will be better able 
to understand that a short term variable pay plan 
links employees with the organization by sharing 
with them the risks and the rewards of running an 
organization. 
If managers are involved in the overall evaluation of 
STVPP, then they will be better able to realize the 
need for aligning employees' performance targets 
with the organisation's business objectives, for 
achieving the goals of STVPP. 
If managers are involved in the actual calculation of 
variable payout amount, then they will be better able 
to understand that one of the important objectives of 
STVPP is to maintain the compensation budget of 
the organization or to keep it controlled . 
If managers are involved in determining their 
performance targets, then they will be better able to 
understand how alignment is achieved between the 
organization business objectives and employees' 
performance targets. 
If managers are involved in the overall design of 
STVPP, then they will be better able to understand 
how alignment is achieved between the organization 
business objectives and employees' performance 
targets. 
If managers are involved in the overall design of the 
STVPP, then it is likely to have a positive impact on 
their level of understanding about the working of 
STVPP. 
If managers are involved in regular communication 
of performance progress reports, then they will be 
better able to understand that the organization must 
achieve its threshold level target in order to have the 
necessary funding that is required to make variable 
payouts. 
If managers are involved in the evaluation of 
STVPP, then they will be better able to understand 
that the organization must achieve its threshold level 
target in order to have the necessary funding that is 
required to make variable payouts. 
SA A NAND D SD 
18 
s. 
No. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Code No. 
HJnI_UW5 
H_UPI 
H_UP2 
H_UP4 
H_UP5 
H_UW1 
H_UW2 
H_UW4 
H_UW5 
Statements 
If managers are involved in the overall 
implementation of STVPP, then they will be better 
able to understand how alignment is achieved 
between the organization business objectives and 
employees' performance targets. 
Managers realize the need for aligning employees' 
performance targets with the organisation's business 
objectives, for achieving the goals of STVPP. 
Managers clearly understand that the main purpose 
of a short term variable pay plan is to support the 
achievement of business objectives. 
Managers clearly understand that a short term 
variable pay plan aims to instill feelings of 
ownership in employees. 
Managers clearly understand the overall purpose of 
instituting short term variable pay plan in the 
organization. 
Managers clearly understand how alignment is 
achieved between the organization business 
objectives and employees' performance targets. 
Managers clearly understand that the organization 
must achieve its threshold level target in order to 
have the necessary funding required to make variable 
payouts. 
Managers clearly understand that they must achieve 
their threshold level target in order to be eligible for 
their variable payout amount. 
Managers clearly understand how their variable 
payout amount is calculated. 
SA A NAND D SD 
Section B 
As mentioned above section B is more to do wih your descriptive views, and it would be in 
the best interest of the research, if you were to express your views in a free-flow form, just as 
these occur to you. Any attempt to trample the originality of your views by judging these as to 
their appropriateness or inappropriateness, would only serve to cause element of loss to the 
research mission. 
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Kindly express your views freely and frani<Iy to the questions asked below. You are 
encouraged to express your views in the fullest. 
Q. 1 What is the purpose of a short term variable pay system? 
In case of multiple variable pay policies, please discuss that particular plan that meets the 
following criteria: 
a) Applies to Middle Managers. 
b) Plan duration of one year or less. 
c) Variable pay falls in the range of 15% to 25% (of Cost-to-company) for Middle 
Managers. 
PI specify the unit / division where this plan / policy is applicable : . 
Q.2 How many levels are there in the organization? Please specify the number: 
Q.3 Which grades are included in middle management? Please specify these grades. 
2_ 
3_ 
4_ 
5 
Q 4 What is the structure of the variable pay system for Middle Managers (w.r.t. yr. 2006 
2007)? 
20 
Q.5 Please fill in the following details about the plan ( for the year 2006-07) 
How is variable pay expressed'/ a)Asa%oftheCTC 
b) As a % of the base salary 
c) As a lumpsum, apart from the salary 
Is it added to base pay? a) Yes a b)Noa 
Variable pay % at various levels of middle management 
Organisation levels % of variable pay 
1_ ^ 
Z_ _%_ 
4. ^ 
i . 
In which form variable pay is paid? a)Cash a b)Cash equivalent D (ex: 
Merchandise, Gift, travel etc) 
Ratio of cash to casih equivalent: : 
Scheme Owner Scheme approver Scheme administrator 
Frequency of plan review Plan reviewer 
Q 6 What is the significance of threshold level goal ? How is the organisation's threshold 
level important to it ? 
Q.7 Who are involved in designing the variable pay policy? Also, what is the extent of their 
involvement? Please mark your response in the boxes shown below. 
Whether involved? 
(please tick mark) 
Human Resources department Q 
Finance Department Q 
All functions Q 
Concerned function only Q 
Top Management team Q 
Middle Managers U 
Extent of involvement 
High involvement / Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent / No involvement 
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Whether involved? 
(please tick marli) 
External Consultant Q 
Any other ( pi. specify ) Q 
Extent of involvement 
High involvement / Toa large extent /Moderate involvement/ 
To a small extent / No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
Q.8 What is the benefit of involving managers in designing the variable pay plan ? 
Q.9 How is variable pay plan communicated to employees? You may mark more than 
one option. 
a) Through intranet • 
b) At the time of induction • 
c) At the time of goal setting • 
d) At the time of performance review • 
e) Policy document is given • 
f) Presentation / Open House • 
g) Any other (pi. specify) • 
Q. 10 Which details are communicated to employees? Please tick the relevant ones. 
a) Objective of a variable pay plan G 
b) Workingofa variable pay plan Q 
c) General business information • 
d) Any other • 
Q. 11 Is it emphasized how managers contribute to business objectives ? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
IfYes, 
• 
a) is it specifically highlighted ? or 
b) is it implied ? 
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Q.12 Which of the following reports are regularly communicated? Also, at what interval 
these are communicated ? 
Interval 
a) Regular progress reports about organization performance 
b) Gap between organisation's threshold and 
organisation's performance (achieved(ill date) 
c) Regular progress reports about managers' 
d) Gap between manager's threshold and 
manager's performance (achieved till date) 
e) Any other (pi. specify) 
Q.I 3 How are middle managers informed about their actual payout amount'? What 
additional information is given to them ? 
Q.14 In which way, variable pay plan seeks to motivate the middle managers ? 
2_ 
3 
Q. 15 What improvements can be made to the system so as to motivate the middle managers ? 
J 
2 
3 
Q. 16 Does the organization intend to increase the % of variable pay for middle managers ? 
a) Yes b) No 
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Please fill in the following details about yourself: 
Name : 
Qualifications: 1. 
Total Experience : 
Grade / Designation : 
Key Responsibilities: 1 
Salary Bracket (CTC): 
Less than 15 lakhs 
15 lakhs to 25 lakhs : 
25 lakhs to 30 lakhs : 
30 lakhs to 50 lakhs : 
More than 50 lakhs : 
yrs 
• 
• 
G 
• 
• 
Age; yrs. Sex; M / F 
2. 
Experience in the current organization : yrs. 
2 3 
Thank you for your valuable inputs. 
Regards 
Sangeeta Chopra 
Research Scholar 
Aligarh Muslim University 
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Perspective of Finance group Annexure - 4.2b 
Dear Respondent,. 
1 am pursuing PhD on the subject 'Short term variable pay plans' from the Aligarh Muslim 
University. In this regard, I need to have your views about these systems, about how these are 
practiced in your organization. The key criteria or condition that differentiates such plans from 
other kinds of variable pay plans or schemes commonly used, is that - under such plans, the 
payout is made within the duration of a year or less. There is just a shade of difference, but 
almost similar in connotation is another similar condhion that under such plans, the 
performance results are measured within a year's period or at shorter intervals. Only such 
plans are covered in the study, as these truly represent the character of short term variable pay 
plans. 
The above elaboration technically demarcates STVPP type of plans from other miscellaneous 
kinds of variable pay plans that commonly float in the industry. With this little brief, the 
respondents are requested to offer their honest opinion and only the factual information as that 
alone can serve the purpose of the study. 
Confidentiality of your views and that of your identity, shall be maintained. 
This questionnaire is divided into two sections. Section A is designed to gather your inputs on 
certain objective-type questions, while Section B aims to understand your viewpoint on certain 
other important aspects about short term variable pay plans. In other words while Section A is 
objective-type in nature, that requires you to just put a tick mark, Section B is more focused on 
your descriptive views, and requires you to tender you opinion on the issue raised. 
The details asked below, relate to the short term variable pay plan used by the 
organization, during the financial year 2006-07. 
Section - A 
Kindly read the following statements and indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement to 
these on the scale given alongside each statement. Please tick (V) in the appropriate box only. 
The possible responses, along with their legends or shortforms used, are described below -
SA- Strongly Agree, A- Agree, NAND- Neither Agree nor Disagree, D- Disagree, SD-
Strongly Disagree. 
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s. 
No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
\'ariable 
F_LS5 
F_LS6 
F_LS3 
FJEPI 
FJEP2 
FJEP4 
F_IEP5 
FJOP 1 
FJOP 2 
F_IOP 3 
F_10P 4 
F_UP_EP2 
F_UP_EP4 
F_UP_EP5 
Statements 
Managers have high degree of control over the 
performance parameters that determine their variable 
payout amount. 
Managers believe that STVPP is like a business solution 
that is designed in the interest of both - the managers 
and the organization. 
Overall, managers are satisfied with the use of STVPP. 
With the implementation of STVPP, managers have 
acquired clarity about their performance goals 
STVPP has contributed to enhancing managers' desire 
to learn more in order to meet their task requirements 
and perform well. 
With the implementation of STVPP, managers' level of 
motivation towards their work has increased. 
Overall, STVPP has had a positive impact on managers' 
performance. 
Use of STVPP has resulted in increased alignment 
between organization's business objectives and 
employees' perfomiance targets.. 
Use of STVPP has contributed to enhancing employee 
retention. 
Use of STVPP has contributed to making the 
organisation's work culture more performance-oriented. 
The organization has fully achieved its intended 
objectives of implementing STVPP. 
If managers clearly understand that the main purpose of 
a short term variable pay plan is to support the 
achievement of business objectives, then it will enhance 
their desire to learn more in order to fulfill or exceed 
their task requirements and perform well. 
If managers clearly understand that a short term variable 
pay plan links employees with the organization by 
sharing with them the risks and rewards of running the 
organization, then it will their level of motivation 
towards woilc. 
If manageis clearly understand the overall purpose of 
instituting short term variable pay plan in the 
organization, then it will have a positive impact on their 
performance. 
SD D NAND A SA 
26 
s. 
No 
Variable Statements SD NAND SA 
15 F UW EP2 If managers clearly understand that the organization 
must achieve its threshold level target in order to have 
the necessary funding required to make variable 
payouts, then it will increase their level of motivation 
towards work. 
16 F UW EP4 If managers clearly understand how the variable payout 
amount varies with the overall financial ability of the 
organization, it will increase their level of motivation 
towards work. 
17 F UW EPS If managere clearly understand the overall working of 
short term variable pay plan, then it will have a positive 
impact on their performance. 
F InD ESI If managers are involved in determining their 
performance parameters, then they are more likely to 
perceive STVPP as a business solution that is designed 
in the interest of both - the employees and the 
organization. 
19 F InD ES3 If managers are involved in determining their threshold 
level goal, then they are more likely to perceive this 
level of goal as reasonably achievable. 
20 F InD ES5 If manageis are involved in overall design of STVPP, 
then their overall satisfaction with STVPP is likely to be 
higher. 
F Inl ESI If manager are involved in regular communication of 
performance progress reports, then they are more likely 
to perceive that the main purpose of STVPP is to 
achieve business objectives. 
22 F In! ES2 If managers are involved in the actual calculation of 
variable payout amount, then they are more likely to 
perceive that STVPP is fairly administered on the basis 
of laid out rules, without any use of managerial 
discretion. 
23 F Inl ES3 If managers are involved in the overall evaluatbn of 
STVPP, then they are more likely to perceive that the 
main purpose of STVPP is to achieve business 
objectives. 
24 F InD UPl If managers are involved in deciding their performance 
parameters, then they will be better able to realize the 
need for aligning employees' performance targets with 
the organisation's business objectives, for achieving the 
goals of STVPP. 
25 F InD UP2 If managers are involved in determining the threshold 
level goal, then they will be better able to understand the 
role of threshold level goal in achieving the business 
objectives of the organization. 
27 
s. 
No 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
N'ariable 
F_lnD_UP4 
F_InD_UP5 
F_lnl_UP2 
F_lnl_UP 3 
FJnl_UP4 
FJnIUP 5 
F_InD_UW 2 
F_lnD_UW 5 
F_lnD_UW 3 
F_InI_UW 2 
Statements 
If managers are involved in the overall design of 
STVPP, then they will be better able to realize the need 
for aligning employees' performance targets witli the 
organisation's business objectives, for achieving the 
goals of STVPP. 
If managers are involved in the overall design of 
STVPP, then they will be better able to understand the 
purpose of STVPP. 
If managers are involved in the regular communication 
of performance progress reports, then they will be better 
able to understand that the main purpose of STVPP is to 
support the achievement of business objectives. 
If managers are involved in the actual calculation of 
variable payout amount, then they will be better able to 
understand that a short term variable pay plan links 
employees with the organization by sharing with them 
the risks and the rewards of running an organization. 
If managers are involved in the overall evaluation of 
STVPP, then they will be better able to realize tlie need 
for aligning employees' performance targets with the 
organisation's business objectives, for achieving the 
goals of STVPP. 
If managers are involved in the actual calculation of 
variable payout amount, then they will be better able to 
understand that one of the important objectives of 
STVPP is to maintain the compensation budget of the 
organization or to keep it controlled . 
If managers are involved in determining their 
performance targets, then they will be better able to 
understand how alignment is achieved between the 
organization business objectives and employees' 
performance targets. 
If managers are involved in the overall design of 
STVPP, then they will be better able to understand how 
alignment is achieved between the organization business 
objectives and employees' performance targets. 
If managers are involved in the overall design of the 
STVPP, then it is likely to have a positive impact on 
their level of understanding about the working of 
STVPP. 
If managers are involved in regular communication of 
performance progress reports, then they will be better 
able to understand that the organization must achieve its 
threshold level target in order to have the necessary 
funding that is required to make variable payouts. 
SD D NAND A SA 
28 
s. 
No 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Variable 
FJnl_UW 4 
F_InI_UW5 
F_UP1 
F_UP2 
F_UP4 
F_UP5 
F_UW1 
F_UW2 
F_UW4 
F_UW5 
Statements 
If managers are involved in the evaluation of STVPP, 
then they will be better able to understand that the 
organization must achieve its threshold level target in 
order to have the necessary funding that is required to 
make variable payouts. 
If managers are involved in the overall implementation 
of STVPP, then they will be better able to understand 
how alignment is achieved between tlie organization 
business objectives and empbyees' performance targets. 
Managers realize the need for aligning employees' 
performance targets with the organisation's business 
objectives, for achieving the goals of STVPP. 
Managers clearly understand that the main purpose of a 
short term variable pay plan is to support the 
achievement of business objectives. 
Managers clearly understand that a short term variable 
pay plan aims to instill feelings of ownership in 
employees. 
Managers clearly understand tlie overall purpose of 
instituting short term variable pay plan in the 
organization. 
Managers clearly understand how alignment is achieved 
between the organization business objectives and 
employees' performance targets. 
Managers clearly understand that the organization must 
achieve its threshold level target in order to have the 
necessary funding required to make variable payouts. 
Managers clearly understand that they must achieve 
their threshold level target in order to be eligible for 
their variable payout amount. 
Managers clearly understand how their variable payout 
amount is calculated. 
SD D NAND A SA 
i 
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Section B 
As mentioned above section B is more to do will your descriptive views, and it would be in the best 
interest of the research, if you were to express your views in a free-flow form, just as these occur to 
you. Any attempt to trample the originality of your views by judging these as to their appropriateness or 
inappropriateness, would only serve to cause element of loss to the research mission. 
Kindly express your views freely and frankly to the questions asked below. You are encouraged to 
express your views in the fullest. 
Q.l Briefly describe the process of designing a variable pay system and finally how it is structured. 
Q.2 What is the purpose of a short term variable pay system? 
Q 3 What is the significance of threshold level goal ? How is the orgiinisation's threshold level 
important to it ? 
Q.4 Are middle manager's performance targets specifically linked to the organization's targets ? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
if Yes, how is it communicated to the middle managers ? 
Q.5 Is finance department involved in the following activities of short term variable pay plan ? 
Please indicate the extent of involvement by marking either 'to a large extent' or 'to a small 
extent' in the second column. 
Decisions about Variable pay plan 
Setting the goals of variable pay plan 
Deciding the Derformance parameters of 
organization 
Determining the threshold level (success 
criteria) 
Deciding the % payout at various 
performance levels 
Deciding actual amount of oavout based on 
organisation's performance nssults 
Review of plan 
Any other (pi. specify) 
Extent of Involvement 
Higii involvemenl / To a large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement / To a large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent / No involvement 
High involvement / To a large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement / To a large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement / To a large extent / Moderate involvement < 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement / Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent /No involvement 
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Q.6 What is the source of funds for variable payout ? 
a) Salary budget D b) Monetary gains achieved from the plan n c) Any other_ 
Q.7 Does the payout amount of middle managers vary in the same proportion with the financial 
results of the organization ? 
a) Yes 
b) It varies, but not in the same proportion. 
c) No 
d) Any other 
Q.8 Does the organization assess the impact of variable pay plan on its overall performance ? 
a) Yes b)No c) Not formally d) Any other 
{f yes, how does it assess the impact of the plan? 
Q.9 What improvements can be made to the system so as to motivate the middle managers ? 
10. Please fill in the performance details of the organisation for the laist 3 
Year 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Performance 
Parameter 
Threshold goals 
(as % of target goal) 
- criteria of payout 
% of target 
% of target 
% of target 
% of goals achieved 
(please lick 
appropriate option) 
70 - 85 % of target 
86-100 % of target 
100-120% of target 
70 - 85 % of target 
86-100 %of target 
100-120% of target 
70 - 85 % of target 
86-100 % of target 
100-120% of target 
years. 
the 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
a 
D 
% of payout paid 
(assuming payout is 
100% at target ) 
% of target 
payout 
% of target 
payout 
% of target 
payout 
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Please fill in the following details about yourself: 
Name : 
Oualifications: 1. 
Total Experience : 
Grade / Designation : 
Key Responsibilities : 1 
Salary Bracket ( CTC ) : 
Less than 15 lakhs : 
15 lakhs to 25 lakhs : 
25 lakhs to 30 lakhs : 
30 lakhs to 50 lakhs : 
More than 50 lakhs : 
yrs. 
D 
D 
D 
D 
a 
Age: yrs. Sex: 
2. 
Experience in the current organization : 
2 3 
M / F 
yrs. 
Thank you for your valuable inputs. 
Regards 
Sangeeta Chopra 
Research Scholar 
Aligarh Muslim University 
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Views of Managers Annexure - 4.2c 
Dear Respondent, 
I am pursuing PhD on the subject 'Short term variable pay plans' from the Aligarh Muslim 
University. In this regard, I need to have your views about these systems, about how these are 
practiced in your organization. The k&y criteria or condition that differentiates such plans 
from other kinds of variable pay plans or schemes commonly used, is that- under such plans, 
the payout is made within the duration of a year or less. There is just a shade of difference, 
but almost similar in connotation is another similar condition that under such plans, the 
performance results are measured within a year's period or at shorter intervals. Only such 
plans are covered in the study, as these truly represent the character of short term variable pay 
plans. 
The above elaboration technically demarcates STVPP type of plans from other miscellaneous 
kinds of variable pay plans that commonly float in the industrj'. With this little brief, the 
respondents are requested to offer their honest opinion and only the factual information as 
that alone can serve the purpose of the study. 
Confidentiality of your views and that of your identity, shall be maintained. 
This questionnaire is divided into two sections. Section A is designed to gather your inputs 
on certain objective-type questions, while Section B aims to understand your viewpoint on 
certain other important aspects about short term variable pay plans. In other words while 
Section A is objective-type in nature, that requires you to just put a tick mark. Section B is 
more focused on your descriptive views, and requires you to tender your opinion on the issue 
raised. 
The details asked below, relate to the short term variable pay plan used by the 
organization, during the financial year 2006-07. 
Section - A 
Kindly read the following statements and indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement 
to these on the scale given alongside each statement. Please tick (V) in the appropriate box 
only. 
The possible responses, along with their legends or shortforms used, are described below -
SA- Strongly Agree, A- Agree, NAND- Neither Agree nor Disagree, D- Disagree, SD-
Strongly Disagree. 
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s. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Code No. 
MDCl 
M_DC2 
M_DC3 
M_DC4 
M_LSI 
M_LS2 
M_LS3 
M_LS4 
MJEPl 
MJEP2 
MJEP3 
MJEP4 
MJEP5 
MJOPl 
MJOP 2 
MJOP 3 
MJOP 4 
M_UP_EP1 
M_UP_EP2 
M_UP_EP3 
M_UP_EP4 
Statements 
1 am able to influence the choice of performance parameters that 
constitute my variable payout structure. 
I am able to influence the relative weights of the performance 
parameters that collectively constitute my variable payout structure. 
1 am able to influence the achievement of the performance 
parameters that detemiine my variable payout amount. 
Overall, 1 have high degree of control over the perfonnance 
parameters that determine my variable payout amount. 
The threshold level of goal is set at a level tliat is reasonably 
achievable. 
STVPP is fairly administered, on the basis of laid out rules, without 
any undue use of managerial discretion. 
Overall, 1 am satisfied with the use of STVPP for managers. 
1 feel the organization should continue with the practice of using 
STVPP for its manageis. 
With the implementation of STVPP, I have acquired clarity about 
my performance goals. 
STVPP has contributed to enhancing my desire to learn more in 
order to meet my task requirements and perform well. 
With the use of STVPP, I feel the drive to achieve my performance 
targets. 
With the implementation of STVPP, my overall motivation towards 
work has increased. 
Overall, STVPP has had a positive impact on my performance. 
Use of STVPP has led to increased alignment between 
organization's business objectives and employees' performance 
targets. 
Use of STVPP has contributed to enhancing employee retention . 
Use of STVPP has contributed to making the organisation's work 
culture more performance-oriented. 
The organization has fully achieved its intended objectives of 
implementing STVPP. 
If I clearly understand the need for aligning employees' 
performance targets with organisation's business objectives for 
achieving the goals of STVPP, then it will help me in achieving 
clarity about my goals 
If I clearly understand that the main purpose of a short term \anable 
pay plan is to support the achievement of business objectives, then it 
will enhance my desire to learn more in order to fulfill or exceed my 
task requirements and perform well. 
If I clearly understand that one of the main purpose of a short term 
variable pay plan is to create a performance-oriented culture in the 
organization, which gives recognition to employees for the 
performance results they help produce, then I will feel the drive to 
achieve my performance targets. 
If 1 clearly understand that a short term variable pay plan links 
employees with the organization by sharing with them the risks and 
rewards of running the organization, then it will increase my level 
of motivation towards work. 
SA A NAND D SD 
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s. 
No. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Code No. 
M_UP_EP5 
M_UW_EP1 
M_UW_EP2 
M_UW_EP3 
M_UW_EP4 
M_UW_EP5 
M_InD_ESl 
M_InD_ES2 
M_lnD_ES3 
MJnD_ES4 
M_lnD_ES5 
M_InI_ESl 
M_InI_ES2 
M_liil_ES3 
M_Inl_ES4 
M_lnI_ES5 
M_InD_UPl 
Statements 
If 1 clearly understand the overall purpose of instituting short term 
variable pay plan in the organization, then it will have a positive 
impact on my performance. 
If I clearly understand that 1 must achieve my threshold level target 
in order to be eligible for my variable payout amount, then it will 
enhance my desire to learn more in order to fulfill or exceed my task 
requirements and perform well. 
If 1 clearly understand that the organization must achieve its 
threshold level target in order to have the necessary funding required 
to make variable payouts, tlien it will increase my level of 
motivation towards work. 
If I clearly understand how my variable payout amount is calculated, 
then 1 will feel the drive to achieve my performance targets. 
If I clearly understand how the variable payout amount varies witli 
the overall financial ability of the organization, then it will increase 
my level of motivation towards work. 
If I clearly understand tlie overall working of short term variable pay 
plan, then it will have a positive impact on my performance. 
If 1 am involved in determining my performance parameters, then I 
am more likely to perceive STVPP as a business solution tliat is 
designed in the interest of both - the employees and the 
organization. 
If I am involved in determining my performance targets, then it is 
likely to have a positive affect on my sense of ownership towards 
the organization. 
If I am involved in determining the threshold level goal, tlien 1 am 
more likely to perceive this level of goal as reasonably achievable. 
If I am involved in deciding the percentage of variable payout 
payable at various levels of performance, then 1 am more likely to 
perceive that STVPP is fairly administered on the basis of laid out 
rules, without any use of managerial discretion. 
If I am involved in overall design of STVPP, then my overall 
satisfaction with STVPP is likely to be higjier. 
If I am involved in regular communication of performance progress 
reports, then I am more likely to perceive that the main purpose of 
STVPP is to achieve business objectives. 
If I am involved in the actual calculation of variable payout amount, 
then I am more likely to perceive that STVPP is fairly administeried 
on the basis of laid out rules, without any use of managerial 
discretion. 
If I am involved in the overall evaluation of STVPP, then 1 am more 
likely to perceive that the main purpose of STVPP is to achieve 
business objectives. 
If I am involved in the overall evaluation of STVPP, then 1 am more 
likely to perceive STVPP as a business solution that is designed in 
the interest of both, the employees and the organization. 
If I am involved in the overall evaluation of STVPP, then it is likely 
to positively affect my sense of ownership towards the organization. 
If I am involved in deciding my performance parameters, then I will 
be better able to realize the need for aligning employees' 
performance targets with the organisation's business objectives, for 
achieving the goals of STVPP. 
SA A NAND D SD 
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s. 
No. 
Code No. Statements SA NAND SD 
39 M InD UP 2 If I am involved in determining tiie thresiioid level goal, tlien I will 
be better able to understand the role of threshold level goal in 
achieving the business objectives of the organization. 
40 M InD UP 3 If I am involved in deciding the percentage of variable payout 
payable at various levels of performance, then I will be better able to 
understand that one of the key purpose of short term variable pay 
plan is to create performance-oriented culture in the organization, 
which gives recognition to employees for the performance results 
they help produce . 
4) M InD UP 4 If I am involved in the overall design of STVPP, then 1 will be better 
able to realize the need for aligning employees' performance targets 
with the organisation's business objectives, for achieving the goals 
of STVPP. 
42 M hiD UP 5 If I am involved in the overall design of STVPP, then 1 will be better 
able to understand the purpose of STVPP. 
43 M hi UPl If I am involved in the actual communication of STVPP, then 1 will 
be able to understand that one of the key purpose of STVPP is to 
create a performance-oriented culture in the organization, which 
gives recognition to employees for the performance results they help 
produce. 
44 M Inl UP2 If I am involved in regular communication of performance progress 
reports, then 1 will be better able to understand that the main 
purpose of STVPP is to support the achievement of business 
objectives. 
45 M Inl UP 3 If I am involved in the actual calculation of variable payout amount, 
then I will be better able to understand that a short term variable pay 
plan links employees with the organization by sharing with tliem the 
risks and the rewards of running an organization. 
46 M Inl UP 4 If I am involved in the overall evaluation of STVPP, then I will be 
better able to realize the need for aligning employees' performance 
targets with the organisation's business objectives, for achieving the 
goals of STVPP. 
47 M InD UWl If I am involved in the design of STVPP, then 1 will be able to 
clearly understand how variable pay component is structured as a 
part of employees' salary. 
48 M_lnD_UW 
2 
If I am involved in determining my performance targets, then I will 
be belter able to understand how alignment is achieved between the 
organization business objectives and employees' performance 
targets. 
49 M_InD_UW 
3 
If 1 am involved in determining the threshold level goal, then 1 will 
be better able to understand the working of short term variable pay 
plan. 
50 M_InD_UW 
4 
If 1 am involved in deciding the percentage of variable payout 
payable at various levels of performance, then I will be better able to 
understand how the variable payout expense varies with the overall 
financial ability of the organization. 
51 M_hiD_UW 
5 
If I am involved in the overall design of STVPP, then I will be better 
able to understand how alignment is achieved between the 
organization business objectives and employees' performance 
targets. 
52 M Inl UWl If I am involved in the actual communication of STVPP, then I will 
be better able to understand the overall working of short term 
variable pay plan. 
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s. 
No. 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
Code No. 
MJnI_UW 2 
MJnIUW 3 
MJnI_UW 4 
M_lnl_UW 5 
M_UP1 
M_UP2 
M_UP3 
M_UP4 
M_UP5 
M_UW1 
M_UW2 
M_UW3 
M_UW4 
M_UW5 
Statements 
If 1 am involved in regular communication of performance progress 
reports, then I will be better able to understand that the organization 
must achieve its threshold level target in order to have the necessary 
funding that is required to make variable payouts. 
If I am involved in the actual calculation of variable payout amount, 
then I will be better able to understand how the variable payout 
expense varies with the overall financial ability of the organization. 
If I am involved in the evaluation of STVPP, then 1 will be better 
able to understand that the organization must achieve its tlireshold 
level target in order to have the necessary funding that is required to 
make variable payouts. 
If I am involved in the overall implementation of STVPP, then I will 
be better able to understand how alignment is achieved between the 
organization business objectives and employees' performance 
targets. 
I realize the need for aligning employees' performance targets with 
the organisation's business objectives, for achieving the goals of 
STVPP. 
The main purpose of a short term variable pay plan is to support the 
achievement of business objectives. 
One of the key purpose of short term variable pay plan is to create a 
performance-oriented culture in the organization, which gives 
recognition to employees for the performance results they help 
produce. 
I clearly understand that a short term variable pay plan aims to 
instill feelings of ownership in employees. 
I clearly understand the purpose of instituting short term variable 
pay plan in the organisation. 
I clearly understand how alignment is achieved between the 
organization business objectives and employees' performance 
targets. 
1 clearly understand that the organization must achieve its threshold 
level target in order to have the necessary funding that is required to 
make variable payouts. 
I clearly understand how the variable payout amount varies with the 
overall financial ability of the organization. 
I clearly understand that I must achieve my threshold level target in 
order to be eligible for the variable payout amount. 
I clearly understand how my variable payout amount is calculated. 
SA A NAND D SD 
37 
Section B 
As mentioned above section B is more to do wih your descriptive views, and it would be in 
the best interest of the research, if you were to express your views in a free-flow form, just as 
these occur to you. Any attempt to trample the originality of your views by judging these as 
to their appropriateness or inappropriateness, would only serve to cause element of loss to 
the research mission. 
Kindly express your views freely and frankly to the questions asked below. You are 
encouraged to express your views in the fullest. 
Q. I What is the structure of variable pay (as applicable to you) ? 
Q.2 What is the objective of a variable pay system? 
Q.3 To what extent you understand the working of variable pay system? Please mark 
your response on the following scale of 1 to 5. 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Completely) (To a large extent) (Partly) (To a small extent) (Not at all) 
Q.4 How much control you have over the performance parameters of your variable pay ? 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Complete control) (To a large extent) (Partly) (To a small extent) (None) 
Q 5 Why is a threshold level fixed ? 
Q.() Is your threshold level goal (or the qualifying criteria) achievable? Please mark your 
response on the following scale of 1 to 5. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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(Completely) (To a large extent) (Partly) (To a small extent) (Not at all) 
Q.7 Can you see a link between your goals and the orgnaisation's goals ? 
a) Yes • 
b)No • 
If yes, how did you know it ? 
a) It was specifically highlighted. 
b) It is implied. 
Q.8 Should your variable pay be linked to the overall performance of the organization too 
? PI give reasons also. 
a) Yes • 
b) No • 
Q.9 Are managers involved in the following decisions of variable pay plan ? Please 
specify the extent of their involvement by marking 'to a large extent' or 'to a small 
extent'. 
Decisions about VPP 
Deciding performance 
parameters. 
Setting performance targets 
Deciding the threshold level 
Deciding the payout % at 
various performance levels 
performance 
Calculating pavout 
Evaluation of variable pav 
system 
Extent of Involvement (of middle managers) 
High involvement / Toa large extent /Moderate involvement/ 
To a small extent / No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent / No involvement 
High involvement / Toa large extent /Moderate involvement/ 
To a small extent / No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent / No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent / No involvement 
High involvement /Toa large extent / Moderate involvement / 
To a small extent / No involvement 
Q.IO Should involvement of managers be increased in the above decisions about variable 
pay policy ? Give reasons in support of your answer. 
a) Yes • 
39 
b) No • 
Q.l 1 Are managers' asked if they have grievances about tlie variable pay policy ? 
a) Yes • 
b) No • 
Q 12 Which aspect of the variable pay system motivates you ? 
2_ 
3 
Q ! 3 How can the policy be made more motivating? 
Q 14 How can managers be more concerned about the variable pay policy ? 
Q.I 5 Please indicate your level of satisfaction with STVPP on the scale given below : 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Highly (Satisfied) (Neither satisfied (dissatisfied) (Highly 
satisfied) Nor dissatisfied) dissatisfied) 
Q 16 Please give the following details about your performance results in the last 2 years 
Year 
2005-2006 
2006 - 2007 
Threshold goals (as % of target) 
% of target 
% of target 
Goals achieved { as % of target) 
% of target 
% of target 
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Please fill in certain basic details about yourself. 
Name: 
Oualifications: 1. 
Total Experience : yrs. 
yrs. 
Name of unit / Division / Function : 
Key Responsibilities: 1 
Salary Bracket (CTC): 
Less than 5 lakhs : • 
5 lakhs to 8 lakhs : • 
8 lakhs to 11 lakhs : • 
11 lakhs to 14 lakhs : • 
More than 14 lakhs : • 
Age : yrs. Sex : M / F 
2. 
Experience in the current organization : 
Grade : 
2 3 
Thank you for your kind cooperation and your valuable inputs. 
Sangeeta Chopra 
Research Scholar 
Aligarh Muslim University 
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Annexure 4.3 
Note: The CMMI status of these organizations was ascertained from a NASSCOM authorized software, 
that was accessed using a specific password, allotted to all its buyers. 
Company Name 
Zinnov Manasemenl Consulting PM Lid 
Zcnta Pvl Lid 
Zcnsar TcchnoloRJes Limiled 
Zcnitli Software Limiled 
Zcniih Infolecli Lid. 
Zavala India Pvl Lid 
Yojana Syslems Pvl. Lid. 
YES Bank Ltd 
Yasu TechnoloBJes Pvl Ltd 
Yamaha Motor Solutions (India) Pvl Ltd 
Yahoo Software Development India Pvl. Ltd. 
Xyka Software Fvt Lid 
XSYS YS Technologies Pvl Ltd 
XS CAD India Pvl Ltd 
Xpanxion International Pvl Ltd 
Xoriani Solutions Pvt Lid 
Xlcom TechnoloRies 
Xerox India Ltd 
Xchanging Technology Services (India) Pvl Ltd 
Xansa (India) Ltd 
WYSE Technology Sales & Marketing India Pvl Ltd 
WNS Global Services (P) Ltd 
Wisdomleaf IT Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Wipro Technologies (Wipro Ltd) 
Winfoware Technologies Pvt Lid 
Whizlabs Software Private Limited 
Weslon Solutions India Pvt Lid 
Wcslgate Technology Solutions Pvt Lid 
West Bengal Electronics Industry Development 
Corporation Ltd. 
Welingkar Institute of Management Development & 
Research 
Webrosoft Solutions Pvl Ltd 
Webify Services (India) Private Limiled 
WebEx Communications India Pvt Ltd 
Webdunia.com (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
Webaroo Technology India Pvl Ltd 
Walsons Services Pvt Ltd 
VXL eTech Ltd 
Vulcan Infotech 
VSoft Offshore Pvt Ltd 
Volvo India Pvt Ltd 
vMoksha Technologies Pvt Ltd 
VKC Software Solutions (P) Ltd 
Viteos Capital Market Services Ltd 
Vision Comptech Ltd 
Virtusa (India) Pvt Ltd 
Virmati Software & Telecommunications Ltd 
Virinchi Technologies Limiled 
Virage Logic Intetnational 
Vijay Mukhi's Computer Institute 
Vidushi Infotech Software Solutions Provider Pvt Ltd 
VOL Softech Limiled 
VFS (India) Pvt Ltd 
Vertex Software Pvl Ltd 
Vertex Customer Services India Pvt Ltd 
Verizon Data Services India Pvt Ltd 
VERITAS Software India Pvt Ltd (VSIL) 
Verisign India Pvt Ltd 
Venture Infotek Global Pvt Ltd 
Venire IT Ltd 
Vec Technologies Pvt Lid 
Vedika Software Pvt Ltd 
vCustomer Services India Pvl Ltd 
ValueMomentum Software Services Pvt Ltd 
ValueLabs (bidia) 
Value One Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Valtech India Technology Solutions Pvl Ltd 
Vakrangee Softwares Ltd 
Vaakya Technologies P\1 Ltd 
Utopia India Pvt Ltd 
UTL Technologies Ltd. 
USi Internetworking Services Pvt Ltd 
UshaComm India Pvt Ltd 
US Technology International Pvl Lid 
UPTEC Computer Consuhancy Ltd. 
Universal Software 
Universal Legal 
Unisys Global Services - India (STP Division of Unisys 
India Pvt Ltd) 
UL India Pvt Ltd 
UGAM Solutions Pvl Ltd 
Transactional Documents India Pvt Lid 
UBS Service Cenlre (India) Pvl Lid 
UBICS Technologies Pvl Lid 
Tvarila Consulting Pvt Ltd 
TUV Rheinland (India) Pvt Ltd 
TTK Healthcare Services P\1 Ltd 
TRRS Imaging Ltd 
TriVium iCOPE Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Triton Corp Ltd 
Tripta Computer Services 
Trimentus Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Trilogy E-business Software India Ltd 
Trilegal 
Trigent Software Ltd. 
Tricom India Ltd 
Trianz Consulting Pvt Ltd 
TransWorks Information Services Pvl. Lid. 
TranSwitch India Pvl Ltd 
Transfleel Global Services Pvt Ltd (TESCO India) 
Trans Continental e-Services Pvt Ltd 
Tracmail India Pvl. Ltd. 
TQM International Pvl Lid 
TPI Advisory Services India Pvl Ltd 
TopSource Infotech Solutions Pvl Ltd 
Timken Engineering and Research India Pvt Ltd 
TIBCO Software India Pvl Ltd 
ThyssenKrupp Industries India 
TTioughtWorks Technologies India Pvt Ltd 
Thomson Digital (ITES Div. of Thomson Press (India) 
Ltd) 
Thomson Corporation (International) Pvl Ltd 
Thomas International Publishing Company India Pvl Ltd 
Thirdware Solution Ltd. 
Thinksoft Global Services (P) Ltd 
Thinking Minds.com (Q Pvt. Ltd. 
The World Bank (IBRD) 
the British Midlands 
Texcity Sofhvare Paiks Ltd 
Texas Instruments India Ltd. 
Tenneco India Engineering &. .Shared Services Pvt Ltd 
Temenos India Pvt. Ltd. 
Telserra India Pvt Ltd 
TeleTech Services (India) Ltd 
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Tclcsis Global Solutions Ltd 
Telepcrfomiancc India (A division of CRM Services 
India Pvt Ltd) 
Telelogic India Pvl Ltd 
TeleDNA Communications Pvt Ltd 
Telecommunications Consultants India Ltd. 
Tecuroseh Products India Pvt Ltd 
Tecnovate eSolulions Pvt. Ltd. 
TechProcess Solutions Ltd 
TECHNOPARK (A Div. of Electronics Technology 
Parks - Kerala) 
TechBooks International Pvt Ltd 
Tech Mahindra Ltd 
TeamLease Services Pvt Ltd 
TCIL BellSouth Ltd. 
TCGIvena Information Technologies Pvt Ltd 
TCP Urtan Infrastnicture Holdings Ltd 
Tavant TechnoloBJes India Pvt Ltd 
Tata TechnoloRJes Limited 
Tata Johnson Controls Automotive Limited 
Tata Elxsi Ltd. 
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd 
Tasaa Netcom Private Limited 
Tarans Software Technologies Pvt Lid 
Tania Solutions Lid 
Tandon Information Solution Pvl Ltd 
Tally Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Talisma Corporation Pvt Ltd 
Take Solutions Ltd 
T - Systems India Pvt Ltd 
SYSTIME Computer Systems (I) Pvt Lid 
Systems Plus Pvt Ltd 
Systems and Software (A Division of S & S Consultants 
Pvt Ltd) 
Sysorex India Pvt Ltd 
S '^nyeY India Pvt Ltd 
Synlel Lid 
Syntax Soft-Tech India Pvl Ltd 
Synopsys (India) Private Limited 
Synergia Consultants Pvt Lid 
Syncata (India) Pvl Ltd 
Symphony Services Corp. (1) Pvt Lid 
Symco Software Pvt. Ltd. 
Symbol Technologies India Pvt Ltd 
Sykes Enterprises (India) Private Limited 
Sybase Software (India) Pvt Ltd 
Sword Global (India) Pvt Ltd 
Swiss Re Shared Services (India) Pvt Ltd 
SVB India Advisors Pvt Ltd 
Sutherland Global Services Pvt Ltd 
SupportSofl India Pvt Lid 
Supersoft Consultants Pvt Lid 
Sunlec Business Solutions Pvt. Lid. 
SunGard Solutions (India) Pvt Ltd 
Sundaram Infotech Solutions (A Division of Sundaram 
Finance Ltd) 
Sundaram Business Services (A Division of Sundaram 
Finance Ltd) 
Sun Microsystems India Pvt. Ltd. 
Sun Life India Service Centre Pvt Ltd 
Sum Total Systems India Pvl Ltd 
Summit Information Technologies Lid 
Summit HR Outsourcing Services Pvl Ltd 
Suma Soft Pvt Ltd 
Subex Systems Ltd 
Stream International Services Pvl Ltd 
STP Software (India) Pvt Ltd 
Slamet Software (India) Limited 
Standard Chartered Private Equity Advisory (India) Pvl 
Lid 
STAG Software Pvl Lid 
Srishli Software Privale Limited 
SRG Global Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Software Quality Center Pvl Lid 
Software Paradigms (India) Pvt Ltd 
SoftProjex (India) Ltd 
SQL STAR International Ltd 
Sprintlink India Pvt Ltd 
SPI Technologies India Pvt Ltd 
Spheris India Pvt Ltd 
Spectrum Business Support Ltd 
Speck Systems Limited 
Spanco Telesystems and Solutions Limited 
Sopra India Pvt Ltd 
Sonim Technologies (India) Pvt Ltd 
Sonata Software Limited 
Sona e-Design and Technologies Ltd 
Sommet Technologies Pvt Ltd 
SolulionNET India Pvt Ltd 
Solix Technologies Ltd 
Solidcore Techsoft Systems India Pvt Ltd 
Software Technology Parks Of India 
Software Data (India) Ltd 
SoftSol India Lid 
SoftPro Systems Lid 
SoflDEL Systems Ltd. 
SoftBrands India Pvl Ltd 
SoftBit Technologies Pvl Ltd 
Socicte Generale Global Solution Centre Pvt Ltd 
Sobha Renaissance Infoimatioti Technology Pvl Ltd 
SNS Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Smile Multimedia Pvl Ltd 
smartPata Enterprises (India) Ltd 
Smart Chip Limited 
SLK Software Services Pvl Lid 
Skyworks Solutions India Pvl Ltd 
SkyTECH Solutions Pvt Ltd 
SKP Cross Border Consulting Pvt Ltd 
Skelta Software Pv1 Ltd 
Silel India Ltd 
SIS Software (India) Pvt Ltd 
Siri Technologies Pvl Ltd 
Silver Software Pvl Ltd 
Silicon Valley Infomedia Pvt Ltd 
Sify Limited 
Siena Atlantic Software Services Limited 
Siemens Information Systans Ltd. 
Siemens Information Processing Services Pvt Ltd 
Shreema Software Solutions P\1 Ltd 
Sherslon Educational Software Pvt Ltd 
Shell Transource Lid 
Servion Global Solutions Ltd 
Serco Global Services Pvt Ltd 
Sequoia Capital India Advisors Pvt Ltd 
Sella Synergy India Ltd 
Selectica India Pvt Ltd 
SEED Infotech Lid 
SEEC Technologies Asia Pvt Ltd 
Secova eServices Pvt. Ltd. 
Seaton India IT Pvt Ltd 
Searchlight India Ltd 
Seal Infotech Pvl Lid 
SPG Software Technologies Pvl Ltd 
SDG Software India Pvt Lid 
Score Information Technologies Lid. 
Scope Inlenialioiial Pvt Lid 
Scope e-Knowledge Cenler Pvt Lid 
SCM Microsystems (India) Pvt Ltd 
SciTech Patent Art Services Pvl Ltd 
Science Applications Inlemahonal Corporation (SAIC) -
India Branch Office 
Scicom Technologies Pvt Ltd 
SCA Technologies India Pvt Ltd 
Satyam Computer Services Ltd 
Sattiav Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Satellite Infotech Services Pvt Ltd 
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Sasken Commuiiicalion Technolo>;ies Limited 
SamofT innovative Technoiofiies Pvt Ltd 
Saria Technologies 
Saraswat infotech Ltd 
Sara Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Sapient Corporation Pvt Ltd 
SAP Labs India Pvt Lid 
SAP India Systems, Applications and Products in Data 
Processing Pvt Ltd 
Sanrit Software Pvt Ltd 
Sankhyaa Learning Pvt Ltd 
Sankhya Technologies Private Limited 
Samyak Infotech Pvt. Lid, 
Samsung S PS Co Ltd. 
Samsung Electronics India Software Operations (SISO) 
Sampooma Matchjobs.com Pvt Ltd 
Sampatti.com Limited 
Salient Business Solutions Ltd 
Saksoft Limilcd 
Sat^un Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Safenel Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Safalick Software Pvt Ltd 
Saba Software India Pvt Ltd 
Saastha Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Saama Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
S7 Software Solutions Pvt Ltd 
SI Services (India) Pvt Ltd 
S. P. Jain Institute of Management & Research 
S R Nova Pvt Lid 
S & S InfoTech & Software Pvt Ltd 
RTEngines Software Pvt Lid 
RSM McGladrey Financial Process Outsourcing India 
Pvt Ltd 
Rose IT. Solutions (P) Ltd 
Rolta India Ltd. 
RocSearch India Pvt Ltd 
Robosofl Technologies 
Robert BOSCH India Limited 
RMSI Private Limited 
RM Education Solutions India Pvt Ltd 
Rising Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Rishabh Software Pvt Ltd 
Rightway Solution (India) Pvt Ltd 
RICO Auto Industries Ltd 
Reuters hidia Pvt Ltd 
Resurgenl India Ltd 
Reservation Data Maintenance (India) Pvt Ltd 
Repro India Ltd. 
Repcol (India) Pvt Ltd 
Relsys India Pvt Ltd 
RelQ Software Pvt Ltd 
Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt Ltd 
Reliance BPO Pvt Ltd 
Regus Business Centre (Bangalore) Pvt Ltd 
Regenesis Project and Infi-astructure Company Pvt Ltd 
Regency Solutions Pvt Ltd 
redifr.com India Limited 
Red Hat India Pvt Ltd 
Receivable Management Services India Pvt Ltd 
Realtime Techsolutions Pvt Ltd 
Real Soft (IntI) Pvt Ltd 
Ready Test Go Pvt Ltd 
Reach Sewn Technologies & Consulting Pvt. Ltd. 
RBS India Development Centre (P) Ltd 
Rave Technologies (India) Pvt Ltd 
Ranal Engineering Services Pvt Ltd 
RAMTeCh Software Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Ramco Systems Ltd 
Ram InfoimaticsLld. 
Raj Ratan Infotech (A unit of Raj-Ratan Castings Pvt 
Ltd) 
RailTel Corporation of India Ltd 
R Systems International Limited 
Quantum-Link Communications Pvt Ltd 
Quality Engineering and Software Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Quadrant Infotech India Pvt. Ltd. 
Quadra Software Solutions Pvt Ltd 
QAI (India) Limited 
QA bifoTech Pvt Ltd 
Pyramid IT Consulting PM Ltd 
R S Software (India) Lid. 
R R Industries Ltd 
Quscient Technologies Pvt Ltd 
QuisLex Legal Services Pvt Lid 
Quintegra Solutions Ltd. 
Quexst Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Quatrro BPO Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Quark Media House (India) Pvt Ltd 
Qualtcch Consultants Pvt Ltd 
Qualcomm India Pvt Ltd 
PXL Soft 
Punjab Information & Communication Technology 
Corporation Limited 
Pulsar Knowledge Centre Pvt Ltd 
PTC Software (India) Pvt Ltd 
PSl Data Systems Ltd. 
Prudentc Solution Pvt Ltd 
Proleans Software Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Property Terminus 
Promctric Testing Private Limited 
Prologix Software Solutions PYt Ltd 
Prologic First India Pvt Ltd 
Progressivexperts Infolabs India Pvt Ltd 
Progressive Infotech Pvl Lid 
Progress Software Development Pvt Ltd 
Priti Sun & Associates (PSA), Legal Counsellors 
Prithvi Infoimadon Solutions Ltd 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Pvt Lid 
Premier Technology Group Pvt. Ltd. 
PreMedia Global Pvt Ltd 
Pramali Technologies (P) Limited 
Pradot Technologies Private Limited 
PottalPIayer Qndia) Pvt Ltd 
Polyplex Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Polaris Software Lab Lid 
Planman Consultant (India) Pvt Ltd 
Planet PCI Infotech Ltd 
PK4 Software Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Pinnacle Infotech Solutions 
Pie Computer & Investments Pvl Ltd 
Picopeia Simputers Pvt Ltd 
Phoenix Software Ltd 
Phoenix IT Solutions Ltd. 
Philips Electronics India Ltd 
PHi Business Solutions Ltd 
PharmARC Analytic Solutions Pvl Lid 
Petro IT Ltd 
Persistent Systems Pvl. Ltd. 
Perot Systems TSI (India) Lid 
Perot Systems Business Proce!:s Solutions India Pvl Ltd 
Perfint Engineering Services Pvt Ltd 
People Interactive (I) Pvt. Ltd. 
PC Technowledge Center Pvt Ltd 
Patoi Computer Systems Ltd. 
Parsec Technologies Ltd 
Paradyne Infotech Limited 
PAR Computer Sciences (Intetnationai) Lid 
Papyrus Software India Pvt Ltd 
Panoramic Universal Ltd 
Pan Business Lists Pvt Ltd 
Paharpur Business Centre (A Div. of Chemical 
Metallurgical Design Co. Ltd) 
P J Softwares Limited 
Oriensoft Technologies Pvt Ltd 
OrangeScape Technologies Ltd 
Oracle India Pvt Ltd 
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QptionMatnx info Tech Pvt Ltd 
Option One Mort^ase Corporation (India) Pvi Ltd 
Optimus Global Services Ltd 
Opera Solutions Management Consulting Services Pvt 
Ltd 
Opel Telecom Pvt Ltd 
Onward Technologies Limited 
Qntrack Systems Limited 
one two three india.com 
Omnicell Corporation (India) Pvt Ltd 
Omnesys Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Olive Technology Limited 
Olive e-Business Pvt Ltd 
OKS Span Tech Pvt Ltd 
QfTiccTiger Database Systems India Private Limited 
Ocwen Financial Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Ocimum Biosolulions (India) Ltd 
Oceans Connect (India) Pvt Ltd 
ObjectWin Technology India Pvt Ltd 
Oberoi Contact Centre (A Div. of EIH Ltd) 
NVIDIA Graphics P\1 Ltd 
NuNet Technologies P\1 Ltd 
NuMark Software Pvt. Ltd. 
Nucleus Software Exports Ltd 
Nucleus Netsoft & GIS India Ltd. 
NTrust Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Nt5 Software Solutions (India) P\1. Ltd. 
NSE.ITLld. 
Novellus Systems (India) Pvt Ltd 
Novell Software Development (India) Ltd 
Novell India Pvt Ltd 
NetYantra India Pvt Ltd 
Novartis Development IT (A Div. of Novartis Healthcare 
PM Ltd) 
Nous Infosystcms Pvt Ltd 
North Shore Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Nokia Siemens Networks India Pvt Ltd 
Nokia India Pvt Ltd 
Niteo Technologies (P) Ltd 
Nipuna Services Limited 
Nimaya Technologies India Pvt Ltd 
NIIT Technologies Ltd 
NUT SmanServe Lid 
Nihilent Technologies Pvt Ltd 
NextSrick Solutions Limited 
Next Link (P) Ltd 
Nexslep Infotech PM Ltd 
Newgen Software Technologies Ltd 
Nevis Networks (India) Pvt Ltd 
Network Systems & Technologies (P) Ltd. 
Network Programs (India) Ltd 
Network General Software India Pvt Ltd 
Network Appliance Systems (India) Pvt Ltd 
NelraScribePvt. Ltd. 
Nellink Digital Energy Pvl Lid 
nelGuru Ltd 
NelEdge Computing Global Services Pvt Ltd 
nelCustomer India Pvt Ltd 
Netaquila Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Net Vigil Software Pvt Ltd 
Net Systems Informatics (India) Pvt Ltd 
Net Solutions 
Ness Technologies (India) Ltd 
neoIT.Com Pvl Ltd 
Nelito Systems Limited 
Neilsoft Limited 
Neev Information Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Neeman Medical Data Management Centre (A BPO div 
of Neeman Intl. (Asia) Ltd) 
NEC Business Coordination Centre (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
NCR Corporation India Pvt Ltd 
NaviSite India Pvt Ltd 
Navayuga Infotech Pvt. Ltd. 
Mukesh & Associates 
Motif India Infotech Pvt. Ltd 
MothersonSumi Infotech & Designs Ltd 
MoTech Software Pvt Ltd 
Mosum Technology (India) Pvt Ltd 
Morgan Stanley Advantage Services Pvt Ltd 
NatureSoft Private Limited 
Natural Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Nalli Soft Solutions 
NAGSOFT Solutions Private Limited 
Nagarro Software Pvt Ltd 
N Y D o x Services Ltd 
Mutual Image & Events Management Pvt Ltd 
MSC Software Corporation India Pvt Ltd 
MResult Services Pvt Ltd 
MPS Technologies Ltd 
MphasiS Ltd 
MphasiS BPO (A unit of MsourcE India Pvt Ltd) 
Motorola India Electronics Pvl: Ltd 
Moores Rowland Consulting Pvt Ltd 
Monster.com India Pvt. Lid. 
Monsoon Multimedia India Pvt Ltd 
Modi Measurement Systems Pvt Lid 
Mobera Systems Pvt Ltd 
m junction Services Ltd 
Misys International Financial Systems Pvt Ltd 
Mistral Software Pvt Ltd 
MindTrte Consulting Ltd 
Mindleck (India) Ltd 
MindRiver Information Technologies Pvl Ltd 
Mindlogicx Infotech Limited 
Mindfirc Solutions 
MindCraft Software Pvt Ltd 
Milestone Interactive Software Ltd 
MIEL e-Security Pvt Ltd 
Microsoft India (R&D) Pvt Ltd 
Microsoft Corporation (I) P\1 Ltd 
Microland Ltd 
Micro Technologies (India) Ltd 
Melaleam Services Pvt Ltd 
Melacube Software Pvt Ltd 
Melstar Information Technologies Ltd 
Megasofl Limited 
Medusind Solutions India Pvl Ltd 
MediaTek India Technology P'/t Ltd 
Media Lab Asia 
McKinsey Knowledge Centre India Private Limited 
McKinsey & Company Inc. 
Maytas Properties Pvt Ltd 
Maverick Quality Advisory Seivices Pvt Ltd 
Maveric Systems Ltd 
MASTER Ltd. 
Mascon Global Ltd 
MarkelTools Research Pvt Ltd 
marketRx India Pvt Ltd 
Manthan Software Services Pvt Ltd 
Manpower Services India Pvl Ltd 
Manjushree Infotech Ltd 
Manhattan Associates (India) Development Centre Pvt 
Ltd 
Mangalam Information Technologies Ltd 
MakeMyTrip (India) Pvt Ltd 
Maintec Technologies Pvl Ltd 
MAIA Intelligence Pvt Ltd 
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation 
Magus Customer Dialog Pvt Ltd 
Magna IT Networking Pvt Ltd 
Magic Software Pvl Ltd 
Madhya Pradesh State Electronics Development 
Corporation Ltd. 
Macmillan India Ltd 
Ma Foi Outsourcing Solutions Ltd 
Luminous Engineering and TecKnology Services Pvt Ltd 
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Lucent Technolofzies Hindustan Pvt Ltd 
LSI Research (India) Pvl Lid 
Lo^ i^x Techno Park (A Div. of IT Enfraserviccs Pvt Ltd) 
Login Infotech Private Limited 
Logica Synectics Pvt Ltd (LogicaCMG) 
Lloyds TSB Global Services Pvl Ltd 
Liqwid K/ystal India Pvt Lid 
Liqvid eLeaming Services Pvt Ltd 
Lionbridgc Technologies Pvl Lid 
Lighthouse Systems Pvl. Ltd, 
Lifetrcc Convergence Ltd 
LG Soft India Pvt Ltd. 
LG CNS Global Pvl Ltd 
Lexmark International (India) Private Limited 
Leplon Software Export & Research Pvt Ltd 
Lehman Brothers Services India Pvt Ltd 
Lauren Software Pvt. Ltd. 
Lason India Ltd 
Laser Soft Infosystems Ltd 
Larsen & Toubro Infotech Limited 
Lapiz Digital Services (A Div. of Ultramarine & 
Pigments Ltd) 
Lanco Global Systems Ltd 
Lambent Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Lakshay Software Solutions 
Labvantage Solulions Pvl Lid 
LAT Infocity Lid 
Kyocera Wireless (India) Pvl Ltd 
KPMG Advisory Services Private Limited 
KPIT Cummins Infosystems Ltd 
Kom/Fcrry Intemational Pvl Ltd 
KnowledgeWorks Global Lid 
Knoah Solutions Pvl Ltd 
Knack Systems & Services (P) Lid. 
KMG Infotech Pvl Ltd 
K-Losic Soflech Solulions Pvl Lid 
KLG Syslel Lid 
KLA-Tencor Software India Pvl Ltd 
KG Information Sysleros Pvl Lid 
Kemex Microsyslems (India) Lid 
Kensoft Infolech Ltd 
Kenexa Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Kelly Services India Pvl Ltd 
Keane Worldzen India Pvl Lid 
Keane India Lid 
KCP Technologies Lid 
Kasshku Infomialion Technologies Pvl Ltd 
Karvy Global Services Ltd 
Kanbay Software (India) Pvl Ltd 
Kale Consultants Ltd 
Kadkomp Solulions Pvt Ltd 
Kaavian Systems Pvl Ltd 
K7 Computing Pvl Lid 
KIO Technologies 
K Rahcja Universal Pvt Ltd 
K Raheja Constructions Pvt Lid 
Juno Online Services Development Pvl Ltd 
JSS Consullancy Services Pvt Ltd 
JP Morgan Services India Pvt. Ltd. 
Jopasana Software & Systems Ltd 
Johnson & Johnson Ltd (Regional Knowledge Centre 
Pune) 
JKTechnosoft Ltd 
JDA Software India Pvt Ltd 
J23J Software India Pvt Lid 
J. Sagar Associates 
Ivy Comptech (P) Ltd 
Ivoiy Properties and Hotels Pvl Ltd 
iViZ Techno Solutions Pvt Ltd 
i-Vanlage India Private Limited 
ITTl Limited 
lleamic Pvl Ltd 
itCube Solutions Pvt Ltd 
ITC Infolech India Ltd 
IT People (India) Lid 
i-Strat Software Pvt Lid 
iSpace Solbvare Technologies Fvl Ltd 
iSOFT R&D Pvt Ltd 
iSmari International Limited 
ISG Novasofl Technologies Lid (A company in the K K 
Birla Group) 
IRIS Business Serv'ices (India) I'M Ltd 
iPrcx Solulions 
lonldea Enterprise Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Invensys Development Centre India (P) Ltd 
Inuva Info Managcmcnl Pvl Ltd 
Intuit Technology Services Pvt Ltd 
INTRUST GLOBAL eServices Pvl Lid 
Inu-aSphere hifonnalion Technologies Pvl Ltd 
Intrasoft Technologies Pvl. Ltd. 
Intolo Software (1) Pvl. Lid. 
Interwoven Software Services India Pvl Ltd 
Interiek Systems Certifications (A div. of Intertek 
Testing Services India Pvl Ltd) 
InterSystcms India Pvt Ltd 
Intersoft Data Labs Pvt Ltd 
Interra Information Technologies (India) Pvl Ltd 
Inlemct Trends (India) Pvl Ltd 
Intemational SOS Services (1) Pvt Ltd 
Intemational Institute of Information Technology 
International Business Wales 
Intergraph Consulting Private Limiled 
IntciBlobc Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Interactive Mullimcdia Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Intelligroup Asia Pvt Ltd 
Intelhcom Contact Centers (A Div. of Jindal Transworld 
Pvt Ltd) 
Inlelenel Global Services Ltd 
Intel Technology India Pvt Ltd 
Integreon Managed Solutions India Pvl Ltd 
Integrated Software Solulions (India) Pvl Lid 
Integrated Property Management & Services Lid 
Integra Software Services Private Limiled 
Insoft com Pvl Ltd 
Inox Global Services Ltd 
Innominds Software Pvl Lid 
InLogic BizCom Pvl Ltd 
Infrasoft Technologies Limited 
Infozech Software Ltd. 
Infovision Software Pvl. Lid. 
Infovision Informalion Services Pvl Lid 
Infolech Enterprises Lid. 
Infosys Technologies Ltd. 
Infosys BPO Lid 
Information Technology Park Ltd 
Information Kerala Mission (A proj. of Centre for Dev, 
of hnaging Technology) 
Infopro India Pvt Ltd 
Infomart (India) Pvt Ltd 
Infogain India (P) Ltd 
Info Edge (India) Ltd 
Infinity Infolech Parks Limiled 
Infinite Computer Solutions (India) Pvl Ltd 
Infineon Technologies India Pvt Ltd 
Indusa Infotech Services Pvt. Ltd. 
Indus Valley Partners (India) Pvl Ltd 
Indus Business Systems Ltd. 
Induclis (India) Pvt Ltd 
Indo-Japan Trade Cenfre Pvl. Ltd 
Indigo Lever Shared Services Limited 
India Prepaid Services Pvl Ltd 
India Insure Risk Management Services Pvt Ltd 
India CyberLeaming Pvl Ltd 
India Com net Intemational Pvl Ltd 
Independent Technology Systems (India) Pvt Ltd 
llncture Technologies Pvt Ltd 
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Inca Informatics P-\1 Ltd 
jNautix Technologies India Private Limited 
Impetus Infotech (1) P\1. Ltd, 
Impact Systems P% t Ltd 
iMantras India Pvt Ltd 
IICTechnolosiesPvtLtd 
IHG IT Services (India) Pvt Ltd 
iGATE Global Solutions Ltd 
i-flex Solutions Ltd 
IDS Infotech Limited 
IDEB Construction Projects (P) Ltd 
IBS Software Services (P) Ltd 
IBM India Pvt Ltd 
IBM Daksh Business Process Services Pvt Ltd 
IBILT Technolofiies Ltd 
ISA Health (India) Pvt Ltd 
lAL Technologies Ltd 
i2i Enterprise Lid 
12 Technologies India Pvl Ltd 
i Tenable India Ltd 
I N S Zoom Sofhvare India Pvl Lid 
i Axis Ltd 
HyTech Professionals India Pvt Ltd 
Hurix Systems Pvt. Ltd. 
Human Base India Inc 
Hughes Systique India Pvt Ltd 
Huawei Technologies India Pvt Ltd 
HTMT Global Solutions Pvt Lid 
HTC Global Services (India) Pvl Lid 
HSBC Software Development (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
HSBC Electronic Data Processing India Pvl. Ltd 
Honeywell Technology Solutions Lab Pvl Ltd 
Honeywell Inlemational (India) Pvl Lid 
Hire Right Inc. 
Hindicron Infosystems Pvt Ltd 
HIFX IT & Media Services Pvl Lid 
Hexawafc Technologies Limited 
Hewlett-Packard India Sales Pvt Lid 
Hewlett-Packard GlobalSoft Ltd 
Hewitt Associates India Pvt Ltd 
Hero Management Service Lid 
Helios & Matheson Infoimation Technology Lid 
Heartland Delhi Transcription & Services Pvl. Ltd. 
Headstrong Services India Pvl Ltd 
HDFC General Insurance Company Lid 
HCL Technologies Ltd 
HCL Coipoiation Ltd 
HCC Real Estate Ltd 
Hazel Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Harlron Communications Ltd. 
Harris Jayanti Technologies 
Harita TVS Technologies Ltd 
Harbinger Techaxes Pvt Ltd 
HAPAG-LLOYD Global Services Pvt Ltd 
Hanu Software Solutions (India) Pvt Ltd 
Hamilton Research & Technology Pvt. Ltd. 
GXS India Technology Centre Pvt. Lid. 
Gurukulonline Learning Solutions (P) Ltd 
Gujarat Venture Finance Ltd. 
Oujaral Narmada Valley Fertilizers Company Ltd 
Gujarat Informatics Limited 
GTL Limited 
GreenPoint Business Processing Services Private 
Limited 
GrapeCity India Pvl Lid 
Granada Services Ltd. (iEnergizer Inc.) 
Google Online India Pvt Ltd 
Good Technology (India) Pvl Lid 
Goldshield Services Pvt Ltd 
Godrej Upstream Lid 
Gojrej Infotech Ltd 
Godrej Global Solutions Ltd 
IGNET Infotech (Unit of GNETIMPEX Pvt Ltd) 
Globsyn Technologies Ltd 
GlobalTech (India) Pvt Ltd 
Globalsoft Pvt Ltd 
GlobalLogic India Pvl Ltd 
Global Vantedge Pvt Ltd 
Global Infovision Pvt Ltd 
Global Edge Software Ltd 
Global e-Business Operations Pvl Ltd 
Global Business Technology Services Pvt Ltd 
Geometric Software Solutions Company Ltd 
Geodesic Information Systems Ltd. 
GENPACT India Pvt Ltd 
Genisys Integrating Systems (1) Pvt Lid 
Genesys Telecommunications Laboratories, Inc. - India 
Branch Office 
General Atlantic Partners Pvt Lid 
GENBAND Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Gemini Systems (India) Pvt Lid 
peine Technologies India Pvt Ltd 
GE Money Servicing (A Div. of GE India Exports Pvt 
Ltd) 
GE Medical Systems (India) Pvt Ltd 
GCl Solutions Pvt Lid 
GCl Enletprise Solutions Pvt Lid 
GAVS Infoimation Services Private Limited 
FXLabs Studios Pvt Ltd 
FuhiTOn Synergie ?vX Ltd 
Future Focus Infotech Pvt. Ltd. 
Fusion Technologies (India) Pvl Ltd 
Fulcrum Logic (India) Pvt Lid 
e-Zesl Solutions Ltd 
Fujitsu Consulting India Ltd 
Franklin Templeton International Services (India) Pvt 
Ltd 
Four Soft Limited 
Fortune Infotech Ltd 
Ford Business Service Center Private limited 
FootprinlsCollaleral Services Pvl Lid 
Focus Infosys (India) Pvt Ltd. 
Fiserv India Pvt Ltd 
Firstware Software Solutions (A Division of Brilliant 
Tutorials Pvt Lid) 
Firstsource Solutions Ltd 
First Indian Corporation Pvt Ltil 
Firs! Advantage Pvl Lid 
Fiorano Software Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Financial Technologies (India) Pvt Lid 
Final Quadrant Solutions Lid 
Fil-Flan Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Fidelity Business Services India Private Limited 
FCG Software Services (India) Pvt Ltd 
Extreme Networks India Pvt Ltd 
exl Service.com (India) Pvt Ltd 
Exevo India Limited 
Exensys Software Solutions Ltd 
Exceed Technologies Pvl Ltd 
Exachis Corporation Ltd 
Exa Infotech Pvl Ltd 
Everest Business Advisory India Pvl Lid 
Euclid India Pvl Ltd 
ETP Inlemational Pvl Lid 
Essar Information Technology Ud. 
E-Softiek Pvt Ltd 
ESN Technologies (I) Pvt Ltd 
eServices(^Symphony Pvt Ltd 
Equinox Global Services Pvl Lid 
Epitome Global Services Pvt Lid 
Epicenter Technologies Pvl Lid 
Enterprise Syslem Solutions Pvl Ltd 
Entente Global Info Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Enlink Infotech Pvt Lid 
Enem Nostrum Remedies Pvt Ltd 
Enam Financial Consultants Pvl. Ltd. 
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eMR Technology Ventures Pvt Ltd 
Emerson Networi: Power (India) Pvt Ltd 
Emerson Design Engineering Center (A Div. of Emerson 
Electric Company (1) Pvt Ltd) 
EMC Data Storage Systems (India) Private Limited 
Emantras Interactive Technologies P\1 Ltd 
Elixir Web Solutions 
Elitser IT Solutions India Pvt Ltd 
Elitecore Technologies Ltd 
Element K India Pvt Ltd 
Electronics For Imaging India Pvt Ltd 
Electronics and Computers India Ltd 
e-lnfochips Ltd. 
Eicher Engineering Solutions (A Unit of Eichcr Motors 
Ltd) 
eFunds International Private Limited 
Efftronic Systems Pvt Ltd 
e-enable Technologies Pvt Ltd 
e-Emphasys Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Eduritc Technologies Pv1 Ltd 
EDISPHERE Software Pvt Ltd 
Eclipse Systems PM. Ltd 
ebusincsswarc India Pvt Ltd 
eBay India Pvt Ltd 
Eastern Software Systems Pvt Ltd 
Earnest John Technologies Ltd. 
e4e Labs Pvt Ltd 
e4e Business Solutions India Pvt Ltd 
E2ESerWi2 Solutions Ltd 
Dynamic Vertical Software Pvt Ltd 
DX Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Drivestream India Pvt Ltd 
DPS Technologies India Pvt Ltd 
Domex e-Data Pvt Ltd 
Directorate of Industries, Madhya Pradesh 
Direction Software Solutions 
Digite Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Digital Illusion Ind Pvt Ltd 
Dexterity Business Analysts Pvt Ltd 
Dewsofl Solution Pvt Ltd 
Deutsche Network Services (P) Ltd 
Det Norske Veritas AS 
Designtnate India Pvt Ltd 
Descon Ltd 
Delta Services (India) Pvt Ltd 
Deloiltc Consulting India (P) Ltd 
Dell Computer India Pvt Ltd 
DecisionCraft Analytics Limited 
DCM Data Systems / DCM Technologies (IT Division of 
DCM Ltd) 
Dawn Consulting 
Datavision Software Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Datamatics Technologies Ltd 
Datamatics Ltd. 
Datamatics Financial Software & Services Ltd 
Datacraft India Ltd 
Data-Core (India) Pvt Ltd 
Databazaar India Pvt Ltd 
Data Sofhvare Research Company (International) Ltd 
Data Infosys Limited 
Daniel Measurement & Control (India) Pvt Ltd 
Damco Solutions (P) Ltd 
Daffodil Software Ltd 
D E Shaw tndia Software Pvt. Ltd. 
Cygnus Sofhvare Pvt Ltd 
Cygnet Infotech Pvt Lid 
Cybertech Systems and Software Ltd. 
CyberQ Consulting Pvt Ltd 
Cybernet Software Systems Pvt Ltd 
Cybage Software Pvt Ltd 
CSM Software Pvt Ltd 
Crossdomain Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Crisil Ltd 
Crimson Logic India Pvt Ltd 
Crest Animation Studios Ltd 
Crecento Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Cranes Software International Ltd 
Covansys India Ltd 
Couth Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Corpus Software Pvt Ltd 
Coromandel Infotech India Ltd 
CoreObjects India Pvt. Ltd. 
Core Projects & Technologies Ltd 
Core BPO (India) Pvt Ltd 
Cordys R&D (India) Pvt Ltd 
CordianI Technologies (P) Limited 
Corbus (India) Private Limited 
Copal Research India Pvt Ltd 
Convergys Information Management (India) Pvt Lid 
Convergys India Services Pvt Ltd 
Contact Singapore 
Consulting Engineering Services (I) Ltd 
Conseco Data Services (India) Pvt Ltd 
Congnjent Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 
Congruent Info-Tech Pvt Ltd 
Conexant Systems Pvt Lid 
Computer Sciences Corpotatioii India Pvl Ltd 
Computer Generated Solutions India Pvt Ltd 
Compulink Systems Ltd 
Compare Infobase Pvt Ltd 
CommVault Systems (India) Pvt Ltd 
Combine Resources 
Comal Technologies (P) Ltd. 
Comait Gilchrist International Pvt Ltd 
Colwell & Salmon Communications (India) Ltd 
COLT Technology Seivices India Pvl Ltd 
CollabNet Software Pvt Lid 
Cognizant Technology Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. 
Coconut Softwares Pvt Ltd 
CMC Limited 
CL13L e-Services Limited 
Cleave Global c-Services Ltd 
ClearTrail Technologies Pvt Ltd 
City Info Services Pvt Ltd 
Citrix Systems India Pvt Ltd 
Citigroup Information Technology Operations and 
Solutions Ltd 
Citigroup Global Services Lid 
Citibank N.A. 
CITEC tafonnation India Pvt Ltd 
Cisco Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd 
Ciena India Pvt Ltd 
ClBERsites India Pvt Ltd 
ClANT Technologies Pvt Ltd 
CI.COM (P) Ltd 
Cherrytec Solutions Limited 
Changepond Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Chakkilam Infotech Ltd 
CGI Information Systems and Management Consultants 
Pvt Ltd 
CFC India Services Pvt Ltd 
CES Pvl Ltd 
Cemer Healthcare Solutions Pvl Ltd 
Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C -
DAC) 
Cendura Software Pvt Ltd 
Celstream Technologies Ltd 
Cellnext Solutions Ltd 
Celcius Technologies Pvt. Ltd. 
CE Info Systems Pvl Ltd 
CCL Softlabs (A Div. of CCL Optoelectronics Pvt Ltd) 
CCG (India) Pvt Ltd 
CB Richard Ellis South Asia Pvt Ltd 
Caterpillar India Pvt Ltd 
Catalytic Software Ltd 
CashTech Solutions India Pvt Lid 
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Capita Offshore Services Pvt Ltd 
Caritor (India) Private Limited 
Caresoft Inc. India 
Career Launcher India Ltd 
CapMark Overseas Processing India Pvt Ltd 
Capital One SerNJces (India) Pvt Ltd 
Cappcmini Consuhing India Pvt Ltd 
Capco IT Services India Pvt Ltd 
Canon India Pvt Ltd 
Canbank Computer Services Ltd. 
Canarys Automation Pvt Ltd 
Cambridge Technology Enterprises Ltd 
Cambridge Solutions Ltd 
CalSoft Private Limited 
California Softvs'are Company Ltd 
CADES Digitech P\t Ltd 
Cadence Design Systems India Pvt. Ltd 
Cable and Wireless (India) Ltd 
CA Computer Associates India Pvt Ltd 
C3i Consultants India Pvt Ltd 
CI India Pvt Ltd 
Butler Technical Services India (P) Ltd 
Busy Infolech Pvt. Ltd 
Business Process Outsourcing (India) Pvt Ltd 
BT India P\1 Ltd 
Brocade Communjcalions Systems Pvt Ltd 
British Deputy High Commission 
Bristlcconc India Ltd 
Brigade Corpoiation India Pvt Ltd 
BrickRed Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Brainvisa Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Brainstomiing Company (International) PM. Ltd. 
BPB Publications 
Botree Software International Ltd 
Borland India Pvt Ltd 
BNP Paribas India Solutions Pvt Ltd 
BMR Managed Services (A Div. of ERIX Advisors Pvt 
Lid) 
BMC Software India Pvt Lid 
Blue Star Infolech Ltd 
Blue Chip Computer Consultants Pvt Ltd 
Bitscape IT Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Biriasoft Limited 
Bharti Tclcsoft Ltd. 
Bertelsmann MarVcting Services India Pvt Ltd 
Bersofi Infolech Pvt Ltd 
Bentlcy Systems India Pvt Ltd 
BEML Technology Division (A div of Bharat Eanh 
Movers Ltd) 
Bells Softech Limited 
Bechtel India Pvt. Lid. 
Bebo Technologies Pvl Ltd 
BEA Systems India Pvt Ltd 
BCGI Wireless Pvt Ltd 
Barry-Wehmiller International Resources Pvt Ltd 
Bangalore Softsell Ltd 
Bahwan CyberTek Pvl Ltd 
BAeHAL Software Limited 
BA Continuum Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Aztecsoft Ltd 
Axis - IT&T Limited 
AXA Business Services Pvt Ltd 
Avocent Networking Products Pvt Ltd (Avocent India) 
Aviva Global Shared Services Pvl Ltd 
Aver Software Technologies Ltd. 
Avaya India Pvt Ltd 
Avaya GlobalConnect Ltd 
Avani Cimcon Technologies Ltd 
AVAANA Software and Services Pvt Ltd 
Autodesk India Pvt Ltd 
aurionPro Solutions Ltd 
Attra Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Atos Origin India Private Limited 
Apt Software Avenues Pvl Ltd 
Athri Infotech 
Athena Info Consulting Pvt Ltd 
Atari Informatics Ltd. 
AT&T Communication Services India Pvt Ltd 
Astute Systems Technology Pvt Ltd 
Astron Document M anagement Pvt Ltd 
Aspire Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
Aspinwall Technologies Ltd 
Aspen Communications P\t Ltd 
Aspect Technology Center (India) Pvl Ltd 
ASM Technologies Ltd 
Ashlcch Infolech Pvt. Ltd. 
ASE Structure Design Pvl Ltd 
Aryabhatta Solutions Ltd. 
Arya Communications & Electronics Services Ltd. 
Artcch Infosystems Pvl Ltd 
Arrowpoint Technologies Pvl Ltd 
Arithme Software & Web Services Pvt Lid 
Aricent Technologies (Holdings) Ltd 
AREVA T&D Systems India Ltd 
Aress Software & Education Technologies (P) Lid. 
Aquarian Management Services Pvl Ltd 
APW President Systems Ltd 
Aplech Ltd 
Applied Software Pvl. Ltd. 
Applied Materials India Pvt Ltd 
AppLabs Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Appel Ser\'ice5 (BPO Division of Essel Shyam 
Communication Lid) 
Apollo Health Street Pvt Ltd 
Apex Computer & Engineering Services 
ANZ Operations and Technology Pvt Ltd 
Antares Systems Ltd 
Answerthink (India) Ltd 
Annik Systems Pvt Lid 
Amtex Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Amrut Software Pvt Ltd 
AmitySoft Technologies Pvt Ltd 
American Megatrends (India) Pvt Ltd. 
American Express (India) Pvl. Ltd. 
America Online India Pvt Ltd 
Amdocs Development Centre India Pvt Ltd 
Amadeus India Pvt Ltd 
Altosys Softwaie Technologies Ltd 
Altair Engineering India Pvl Ltd 
Allsec Technologies Ltd 
Alliance IT Consulting India Pvt Ltd 
All India Society For Electronics & Computer 
Technology (AISECT) 
All e Technologies (P) Ltd 
Algorithms Software Pvt Lid. 
Alden Prepress Services Pvl Ltd 
Alcatel Development India Private Limited 
AksaTcch Solutions Pvt Ltd 
Akmin Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Akamai Technologies India Pift Ltd 
Akal Infoimation Systems Ltd 
Ajuba Solutions (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
Ajax.com Pvt Ltd 
Aithent Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Agree Ya Solutions (India) Pvt Ltd 
Agilent Technologies (International) Pvt Ltd 
Agarwal Management Consultants Pvt Ltd 
AfTmity Express India Pvt Ltd 
Affiliated Computer Services of India (P) Ltd (ACS) 
Affarsstrategema Think Tech Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Aegis BPO Services Ltd 
AdvenlNel Development Centre (India) Pvt Ltd 
Adventity BPO India Pvl Ltd 
Advent Software Ltd 
Adrenalin eSyslems Ltd 
ADP Pvl Ltd 
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List of member organisations of NASSCOM (Year 2007) 
contd. 
Adobe Systems India Pvt Ltd 
Aditi Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Adiance Technologies Pvt Ltd 
Adea International Pvt Ltd 
ADCC Research & Computing Centre Ltd 
Adaptec (India) Pvt Ltd 
Acumen Software Technologies Ltd 
ACES Infotech Pvt Ltd 
Accord Software & Systems Pvt Ltd 
Acccnturc Services Pvt Ltd 
Accent Consulting (A division of Accent Overseas P\1 
L(d) 
AccelTree Software Pvt Ltd 
Accel Transmatic Ltd 
Accel Frontline Ltd 
ABN AMRO Central Enterprise Services Pvt Ltd 
ABM Knowledgeware Ltd 
Abhishek Infotech Pvt Ltd 
AABSyS Information Technology Pvt Ltd 
A G Technologies Pvt Ltd 
3i Infotech Ltd 
3D PLM Software Solutions Lid 
247 Learning Solutions Pvt Ltd 
24/7 Customer Pvt Ltd 
Source: NASSCOM, 2007 
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Annexure 4.4 
Responses to CMMI-related queries 
This annexure provides information about responses of personnel from industry and 
academics, concerning suitability of'CMMl' as the criteria for sample selection of All 
communication with the concerned personnel was carried out during the first 3 quarters 
ofyear 2007. 
In order to assess suitability of CMMI quality standard, the following questions were 
put forth. Authors about this subject, Institutions involved in CMMI certification, and 
HR personnel of CMMI certified organizations (3 organisations for each level of 
CMMI) were approached, with the following queries. 
1 Does CMMI apply to only product related processes or does it apply to service 
related processes too? 
2. Does CMMI apply to processes of support functions also? (For example: 
processes that involve designing a compensation plan) 
3. In your view what is a good indicator of a software organisation's maturity at 
designing variable pay plans - CMMI or PCMM ? 
The responses of some of the personnel contacted for the above purpose, are listed 
below: 
Institution / Author Responsie 
Phil Babel 
(Chairman of the CMMI 
Steering Group, U.S. Air 
Force.) 
The CMMI model is a process improvement model 
designed by engineers, who are primarily experienced in 
defense systems development and acquisition. Although 
there are many fundamental principles fostered by the 
model such as formal requirements specification and 
management, I do not believe it would apply as it is to 
designing a compensation plan. 
Deen Blash, SEI Customer 
Relationscustomer-
"The current CMMI model addresses the development 
of product and service systems, but not the provisioning 
or delivery of services. The CMMI for Services has not 
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Institution / Autiior Response 
relations(a),sei.cmu.edu. been released. Unfortunately at this time we do not 
have a release date as well." (October 3, 2007). 
QAI, Ajay Batra, 
consulting partner. 
(the response was given by 
Ms. Girija, a research 
associate, on behalf of Mr. 
Batra) 
Per se, neither CMMl nor People CMM can be directly 
used to define and measure variable pay plans. A high 
organizational maturity on either model has no (proven) 
co-relation with the maturity of a variable pay system. 
Ms. Sunita (signed as a 
representative of HR 
department), Wipro 
technologies ltd. 
CMMI can be used for product or for software 
development, maintenance, testing services etc. CMMl 
is not meant for support functions, cannot be used for 
designing compensation, it was not meant for it 
Badrinarayan R. Head, 
Quality group, Sify Limited 
CMMl is specifically designed for organizations 
involved in Systems Engineering (SE) and Software 
Engineering (SW). CMMI is not an appropriate process 
framework for your stated requirement (although it can 
be interpreted as a generic standard). A well defined and 
structured HR process coupled with payroll and finance 
can be considered a good indicator for Software 
organization's maturity for designing a pay plan. 
Note - Only key responses are mentioned above, as all the responses were not equally 
crucial or critical for insight. 
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Annexure 4.5 
This annexure gives the opinions of industry personnel and that of authors of this 
subject, about possibly useful criteria for sample selection. 
Authors' views about possible criteria for sample selection 
Name of the Author/ 
specific industry 
personnel 
Opinions 
Sandeep Kanwar, Chief 
financial officer, HCL 
Infosystems. 
"Company size has nothing to do with how seriously an 
organization pursues its variable pay strategy. For instance: 
we have always been using variable pay as a key element 
of business strategy even when we were small". 
Dow scott, 
Professor, Loyola 
University, Chicago 
"An organization with more than 100 employees would 
have a HR professional who would design professional 
human resource programs (including variable pay). Thus, 
employee strength, could be one of the criteria that could 
be considered". 
Jay R. Schuster Following criteria may be considered. 
1. The best performing companies software companies in 
India, financially for at least 5 years. Only profitable 
companies can afford sound compensation programs 
2. Should have at least 500 employees. 
3 Pick companies with the same revenue size if you can, 
and in the same business. 
4 No new companies. 
Tom Wilson (Wilson 
Group, Inc.) 
-The plan should have been in place for at least 3 if not 5 
years. 
-The program should be a formal one, where there is a 
budget, clearly defined measures (as opposed to a purely 
discretionary plan), and actual payments should be made 
according to a pre-determined cycle - quarterly, semi- or 
annual. 
-The company should have more than 100 people. Plans in 
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Name of the Author/ 
specific industry 
personnel 
A mid-level, HR 
executive of a NOIDA 
based software company 
(name not disclosed) 
Opinions 
companies witli less than this reflect the personality of the 
top executive and not necessarily a process of the 
organization. 
I think the suitable indicator will be employee turnover/rate 
of attrition. This indicator will be specifically applicable to 
Software industry only, to the exclusion of BPOs, call 
centres etc. A low attrition rate would mean that the 
compensation plan is working satisfactorily for employees, 
and hence is worthwhile studying. This is so, since a major 
reason for job hopping is employees' displeasure with the 
compensation policy / plan of organization. 
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Annexure 4.6 
List of Companies in Indian Software Industry 
(sourced from PROWESS database on 23rd September 2007) 
S.No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Name of Organisation 
Hindustan Bio Sciences Ltd. 
Integrated Hitech Ltd. 
Usha Martin Infotech Ltd. 
European Software Alliances Ltd. 
Cauvery Software Engg. Systems Ltd. 
Netlink Solutions (India) Ltd. 
Acme Resources Ltd. 
Space Computer & Systems Ltd. 
Intelicent India Ltd. 
Intertec Communications Ltd. 
V M F Soft Tech Ltd. 
Objectone Information Systems Ltd. 
Synfosys Business Solutions Ltd. 
Ace Software Exports Ltd. 
Venus Ventures Ltd. 
Sparc Systems Ltd. 
ABM Knowledgeware Ltd. 
Softpro Systems Ltd. 
Softsol India Ltd. 
Fortune Infotech Ltd. 
W TI Advanced Technology Ltd. 
Revenue for 2005-
06 (in crores) 
0.3 
0.38 
0.54 
0.58 
0.74 
0.81 
1.46 
1.69 
2.26 
2.35 
2.93 
3.56 
4.49 
4.97 
5.27 
5.29 
5.56 
6.37 
7.01 
7.15 
8.55 
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S.No. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Name of Organisation 
Asian Cere Information Teehnology Ltd. 
Shree Tulsi Online.Com Ltd. 
C S Software Enterprise Ltd. 
Infotrek Syscom Ltd. 
Sankhya Infotech Ltd. 
V JI L Consulting Ltd. 
Pentasoft Technologies Ltd. 
Exensys Software Solutions Ltd. 
Intellvisions Software Ltd. 
Tutis Technologies Ltd. 
Brels Infotech Ltd. 
Cambridge Technology Enterprises Ltd. 
Aurionpro Solutions Ltd. 
Zen Technologies Ltd. 
Core Projects & Technologies Ltd. 
Panoramic Universal Ltd. 
Four Soft Ltd. 
Compucom Software Ltd. 
Virinchi Technologies Ltd. 
Saksoft Ltd. 
Zigma Software Ltd. 
Parle Software Ltd. 
Interworld Digital Ltd. 
Revenue for 2005-
06 (in crores) 
8.89 
10.21 
10.69 
11.11 
15.22 
15.38 
16.17 
16.48 
16.55 
16.76 
18.34 
18.4 
19.69 
20.23 
21.01 
21.85 
21.87 
23.14 
25.71 
26.29 
26.98 
28.14 
28.88 
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S.No. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Name of Organisation 
Bartronics India Ltd. 
Ontrack Systems Ltd. 
Karuturi Networks Ltd. 
Motherson Sumi Infotech & Designs Ltd. 
Tera Software Ltd. 
Goldstone Technologies Ltd. 
Zenith Infotech Ltd. 
Lanco Global Systems Ltd. 
California Software Co. Ltd. 
Quintegra Solutions Ltd. 
Hit Kit Global Solutions Ltd. 
Kernex Microsystems (India) Ltd. 
N S E.I T Ltd. 
Tanla Solutions Ltd. 
K L G Systel Ltd. 
Vakrangee Softwares Ltd. 
Educomp Solutions Ltd. 
T Spiritual World Ltd. 
Omnitech Infosolutions Ltd. 
Micro Technologies (India) Ltd. 
3D P L M Software Solutions Ltd. 
Jetking Infotrain Ltd. 
Kale Consultants Ltd. 
Revenue for 2005-
06 (in crores) 
29.03 
29.25 
29.36 
33.27 
35.08 
35.14 
35.37 
35.63 
37.43 
37.79 
40.56 
41.3 
41.4 
41.4 
49.8 
51.15 
52.61 
53.92 
54.1 
58.56 
59.61 
61.26 
62.58 
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S.No. 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
11 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
Name of Organisation 
Blue Star Infotech Ltd. 
Visu International Ltd. 
Visesh Infotecnics Ltd. 
IC S A (India) Ltd. 
R Systems International Ltd. 
Northgate Technologies Ltd. 
Paradyne Infotech Ltd. 
Geodesic Information Systems Ltd. 
Financial Technologies (India) Ltd. 
Nucleus Software Exports Ltd. 
Mastek-D C Offshore Devp. Co. Pvt. Ltd. 
Computech International Ltd. 
F C S Software Solutions Ltd. 
Geometric Software Solutions Co. Ltd. 
Helios & Matheson Information Technology Ltd. 
Aztecsoft Ltd. 
Visualsoft Technologies Ltd. [Merged] 
Sonata Software Ltd. 
Cambridge Solutions Ltd. 
Subex Azure Ltd. 
Cranes Software Intl. Ltd. 
Aftek Ltd. 
Infotech Enterprises Ltd. 
Revenue for 2005-
06 (in crores) 
65.19 
69.52 
78.46 
81.14 
81.27 
81.92 
86.73 
92.25 
93.59 
94.37 
105.69 
107.42 
115.41 
118.1 
118.33 
128.61 
160.25 
161.76 
164.85 
181.22 
187.02 
193.29 
213.69 
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S.No. 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
H3 
Name of Organisation 
Tata Technologies Ltd. 
Spanco Telesystems & Solutions Ltd. 
N I i T Technologies Ltd. 
Hinduja T M T Ltd. 
Zensar Technologies Ltd. 
Tata Elxsi Ltd. 
Mastek Ltd. 
K PI T Cummins Infosystems Ltd. 
Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd. 
31 Infotech Ltd. 
Sonata Information Technology Ltd. 
N U T Ltd. 
Rolta India Ltd. 
Hexaware Technologies Ltd. 
Mphasis Ltd. 
Prithvi Information Solutions Ltd. 
Tulip I T Services Ltd. 
Syntel Ltd. 
Igate Global Solutions Ltd. 
Teledata Informatics Ltd. 
Polaris Software Lab Ltd. 
Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd. 
CMC Ltd. 
Revenue for 2005-
06 (in crores) 
214.92 
216.16 
222.72 
224.31 
229.08 
235.63 
255.41 
257.72 
269.43 
289.82 
336.06 
339.74 
345.97 
358.39 
380.67 
452.72 
508.81 
535.67 
563.48 
.565.58 
683.94 
793.38 
828.82 
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S.No. 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
Name of Organisation 
Patni Computer Systems Ltd. 
Hewlett-Packard Globalsoft Ltd. 
I-Flex Solutions Ltd. 
Tech Mahindra Ltd. 
H C L Technologies Ltd. 
Satyam Computer Services Ltd. 
Infosys Technologies Ltd. 
Wipro Ltd. 
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. 
Revenue for 2005-
06 (in crores) 
875.6 
1031.21 
1153.82 
1205.27 
1447.01 
4634.31 
9039 
10264.1 
11236.01 
AVERGE REVENUE = 54291 cr./122 = 445 or. 
From the point of average, 8 companies above this point and another 8 below this 
point are selected. These are shown with a thick border around. These organizations 
were subsequently screened against criteria laid out in the study. 
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Annexure 4.7 
Criteria for selection of organizations to the PROWESS database 
This annexure provides information about the criteria that 'Centre for Monitoring Indian 
Economy (CMIE') uses for selection of organizations to the PROV/ESS database. 
How Prowess organizes companies? 
1. The information available in PROWESS is based on the 'audited annual reports of 
companies'. 
2. PROWESS includes only those companies, information about which, falls in the 
public domain. 
3. The organization should be public limited; it should not be closely held, privately 
owned or a proprietorship company. 
Basis of selection of companies to PROWESS 
a. Such companies should have atleast 3 years of audited financial results. 
b. Sales and Gross fixed assets or size of the company should be greater than 200 cr. 
Methodology used for classification of Industries 
a) The various industries in this database are organized according to the National 
Industrial Classification given by Department of Industry. 
b) Each company in the PROWESS database is classified under a unique industry 
group. A company is classified under a particular product /service group if more 
than half of its sale is derived from the products under such a group. If a company 
cannot be classified under any of the industry groups in such 
a manner (possibly because there are a large number of products 
manufactured/ services rendered, none of which singly or in a logical 
combination accounts for more than half of the sale) then the company 
is classified as a ^ /ver5///ei company. 
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Annexure 4.8 
Frequency distribution by size, of software companies listed in the CMIE 
PROWESS database. 
Class interval 
Less than 100 cr. 
100 to 200 or 
200 to 300 cr 
300 to 400 cr 
400 to 500 cr 
500 to 600 cr 
600 to700cr 
700 to 800 cr 
800 to 900 
900 to 1000 
More than lOOOcr 
f 
77 
12 
11 
5 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
0 
8 
Cf 
77 
89 
100 
105 
106 
110 
111 
112 
114 
114 
122 
The above distribution pattern shows a preponderance of companies in the size of less 
than 100 cr., indicating the presence of a large number of smaller players in the Indian 
Software Industry. For this reason positional average (with its basis in revenue size) is 
not the suitable instrument to select sample companies, as the distribution is highly 
skewed in favour of the small size players. 
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Annexure 4.9 
Middle Management profile, on the basis of criteria used in NASSCOM-Hewitt 2005 
study 
This annexure is about defining the middle management level, on the basis of employee 
classification used for 'Nasscom-Hewitt Total Rewards Study - 2005, Benefits Base Report: 
IT industry.' 
Levels of hierarcliy and their generic roles 
Note: Besides description offered for any particular level, researcher's own comments are 
also provided. 
1. CCE (0 to 1 ) : 
a. Handles transactions as per the specified standards. 
- Everything is written, he just follows it. 
CCE (1 to 2 ) : 
a. Handles transactions as per the specified standards. 
2. Sr. CCE: 
a. Takes complex calls 
b. Guides new recruits. 
- Works as per the specifications. 
3. Team Leader / Group Leader / Supervisor : 
a. Supervises a team of 10 to 20. 
b. Monitors productivity 
c. Tries to improve the processes. 
d. Manages the operation during the shift. 
e. Responsible for troubleshooting on the floor. 
Mainly concerned with operational issues. No hint of escalation to people-related 
/customer-driven or strategic processes. 
4. Assistant Manager / Deputy Manager : 
a. Supervises a team of 40 to 60. 
b. Responsible for team's smooth operation. 
c. Plans, directs and evaluates the work flow 
d. Takes care of resource utilization. 
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The above functions are characteristic of middle management roles. 
Justification: a) Supervision of 40 to 60 people is by no means the job of a low level 
manager, b) Involvement is there in planning and resource utilisation. Though the strategic 
link is not there, there is a hint of slight escalation from operations. It would be 
appropriate to characterize this level as the onset of middle managerial roles, c) At levels 
lower than assistant manager, focus is on strengthening the internal process machinery. 
5. Operations Manager / Manager : 
a. Ensures seamless delivery to customers 
b. Strategically facilitates process improvements or cost reduction initiatives 
c. Identifies career development opportunities for staff 
d. Supervises a team size of 100 to 150 
This level is the true representation of middle level since there is a linkage with strategic 
roles. At this level, the focus shifts from 'group's functioning to ensuring smooth delivery to 
the customer. Further, adopts a developmental role, taking a longterm view of staff 
members' development. 
6. Operations senior Manager: 
a. Ensures seamless delivery to customers 
b. Develops business plan for small / medium sized business unit including 
budget development. 
c. Infrastructure capacity planning, 
c. Supervises a team of 200 to 250. 
- Apparently, this level represents the outer limit of middle management. 
The above role appears to be the upper end of middle managemient since its scope while 
being wider is well within the range of the role of Operations manager/ Manager. 
7. AVP operations / Service Delivery leader / Director 
a. Ensures seamless delivery to customers. 
b. Succession planning and career management. 
c. Develops business plans for large business units including budget 
development. 
d. Infrastructure capacity planning. 
f. Supervises a team of 300 to 400. 
The above aspects clearly belong to the senior management profile. 
This particular role seems to be bordering on the cusp between the middle and the 
upper management. While most responsibilities are similar in scope to that of other 
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levels of middle management, the distinct point of departure appears to be w,r,t the 
responsibility of making business plans for the large business units. It can easily be 
seen as a precursor to upper management levels. 
8. Head of Operations / Vice president operations: 
a. Revenue and profitability responsibility 
b. Overall customer satisfaction and relationship building 
c. Responsible for overall operation of all Units. 
d. Budget Management 
e. Manages a team of 800 to 1000. 
Clearly, this level too belongs to the senior level cadre. 
Revenue, profit responsibility etc fall in the realm of top management, and so is the 
case with the responsibility for overall operation of units. The scope of supervision is 
distinctly higher in this case, and is evidently a tell-tale indicator of its positioning in 
upper management roles. 
To sum up, on the basis of the above description, the following levels can be qualified as 
middle level managers. 
(I) Assistant Manager / Deputy Manager-: Solidifies the Operational Front) 
(II) Operational Manager / Manager - connects to the customer, and assumes 
strategic responsibilities. 
(III) Operations senior manager :It is at this level that he begins to develop 
business plans, taking care of the budget and the infrastructure. It appears that a 
role earlier reserved for the top management is in transition and is presently 
caught between the boundaries of top and middle level. While presently, not a 
pure middle managerial level, with further devolution of upper-level-roles, this 
level is likely to come under complete purview of middle management. 
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Annexure 5.1 
This annexure provides the detailed profile of the short term variable pay plans, that 
the sample organizations use and that were researched, for the study purpose. This is 
a complete narrative of the plans and may not carry the figures that are detailed in 
the main text or tables. 
Detailed profile of the short term variable pay plans studied for the research work 
The primary motivation in writing the plan profiles is to give the readers a complete 
picture of the Short term variables pay plans that have been studied in the research 
study. The tabular analysis carried out in chapter 5 has lost out on many details that 
were mentioned by respondents, that are important to understand each plan's nature, 
but these could not be quantified in numbers or even closely summarized verbally. 
Essentially, these aspects have been brought to light through the profiles mentioned 
below. 
Information about the short term variable pay plans that is considered relevant for 
understanding the working details, has been documented. This narrative also includes 
evaluation of these systems and suggestions for their improvement. Details that are not 
directly related to plan, but nevertheless useful for fuller grasp of plan functioning and 
for understanding its consequent impact, have been included in 'Additional 
Information'. 'Suggestions' include opinions / recommendation offered by the 
respondents. A short term variable pay plan can be conceptualized as a cyclical process 
- a continuous quest of refining plan process, in a bid to increase its instrumentality for 
achieving desired business outcomes. Care has been taken not to repeat the plan aspects 
that have been reported in table 5.9 and table 5.20 of Chapter 5. However, wherever 
little redundancy helps to maintain the logical thread of understanding, some details 
have been repeated. 
It may be observed that at many a places in the profiling that follows, organizations 
have used the word 'policy' instead of referting to it as a pay plan. In these cases, the 
users' terminology has been retained, considering there is a deeper meaning attached to 
it than just a casual use of different nomenclature. 
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Plan Profile for organization CI 
A uniform variable pay policy is used across the organization. There are three levels 
included at the middle management level viz. Manager, Senior Manager and Assistant. 
Vice Presid ent. The CTC of employees routinely increases every year. Thereafter 
backward calculation is performed and accordingly target variable payout amount is 
calculated. A larger consideration for compensation designers is that overall 
competitive pay should be maintained. 
Plan Objectives: Its multiple objectives include - to pay on the basis of performance, to 
make performance measurable, to provide performance feedback, and to give 
employees recognition for their contribution. It intends to motivate managers by 
emphasizing STVPP's incentive value. "Chief resource of the software industry is its 
manpower, which unlike machines, requires a push factor for making them work." 
Thus, the need for a mechanism to 'pull' their performance. 
Variable pay structure : 23% of a middle manager's CTC is variable. 15.3% is based on 
revenue performance (threshold is 80% and upside potential is at 110%) that is a part of 
every employee's responsibility. The relationship between employee performance and 
revenue based achievement is so clear that it is motivating for managers. Through 
Peoplesoft (software), actual revenue earned by an employee is translated into 
computed revenue, on basis of six to seven performance parameters like profitability, 
on-time delivery etc. This calculation process is beyond human tinkering. Remaining 
7.7% carries no threshold, payout is capped at 100% and it is assessed by one's 
supervisor based on behavioural performance. 
Variable payout - Payout frequency is annual, sourced partly sourced from salary 
budget and partly from gains made to business targets over and above previous year's 
achievement. The variable payout amount reflects improvement achieved in business 
results, however the gains are not passed on to middle managers in the same proportion. 
Line of sight - Middle Managers' targets are linked to their verticals, but the presence 
of this linkage is not explicitly communicated to them in a refined way. 
Plan Management and Involvement - HR, Finance, the concerned function, and top 
management are involved in plan design. Involvement of finance is deeper in those 
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aspects that have a direct financial impact. Human resources is the plan owner and also 
has its administration responsibility. Management council (top management) has the 
approving authority and the authority to review it. 
Plan Communication: Every quarter a mail goes from the CEO to all employees 
informing them about company performance results. No reference is made to 
organization level threshold. Regarding individual performance updates, every project 
manager carries out a semi-annual review. During the review exercise, it is 
discretionary, whether gap between achievement-and-threshoid is brought our or not. A 
need was felt to provide regular performance feedback to managers, at such frequency 
intervals, that the process appears as real-time. 
The overall system is complicated. It was felt (according to the CFO) that "it requires a 
great deal of expertise to communicate the philosophy of variable pay to all employees 
and to make everyone understand business in plain language." On persistent enquiry, 
respondent concluded that it was not the organisations' unwillingness to communicate 
but a case of requiring expertise and also resources for carrying out such grassroot-level 
communication. 
Plan Evaluation: The company assesses VPP results by evaluating if the set targets 
have been met. 
Additional Information: The company feels that if an employee overshoots the forecast 
target, the act is comparable to an offense. Achieving such lofty target requires 
corresponding manpower availability at all points of value chain. It was expressed that 
it is unfair to expect others in the value chain too to similarly overshoot their targets, 
since it requires stretched capability. 
Suggestions: a) It was strongly suggested that managers' involvement would help in 
achieving employee buy-in to the plan. It was also felt that managers should atleast be 
involved in definition of their targets, which is currently not practiced. This would 
result in setting performance targets that employees perceive as controllable and thus 
achievable. In general, involvement will have benefits like achieving transparency in 
design process, transparency in performance assessment and also in calculation of 
payout, b) Also, the organization should constantly keep tabs on perception of 
managers about the plan, in particular focusing on their level of understanding about 
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the plan, c) It was suggested that better communication about performance progress and 
business 'in general' should take place. Meaningful data should be communicated (that 
managers can understand and not loading them with unnecessary deluge of facts and 
figures) and there should be integrity in data communicated to managers. Managers' 
visibility should be enhanced in terms of letting them know how they contribute to 
company performance. 
Plan Profile for organisation C2 
CTC is fixed up, and thereafter percentage increments are added to it, on an annual 
basis. Backward calculation is then done, dividing its broad base into components of 
base pay, benefits, and variable pay. 
Plan Objective: The objective of using a variable pay system is to pay for performance 
(includes to reward top performers), retention of employees and better management of 
budgets. The plan seeks to motivate the managers through perfonnance-based pay 
differentiation. Contrarily, as per the CFO "the only objective is retention." Asked 
explicitly about how important is the objective of 'achieving business objectives', it 
was expressed that it was more like a "motherhood statement." It is clear, this is 
considered an idealistic objective which is not actively pursued, and may have been 
neglected due to its limited practicability. 
Variable pay structure: Levels of middle management include Project leads (7.5% of 
CTC as VP), Project Manager (10% of CTC as VP), and Project director (12% of CTC 
as VP). The variable pay structure is linked to individual performance, and bears no 
linkage to the company performance factor. VP is linked to performance rating, and is 
paid on an annual basis. The rating scale ranges from 1 to 6 where 3 stands for above 
average and is pegged as the threshold rating. Aspects of work that are measurable 
become KRAs. These KRAs are measured and regular feedback is given about these. 
Cumulative KRA achievement is converged into a composite performance rating score 
. The entire process of rating and its outcome is explained to employees on a one-on-
one basis. Normally, an employee can easily earn upto 60% of target VP. Therefore 
really what remains variable is (or subject to uncertainty) between 60% to 100% of 
target variable pay (or 40% of VP). Provision of upside potential is available only for 
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revenue functions - an opportunity not available to the support functions or functions 
where direct linkages with financial metrics are not possible to weave. 
Line of sight: There is no laid out process to show employees how they contribute to 
business objectives. "It may be known in some pockets, but there is no system or 
process to ensure employees' line of sight". In general forums like locational meetings, 
middle managers are involved, but these are adhoc practices not intended to 
ensure/establish/upgrade line-of-sight. 
Organization performance parameters include Revenue and Profit. Threshold is 
determined for each of these, however the organisation refused to share the exact 
figure. The threshold level is relevant only for the senior level personnel. The payout 
amount is sourced from the salary budget. 
Plan Evaluation: The organization does not assess the impact of variable pay plan on 
organization performance. 
Plan Management and Involvement: The HR and the top management are involved in 
the VPP design to a large extent. The Finance function and other functions' 
representatives are involved to a small extent. Wherever budgetary impact is there, 
finance too is involved. The variable pay plan is owned and administered by the Human 
resources function. Its approving authority rests with the CEO and it is reviewed (on an 
annual basis) jointly by the CEO and the HR. Surprisingly, according to the CFO, 
"Finance is nowhere involved in the process". The only point of involvement is at the 
time of making the payout. Instances like these where Finance and HR do not see eye 
to eye suggests there is enormous scope for increasing involvement which should help 
in achieving convergence of opinions and also value-add to the VPP process. 
Managers' involvement is limited to their target setting. Potential benefit of involving 
employees deeper into the process of VPP would be immediate buy-in, resulting in 
fewer or no complaints. It may be inferred fi^om above, variable pay is a contentious 
issue among managers and quite often a subject of complaints. 
Plan Communication: The VPP is communicated at the time of induction, goal setting 
and at the time of performance review. A presentation / open house is also conducted 
about it. "Since it is a policy it is not posted on the intranet". All details including plan 
objective, working details and additional general business information are 
70 
communicated to managers. These details are communicated at the level of unit heads, 
who are further required to communicate these to the employees within their units. 
Information about organisation's performance with specific reference to threshold goals 
is not provided at the middle level. It is expected that feedback would be provided by 
line managers. 
Payout information is provided through a letter, that also carries annual salary revision 
details. Related explanation about calculation of payout amount may be provided by 
immediate supervisors, at their discretion. 
Suggestions: a) The VPP potential could be greatly improved through increased 
communication and transparency. Transparency should be of the order that employees 
are clearly explained about what the total compensation budget is, how much is set 
aside for variable pay, and how the payout amount is calculated etc. It should be very 
clearly stated how much payout will be paid at various levels of performance and its 
calculation should be automated, b) Variable pay should be projected as an element 
outside CTC. "It should be projected like a bonanza", otherwise its rhetoric. Also 
performance should be objectively measured, c) It was strongly felt that the appraisal 
timing and payout delivery timing should be adhered to. In a nut shell in order to cause 
motivation level, transparency about VPP processes should be enhanced. 
Additional Information: A peculiar problem was expressed. Sometimes one BU may 
have people on bench - which means the resource is spare and can be shared. This 
information may not be shared with other BUs for the fear of not being able to retrieve 
it when the need arises. So usually BUs maintain their independent bench resources 
even if profitability is hurt. This suggests that business units / divisions may 
compromise their 'sense of oneness' in order to retain control over their resources. This 
point was brought out by the respondent, when discussion was underway about 
whether objective of instilling ownership feelings through STVPP was activated. 
For certain aspects of performance, above-target-performance can't be rewarded with 
upside potential. Rating is defined only till 6 (where 6 is equivalent to on-target 
achievement) and beyond this point rating is not defined since there is no method to 
translate performance enhancement beyond target in terms of additional revenue. 
Thus, upside potential is defined for revenue, sales, or financially oriented functions but 
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not for operational performance results (for these, payout is capped at 100%). It was 
expressed that at times subjective decisions are taken concerning payout amount. For 
instance someone's payout is a lakh rupees, on some subjective basis (rather a ruse) HR 
may lower the payout amount to 75,000, without any basis to it or any explanation 
offered. In such cases, just the decision is communicated to finance for execution, 
without any accompanying justification. It was added that sometimes subjectivity is 
used in salary related decisions too. For instance: if an individual intends to leave the 
organization, the company may not give him the 'rightful due' amount of increment as 
it would be like putting good money after a wasted asset. In cases like these, total 
transparency may not be desirable. "If employees sense even the 'S' of subjectivity in 
the working of the system, they would stop trusting the system." Against this 
background, it was suggested that total transparency about the pay process is desirable 
provided complete fairness is observed and adhered to by the organization. It was also 
expressed, rather strongly, that variable pay is not the only answer to motivation. As 
there were people who got high ratings of 5 or 6 (highest ones), earned handsome 
variable pay amounts, and yet they left the organization. It was expressed that VP needs 
to be supplemented by 'recognition'. The CFO held a very pessimistic view about 
variable pay system and expressed that "the VPP was not meant for motivation in the 
very first place." 
Plan Profile for organisation C3 
The organization is structured into various business units, each of which comprises 
multiple verticals. Each vertical has roughly 10 to 15 accounts under it. 
Plan Objective: The objective of using variable pay system is to boost performance, and 
to align employee goals with business goals. 
Variable payout structure: There are two levels at the middle management level. These 
are Sr. Managers (VP: 13% to 14% of CTC) and General Managers (VP : 14% to 16% 
of CTC). Appraisal is carried out annually while variable payout is paid on quarterly 
basis. Business unit results are available quarterly and are used for assessment of 
variable payout. The individual performance results, that are captured through appraisal 
are rewarded through MSI i.e. merit salary increase. There is no component of 
Individual-performance in variable payout structure. The payout is linked only to the 
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unit performance and the organisation's performance, eacii having 50% weightage. All 
middle managers in a vertical get the same percentage of V P. It is at the senior levels 
that individual performance makes a difference and therefore is measured for purposes 
of payout amount. The interpretation is that individual performance is not important 
enough at the middle level to make a difference to business results. Quite contrarily, 
line-of-sight posits that managers' contribution, no matter its proportion, should be 
identified, communicated and even highlighted, for enhancing ownership feelings in 
managers. 
Organisation Performance parameters the company uses PBIT as the business 
performance parameter because of its simplicity and ease of understanding it. The 
payout amount is sourced from the salary budget. The performance payout schedule at 
organization level is explicitly defined (detailed in table 5.20, chapter 5). 
Plan Management and Involvement: HR gets feedback about the VPP from line 
managers which it consolidates and incorporates as aspects of plan. The plan is 
finalized by the Chairman and the IT mgt council. The IT mgt council comprises the 
CEO, Finance department and the Heads of Businesses. The VPP is owned and 
administered by HR (C & B) and is reviewed annually by the Chairman and the 
Governing body. The approving authority rests with the EVP-HR. 'All functions' 
representation in plan design is limited 'to a small extent'. The middle managers are not 
involved in the design of the plan. As per the HR, involvement of middle managers is 
not feasible as there are some 7000 to 8000 of these in the organisation. Also they are 
not mature enough to fruitfully contribute to the design process. Moreso, the HR person 
felt that the company's systems were not geared to systematically gather feedback, 
process it and use it. The existing practice of involvement is like a dipstick. Deeper 
Involvement of middle managers will help achieve alignment between managers and 
organization objectives, and more importantly the plan can be customized to the 
business roles. 
Plan customization: The company feels that customization would help but it would 
increase the complexity. The company cited the example of its consulting arm which is 
a high end group. This particular group (the consulting arm) designed its own policy, a 
customized one, that showed linear linkages between pay and performance. HR agreed 
to the policy. However, the customized versions are not much different from the 
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standard policy. Moreso, it was mentioned that since this consulting wing is a high end 
group, it was allowed to have a customized policy. Interpretation is that its perceived 
value to business was high so it was permitted to customize the VPP. 
Plan Communication: HR is engaged with the line department to communicate the 
policy. Communication happens through mail, and workshops and open houses 
conducted by the HR. All plan details including its objectives, working details and 
general business information are shared. Managers' targets are shown as specifically 
linked to the organisation's targets. This happens as a) Plan numbers are shared with 
all, and b) The plan is built bottom up. 
Performance Information : Every month a MIS meeting is conducted by Finance and by 
the C & B. In this meeting, the C & B talks about the compensation cost. Finance 
provides information on company's performance, and gap from threshold level to the 
unit heads (on a monthly basis). Middle managers have access to this information but 
such information is not routinely communicated to all. At an individual level, no 
threshold level performance is set, so there is no question of communicating gap-from-
threshold. Performance updates in terms of absolute numbers of individual performance 
are accessible to managers at all times. 
Payout information: The information about variable payout is provided through the 
employee payslip. Emphasis is not laid on providing explanatory information. 
Evaluation: The organization checks the impact of VPP on organization performance 
by two means. These are: a) whether threshold level performance has been met or not. 
b) checking employee satisfaction on account of VPP through the instrument ESS 
(employee satisfaction survey). 
Motivation (and other benefits): The monetary variation in the amount of payout is not 
much. Motivation is caused by giving them a feeling accountability - at the level of a 
vertical. They are trying to inculcate a feeling of collective accountability in the 
employees. It was suggested that the plan should have 1 or 2 levers that middle 
managers can directly control. As of now, middle managers have 3rd or 4th level 
linkage. The inference of the suggestion is that MM have limited influence over the 
performance measures that determine their payout. The overall benefit of the policy has 
been 60 for the organization and 40 for the employees. Such interpretation of Head -
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C&B showed that the assessment is intuitive and is not based on objective parameters. 
With the VP concept, the simplicity of its linkage to PBIT, all BU heads have now 
developed a business sense about how different kind of decisions would impact PBIT. 
The respondent felt it was a definite benefit as all BU heads now have developed 
business acumen; business knowledge is drilled down in them. 
Additional Information: There is a plan to increase variable pay for middle managers, 
but not until the industry booms back into phase of normalcy. 
Suggestions: a) In order to improve the system, apart from just PBlT(which is a lag 
indicator) some lead indicators should be used that indicate future growth. Example of 
such measures could be 'second level recommendation' by promoters, feedback from 
customers. For units, it was suggested that indicators like revenue growth should be 
used which indicate future growth path, b) For the middle managers if the system is to 
be made effective, it should have process linkages and should be backed by an 
information system so that it is administratively effective and robust. 
Plan Profile for Organisation C4 
There are 10 hierarchical levels in the organization, of which 3 levels are at the middle 
level. The levels of middle management include Associate Manager, Manager and Sr. 
Manager. 
Plan objectives: The purpose of instituting variable pay plan is to ensure high 
performance and to achieve performance-based pay differentiation. The objective is to 
"keep the management, shareholders and the employees happy and to ensure that the 
company is running smoothly". It helps to keep some costs variable especially in 
turbulent times. The plan motivates managers by giving them a feeling of responsibility 
and by showcasing its incentive aspect. 
Line of sight: Balanced Scorecard methodology is used for mapping middle mangers' 
performance. This clarifies to them how they are contributing to business goals. People 
who manage accounts ie the project managers have control over bottom line and 
productivity, and so they have the benefit of clear line-of-sight with business goals. 
Payout-related details: The payout calculation methodology is such that all gains are 
passed to employees. It is like a profit-sharing arrangement between employees and the 
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company. The capping to payout is in terms of what is to be paid out in a financial year. 
At the company budget level, no capping is applicable to either the Profit or the 
operating margin. Payout for the company-performance-linked component is based on 
the revenue performance (topline). Variable Pay amount is accounted for as a part of 
expenses. 50% of VP is factored as an expense. The company policy is to maintain an 
operating margin (or savings) of minimum 28%. Threshold is linked to this corpus (or 
kitty). If this figure of 28% is not maintained then the figure of 50% VP flows here to 
makeup for the shortfall in operating margin. This kitty is then made available for 
payout and thereafter individual performance rating (scale 1 to 4), and target variable 
pay amount are used as factors for calculation of variable pay amount. Payout schedule 
applicable at organization level is available in table 5.20, and its details at individual 
level of disbursement are discussed in 5.9, of chapter 5. At the organization level, the 
performance parameters are revenue and operating margin. The company gives 
information about unit performance to unit heads, but not to each employee. 
Evaluation: The impact of the VPP on organization performance is measured through 
employee satisfaction survey. Another method for checking its eflectiveness is in terms 
of how well organization is performing. If the company does well, that means that the 
variable pay plan is working. 
Plan Management and Involvement: The variable pay plan is owned and administered 
by the Human Resources Function. Approval for the plan is jointly given by the HR 
and the Finance. The plan is reviewed by the top management on an annual basis. 
Finance, HR, Delivery heads (ie line functions) and the Policy council are involved in 
the design process. It was expressed that managers' involvement would be possible 
only when the plan is up for modification in its next cycle. At the time of interview, 
middle managers' involvement was not practiced. Also, at that time the organization 
was not contemplating any kind of plan modification, which suggests any initiative to 
involve middle managers was not on the cards or anywhere in the vicinity of near 
future. 
Plan Communication: The VPP is communicated through intranet and at the time of 
performance review. All details including objective of the plan, working of the plan, 
and general business information are communicated. Information about the payout 
amount is provided through a letter (along with information of annual increment). 
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Additional Information: 
Future direction: An increase in tlie proportion of variable pay is not likely in the near 
future. 
Perspective about how managers perceive the system: Middle Managers have a mental 
block that VP element is against their interests. Hence they don't want to understand 
the plan details or its working. On the contrary, the HR perceives the VPP as a win win, 
both for the employees and for the company. It was expressed that involvement of 
managers could help ease up the mental block against the system. If HR makes any 
modification to the system, employees would voice their concern that just when they 
had understood the system, it got changed. Given an opportunity, managers would 
rather want their salary to be fixed, as they dislike the uncertainty of ups and downs. 
Even if this salary arrangement (one that includes variable pay) leads them to earn 
more, they would still want to get rid of it or if possible opt out of it. Author feels that 
an option should be given to managers if they would like to opt out of variable pay 
component in their salary. To this suggestion, the HR personnel expressed that given 
that circumstance, managers would crib about earning less than those who opted to 
retain VP. It appeared to the author that HR holds a view that managers carry negative 
views about the variable pay system. A point was made that overseas (in the company's 
branches) the VP component was comparatively lesser compared to its prevalent level 
in the Indian arm of the organization. 
Suggestions: It was felt that there is a need for better communication with managers 
and also that there is a need to make managers understand the link between their 
performance and payout. Counter argument was offered that managers don't want to 
understand the system. It was felt that their involvement in the plan process would 
erode some negativity of their mindset against variable pay system. It clearly indicates 
there is a realization that involvement of managers would have salubrious effects on 
employees' perception about variable pay plan. 
Plan Profile for organisation C5 
Uniform policy is followed across the organization. Variable pay is structured as a part 
of the salary in the form of a lumpsum amount earmarked at each grade. 
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Plan objectives: The objective of using STVPP is to convey the idea that the variable 
pay portion of salary is linked to performance and that payout delivery is not an 
automatic process. In other words the plan aims to emphasize the performance-linked 
aspect of variable pay plans. This is important in the service sector as its salaries are 
much higher as compared to the manufacturing sector. It also aims to bring quality of 
performance focus among its employees. The organization regards variable pay 
element as an instrument of incentive and uses this argument to motivate middle 
managers. 
Variable pay structure: At the middle management level, variable pay is not linked to 
the company performance results. The levels of middle management and the 
corresponding target variable payout amount are predefined, in the manner shown 
below. 
Level 4 (Manager) 
Level 5 (Sr. Manager): 
Level 6 (Asst. V.P.) : 
: 1.5 lakh of variable pay (annually) 
2.25 lakh of variable pay (annually) 
2.25 lakh of variable pay (annually) 
The payout schedule (ie the relation between performance and payout) is defined 
differently for each of these levels, (see table below) 
Level 4 
Range of Points 
100-125 points 
125 - 140 points 
140-150 points 
Percentage of 
Target Payout 
100% payout 
110% payout 
135% payout 
Points 
105 points 
135 points 
150 points 
Levels (5 & 6) 
Percentage of 
Target Payout 
90% payout 
100% payout 
120% payout 
The description given above has anomalies to it, like use of 'range' at level 4 , and use 
of 'absolute points' at levels 5 and 6 ; varying degree of maximum payout - which is 
likely to result in feelings of unfairness. Such discrepancies call for justification 
through well-thought out communication plan. 
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Performance Management Process: The company uses a point system for performance 
measurement. A predefined number of points are allocated to each KRA. The 
achievement range is between I to 150 points. The threshold level (which is like a 
milestone) is fixed at 70% of individual performance. The company uses a Balanced 
Scorecard methodology for levels 5 & 6 suggesting that higher in the hierarchy, the 
performance goals become more integrated and inclusive. 
Line-of sight: The KRAs are designed in a manner to give employees message about 
their contribution to business objectives. It is also an expectation from the immediate 
supervisors to emphasize this linkage to their subordinates. It was expressed that 
managers are aware of how their targets are linked with the organisation's targets. 
Therefore, no specific procedure is used to emphasize the linkage. It is left 
discretionary and its implementation is not enforced through a process or a system. 
Organisation performance parameter is PBT (Profit before tax) and its threshold is 
determined at 85% performance level. 
Flan management and involvement: The Human resources (HR) is the plan owner and 
also has its administration responsibility. The HR, Finance, and the CEO jointly have 
approving authority of the plan. Finance function is involved in aspects which have 
financial implications (ex: payout delivery). It has little involvement in the nitty-gritties 
of the design aspects of the plan. Aspects of payout where financial impact is there, it is 
certainly involved. The plan review is carried out by the HR and the CEO on an annual 
basis or as and when the need arises. There is a managing comimittee which involves 
ST. Managers which is a think-tank for all major decisions about systems and processes. 
In such indirect manner, middle managers are involved in decisions about the variable 
pay plan. 
Plan Communication: Earlier the CEO used to give business information to all 
employees in small groups. Now since the company has grown big, carrying out small-
group discussions or presentations is no longer seen as possible/ feasible. 
Payout amount: A letter is given to all HODs informing them of the variable pay 
amount along with an explanation of its computation. Thereafter, it is the responsibility 
of the HODs to further communicate the information to all employees in the 
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department. This is an expectation from the HODs and it is not enforced through a 
system or a defined process. 
Area of concern: A peculiar problem is that when the salary amount is increased (on 
account of annual increment), the variable pay amount (which is a defined sum for each 
grade) remains the same. Therefore, the organisation is trying to make the variable pay 
amount relative to the amount of total salary. This would allow for increase in variable 
pay amount alongwith upward salary movement. 
Additional information: The upside payout potential offered at the senior levels is 
referred as the 'performance bonus'. This component is deliberately named so, in order 
to give one the feeling that if one stretches beyond the minimum requirement (target), it 
would be possible to earn extra amount. This kind of labeling (ie performance bonus 
for beyond target payout) has a "behavioural side to it". This particular feature is not 
present at the middle levels. This has become the reason that managers restrict their 
performance level 'at target' and do not stretch beyond, till the onset of the next 
performance cycle. This particular problem was observed at the senior levels too, and 
to address this issue, provision of 'performance bonus' was made. It sends the message 
"we are extending the carrot, so work more; do not stop short of the possibilities". 
Motivation: It was strongly felt that "it is very difficult to motivate through variable 
pay." Its limited motivational effect is true across levels; since even at the top levels 
"there is bitterness about it".(according to the CFO). The primary reason is the problem 
of measurement in a team-setting. It was added that fairness in measurement, even if 
attempted, is not possible, and for this reason instead of variable pay, other measures 
like career advancement should be used for causing motivation. 
Plan Profile for organisation C6 
The company has two types of Variable pay plans 
a) Target Bonus scheme: This is managed by group heads. In this scheme. Group heads 
+ Chief operating officer (COO) are involved. COO is the final authority. Based on the 
Gross Contribution, a certain percentage is earmarked for disbursement among the 
members of team, by the group head. This distribution is based on the criteria chosen 
by the Group head. 
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b) Individual performance linked incentive scheme: This scheme matches the STVPP 
specification as defined in the study. This plan is managed by HR function. Payout is 
made annually, and the payout is so structured to provide linkages at level of individual 
performance only. The variable Pay amount is kept outside CTC. For each level of 
middle management, a midpoint is fixed - which is the minimum variable pay that an 
employee can earn. Beyond this midpoint, there is a predetermined schedule of'How 
much variable pay at what rating'. Herefrom plan (b) will be discussed since it matches 
the study specifications 
Plan Objectives: Variable pay system serves as a succor in troubled times. Using this 
system, leads to fewer retrenchments of employees. Its primary objective is concerned 
with motivation, and at the same time the endeavour is to ensure that minimum 
resource loss occurs in troubled times. 
Variable pay structure: The company has three levels as part of its middle management. 
These are Group Manager, Sr. Project Manager and Project Manager. Variable pay is a 
lumpsum amount and is structured as an element outside the salary. It is paid out in 
cash and it is not added to base pay. The schedule of payout is determined in advance -
as indicated in table below. For instance: If a manager gets a rating of 3, he gets 45000. 
(see table below) 
Rating 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Variable payout amount at these grades of niiiddie management 
Manager 
0 
39,150 
45,000 
90,000 
1,35,000 
Sr. Manager 
0 
52,200 
60,000 
1,20,000 
1,80,000 
Group Manager 
0 
65,250 
75,000 
1,50,000 
2,25,000 
In the existing system, variable payout amount is specified for every rating. Over and 
above this amount, the payout is determined based on level of performance exhibited. 
In such a scenario, the sign-off on appraisals becomes a problem. Employees do not 
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signoff at a particular rating because they would rather fight (or badger) for the higher 
rating. In future the company intends to specify only the midpoints and not the detailed 
schedule of payout. Variable pay amount beyond the one defined at the midpoint is 
decided based on the rating. 
Plan Management and Involvement: Mainly HR is involved in designing the plan. 
Finance is involved wherever monetary consideration is there. HR's involvement is 'to 
a large extent' and that of finance is 'to a small extent'. The plan ownership rest with 
HR, its approving authority is with the chief operating officer (COO) and its 
administration is jointly managed by Finance and HR. The plan is reviewed annually by 
the Chief operating officer of the company. 
Middle Manager Involvement The company believes that if managers are involved, 
their targets can be set at a more realistic level and the plan acceptability is likely to be 
better. They can also offer their unique perspective. 
Line of sight: Through various forums managers' LOS is established, and is usually 
implicitly attempted, through discussions. Thereafter, it is upto managers' own 
understanding how they perceive it. This suggests that setting up of LOS is left open-
ended and is not implemented or checked through a process or a system. Infact as per 
the HR respondent, the company rather downplays the monetairy aspect for causing 
motivation. 
Plan Communication: VPP is communicated to employees at the time of joining 
through a policy document. The policy is also available on intranet. All important 
details of a VPP are communicated to middle mangers. These details include objective 
of a VPP, its working details, and other general business information. This information 
is provided through project level discussions. 
Suggestions: a) Variable pay should also be based on an employee's criticality to the 
company, and not just on the basis of the performance results. However, the tricky part 
Is how to define the 'crificality factor', b) A need was felt for improvement in the area 
of goal definition mainly poinfing at clear definition, c) Focus should also be on cost 
efficiency. This means lesser number of people should be there in the team so that more 
amount in payout pool is available for distribution. Cost efficiency, if attempted, will 
give employees an impression that organizafion is concerned for them and they will 
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regard variable pay is an employee-friendly policy. The author also suggests that 
similar initiatives at incorporating employee suggestions in design and implementation 
phases of VPP would change mindset of employees in favour of variable pay system. 
Plan Profile for organisation C7 
There are 7 levels in the organization of which, two are at the middle level. These 
levels are Sr. Manager and Manager (Grade M3), Delivery Managers & Group Product 
Managers (Grade M4). 
Plan Objective: The objective of variable pay plan is to reward performance. It is 
perceived that while "fixed pay is for 9 to 5 job, variable pay is meant for what one 
does beyond". Clearly, the import is that variable pay is a reward for the stretch 
element of target. Variable pay enables fair sharing of earnings among its contributors. 
It also helps to avoid cost overruns. Variable pay plan seeks to motivate managers by 
highlighting its earning potential and by giving employees a feeling of responsibility. 
Payout determination: Individual-performance linked component is tied to individual 
performance rating, which is assessed on the scale - Outstanding, Eixceeds expectations, 
Meets expectations, and Needs Improvement (represented as rating scale I to 4, for 
ease of tabulation). Payout structure is so configured that its broad milestones are 
stated, in between which, the payout amount is proportionately calculated. Payout is 
made in cash on a quarterly basis and is sourced from the salary budget. According to 
the CFO "it is the company's endeavour to source it from the monetary gains achieved 
exclusively from VPP, but they are not equipped with the right methodology to do so." 
Line of sight: Targets of managers are specifically linked to the organisation's targets. 
The company conducts a 'goal flowdown exercise' that is spearheaded by 2 or 3 key 
senior executives. It ensures cascading of goals from top to bottom. It takes up the 
process of goal definition at all levels, breaking it down into measurable parts, and the 
process continues till the lowest levels. They ensure that goals decided for each level 
are measurable, have sufficient stretch element and also retains quality of buy-in. Done 
this way, employee line-of-sight is established clearly. The initiative was taken up 
because if departments are expected to do the goal-setting entirely by themselves, they 
would usually develop a cosy goal (having low stretch) for themselves. For this reason. 
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the exercise is carried out by senior personnel, so as to ensure its acceptability among 
the mass of employees. 
Plan Management and Involvement: Human resources, Finance and Top Management 
are involved in plan design. Finance has always been involved in the variable pay 
system. It would be beneficial to involve middle managers as it would lead them to take 
ownership of the plan. Human Resources is the plan owner and also has the plan 
administration responsibility and its reviewing authority. VPP review is carried out 
annually on a need basis. The approving authority is the Head HR and the Executive 
Committee (which is essentially the top management). 
Plan Communication: The VPP is communicated through intranet and is discussed at 
the time of induction. A policy workshop is conducted for discussing it in greater detail 
and giving emphasis to its implementation. The objective of VPP, its working details 
and general business information are communicated as elements of plan 
communication. Managers' line-of-sight is established through discussions, or 
explanation conducted at the discretion of respective Project Managers. As part of 
routine performance update, information about organization performance is provided in 
terms of regular reports. The analysis between organization threshold and progress 
achieved as-on-date is not communicated. 
Gap analysis between managers' performance and threshold is not explicitly 
communicated, however, this gap information is accessible to managers and it may be 
communicated at the discretion of the line manager. Information about the payout 
amount is communicated through a letter. 
Plan Evaluation; The organization does not evaluate the impact of variable pay plan on 
its overall performance. According to the CFO "this is where we lack." 
Suggestions: a) An area of improvement is that the a)goal definition needs to be clearer 
with predefined milestones. The criteria of payout should be more objective, b) The 
variable pay component should be shown outside the salary, c) In order to make its 
impact felt, this component should be larger, that is significant enough for causing 
motivation. In the near future, organization has no intention for increasing the 
percentage of variable pay for its middle managers. 
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Plan Profile for organisation C8 
Variable pay, paid on the basis of employee's annual performance is termed as 
'performance bonus' in this organisation. The company reserves the term variable pay 
exclusively for its sales employees. 
Plan Objective: The objective of using a VPP is to drive company performance, induce 
employees to achieve performance goals, and also to drive retention among employees. 
The plan seeks to motivate middle managers through a) monetary incentive aspect and 
b) by offering employees an opportunity for capability building (since middle managers 
would stretch their performance in order to meet the stiff targets). It was felt that more 
important issues like opportunity for promotion, career growth, which are potentially 
stronger motivators, are not catered to by variable pay. 
Variable Pay structure: Uniform variable plan is used across the organization. Middle 
Managerial levels include - Senior Associate (VP : 8.33%), Asst. Project Manager (VP 
: 8.33%), Project Manager (VP : 12%), Sr. Project Manager (VP: 15%). Performance 
bonus is a portion of the gross package and not that of CTC. Gross package = Monthly 
Gross * 12 + Yearly Component. The yearly component includes statutory bonus (as 
per state govt, rules), Gratuity(as per central govt, rules), and the Performance Bonus. 
Performance bonus as described by the organization matches the 'variable pay' 
description defined in the study. CTC is different from gross package. Package is what 
an employee gets in hand while CTC = Package + benefits (like accident insurance, 
mediclaim etc). These benefits are taken for granted in this industry. It is really illusory 
to include these as this money is not going to employees' pocket. Performance bonus 
(read as variable pay) is divided into two parts - 5% is for individual performance, and 
a second component is project performance. Individual performance is assessed on 3 
parameters: Functional (Responsibility: Wt.:0.55), Personal (Behavioural Traits: 
Wt.:0.20 or 0.25) and Managerial (PDCA: Wt.:0.20 or 0.25) abilities. Based on the 
assessment, points are assigned for individual performance. Accordingly, variable 
payout ranges between 50% and 140% of target payout. 
In addition, 20% of savings from Project (Cost, time and effort) are shared with the 
project team members. This is a major source of motivation as managers see a clear 
linkage between the savings they help earn and their share of variable pay, out of it. 
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Year on year the package increases and the reverse process begins, whereby portions of 
fixed pay and performance bonus are determined. 
Payout:: Payout frequency is annual. Amount of payout ranges between 50% and 
140%. Variable pay is 5% of the package. Though there is no linkage of variable pay to 
overall company performance, the linkage exists at an intermediate level. This kind of 
linkage enhances managers' line-of-sight about their contribution to goals. 
Performance management : Its features include definition of quarterly and yearly 
targets, provision of an escalation mechanism (option to escalate to the higher 
authority), quarterly performance review and performance appraisal. Employees may 
be rated as 'Outstanding' (payout ranges between 135 % to 140%o), 'Excellent' (payout 
ranges between 105%) to 120%)), 'Good' (within it relative ranking is done, and the 
payout ranges between 85%) to 100%)). Other ratings are Satisfactory (50% payout) and 
Poor (0% payout). Based on performance, points are assigned which are converted 
into goal achievement. The threshold level performance is set at 50% which represents 
satisfactory performance. 
Organisation's performance parameters include Revenue and profit. The threshold level 
for revenue is 50%) of expected improvement (taking base of previous year's target) and 
for Profit there is no threshold. At the level of budget, it is decided what percentage of 
the target payout will be distributed. Within this broad limit, the payout amount differs 
fi-om one performer to another. 
Plan evaluation: Assessment of the impact of STVPP on performance is not done; 
neither there is awareness of a methodology to do it. 
Plan Involvement: Mainly HR designs the plan. Finance is involved as a procedural 
function. HR takes the lead, and Finance supplies the performance data. Finance gives 
information updates about the expenses incurred as on a specific date. The background 
is that the project leaders compute the forecast project cost. Finance department gives 
them a sheet every month showing them the expenses incurred so as to caution them. 
Middle managers are not involved because it is believed that a person can understand 
the systems' intricacies only when having minimum 15 yrs of experience. 
Key aspects of the plan include: The company talks about package and not about 
CTC because package is something that an employee gets in hand while CTC only 
gives an inflated figure. While the industry has a norni of having 'people on bench', the 
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company prides in not using it and therefore is able to reduce its costs. This mai<es 
more money available for variable payout. 
Suggested improvements: Choice should be offered to employees about how they 
would like to have their variable pay (which could be in cash or kind). 
Plan Profile for organisation C9 
The organization hierarchy is structured into four bands, each of which comprises 
multiple levels or layers. One of these bands, called Band I represents middle 
management level, which further comprises layers BIl and BI2, both of which 
represent Project Leads. They have a concept of full cycle leaders wherein individual 
employees are incharge of one full process and roles are defined around distinct 
processes. These employees become process owners which gives them a feeling of 
responsibility and are thus able to understand how they contribute to the organization. 
Those who lead teams are called Team Leads, and those who lead BUs are called BU 
heads or Project leaders. 
Plan objective: The objective of VPP is to reward performance, keep salary expenses 
under a check, and to differentiate pay on the basis of performance results. 
Variable Pay structure: An employee's CTC includes TCC (Total cost to company) + 
Benefits. TCC includes Fixed cost (80% of salary) + Variable cost (20% of salary). The 
breakup for 20% variable pay is: 20% linked to organization performance, 30%) linked 
to business unit performance, and 50%o linked to project performance. This is the 
'sphere of influence' of an employee. It is a motivation to the managers that 50% of 
payout depends on their project performance. On the basis of how a project performs, 
all managers get equal payout. The overall payout eamable ranges between 0.5 to 1.25 
for managers. This is so since 50%) of all variable pay is committed by the organization. 
The committed VP is a decision based on company's past record of payout to managers. 
Payout amount earned over and above 100% of target variable pay, is not added to CTC 
since this would pass the performance gains of any single year to all the future years or 
performance cycles. The policy design was formalized only two years back (ie 2 years 
backward from 2008, meaning 2006). The policy is designed by HR, BU heads and the 
Corporate group. 
Asked about customizing variable pay plan for managers, it was felt that it would not 
be practical to customize variable pay plans for all, though it would certainly help. 
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Regarding a totally proportionate relationship between business results and managers' 
payout, it was expressed that it would be like a parabolic curve, and such relationship 
was not possible with middle managers due to their unpreparedness to accept it. This 
kind of "swinging with the real results" is possible only at the senior level. 
Plan Communication: There is complete transparency. All business unit heads are 
aware of unit performance results and they are expected to communicate it down the 
line to other employees. The CFO felt confident that "the communication umbrella was 
fairly strong at the organization". Weekly review of project perfonnance is carried out. 
This helps in giving employees clarity about their roles. Similar other forums are used 
to enhance employees' !ine-of-sight. Quarterly organization results are available to 
employees at their desktop. Their measurement systems are strong and one is 
commonly heard saying that "Don't talk English, talk in terms of measures" (according 
to the CFO). However it was admitted that 100% measurement is not possible. Effort is 
made to make all performance aspects measurable and minimize subjectivity. 
Plan Management and plan involvement: The Human resources is the plan owner and is 
involved along with finance in plan administration. Finance and the Corporate (top 
management body) are plan approvers and also plan reviewers. The review exercise is 
carried out annually. The finance function is fairly intricately involved in the entire 
process at a macro level. 
Middle Manager Involvement: They are not involved because it is perceived that 
managers would not be able to add value. However, if they are involved it would lead 
to better buy-in, teething problems will die out and other operational problems would 
minimise. 
Suggestions: The organisation's variable pay process is in transition. It was felt there 
should be stretch element included in organization performance targets. Since the level 
of guidance is aligned with the threshold level, it is deliberately conservatively set. 
Guidance level is routinely a conservative estimate, as this must be compulsoriiy 
achieved lest it should invite the wrath of investors. For the past 7 years the company 
achieved the threshold target and therefore the payout has been in the range of 100% to 
110%. Therefore variable pay is not really variable. It was felt that while there is stretch 
element involved in the BU targets, this is not so in the case of organization targets. 
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Changes likely to happen: The organisation currently makes 50% of variable pay fixed 
for employees; which is like a committed sum. In future, it intends to eliminate this 
feature of committed variable pay. When asked about the satisfaction with the current 
variable pay system, the response was not a prompt "Yes", but a delayed reaction that 
looked more like a compromise on reality "We have no complaints about it."(as 
reported by the CFO). Apparently there are issues of discontent that require 
confrontation and active resolution strategy. This would first require organization 
initiative to solicit active involvement of finance in variable pay plan process. 
Plan Profile for organisation CIO 
The organization believes in giving out variable pay even if the minimum benchmark 
(or threshold performance level) has not been met. An instance of paying 34% of target 
payout was cited, a year when the company had incurred losses. It shows that 
regardless of profitability, payout is still given to employees. Such instances however 
weaken the instrumentality perception between performance and payout, which also 
ser\'e to reinforce perceptions about its discretionary nature. 
Plan Objectives: Salary is relatively high in this industry and therefore it is important 
to drive performance through tools like variable pay; it creates a "pull" factor. Other 
important objectives are to differentiate pay based on performance and to retain 
manpower. The company does not define threshold level at the organization level 
because it is felt that the industry is growing and "sky is the limit". 
Variable pay structure: There are 14 levels in the organization hierarchy. Three of these 
are at the Middle management level. 
Levels of Middle Management 
Sr. Manager 
Asst. General Manager 
Dy. General Manager 
VPasa%ofCTC 
25% 
27.5% 
30% 
It is interesting to note how the company decided the percentage of VP component at 
various levels. The company decided that 5% VC for lower managers was fine. Also 
they thought that 35% was good enough for the top management. The company first set 
these 2 points. In between they filled up the figures progressively for all grades. 
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Line-of-sight - Middle Managers perceive their contribution at a BU level because at 
that level lies their impact, and not directly at the level of organization. Their targets are 
not specifically linked to organisation's targets through a laid-out process. 
Performance Measurement - Variable pay is not tagged to any type of quantitative 
assessment; it is based on a qualitative assessment of an employee. A performance-
payout matrix is used for assessing performance of managers. The matrix has 5 
quadrants which represent varying combinations of performance and potential. Each 
manager is assessed on parameters of performance and potential and is accordingly 
assigned to the appropriate cell of the matrix. The assessment of performance and 
subsequent assignment to specific quadrants is done by a committee. Variable pay 
amount is tagged to each quadrant which serves as a basis for determining the payout 
amount. It was expressed that the managers are well aware of the criteria of assessment 
and the basis of assigning employees to a quadrant. Regarding the upside potential ie 
payout for more than 100% target performance, the HR personnel responded that "we 
are talking of a very very small percentage of population, something like 0.2%." 
Therefore they don't factor for these in the plan design. Threshold level performance is 
not determined at an individual level. 
•2 
B I 
H 
L 
Q3H 
04 
QIB or 
Q2V 
Q2S 
QIT 
Performance H 
Q3H is the area of high potential and low performance. 
Q4 is the area of low potential and low performance. 
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Q2S is the area of low potential but high performance. These are solid citizens. 
Q2V is the area of high performance but not high potential. 
QIB the area of high potential and high performance (employees on the business side) 
QIT = is high potential and high performance (employees on the technology side) 
Managers are assigned to specific quadrants on the basis of perceptual assessment. The 
payout schedule is described in table 5.9 of chapter 5. Within the broad parameters of 
predetermined payout percentages, the company has discretion to pay someone 
100(instead of 95) and pay someone 55 (instead of 60). 80% of Corpus is distributed 
based on individual performance. This can be played with and adjusted within limits. 
Payout amount is sourced from the salary budget. 
Payout: Employees must be on company rolls on 1st October for eligibility to payout. 
This clause is only for first 3 years of service. While, the annual increment letters are 
issued on 1 st July, the annual variable pay letters are issued on 1 st October after a 6 
month delay. Employee performance is assessed between the period April to March. 
The company takes three months extra time to complete the appraisal process, well 
after the close of the financial year. Their system very clearly aims at retention as they 
delay the variable payout payment from July to September, while the increment letter is 
issued in June. A corporate performance index comprising organisaiton level 
performance parameters is calculated, and the figure is used as a factor in calculating 
individual level payouts. The exact mix of Revenue and PAT (ie the organization level 
parameters) changes every year in view of organization growth and maturity. All 
employees have a pay component of variable pay, and when these are pooled together, 
it results in the variable pay budget. 
Plan Management and Involvement: The corporate HR designs the VPP, reviews it and 
is also the plan owner. The Head-HR is the reviewing authorit)'; and carries out the 
review annually. Every business unit has its independent HR setup which has the 
administration responsibility of the plan. The HR, Top management team and BU heads 
are involved in the plan design to a large extent. Finance is involved to a large extent in 
deciding the performance parameters of the organization, and in review of the plan. 
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The middle managers are involved to a small extent; their involvement is in target 
setting and assessment of performance. The potential benefit of involving them into the 
process would be immediate acceptability of the plan. 
Plan Communication: Every policy is posted on the intranet and also mass-mailers are 
sent. Plan details like its objective, working details are communicated along with the 
general business information too. The heads of BU are involved in all policy matters 
and decisions taken. They are inturn expected to communicate these down below to the 
middle managers. This is not prescribed- it is merely an expectation. BU heads are 
supposed to communicate the policy details on a one-to-one basis to managers. 
Plan Evaluation: The assessment of impact of STVPP on overall performance is not 
performed; it is discussed informally. 
Issues of concern: It was expressed that candidates try to maneuver the recruitment 
negotiations, w.r.t. variable pay percentage in their salary , based on their estimate of 
expected payout amount. They typically negotiate for a higher package or insist on 
lower VP percentage in their CTC. There are competitors who pay higher, so they too 
have to pay similarly higher amount and bow to these tactics of employees. There is an 
entitlement mentality w.r.t variable pay. "Like it is now taken for granted that a hotel 
will give a clean towel, even when not so specified, similarly it is expected that variable 
pay will be paid out anyways." 
Suggestions: a) It is felt that at an intermediate level line of sight should be established 
with the business unit or the vertical, b) Also, measurability of performance should be 
enhanced, ie made more objective. It was expressed that variable pay should be tied to 
a more objective indicator like percentage goals achieved than to a subjective measure 
like rating, which the organization currently uses, c) The company feels the need to 
measure/index 'agility' level of an employee and use it as one of the basis for deciding 
variable payout. The index composition was being worked out when the author 
interviewed the respondent. 
Plan Profile for organisation Cll 
There are 12 levels in the organisational hierarchy of which 3 are at the middle level. 
Variable pay is applicable beginning from middle management levels because at levels 
lower than this, there is minimal employee control over organization performance. 
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Plan Objectives: The objective of variable pay plan is to align employee performance 
with business goals, imbibe teamwork culture, achieve cost efficiency and drive 
performance. The plan seeks to motivate middle managers by highlighting employee 
contribution to company growth, giving employees greater exposure to business area, 
giving them greater exposure to senior management, and by focusing on value of team 
work. 
Variable pay structure: The specific levels of middle management are: Associate 
Managers - Grade G, Team Lead - Grade H, and Managers - Grade 1. A lumpsum 
amount of variable pay is defined for middle management levels.(details available in 
table 5.9). The amount of variable pay progressively increases at higher levels. Middle 
managers' targets are linked to division level goals, in terms of domainwise targets. No 
individual performance criteria is used (at best left implicit, and unsaid) 
Payout delivery is biannual and it is based on business results. Normally the payout 
amount is sourced fi-om the salary budget, but for upside potential, business budget is 
used. The payout amount depends on domain revenue target achievement. Depending 
on percentage achievement of revenue targets for respective domains, per-employee 
payout is calculated. Individual performance factor is applied implicitly in determining 
payout amount; its exact formulation was not revealed. It may be argued that in such 
cases where individual performance criteria is used but not defined, the criteria is 
subjective. It was mentioned that the variable payout of managers is not linked with 
performance appraisal results. 
Line of sight: Middle managers are involved in the day-to-day activities. It was 
suggested that in order to do a mapping of their contribution to business goals, they 
should instead be involved in the decision making activities. This would lead to a 
feeling of ownership as they would be able to broadly assess how they contribute to 
business goals. 
The organization performance parameters are Revenue and Profit before tax. Functions 
that have direct cost and revenue linkage are linked with their respective Revenue and 
PBT. Functions not having such direct linkages, are linked with the Revenue and PBT 
of the organization. Threshold is defined at 60% for established divisions, and a little 
lower at 50%, for new divisions. For performance levels failing below the threshold 
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level, no payout is made. Performance achievement beyond 100% is not defined in the 
policy; it is kept discretionary. It was reasoned that upside potential was not defined 
because in case business results exceed expectations, in such cases compensation is 
made by way of higher increments. Argument for not passing the performance gains 
through variable payout was, that per se the salary-increases are not permanent in the 
private sector, and that these can be withdrawn during times of poor financial health. In 
this sense, the committed salary was perceived to be flexible, and not as an obligation 
to be honoured through the thick and thin. 
Plan management and Involvement: The approving authority of the plan rests with the 
MD and the CEO. The policy is decided by HR (C & B), top management, and the 
domain heads. Its administration and review are carried out by the HR. Finance is 
involved in cases of monetary consideration - for instance to decide the likely payout 
amount, and when deviations occur from the plan. There is negligible involvement of 
managers in the design of the plan. It was felt that if they are involved, it would have 
positive effects like clarity in business outlook, feelings of ownership, clarity of linkage 
between revenue targets-project deliverables and bill collection. 
Plan Communication: The plan is communicated through intranet, at the time of 
induction, and also a policy document is provided to managers. Communication 
contents include objective of VPP, general business information and little information 
on working of VPP. The MD discusses the developments about company's progress 
(on business targets) with the technology heads on a weekly basis who intum discuss 
the progress information with seniors in their department. Oragnisation performance 
updates are provided in this manner, and no deliberate effort is made to show gap 
analysis information from the threshold; as it is self-evident. Till this stage, a well 
defined process exists to ensure dissemination of information. Ideally, this information 
should trickle down to lower levels too. However there is no system or process to 
ensure that communication process continues to lower levels too. 
Plan Evaluation : The impact of VPP is assessed in terms of checking the amount of 
sales and the variable pay earnings of employees. If the payout is less, then either the 
employees are not stretching themselves sufficiently or the plan is not working. Either 
way this information is helpful as the company does not want an employee to be a 
passenger. 
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Suggestions: Cost efficiency should be brought in so that more money is available for 
distribution, which can be passed on in the form of increased variable payout. In other 
words each person should assume greater accountability in terms of cost. It was 
suggested that linkage be established to the profit margins of projects - especially in the 
case of large clients. This will ensure employees are able to see direct fallout of project 
savings on their variable payout. For large order closures (for major achievements) 
payout should be provided from a separate kitty so that liberal awards can be given, and 
preferably given immediately. Such payout (like prize money) should be given to all 
team members and not just to the front-enders (like sales). Finance & administration, 
all are involved and should be rewarded. It was expressed that the plan, in the manner 
it operates currently, merely facilitates performance but does not drive it actively. It 
was being used more for cost-control motive than for purposes of motivation. "A VPP 
should be so designed that it causes excitement among employees". Also, the VP 
amount should have predictability so that employees can plan their investments (for 
instance EMIs). 
Plan Profile for organisation C12 
The organisation has 10 hierarchical levels - 2 of these are at the middle management 
level. These grades are: 1) Manager and 2) Sr. Executive. The general salary structure 
includes: Basic (based on one's education etc.) + Bouquet of perks (these are fixed 
grade-wise) + Statutory compliance (PF + gratuity ) + Meal coupons + Variable 
Allowance(or VA) are the key salary components. The company has 5 SBUs and each 
SBU has its independent variable pay system. Each SBU performs different types of 
functions - there is therefore a need for customized variable pay system. When a 
particular SBUs functioning is coveted, and the SBU is in demand, in such units, 
portion of variable pay is relatively higher, as a part of the salaiy. The support functions 
do not have high VA amount as these functions are not much in demand. 
Plan Objective: The objective of variable pay system is to reward high performers. It 
does so by giving differentiated pay to employees. There was no explicit mention of 
'achieving business objectives' as an objective of variable pay system. 
Variable pay structure: Variable pay is a part of the CTC. The variable allowance (as it 
is called here) depends a) on performance rating, b) grade of employee and c) the SBU. 
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No threshold is set at the organization level. Variable pay is part of every one's salary, 
referred as the variable allowance. There is a variable allowance grid that helps to 
determine the amount of VA payable to employees. This is a fixed amount showing the 
VA amount at every grade, given for each rating. A unique grid is designed for each 
SBU, and such information is not shared with the employees. 
Grade 
Manager 
Sr. 
Executive 
Rating 5 
(equivalent to 
90% to 100% 
achievement) 
75000 
50000 
Rating 4 
(equivalent to 
80% to 90% 
achievement) 
70000 
42000 
Rating 3 
(equivalent to 
70% to 80% 
achievement) 
62000 
35000 
Rating 2 
Threshold 
(equivalent to 
60% to 70% 
achievement) 
52000 
25000 
Rating 1 
0 
0 
Middle managers' payout is not linked to company performance. Even at senior levels, 
such linkage is not there. The question arises that if VA is not linked to business 
objectives then how it can be said that VA's purported objective is to achieve business 
objectives. When author raised this point, the HR respondent was baffled at the evident 
contradiction (between the objective of VP and the way it was practised in the 
organisation.) 
Line of sight: During goal setting it gets clear to managers how they contribute to 
business goals. When a manager discusses his targets, it becomes clear what is the 
contribution one makes to one's senior's targets. This way the cascading of targets 
becomes clear. This may however not make apparent the link between one's individual 
targets and the business targets of organization. 
Performance Management Process: Annual appraisal is carried out. Everyone gets a 
rating primarily based on performance aspects and also little bit on the basis of 
behavioural aspects. At entry level, by default rating of 3 is assigned, and in some of 
the rare cases this rating may be upgraded to 4. This rating is purely individual 
performance based having no link with company performance. 2 is the threshold or the 
minimum rating. At rating 1 there is no payout. They have a rating system of 1 to 5 
where 1 is unsatisfactory (equivalent to less than 50% goal achievement), 2 is 
satisfactory (equivalent to 60% goal achievement), 3 is good (equivalent to 70% to 80% 
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goal achievement), 4 is very good, and 5 is excellent. Rating is declared at end of year. 
During the course of the year, calculation of rating is not possible. Half yearly 
evaluation is done. Performance appraisal system is so designed that very few get the 
maximum rating of 5. 
Payout calculation: They have a software and depending on the rating a person gets, 
each person's VA amount is calculated which gets flashed on the screen. This 
component is payable along with the monthly salary. This means that the rating one 
gets at the end of year, will determine the VA amount. Accordingly monthly VA 
amount is calculated. This amount is paid out every month, uniformly. The payout 
amount is sourced from the salary budget. The company keeps a project allowance. If 
the project members manage to get an enhanced billing ie extra billing over and above 
the agreed billing, then that extra money Is split between company and the project team. 
The specific sharing arrangement is discretionary. This simply means that if one 
manages to get the client agree to a billing of x + 1, which is T' over and above the 
pre-contracted amount of x. The amount ' 1' is split between the company and the 
employee. 
Plan Management and Involvement: The HR, SBU Heads, Top Management and the 
concerned function are involved to a large extent in plan design; finance is involved to 
a small extent only. It is owned, administered and reviewed (annually) by the HR, its 
approving authority rests with the MD. It was felt that involving middle managers any 
deeper into the design process would only confuse them. As of now they are involved 
only in target setting and performance assessment. All basic details of variable pay plan 
are shared with employees. The VA grid, in particular, is not shared with middle 
managers. Therefore, middle managers are not aware of the payout calculation 
methodology. 
Evaluation: The company does not use any formal methodology to evaluate the impact 
of VPP on organization's performance, due to lack of awareness of such a 
methodology. 
Suggestions: It was suggested that variable pay structure should be role-based. 
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Upside potential should be defined beyond 100%. It was expressed that the company 
was using its pay plan rather passively and should rejuvenate it to revive its 
motivational power. 
Plan Profile for organisation C13 
Plan objectives: The objective of variable pay plan is to induce a spirit of team 
performance in employees, to make employees feel aligned with business-unit 
performance and company performance, and to have part of pay budget as variable, so 
that money can be saved. When employees feel aligned with organisation, their interest 
in business will increase and they will be interested to know about the performance of 
their business unit, and the organization. It intends to motivate middle managers by 
causing a feeling of 'ownership', through means like KRA design and variable pay 
structure. Another method of motivation is by projecting variable pay as monetary 
incentive. 
Variable pay structure: Variable pay structure for middle managers is briefed below. 
Levels of 
Middle 
management 
Associate 
Manager 
Manager 
Sr.Manager 
Fixed pay 
(as a % of 
CTC) 
88% 
80% 
80% 
Variable 
pay (as a % 
of CTC) 
12% 
20% 
20% 
Variable pay 
Individual -
performance 
linked 
80% 
50% 
50% 
Company 
perlbrmance-
linked 
20% 
20% 
20% 
Line-of-
Business 
performance 
linked 
0% 
30% 
30% 
At the organization level, performance parameters are Revenue and PAT, each having a 
threshold at 75% performance level. While these are the officially declared figures, the 
organization for its own internal use fixes the threshold level, a lot higher, at 90% for 
Revenue and at 85% for PAT. The weightage of the two are 40%o and 60% respectively. 
The significance of threshold is that it is that performance point, lower than which the 
company loses its ability to pay. That way it sends alarm signal to organization about 
the need to control cash outflow. The payout proportionately increases till the point of 
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target. Beyond the target, any overachievement is rewarded on a discretionar>' basis. 
Uniform policy is followed throughout the organization. The payout amount is sourced 
from the salary budget. As per the CFO the methodology of sourcing the payout from 
the monetary-gains-achieved-from-the-plan is not practiced in India. 
Performance Management Process: Half yearly performance appraisals are done. A 
rating scale of 1 to 9 is used to assess performance. At each rating, a certain percentage 
of target payout is defined. The schedule of rating and the corresponding payout 
amount is detailed in table 5.9. 
Payout-related working details : Payout is delivered on a quarterly basis. In Qtr 1, flat 
15% is paid without any assessment of performance. In Qrtr 2, performance is assessed 
and each employee's payout amount is calculated for 2 quarters put together. From this 
amount, 15% of payout, that has already been paid (at end of Qrtr 1) is subtracted. The 
balance amount is paid as the payout amount at end of quarter 2. The company uses this 
methodology on the assumption that each employee would earn atleast 15% payout in 6 
months period and therefore this much can be paid to them blindly without assessing 
performance. With this assumption, the following payout schedule is used. 
Q1: 15%) paid flat without performance assessment. 
Q2: They assess performance of 6 months and calculate the due share of variable 
payout. 15% is subtracted from this amount and the balance is paid. Similar process is 
followed for Q3 and Q4. This process is used because company results are declared 
only at Q2 and Q4 end. Therefore the payout calculation is aligned with business 
results at end of Q2 and Q4 respectively. There is a variable pay calculator available at 
every employee's screen. Company performance and LOB (line-of-business) 
performance figures are provided. Thereafter, they can perform the calculation 
themselves and know their payout amount. 
Plan Communication: The Variable pay plan is communicated through intranet, at the 
time of induction, during goal setting, performance review and through presentations. 
The objective of VPP, and its working details are communicated. They have now 
started communicating variable pay plan in small groups of employees. This is done 
through presentations. The company had recently (last year) added a LOB (iine-of-
business) tier in the variable pay structure. With this addition, managers constantly 
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enquire about the performance of their LOB. The intervention is working well as the 
company feels that now managers have become more concerned about the LOB 
performance. A strong point about the plan is that middle managers' targets are 
specifically linked to the orgnaisation's targets by virtue of the role consolidation 
exercise that starts at the top and continues till the bottom of the pyramid. 
Plan management and involvement; The VPP is owned, administered and reviewed by 
the Human resources function. Its approving authority rests with the head of HR. The 
review frequency is annual. In the design of the VPP, HR, Finance and top 
management are involved to a large extent, and other functions' involvement is only to 
a small extent. 
Middle Managers' Involvement: Presently managers' involvement is limited to target 
setting, and assessment of performance. It was expressed that with deeper involvement 
of middle managers, positive effects of better buy-in, transparency would accrue and 
also the intended objectives of VPP would be clearer to them. Concern was expressed 
that in case of poor com.pany performance, those involved in the process, may get 
worried to the point that it drives up attrition in the company. Managers may sometimes 
see too much of negative in a temporary dip in company performance. Therefore, the 
company feels that middle managers are not yet mature enough and therefore business 
information can't be given to them on a platter (on 'as is where is' basis) - as far as 
company performance is concerned. A counter argument may be put that with better 
business education, complete performance information alongwith sensitization to the 
industry scenario, their apprehensions can be shelved, as they would become more 
understanding. 
Plan Communication: Organisation performance information, and the payout amount 
declared are communicated every quarter, but the gap analysis from threshold point is 
not done. Employee performance status is accessible to them at their desktop, hence it 
is not explicitly told to them. Immediate supervisors are supposed to do a gap analysis 
from the point of threshold, but this is not enforced through a system. 
Likely changes : The company does not intend to increase the variable pay % for 
middle managers in he near future. About the composition of variable pay structure, the 
respondent rather sarcastically expressed that middle managers would like to have their 
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variable pay tied to that level of aggregation, whichever pays higher; ideology is least 
of their concern. This meant that managers would be driven by purely monetary 
concerns and have no ideological preferences. Here too the counter argument may be 
that there is a need for better education of managers about the purpose of variable pay 
and also need for regular business information for giving them feelings of partnership. 
Desire was expressed for increasing proportion of variable pay linked to LOB 
performance and the one linked to company performance. Justification offered was that 
while an employee's fixed salary reflects employees' own performance, the variable 
pay component should reflect company performance and LOB performance. According 
to the author, this suggestion is flawed as the purpose of variable pay is to share the 
effect of business performance to the extent employees have contributed to such results. 
In other words variable pay too is a payment for one's performance, but the amount of 
payout is moderated by overall business results or results achieved at other levels of 
aggregation to which an employee has contributed. 
Suggestions: It was strongly felt that the payout should be timely because when it gets 
delayed, it fuels suspicion among employees. This indicates "underlying distrust on the 
part of managers" (suggested by author), and this was agreed to by the CFO. Other 
improvements that should be made include transparency, and better communication. 
Variable pay component should be kept apart from CTC as it would give employees 
feeling of security that their CTC is guaranteed. 
Evaluation: The organization does not assess the impact of STVPP on its performance. 
Plan Profile for organisation €14 
A uniform policy is followed across the organization. Policy customization for each 
business unit is done by respective unit heads. Each business division has a head and 
further up a director is there. The Head prepares a variable pay plan for the division and 
then the director approves it. While by and large a unfiorm policy is used across the 
organisation, different business divisions set their own targets, threshold level 
performance and use different processes for goal setting. 
Plan objective: The objective of pursuing variable pay systems is to reward top 
performers, to share business risk and reward with employees, to achieve business 
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objectives, to increase measurability of performance and to instill in employees a sense 
of entrepreneurship. 
Variable pay structure: There are two levels at the middle management level - Project 
Managers and Sr. Project Managers. 15% of their CTC is variable. The threshold level 
is fixed at 70% level of performance. 50% of the payout is based on individual 
performance and another 50% is based on team performance (ie the Business Unit 
performance). At the manager level, there is no linkage of VP with the company 
performance parameter. There are only top 40-50 top executives, whose variable pay is 
linked to the company performance. The threshold level performance is set at 70% of 
target, across all levels of the organization. This is a standard norm that uniformly 
applies across functions and levels. Beyond 100% target, there is an accelerator pedal 
applicable till 125% of target; payout is capped at this point. Capping is essential, since 
a division that earns way beyond its target, (for instance achieving 180% of target), 
gives signals of incorrect forecast, which could be due to either lack of ability or act of 
fraud. Between 100% and 125%, the payout amount is determined on a prorata basis. 
Below threshold no payout is paid. The payout for managers is sourced from the salary 
budget. 
Line of sight : Middle managers mainly understand from their projects how they 
contribute to business goals. The payout frequency varies at the two levels. For Project 
Managers, the individual component is paid quarterly and the team component is paid 
biannually while for the senior project manager level, both components are paid 
annually. 
STVPP Communication: The methodology for payout calculation is available on the 
intranet. The plan is communicated to the managers through intranet, informal 
discussion (within the department), and is discussed during the induction programme. 
Performance feedback about organization performance is provided quarterly and for 
individual performance, it is provided biannually. 
Plan management and involvement: Policy making is considered HR's job. The plan' 
ownership, administration and review responsibility (carried out annually) are under 
human resources' purview. The plan is chiefly designed by the HR and the top 
management. The approving authority rests with the Head-HR and heads of business 
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units. Finance' duty is only to provide accounting data of past years to aid decision 
maicing. The CFO made this point very clearly. 
Middle manager involvement: Middle managers are involved 'to a small extent' in 
setting goals, selecting performance measures and in deciding the method of 
measuring performance. The potential benefits of involvement would be acceptance, 
buy-in and transparency. 
Plan Evaluation: The idea of assessing impact of STVPP was so alien to the CFO that 
instead he questioned the author about how impact measurement was possible. Such 
response was given in exasperation as if their professional abilities were hurt. 
Area of concern: It was highlighted that for functions like Human Resources, it is 
difficult to define upside potential as it requires justification in teirms of added revenue 
generation. The value-add of higher-than target performance needs to be ascertained so 
as to justify extra payout that goes beyond 100% target payout. Once again this was a 
generic concern that was shared. An example was given of doing full and final of an 
employee before the target date. In such a case it would be difficult to assess the 
monetary value-add - therefore the difficulty of defining upside potential for 
overachievement. This is more an issue of measurement maturity, but is considered a 
problem/ lacuna of variable pay system since the payout amount depends on how much 
of performance is measured. 
Suggestions: a) Goal setting process should be carried out more objectively. 
Performance goals should be decided early during the year. The process should not be 
allowed to linger on for successive months in a row. The respondent expressed that this 
lacuna was generic, not just limited to this particular that particular organization. 
Observation was made that mostly goals are not firmed-up until halfway through the 
year. It was emphasized that goals should be objectively measured, performance 
feedback should have the feel of real-time process and it should be objective enough to 
give realistic assessment about gap from the target, b) Involvement of managers could 
be increased, through representation, c) Variable pay should be structured as a 
component outside CTC. It is usually shown as part of CTC to give an inflated figure of 
total salary. However, when projected in this manner, variable pay is seen as an 
entitlement and is considered guaranteed. The flaw with this approach is that even a 
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small cut in payout amount pinches employees as they consider their salary amount 
their rightful due. 
Plan Profile for organisation C15 
Uniform policy is applicable throughout the organization. There are 6 levels of 
hierarchy in the organization, of which one particular level - Level 3 designated as 
Managers, falls under the band of Middle Management level. 
Plan Objective: The objective of using variable pay system is to drive company 
performance, to motivate employees, to secure alignment between employee 
performance and organization goals, and to retain employees (to minimize tendency of 
attrition). 
Variable Pay structure: Variable payout amount of managers varies disproportionately 
with company performance results. The payout amount is sourced from salary budget 
and is paid annually. An employee must have minimum 9 month service period for 
eligibility to payout. 
Performance Management: Managers may get rating A,B,C or D based on their 
individual performance assessment. For individual performance, the cut-off (or 
threshold) is 'C rating. Variable payout schedule that is contingent on performance 
rating of managers, is explicitly designed, in the manner specified below: 
Individual Performance Rating 
Rating A(equivalent to 90% to 100% performance) 
Rating B(equivalent to 75% to 90% performance) 
Rating C(equivalent to 60% to 75% performance) 
Rating D(equivalent to less than 60% performance) 
Con-esponding Payout 
Capped at i 00% 
80% 
40% 
Nil 
A'o/e-pattern of equivalence between 'rating' and 'percentage goal achieved' was found out from the 
compensation personnel. 
The company-linked performance component (in a managers' payout) depends on 
individual performance and company performance. If the company performs at 100% 
level, an A grader gets 100% (100% (40%))), B grader gets 80% (100% (40%))), a C 
grader gets 40%(100% (40%))) and a D grader gets no payout. This brings out the 
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moderating effect of individual performance on the component linked to company 
performance. 
Line-of-sight: The linkage between employees' contribution to business goals gets clear 
during the goal setting process. Infact the company utilises goal setting process as a 
means to establish employee LOS. The organisation motivates managers by showing 
linkage between manager's roles and business objectives. The importance of line-of-
sight within the framework of variable pay system was emphasized by the CFO of the 
organization. According to him, "There are times when the top management members 
are more interested in variable pay than in shares since they perceive high 
influencability of their actions and also because they understand business, they see it, 
and can almost feel it." This brings out the criticality of influencability over 
performance measures, and the need for understanding business thoroughly (such 
understanding that has intuitive appeal), as it renders meaning to philosophy of variable 
pay system and reinforces understanding of its purpose and working. 
Plan Management and Involvement: A committee is involved in designing STVPP and 
its review. The committee comprises Board of Directors, the MD, and senior executives 
of organization. Involvement of finance is mainly in setting the organization goal and in 
assessing organization goal achievement. The approving authority for the plan rests 
with the Head-HR. Plan administration and plan ownership rests with the Human 
Resources function (compensation and benefits). 
Middle managers are not involved in the process of STVPP. It was expressed that not 
much potential benefit can accrue from involving managers. At present, their 
involvement is limited to a) target setting and b) performance assessment. 
Communication about performance progress: Information about organisation's 
performance progress is flashed every quarter from ME)'s and CEO's desk. 
Communication about individual performance progress and its gap from the threshold 
is one of the expectations from the Project Managers. There is an expectation that they 
would communicate the gap analysis information to managers. However, there is no 
system or process to ensure occurrence of such communication. 
STVPP Evaluation: The company does not utilize any evaluation mechanism for 
assessing impact of STVPP on organization performance. 
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Additional Information: Explanation was provided that a company's less-than-target 
performance finds its reflection in lower amount of increment g;iven to employees. 
Such cutbacks are not perceived negatively by managers, since no entitlement mentality 
is associated - as the increment amount is not predefined as a specific target amount. 
Hence, no expectations are tagged to it. In the case of variable payout, since the target 
amount is determined in advance, it fosters an entitlement mentality. This causes 
concern among managers when their payout is any less than the target payout. It was 
expressed that while for company losses, cuts are made to variable pay amount, 
however, in the same rhythm, the rewards for good business performance do not use the 
same route. Instead, handsome business earnings get passed on to employees in shape 
of upward nudges to increment amount. In some instances, variable pay route may not 
be chosen due to capping at 100% payout amount. The HR respondent confessed that 
the uncertainty of variable payout was a cause of concern for managers. He used the 
analogy of the sky to highlight managers' frustration, in these words "You see it but not 
sure if you will get it." Interpretation is that variable pay is perceived as illusory, 
manifestation of expectations but an uncertain proposition as to whether it will be 
realised. 
Area of concern: It came through during the discussion about line-of-sight that merely 
instating a process is not the equivalent of achieving the intended objectives. For 
instance in reference to use of Balanced Scorecard linkages (instruments for setting up 
line-of-sight) its futility was expressed in these words "it takes employees through 
some jungle and some indirect link is then shown with business results." The 
suggestion is that the existing (communication) process is hazy, cumbersome, difficult 
to understand and a failure at transmitting ownership feelings. It was expressed that 
companies usually don't show the upside potential, while for losses, these are passed on 
through cuts to variable pay. Therefore the variable pay policy is perceived by 
managers as a risk mitigation policy. The plan needs to be more employee friendly in 
order to break the negative mindset brewing against it. The company is facing problems 
in attracting talent. The prospective recruits compare the variable pay elements offered 
by organizations, and opt for that particular organization which offers a lower 
proportion of variable pay component. In this context the respondent added that if 
employees are not sufficiently attracted to join the organization, then it is no good 
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making the policy simpler or easier to understand. For this reason, argument about 
desired variable pay practices takes a back seat when it is the question of attraction of 
talent. Therefore while designing a STVPP, the primary consideration is whether it 
would help in attracting managers than the question of it being an ideal pay plan. 
Suggestions: a) It was agreed that if performance gains higher than target are passed on 
to managers, it will enhance motivation. The respondent agreed to the idea in principle 
but reiterated faith in company practice of using the conventional route of increments to 
pass on the gains. The reasoning was contradictory, b) Suggestion was made about 
desirability of an intermediate level of aggregation such as a business unit to which the 
payout should be tagged. The company intends to reduce the portion of variable pay for 
managers, since the point was raised in an open house that highlighted this as an issue 
of concern among managers. It was felt that their variable pay proportion was on higher 
side, compared to the industry practice, c) Other improvements suggested include: 
offering managers better visibility of organisation goals, increasing the frequency of 
payout (making it quarterly since company results are out every quarter), enhancing 
objectivity of performance measurement, and increasing proportion of company-linked 
performance component in the variable pay structure. 
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Annexure 5.3 
This annexure gives organisaiton performance figures for 3 year peeiod, and contrasts it with the 
threhsold level, to determine level of overachievement. 
Performance of Organisations over the period, 2004 to 2007 (measured in terms ofperforance 
parameters used for determinng payout amount) 
Organisations' 
code 
CI 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
CIO 
Cll 
C12 
C13 
C14 
C15 
Overall 
Average 
Average 
threshold* level 
goal (2004-05, 
2005-06,2006-
07) 
75% 
85% 
70% 
87.50% 
85% 
80% 
80% 
65% 
85% 
87.50% 
60% 
75% 
89% 
75% 
75% 
78% 
Performance 
for the year, 
2004-05 (in 
terms of'% of 
target goal') 
93% 
90% 
110% 
100% 
100% 
93% 
75% 
94% 
85% 
100% 
85% 
77.50% 
89% 
77.50% 
93% 
91% 
Performance 
for the year, 
2005-06 (in 
terms of'% of 
target goal') 
77.50% 
102% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
93% 
90% 
94% 
105% 
105% 
85% 
93% 
90% 
77.50% 
77.50% 
93% 
Performance 
for the year, 
2006-07 (in 
terms of'% of 
target goal') 
93% 
95% 
86% 
100% 
120% 
93% 
100% 
89% 
105% 
110% 
85% 
93% 
94% 
77.50% 
93% 
96% 
Average 
performance 
over 3 year 
period (2004-
05, 2005-06, 
2006-07) 
87.80% 
95.70% 
98.70% 
100% 
106.70% 
93% 
88.30% 
92.30% 
98.30% 
105% 
85% 
87.80% 
91% 
77.50% 
87.80% 
93% 
Average Over 
achievement** 
12.80% 
10.70% 
18.70% 
12.50% 
21.70% 
13% 
8.30% 
17.30% 
13.30% 
17.50% 
25% 
12,50% 
2% 
2.50% 
12.50% 
13% 
* Threshold level is uniform for all three years. 
** Overachievement is calculated as - Target goal achieved - threshold goal. 
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